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Dignāga, On Perception,

being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's

Pramāṇasamuccaya

from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions

Translated and annotated
by
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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The present volume is the first attempt in a Western language to furnish both source and interpretation for a major body of Dignāga's thought. While the book is directed to the needs of the specialist in Buddhism and the history of Indian philosophy, its translations I hope may be of interest to more general readers and it is with them in mind that I write these words.

Dignāga (circa A.D. 480–540) was among India's most powerful and original thinkers. His influence was to spread far beyond India, for his judgments, even when received at second and third hand, molded Buddhist thought for many centuries. It was Dignāga who first gave to the Vijñānavāda school its power of logic and so raised it to that position of eminence which it has never quite lost. Only recently has the history of Dignāga's influence occupied the attention of a small band of scholars—men like Theodor Stcherbatski, Erich Frauwallner, Hidenori Kitagawa, and Masaaki Hattori. But the name of Dignāga has been held in reverence by millions of Buddhists without a break since the sixth century of our era.

In view of Dignāga's fame, it is disheartening to discover how few of those who honor him have read any of his works, and of those who have read, how few have understood. Masaaki Hattori, who here translates and explains the first chapter of Dignāga's greatest work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, points out one reason for this ignorance. Dignāga found an interpreter in the seventh century, Dharmakīrti, who covered the same ground in greater detail and on some points with greater precision, and who furnished arguments against the more formidable opponents of a later age. The interpretations of Dharmakīrti became more popular in the schoolrooms of the Vijñānavāda than the basic texts of the older teacher. Several of Dignāga's treatises have now completely disappeared. None is preserved in its entirety in the original language of the author.

This paradox of a famous author whose works are all but unknown is of common occurrence in India. Until recently Indians were little interested in history and not at all interested in the history of philosophy. Indians who read philosophy did so for practical reasons: in order to avoid error; in order to refute opponents; in order to discover reality and by that discovery to pass beyond the

sufferings of the phenomenal world of transmigration. Certain basic religious texts the Indians preserved, memorizing them even word for word. The works of the intellect, on the other hand, the commentaries and the literature of philosophy, they treated with less piety. What was wanted in philosophy was the revelation of a system. Two sorts of texts would be copied and preserved: those which gave the clearest summary, and those which gave the most detailed description. But both must be up to date. When a text failed to meet modern needs, it was reimbodied in a new version. The later version would keep what was useful of the old but would add the new material that had become cogent.

Given the fact that manuscripts of palmleaf and birchbark seldom endure in India for more than three centuries, it is a wonder that we possess as much material for the history of Indian philosophy as we do. The historian is aided in part by the emboxment of older material in later texts. His greatest aid, however, comes from beyond India. The Chinese and Tibetan converts to Buddhism translated immense numbers of Sanskrit texts. Their writing materials were less fragile than those of India and their climate was less destructive. Thus we have, in Chinese and Tibetan, an unbroken record of one stream at least of Indian philosophy from about the time of Christ to the thirteenth century.

Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is preserved in two Tibetan translations, of the eleventh and the early fifteenth century respectively. Also preserved in Tibetan is a translation of the detailed commentary on Dignāga's work by Jinendrabuddhi. It will immediately occur to the reader that here is the means of resurrecting Dignāga's great work. But the reader should be told of the second reason for the general ignorance of Dignāga, and since the author out of modesty has been silent on that point, the editor should speak on his behalf. The *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, even to one who reads classical Tibetan with ease, is a formidably difficult text.

The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* exhibits in exaggerated form the elliptical style that characterizes Sanskrit texts of philosophy. The style results in part from a conscious effort for brevity, for that extreme form of brevity that the Sanskrit ritualists and grammarians had stamped out as a model for intellectual literature. In part it is a natural form of communication, resulting from the social cohesion of the Indian circles in which philosophy was discussed. Indian philosophers were banded together in small groups of teacher and pupils, following set rituals of worship and well-established regimens of exercise and meditation. Their writings are directed inward, are addressed to a narrow circle of colleagues and pupils, or, in the rare cases of outward direction, are concerned with refuting the views of other tightly knit groups. There was no attempt, at least until some centuries after Dignāga's time, to set forth philosophical ideas in a fully explained exposition that a general reader might understand. For in Dignāga's time there

were no general readers; such persons as could read had been trained in very special disciplines, first in Sanskrit grammar, and then in ritual exegesis, philosophy, law, or some such field. Now, the more inner-directed a group's communication, the more elliptical will its expression be. Persons who have lived with each other many years, who have passed through the same education and had many of the same experiences, need mention only the briefest selection of thought and their companions can conceive the whole vision and can set it in order with other visions just as it was ordered in the speaker's mind. One may observe this ellipsis in the conversations of man and wife, in the shop talk of artisans, and in the communication of workers engaged in any specialized research. One finds it in a peculiarly impenetrable form in the writings of Dignāga.

The *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, as its title states, is "a collection [of remarks] on the means of [valid] cognition." These means, according to the school of Dignāga, are two: perception and inference. The work, then, is a treatise on epistemology and logic. Of the treatise Hattori here translates the first chapter "On Perception," that is to say, the portion of the whole work that deals with epistemology. Of the remaining chapters, which are devoted mainly to problems of logic, all but one have recently been translated into Japanese by Hidenori Kitagawa.

The core of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is formed by some two hundred brief verses, so brief that the syntax is often not clear: subjects of sentences are omitted; complex arguments are compressed into a single noun compound. These verses belong to the style known as *kārikā*. They furnish the catchwords, the title headings, so to speak, of Dignāga's system and they were intended to be memorized. Around and about them Dignāga has woven an elucidation (*vṛtti*) in prose.

Dignāga's *vṛtti* would doubtless have been unambiguous to members of his inner circle. For the modern reader—and even not so modern, for it presented serious difficulties to Jinendrabuddhi—it leaves much unsaid. A major part of the work is devoted to a refutation of non-Vijñānavāda systems. Not only must one be expert in those systems, one must be well versed in the particular views which each system held in the fifth century, in order to catch Dignāga's meaning aright.

A glance at Hattori's translation will show that almost half of it stands in square brackets. These bracketed words are the minimum addition necessary for the modern reader to get at Dignāga's intention. Usually the translator has supplied the extra words from Jinendrabuddhi or from writers contemporary with Dignāga. Both translator and editor have done their utmost to preserve a smooth syntactical flow through this intellectual obstacle race. That is to say, the translation should furnish clear English syntax when read in its complete form

and should still furnish clear syntax when the bracketed portion is removed and one is reduced to the true skeleton, the sentences as Dignāga wrote them.

Merely to fill in the ellipses, however, is not enough. The reader must be put in possession of that background of philosophical opinion and dispute against which Dignāga composed his work. To furnish this background Hattori has employed the technique of annotation. The annotation, as will be seen, is twice the length of the text but has been kept physically separate therefrom. One result of this labor of annotation has been the recovery from other Sanskrit works of a larger number of quoted fragments of the original text than have hitherto been brought to light. Equally important is the tracking down of the arguments of other schools, both Buddhist and Hindu, referred to by Dignāga. A careful study of Hattori's notes brings the reader, I think, wonderfully close to the inner circle of Dignāga's colleagues and pupils.

On facing pages Hattori furnishes transliterated texts of the two Tibetan translations from which the English has been prepared. His Introduction reviews the meager evidence we possess for Dignāga's biography and the more extensive evidence for the names and nature of his works. Indexes of technical terms in Sanskrit and Tibetan are given in appendixes.

There is a final appendix, conceived in the cold winter days of 1962, when six men, of whom I was one, met regularly on the top floor of Widener Library for a seminar in Indian epistemology. To aid the non-Tibetanists of the group in following Dignāga's arguments, Professor Hattori wrote out for us by hand as much as could be recovered with certainty of Dignāga's Sanskrit original. As the final appendix to the book I have now had printed Hattori's full reconstruction of the first section of the First Chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. The Sanskrit is given, in Devanāgarī characters, wherever it is recoverable from later quotations. Where quotations fail, the lacuna is filled by the Tibetan translation in Tibetan characters. A glance will show what a high percentage of the original has been recovered. The sources for the reconstruction will be found in Hattori's notes. The reconstruction itself may stand as his gift to Dignāga's fellow Sanskritists.

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Editor, Harvard Oriental Series

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Quite a few years have passed since I commenced the work of translating the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti.* The work was far more difficult to carry out than I had at first expected, and it was the kind help of my teachers, colleagues, and friends which has enabled me to present my work in its present form. From the fall of 1962, I spent a year and some months at Harvard University, and during this period I finished my manuscripts, thoroughly revising my tentative translation of some sections and newly translating the remaining sections. Here I would like, first of all, to express my deepest obligation to Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls of the Harvard Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, for his arranging a special seminar in Indian epistemology while I was at Harvard and imparting his wide and deep knowledge in that field to me. It is by his suggestion that my work has come to take this shape. He kindly read through my manuscripts and gave me invaluable suggestions and advice. He is the *sādhakatama* of this work of mine, since Dharmakīrti says:

> *sarveṣām upayoge 'pi kārakāṇāṁ kriyāṁ prati*
> *yad antyaṁ bhedakaṁ tasyās tat sādhakatamaṁ matam*
> (*Pramāṇavārttika*, III, 311).

I acknowledge with thanks my indebtedness to Professor Masatoshi Nagatomi of Harvard University and Professor A. Pandeya of Delhi University, with whom I exchanged views on Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the seminar and in informal discussions. It is a pleasure to learn that Professor Nagatomi's translation of the *Pramāṇavārttika* will appear in this same series before long.

Great is my gratitude to Jain Muni Jambuvijaya, who kindly sent me the proof of his excellent Sanskrit reconstruction of some parts of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* and Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā*, from which I derived much help. He also enlightened me on many difficult points through occasional correspondence.

I am greatly indebted to Dr. Erich Frauwallner, Professor Emeritus of the University of Vienna, who favored me with offprints of his erudite articles which I fully utilized while carrying on this work.

My thanks are also due to my colleagues Professor Yutaka Ojihara of Kyoto University and Professor Hidenori Kitagawa of Nagoya University for their

constant encouragement and valuable advice. The portions dealing with logic of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* were translated by Professor Kitagawa into Japanese, and I owe much to his achievements.

Dr. Jacques May, Mr. Jeffrey Masson, Mrs. Burnett, Mrs. Robert Hurley, and Miss Gail Bernstein were so kind as to help me improve my English style, and I am ever grateful to them.

Finally I express my obligation to the Harvard-Yenching Institute Visiting Scholars Program, which afforded me the opportunity to spend gratifying days at Harvard, thus enabling me to complete my work.

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INTRODUCTION

DIGNĀGA AND HIS WORKS

In this volume I present a critical edition of the Tibetan texts of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Pratyakṣapariccheda, together with an annotated English translation of the same. Dignāga has been known to scholars of Indian philosophy as the father of medieval logic in India. The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with its autocommentary (*Vṛtti*) is his last and greatest work, in which he made a systematical exposition of his theories concerning the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Unfortunately, however, this work has not come down to us in the Sanskrit original. Two Tibetan versions and Sanskrit fragments found quoted in various texts are the sources for the study of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Owing to this problem of source materials, a comprehensive study of this important text has been postponed until today.

As regards the life of Dignāga, we have only half-mythical records by Bu-ston and Tāranātha.[1] From their records we may extract the following particulars which seem to refer to historical facts. Dignāga was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in south India near Kāñcī and was ordained by a teacher of the Vātsīputrīya sect. Being dissatisfied with the doctrine of that sect, he left his teacher and traveled to the north. He became a pupil of Vasubandhu, and under the influence of that great scholar he came to obtain mastery of the Vijñānavāda theory and of logic. Thereafter he composed many works, of which the most important one is the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. He defeated heretics in debates, and was called the "Bull in discussion" (*tarka-puṅgava*).

Kāñcī was the seat of the Pallava kings who reigned south of the Pennar and the Tuṅgabhadrā from the middle fourth to the late ninth century. Under the patronage of these kings, Brahmanical as well as Buddhist learning flourished, centering around the city of Kāñcī. The *Maṇimekhalai*, a Buddhist epic poem composed in Tamil probably a little earlier than Hsüan-tsang's visit to India, relates that the lady Maṇimekhalai received instruction from the scholars of

[1] E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyuṅ) by Bu-ston*, II, 149–152; A. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien*, pp. 130–135. See also S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 272; Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, 31–34.

Kāñcī in the Vedas, Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism and the Ājīvika, Jaina, Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Lokāyata doctrines.[2] Hsüan-tsang saw many Śvetāmbara Jains in Kāñcī, but he also mentions the prosperity of Buddhist and Hindu religious institutions.[3] Dharmapāla, a grand-pupil of Dignāga, is also said to have been a native of Kāñcī.[4] In the absence of counter-evidence there is no reason to deny that Dignāga was born and educated in this great center of learning.

Dignāga's relation to the Vātsīputrīya sect is not certain. Both Bu-ston and Tāranātha tell us an anecdote of how Dignāga ridiculed the Vātsīputrīya doctrine. One day Dignāga stripped himself of his clothes and kindled fires at the four corners of his room in order to search for the Ego (*pudgala*) which was assumed by the Vātsīputrīyas to exist as an entity neither identical with nor different from the elements composing the body. Instead of discovering the Ego, he only enraged his teacher, and soon parted from the Vātsīputrīya sect.[5] In Dignāga's works, however, we do not find polemics against the Vātsīputrīyas. The doctrine of this sect is criticized by Vasubandhu in the ninth chapter of his *Abhidharmakośa*. Dignāga composed an abridgment of this work of Vasubandhu's, namely, the *Abhidharmakośa-Marmadīpa*.[6] In the first eight chapters, Dignāga faithfully follows Vasubandhu's main arguments, leaving aside passages which deal with topics incidental to the subject matter, which refer to the theories of other scholars, or which are merely quoted from other texts. But in the ninth chapter, Dignāga omits most of the arguments made by Vasubandhu in refutation of the Vātsīputrīya doctrine of the Ego, and reproduces only a few unessential discussions.[7] If Dignāga had belonged to the Vātsīputrīya sect and later renounced its doctrine, he surely would have been more serious in pointing out the defect of the Ego theory of this sect. The refutation of the Ego theory of the Vātsīputrīyas is found in the *Tattvasaṁgraha* of Śāntarakṣita,[8] who belongs to Dignāga's school. But no reference is made by the author to Dignāga's writing on that subject.

Not only the Tibetan records, but also the Jain scholar Siṁhasūri, who is chronologically not distant from Dignāga, recognizes that Vasubandhu was the

[2] See S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, *Maṇimekhalai in its Historical Setting*, London, 1929, pp. 192 ff.

[3] *Ta t'ang hsi yü chi*, p. 931b.29–c.7.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 931c.7–17.

[5] Obermiller, *History of Buddhism*, II, 149; Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 131.

[6] See below, list of Dignāga's works, 8.

[7] Dignāga quotes the passage which discusses the omniscience of the Buddha (*AKBh*, p. 155a.1–3, 9–11, 5–8; De la Vallée-Poussin, *L'Abhidh.*, pp. 254–255), and the passage which treats the question why the Buddha did not deny the existence of *pudgala* (*AKBh*, p. 155c.29–156a.4, 156a.12–156b.6; *L'Abhidh.*, pp. 264–267). The other arguments which Dignāga copied from *AKBh*, ch. 9, are those aimed at the refutation of the views of the Vaiśeṣikas and other schools, and not of the Vātsīputrīya doctrine.

[8] *TS(P)*, ch. VII/6: "Vātsīputrīyaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā," pp. 125–131.

teacher of Dignāga.[9] However, there is a passage in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* which shows that Dignāga was uncertain of the authorship of a work generally ascribed to Vasubandhu. Thus we have some hesitation in admitting the relationship of teacher and pupil between the two.[10] What we can say with certainty is that Dignāga was well conversant with Vasubandhu's works. The *Abhidharmakośa*, of which he made an abridgment, is referred to in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya.*[11] He wrote a commentary on the *Vādavidhāna* of Vasubandhu.[12] In composing the *Nyāyamukha*, he seems to have followed the pattern of Vasubandhu's work on logic.[13] In many others of his works we can point out the influence of Vasubandhu's Sautrāntic and Yogācāric thoughts.[14]

There is little doubt that Dignāga's literary activity ended with the composition of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya.* At the beginning of that work he expresses his intention of uniting together the theories which he had already expounded in scattered form in various works. We find that many verses and passages of his *Nyāyamukha* are incorporated in it, sometimes with amplification, and that mention is therein made of his earlier works intended to refute the theories maintained by other schools.[15] The arguments given in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā* provide the basis of his epistemology as set forth in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*,[16] but the former do not seem to presuppose the latter. The *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* and some other works stand under the influence of the doctrines which existed before Dignāga,[17] and we do not find in them his original thought as we do in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya.* Taking all this in view, we may say with great probability that the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* was the last work to have been composed by Dignāga.

9 *NCV*, p. 96.4–6: *idānīṁ Vasubandhoḥ sva-guroḥ "tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam" iti bruvato yad uttaram abhihitam . . . Dinnena (Dignāgena) Vasubandhu-pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇaṁ dūṣayatā* . . .

10 See below, Section 2, n. 2.4.

11 See below, Section 1, n. 1.39.

12 See below, under Dignāga's work, 19.

13 See E. Frauwallner, "Vas. Vād."; "Dig. W. E."

14 See Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E.," pp. 123–124, 131.

15 See below, list of Dignāga's works, 16, 17, and 18.

16 In the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, Dignāga proves that the object of cognition (*ālambana*) is nothing other than the appearance of an object in cognition itself. On the basis of this conclusion, he expounds the theory of self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*) in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya.* Cf. Section 1, n. 61; Section 2, n. 17.

17 The *Prajñāpāramitāsaṁgrahakārikā* summarizes the contents of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras in thirty-two topics, of which the main ones are (a) sixteen varieties of voidness (*ṣoḍaśavidha-śūnyatā*), and (b) ten kinds of mind-distraction (*daśa-vikalpa-vikṣepa*); (a) is expounded in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, ch. I, and (b) in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* (XI, k. 77), *Mahāyāna-saṁgraha* (ch. III, T. 1594, vol. XXXI, p. 140a), and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (T. 1605, vol. XXXI, p. 692c). The *Yogāvatāra* corresponds to the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*, ch. XIV. The *Trikālaparīkṣā* is based upon the *Vākyapadīya*, III, xiv (Sambandhasamuddeśa). See Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E."

It is likely that Dignāga was a powerful and skillful debater. Debating was a common practice at his time. In the *Life of Vasubandhu*, Paramārtha mentions the debate held in the presence of King Vikramāditya between the Sāṁkhya master, Vindhyavāsin, and Vasubandhu's teacher, Buddhamitra, which resulted in the former's victory and provoked Vasubandhu to challenge this Sāṁkhya teacher.[18] Hsüan-tsang also gives a detailed account of the debate which took place in Magadha between the Buddhist master Guṇamati and the Sāṁkhya Mādhava.[19] We have no other source to attest the name of the heretic who is said by Bu-ston and Tāranātha to have been defeated in disputation by Dignāga.[20] However, in each chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, we find the views of other schools being refuted. Besides, as mentioned above, Dignāga wrote in his earlier days several works in refutation of his adversaries.

Dignāga's dates are approximately A.D. 480–540.[21] His great contribution to the cause of Indian logic is the invention of the *hetucakra*, that is, the table which shows nine possible relations between the Reason (*hetu*) and the *sādhya-dharma* or predicate of the Thesis (*pakṣa*, *sādhya*) to be proved. This invention makes clear in which cases a certain Reason is valid and in which cases it is invalid. It was already known to Vasubandhu and even to Asaṅga that, in inference, a Reason should satisfy three necessary conditions: it must be a property of the *dharmin* or subject of the Thesis (*pakṣadharmatva*); it must exist in all or some homogeneous instances (*sapakṣe sattvam*); it must never exist in any heterogeneous instance (*vipakṣe 'sattvam eva*).[22] Perhaps Dignāga succeeded in making the table while he was examining individual cases of valid and invalid reasons as shown in Vasubandhu's logical treatises. Dignāga went only one step further than Vasubandhu. Preparatory works had already been done by

[18] *P'o-sou-p'an-tou fa shih chuan*, T. 2049, pp. 189b.24–190a.28.

[19] *Ta t'ang hsi yü chi*, pp. 913c.13–914c.1.

[20] The heretic is named Nag-po thub-rgyal (Kṛṣṇamunirāja) in Bu-ston, Obermiller, *History of Buddhism*, II, 150, and Nag-po (Kṛṣṇa) in Tāranātha, Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 132. The identification of this person with Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, seems to me unlikely. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga refutes the views of Vārṣagaṇya and of Mādhava, but he does not refer to the thought put forth in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, nor does he mention the name of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

[21] This date has been suggested by E. Frauwallner in "Landmarks." I had fixed Dignāga's dates at A.D. 470–530 in my article: "Dignāga to sono Shūhen no Nendai (The Dates of Dignāga and his milieu)," *Essays on the History of Buddhism, presented to Professor Zenryu Tsukamoto on his retirement from The Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University*, Kyoto, 1961, pp. 79–96. In that article I referred to almost the same materials as those utilized by Frauwallner. Here I will omit details and mention only the main facts which are to be taken into consideration in order to determine the date of Dignāga. The relation of Dharmapāla to Asvabhāva, and that of the latter to Dignāga are not mentioned in Frauwallner's article.

[22] See *Shun chung lun*, T. 1565, p. 42a.5–28; *Ju shih lun*, T. 1633, p. 30c.20–21; Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, p. 13.16–18. See also *NV*, pp. 126–127.

the latter. We may therefore infer that Dignāga is chronologically close to Vasubandhu.

There are some other facts which serve to determine the date of Dignāga. Two of his works, the *Hastavālaprakaraṇa* and the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, were translated into Chinese by Paramārtha,[23] who came to Nan-hai (Canton) in A.D. 546, probably after staying for some years in Fu-nan (Annam). Therefore, these works must have existed before A.D. 540. There is a commentary on the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* by Dharmapāla,[24] whose date can be determined as A.D. 530–561 on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's record.[25] Dharmapāla, on the other hand, depends upon Asvabhāva in his interpretation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*,[26] and there is an allusion to Dignāga's theory of the triple-division of *vijñāna* and also a quotation from the *Hastavālaprakaraṇa* in Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*.[27] Thus we may say that Dignāga preceded Dharmapāla by two generations.

In the first chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga criticizes the views of the Sāṁkhya teacher Mādhava.[28] We are told by Hsüan-tsang that Mādhava was defeated in debate by Guṇamati,[29] who is acknowledged to have been the teacher of Sthiramati.[30] We know from inscriptions that Sthiramati lived at the time of King Guhasena of Vallabhī, who was on the throne from A.D. 558 to 566.[31] Accordingly, one may assume that Sthiramati lived for some years after the death of Dharmapāla, but this assumption does not conflict with the Chinese record that the former was an elder contemporary of the latter,[32] since the latter's lifetime was short. Hence, there is no harm in assuming that Guṇamati was

[23] See below, list of Dignāga's works, (5) and (10).

[24] This is preserved only in the Chinese Tripiṭaka: *Kuan so yüan yüan lun shih*, T. 1625, vol. XXXI, pp. 889–892. A translation into Sanskrit has been attempted by Aiyaswami Śastri in *The Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti by Dignāga, with the Commentary of Dharmapāla*, pp. 21–39.

[25] H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, V, 128–130; Frauwallner, "Landmarks," pp. 132–134. Cf. N. Péri, "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu," *BEFEO* 11 (1911), 383 ff.

[26] *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, T. 1585, pp. 24c.8–26a.9, is intended to prove the existence of *manas* as the seventh *vijñāna*. Here the author Dharmapāla says that he bases his discussion upon the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*. However, he sets forth detailed arguments which are not to be found in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* or in Vasubandhu's commentary on it. Some of these arguments are obviously based upon Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (T. 1598, vol. XXXI, pp. 380–449). For example, *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, p. 25a.19–24, corresponds to Asvabhāva's commentary, p. 384b.12–14. The verse in the former, p. 25c.18–19, must have been taken from the latter, p. 384c.29–385a.1.

[27] T. 1598, p. 415b.28–29:又於一識似三相現. 所取能取及自證分名爲三相. 如是三相一識義分非一非異 ; p. 415c.11–12: 於繩謂蛇智 見繩了義無 證見彼分時 知如蛇智亂

[28] See below, Section 5, Ea ff.

[29] See *Ta t'ang hsi yü chi*, pp. 913c.13 ff.

[30] *Ch'eng wei shih lun shu chi*, T. 1830, p. 231c.16–19.

[31] See Sylvain Lévi, "Les donations religieuses des rois de Valabhi," *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes*, sciences religieuses, études de critique et d'histoire, 2nd ser., VII, 75–100.

[32] *Ch'eng wei shih lun shu chi*, p. 231c.19–23.

older than Dharmapāla by two generations. Probably Mādhava was not alive when Dignāga composed the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Taking into account that the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is the last work of Dignāga and that Mādhava was old when Guṇamati defeated him, we may infer that Dignāga's dates almost coincide with those of Guṇamati. Both were older than Dharmapāla by two generations.

Dignāga quotes some verses from the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari in the fifth chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[33] Moreover, it has been proved that the *Trikālaparīkṣā*, one of Dignāga's earliest works, is based upon a part of the third Kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya*.[34] Bhartṛhari was a pupil of Vasurāta,[35] who is known, on the authority of the *Life of Vasubandhu* by Paramārtha, to have been a junior contemporary of Vasubandhu.[36]

Taking all these facts into consideration, E. Frauwallner suggested as a working hypothesis the above-mentioned date to be the lifetime of Dignāga, and I do not suppose any substantial change can be made in this date. I would not consider the word "*diṅnāga*" occurring in Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta*[37] to refer to the Bauddha master Dignāga, while the occurrence of the word in the *Kṛṣṇacarita* is modern and of no historical value.[38]

Most of Dignāga's works have been lost in the Sanskrit original, but the Tibetan and Chinese Tripiṭakas contain a good number of them. The Tohoku Catalogue of the Tibetan Bstan-ḥgyur gives the following list of Dignāga's works, some of which are also available in Chinese translation.

Bstod-tshogs

1. *Miśraka-stotra* (Catalogue No. 1150), tr. by Kumārakalaśa and Bsod-nams bzaṅ-po.[39]

[33] *Vākyap.*, II, 160 and 157, are cited at the end of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, ch. V; see H. R. R. Iyengar, "Bhartṛhari and Diṅnāga," *JBBRAS*, new series, 26, 147–149; H. Nakamura, "Tibetan Citations of Bhartṛhari's Verses and the Problem of his Date," *Studies in Indology and Buddhology, presented in Honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday*, Kyoto, 1955, pp. 122–136. Also *Vākyap.*, III, xiv, 8, is cited in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, ch. V. (This citation is found only in Vasudhararakṣita's translation, see Pek. ed., 70b.8, and is missing in Kanakavarman's translation.)

[34] See Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E."

[35] *Vākyap.*, pp. 286.3, 284.19, 285.24, 290.23. Cf. Frauwallner, "Landmarks," p. 135.

[36] *P'o-sou-p'an-tou fa shih chuan*, p. 190b.22–28.

[37] Pūrvamegha 14. Mallinātha takes the word "*diṅnāga*" to refer to Acārya Dignāga, but I think that the above-mentioned relative chronology works more conclusively in fixing Dignāga's dates than the assumption of the fifteenth-century commentator of Kālidāsa. The word "*diṅnāga*" may better be understood in its normal sense as an elephant of quarters, a sense expressed elsewhere by "*dig-gaja*" or "*dig-vāraṇa*"; see *Kumārasambhava*, II, 44; *Raghuvaṁśa*, I, 78.

[38] Cf. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "The Kṛṣṇacarita of Samudragupta: A Modern Forgery," *JAOS* 85 (1965), 60–65. The reference to Dignāga occurs in *Kṛṣṇacarita*, vv. 27–28.

[39] The Tibetan text is edited by D. R. Shackleton Bailey in *The Śatapañcāśatka of Mātṛceta*, Cambridge, 1951, pp. 182–198.

2. *Guṇāparyantastotrapadakārikā* (1157=4561), tr. by Dpal-brtsegs rakṣita.
(2) *Guṇāparyantastotra-ṭīkā* (1156=4560), tr. by Dpal-brtsegs rakṣita.

Rgyud

3. *Āryamañjughoṣastotra* (2712), tr. by Śraddhākaravarma and Rin-chen bzaṅ-po.

Śes-phyin

4. *Prajñāpāramitāsaṁgrahakārikā* (3809), tr. by Tilakakalaśa and Blo-ldan śes-rab.[40]

5. *Hastavālaprakaraṇa* (3844), tr. by Śraddhākaravarma and Rin-chen bzaṅ-po; *Hastavālaprakaraṇakārikā* (3848), tr. by Dpal-brtsegs rakṣita.
(5) *Hastavālaprakaraṇa-vṛtti* (3845), tr. by Śraddhākaravarma and Rin-chen bzaṅ-po; *Hastavāla-vṛtti* (3849), tr. by Dānaśīla, Dpal-ḥbyor sñiṅ-po, and Dpal-brtsegs rakṣita.[41]

Mdo-ḥgrel

6. *Samantabhadracaryāpraṇidhānārthasaṁgraha* (4012), translator is unknown.

Sems-tsam

7. *Yogāvatāra* (4074=4539). tr. by Dharmaśrībhadra and Rin-chen bzaṅ-po.[42]

[40] Chinese translation by Shih-hu and others: *Fo mu pan jo po lo mi to yüan chi yao i lun*, T. 1518, Vol. XXV. pp. 912–914; Sanskrit and Tibetan texts and English translation in G. Tucci, "Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñāpāramitā," *JRAS* (1947) 53–75; Japanese translation with notes in H. Ui, *Jinna Chosaku no Kenkyū* (Studies of Dignāga's Works), Tokyo, 1958, pp. 233–329; revised Sanskrit text in Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E.,"; Japanese translation and explanations in M. Hattori, "Dignāga no Hannyakyō Kaishaku (Dignāga's Interpretation of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra)," *Bulletin of the University of Osaka Prefecture*, ser. C, 9 (1961), 119–136. Triratnadāsa's commentary is available in Tibetan and Chinese translations: Tohoku No. 3810, T. 1517, cf. Ui, *Jinna Chosaku*; Hattori, "Dignāga no Hannyakyō."

[41] In the Tibetan Tripitaka, 5 and (5) are wrongly ascribed to Āryadeva. Chinese translation by Paramārtha: *Chieh chüan lun*, T. 1620, vol. XXXI, pp. 883–884, also by I-ching: *Chang chung lun*, T. 1621, vol. XXXI, pp. 884–885; Tibetan and Chinese texts, Sanskrit reconstruction, and English translation in F. W. Thomas and H. Ui, "The Hand Treatise, a Work of Āryadeva," *JRAS* (1918), pp. 267–310; Japanese translation from Chinese with notes in H. Ui, *Jinna Chosaku*, pp. 133–165; Tibetan text in Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E."; Japanese translation from Tibetan and explanations in M. Hattori, "Dignāga ni okeru Kashō to Jitsuzai (Dignāga's views of *saṁvṛti-sat* and *paramārtha-sat*)," *FAS* No. 50, Kyoto, 1961, pp. 16–28.

[42] Tibetan text contained in Dharmendra's *Yogāvatāropadeśa* (Tohoku No. 4075=4544) and Sanskrit reconstruction in D. C. Chatterjee, "The Yogāvatāropadeśa, a Mahāyāna treatise on Yoga," *Journal and Proceedings, Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new ser., XXIII (1927), 245–259; Sanskrit text in V. Bhattacharya, "Yogāvatāropadeśa," *IHQ*, IV (1928), 775–778; revised Sanskrit text in Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E."; Japanese translations in M. Hattori, "Dignāga no Hannyakyō."

Mṅon-pa

8. *Abhidharamakośa-Marmadīpa* (4095), tr. by Rnal-ḥbyor zla-ba and Ḥjam-ḥpal gṣon-pa.[43]

Tshad-ma

9. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (4203).

(9) *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* (4204).[44]

10. *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (4205), tr. by Śāntākaragupta and Tshul-khrims rgyal-mtshan.

(10) *Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti* (4206), tr. by Śāntākaragupta and Tshul-khrims rgyal-mtshan.[45]

11. *Trikālaparīkṣā* (4207), tr. by Śāntākaragupta and Tshul-khrims rgyal-mtshan.[46]

12. *Hetucakraḍamaru* (4209), tr. by Bodhisattva and Dharmāloka.[47]

Besides these, there are three treatises preserved only in Chinese translation:

13. *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa* (*Ch'ü yin chia shê lun*), tr. by I-ching.[48]

[43] Studied by H. Sakurabe in "Jinna ni kiserareta Kusharon no Ichikōyōsho (An Abridgment of the *Abhidharmakośa* ascribed to Dignāga)," *Tokai Bukkyo* no. 2 (1956), pp. 33–36.

[44] See below, second section of this Introduction.

[45] Chinese translation by Paramārtha: *Wu hsiang ssŭ ch'ên lun*, T. 1619, vol. XXXI, pp. 882–883, also by Hsüan-tsang: *Kuan so yüan yüan lun*, T. 1624, vol. XXXI, pp. 888–889; Vinītadeva's commentary is available in Tibetan version: Tohoku No. 4241; Dharmapāla's commentary is preserved in Chinese version: T. 1625, vol. XXXI, pp. 889–892: Chinese translation from Tibetan and a study of Dharmapāla's commentary, in Lü-ch'êng and Shih-yin-ts'ang, "Kuan so yüan shih lun hui shih," *Nai shüeh*, vol. 4 (1928); Tibetan and Chinese texts, French translation and Notes based on Vinītadeva's commentary in S. Yamaguchi, "Examen de l'objet de la connaissance (*Ālambanaparīkṣā*)," *JA* (1929), pp. 1–65; Tibetan text, German translation and explanations in Frauwallner, "Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā," *WZKM* Bd. 37 (1930), pp. 174–194; Studied in Magdalene Schott, *Sein als Bewusstsein, Ein Beitrag zur Mahāyāna-Philosophie*, Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, Heft 20, Heidelberg, 1935; Tibetan text, Sanskrit reconstruction, English translation with notes, and Sanskrit reconstruction of Dharmapāla's commentary in Aiyaswami Śāstri, *Ālambanaparīkṣā with Vṛtti by Dignāga*, Adyar Library, 1942; Japanese translation of the text and Vinītadeva's commentary in S. Yamaguchi and J. Nozawa, *Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei* (Textual Studies of Vasubandhu's Treatises on Vijñaptimātratā), Kyoto, 1953, pp. 409–484; Japanese translation of two Chinese versions with notes, in H. Ui, *Jinna Chosaku*, pp. 23–131; Tibetan text with some Sanskrit fragments in Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E."

[46] Tibetan text with the corresponding verses of *Vākyap.*, III, xiv (Sambandhasamuddeśa), in Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E." Cf. Frauwallner, "Dignāga und anderes," *Festschrift Moriz Winternitz*, Leipzig, 1933, p. 237.

[47] Tibetan text, Sanskrit reconstruction, and English translation in D. C. Chatterjee, "Hetucakranirṇaya," *IHQ*, IX (1933), 266–272, 511–514; Tibetan text in Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E."

[48] T. 1622, vol. XXXI, pp. 885–887. An abridged English translation in H. Kitagawa, *Indo Koten-Ronrigaku no Kenkyū* (A Study of Indian Classical Logic), Tokyo, 1965, app. A, II: A Study of a Short Philosophical Treatise Ascribed to Dignāga (first published in *Sino-Indian Studies*, vol. 5, nos. 3–4, Liebenthal Festschrift, pp. 2–13); Japanese translation with notes in H. Ui, *Jinna Chosaku*, pp. 167–231.

14. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇaparīkṣā* (*Kuan tsung hsiang lun sung*), tr. by I-ching.[49]

15. *Nyāyamukha* (*Yin ming chêng li mên lun*), tr. by Hsüan-tsang and by I-ching.[50]

There are some other treatises which must have been composed by Dignāga but are preserved neither in the original Sanskrit nor in any translation:

16. *Nyāyaparīkṣā.*

17. *Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā.*

18. *Sāṁkhyaparīkṣā.*

These three are mentioned by Dignāga himself in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* as follows: "I have shown only partially the defects found in the theories maintained by others concerning the true demonstration (*sādhana*) and refutation (*dūṣana*) and false ones (*tad-ābhāsa*). The detailed refutation of these theories as well as of those concerning the object of the means of cognition (*prameya*) should be understood from [what I have said] in the *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, *Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā*, and *Sāṁkhyaparīkṣā*."[51] The *Nyāyaparīkṣā* is referred to by Śāntarakṣita in the *Vādanyāyaṭīka*.[52] The *Sāṁkhyaparīkṣā* is mentioned also in the *Nyāyamukha*.[53]

19. *Vādavidhānaṭīkā.*

The *Vādavidhāna* is one of Vasubandhu's works on logic. In the *Nyāyavārttika* (ad I, i, 33), Uddyotakara refutes the definition of *pakṣa* in the *Vādavidhāna*, which runs: *pakṣo yaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ*. Then he quotes the following sentence from the *Vādavidhānaṭīkā*: "*sādhayatîti śabdasya svayaṁ pareṇa ca tulyatvāt svayam iti viśeṣaṇam.*" From this fragment we understand that the author of this *ṭīkā* felt it necessary to add the word "*svayam*" to the above-cited definition in the *Vādavidhāna*. This word "*svayam*" is found employed in the definition of

[49] T. 1623, vol. XXXI, pp. 887–888. This translation is incomplete.

[50] T. 1628 (Hsüan-tsang's translation), vol. XXXII, pp. 1–6; T. 1629 (I-ching's translation), vol. XXXII, pp. 6–11. Japanese translation and explanations in H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, V, 505–694; English translation with notes in G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, Heft 15, Heidelberg, 1930.

[51] See Pek. ed., No. 5702 (Kanakavarman's translation), 176b.6–7 (=No. 5701, Vasudhararakṣita's translation, 92b.8–93a.1): "gṣan gyis bśad paḥi sgrub pa daṅ sun ḥbyin pa daṅ, der snaṅ ba bstan pa rnams la ñes pa phyogs tsam bstan pa yin la, ḥdis rgyas par dgag pa daṅ gṣal bya dgag pa ni rigs pa can daṅ bye brag pa daṅ graṅs can pa (brtag pa) rnams las śes par byaḥo."

[52] *Vādanyāyaṭīkā*, p. 142.13–15: *ayaṁ vādanyāya-mārgaḥ . . . kṣuṇṇaś ca tad-anu mahatyāṁ nyāyaparīkṣāyāṁ kumati-mata-matta-mātaṁga-śiraḥ-pīṭha-pāṭana-paṭubhir ācārya-Diṅnāga-padaiḥ . . .*

[53] T. 1628, p. 1c.26–27.

pakṣa in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*.[54] Furthermore, Uddyotakara criticizes two different explanations of the meaning of the word "*svayam*," of which one is that given in the *Vādavidhānaṭīkā* and the other is that found in the *Nyāyamukha*. Taking these facts into consideration, we may assume with great probability that this *ṭīkā* on the *Vādavidhāna* was written by Dignāga.[55]

20. *Hetumukha* (and *Hetvābhāsamukha*).

Kamalaśīla quotes two short sentences from the *Hetumukha* in his *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā*, and ascribes this work to the "*lakṣaṇa-kāra*," that is, Dignāga.[56] I-ching mentions this work as one of the eight works on logic by Dignāga in his description of the state of Buddhist learning at Nālandā.[57] He also mentions the *Hetvābhāsamukha*, but there is no evidence to prove that this is a separate work.

21. *Sāmānyaparīkṣā*.

22. *Dvādaśaśatikā*.[58]

The classification of Dignāga's works in the Tibetan Bstan-ḥgyur is not appropriate. For example, Number 5 is hardly recognized as a Prajñāpāramitā treatise. It deals with the problem of reality and unreality of existences from the Sautrāntika point of view. Number 10 discusses the same problem as that dealt with by Vasubandhu in the *Viṁśatikā Vijñaptimātratā*. Therefore, it is better to classify it under *Sems-tsam* than under *Tshad-ma*. E. Frauwallner made an attempt to sketch out a line of development of Dignāga's thought.[59] With sharp observations of the above-listed texts, he drew the following conclusion, which seems to me most acceptable.

There are three works in which Dignāga set forth the theory of the *hetucakra*: the *Hetucakraḍamaru*, the *Nyāyamukha*, and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. From a

[54] *NMukh*, k. 1b–d (T. 1628, p. 1a.6–7, cf. *NV*, p. 116.7, 9, 17):

. . . svayam
sādhyatvenêpsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhârthânirākṛtaḥ.

[55] See Frauwallner, "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam," *WZKM* Bd. 40.

[56] *TSP*, p. 321.21: *nanu Hetumukhe nirdiṣṭam—ajñeyaṁ kalpitaṁ kṛtvā tad-vyavacchedena jñeye 'numānam iti. Ibid.*, p. 339.15–16: *kathaṁ tarhi Hetumukhe lakṣaṇa-kāreṇa "asambhavo vidheḥ" ity uktam.*

[57] *Nan hai chi kuei nei fa chuan*, T. 2125, p. 230a.6–7. The eight works mentioned by I-ching are as follows: (1) *Kuan san shih lun* (觀三世論) = 11; (2) *Kuan tsung hsiang lun* (觀總相論) = 14; (3) *Kuan ching lun* (觀境論) = 10; (4) *Yin mên lun* (因門論) = *Hetumukha*; (5) *Ssŭ yin mên lun* (似因門論) = *Hetvābhāsa-mukha*; (6) *Li mên lun* (理門論) = 15; (7) *Ch'ü shih shih shê lun* (取事施設論) = 13; (8) *Chi liang lun* (集量論) = 9.

[58] For Numbers 21 and 22, see Jambuvijaya, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, app. 7, p. 154, n. 8.

[59] See Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E."

comparison of the different expositions of the *hetucakra* in these works, one can see that the first-mentioned is the oldest among the three. We may therefore assume that Dignāga first described this important discovery in the field of logic in the *Hetucakraḍamaru*, and later incorporated it in the *Nyāyamukha* which, in its structure, follows the pattern of his predecessors' works on dialectic. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* one sees that Dignāga came to be interested in the theory of knowledge in general rather than in dialectic. He rearranged in that work the subjects which he had treated in the *Nyāyamukha* and furthermore expounded anew the *apoha*-theory, a unique theory concerning the nature of a concept. Thus, there seems to have been a long interval between the *Nyāyamukha* and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, during which Dignāga studied the nature of a concept and built up his *apoha*-theory. The *Hetumukha* is probably one of those works which were composed in this period. Among his nonlogical works, those in which a Vijñānavāda theory of Maitreyanātha type is expressed—11, 4, and 7—are considered to be earlier ones. Another group of works—8, 5, 13, and 10—stand under the influence of the Sautrāntika doctrine, and his thoughts of the logical period are foreshadowed in them. Therefore they are to be regarded as being composed during the period of Dignāga's transition toward the logical works. The *Vādavidhānaṭīkā* and some polemic works aimed against the views of rival schools, that is, 16, 17, and 18, must have appeared in the early days of his logical period.

THE *PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYA* AND ITS *VṚTTI*

The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is a systematic exposition of epistemology, logic, and semantics. It consists of six chapters: Pratyakṣa (perception); Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own sake); Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others); Dṛṣṭānta-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (true and false examples); Apoha (exclusion of other objects as the meaning of a word); Jāti (futile refutation).

Chapter I begins with a salutation to the Buddha and a statement of the purpose of composing the work; it establishes the theory of the two means of cognition on the basis of a radical distinction between the two kinds of objects—the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*)—and proceeds to discuss the nature of perception, its varieties, and the relation between the means and the result of cognition.

Chapters II, III, IV, and VI deal with logical problems. Dignāga is probably the first to distinguish between inference for one's own sake and inference for the sake of others.[60] The former is the apprehension of an object through an inferential mark (*liṅga*), and the latter is the demonstration of what one has inferred through a statement of Thesis (*pakṣa*, *sādhya*), Reason (*hetu*), and Example (*dṛṣṭānta*). In these four chapters, Dignāga sets forth his original views concerning the three necessary conditions (*tri-rūpa*) that an inferential mark should satisfy; the nature of the object to be inferred (*anumeya*); the relation between an inferential mark and *sādhya-dharma*, or the predicate of the Thesis to be proven; the characteristic feature of a Thesis; the table of nine possible relations between a Reason and *sādhya-dharma*; homogeneous (*sādharmya*) and heterogeneous (*vaidharmya*) examples; and fourteen kinds of futile refutations and counter-arguments.

In Chapter V, Dignāga expounds his theory that a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects (*anyâpoha*, *-vyāvṛtti*). For example, the word "cow" simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word cannot denote anything real, whether it be an individual (*vyakti*), a universal (*jāti*), or any other thing. The apprehension of an object by means of the

[60] The basis for this distinction seems to have been provided by Vasubandhu in his *Vadavidhi*; see Frauwallner, "Frag. bud. Log.," pp. 297–298.

exclusion of other objects is nothing but an inference. For this reason, Dignāga does not recognize the Word (*śabda*) as an independent means of cognition.

The text of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is written in verse style, and there is a prose commentary by Dignāga himself, namely, the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti.*[61] Neither *PS* nor *PSV* is preserved in the Sanskrit original, but each of them is available in two different Tibetan versions. I list them here with their respective abbreviations:

Vk: *Tshad-ma kun-las btus-pa* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*), tr. by Vasudhararakṣita and Ṣa-ma seṅ-rgyal, Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, no. 4203.

Kk: *Tshad-ma kun-las btus-pa* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*), tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-pa śes-rab, Peking ed., vol. 130, no. 5700.

V: *Tshad-ma kun-las btus-paḥi ḥgrel-pa* (*Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*), tr. by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ-rgyal, Peking ed., vol. 130, no. 5701, Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4204.

K: *Tshad-ma kun-las btus-paḥi ḥgrel-pa* (*Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*), tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-paḥi śes-rab, Peking ed., vol. 130, no. 5702.

The approximate date of Seṅ(-ge) rgyal(-po) is known. He studied the art of translation (*lo-tsā*) under rMa lo-tsā-ba, who was born in A.D. 1044, when Atīśa came to Tibet.[62] Therefore, the translation of *PS*(*V*) must have been done in the late eleventh or early twelfth century. The *Blue Annals*, which gives us the above information, says, "Up to the present time logicians have been following this translation [namely, V]."[63] The name of Dad-pa(ḥi) śes-rab is not mentioned in the *Blue Annals*, which were composed between A.D. 1476 and 1478.[64] It seems that K appeared later than the last quarter of the fifteenth century. Neither *PS* nor *PSV* is listed in the Ldan-kar catalogue of translations, which dates from A.D. 800 or 812.[65] Bu-ston informs us that Tiṅ-ṅe-ḥdzin bzaṅ-po, assisted by Candrarāhula, translated *PS* and other works.[66] However, his translation is not available in any edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka. The Sde-dge

[61] Henceforward, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and its *Vṛtti* will be abbreviated as *PS* and *PSV*, or referred to as the Kārikās and the Vṛtti. The abbreviation *PS*(*V*) indicates *PS* with *PSV*.

[62] G. N. Roerich, *The Blue Annals*, 2 parts, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Monograph Series, vol. VII, Calcutta, 1949–1953, part I, p. 220.

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. i.

[65] See M. Lalou, "Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-sroṅ-lde-bcan," *JA*, 1953, pp. 313–353. In this article, M. Lalou fixed the date of this catalogue at A.D. 788. But E. Frauwallner and G. Tucci determine its date respectively as A.D. 800 and A.D. 812, see Frauwallner, "Zu den buddhistischen Texten in der Zeit Khri-sroṅ-lde-bstan's," *WZKSO* Bd. I (1957), 1–11; Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, part II (Serie Orientale Roma IX/2), Rome, 1958, p. 46, n. 1.

[66] Obermiller, *History of Buddhism*, II, 215.

and the Co-ne editions of the Tibetan Bstan-ḥgyur list only Kk and V, while the Peking and the Snar-thaṅ editions have Vk, V, and K.

Bu-ston says that one of Dignāga's disciples, Īśvarasena, wrote a commentary on *PS*(*V*) but neither this commentary nor any other work of Īśvarasena's has come down to us.[67] The only commentary on *PS*(*V*) accessible is the *Viśālāmalavatī* of Jinendrabuddhi.[68] To our regret, this is also preserved only in Tibetan translation, the Sanskrit original being lost. The translation was made by Blo-gros brtan-pa. We notice in this commentary the influence of Dharmakīrti. For example, referring to the distinction between "*sva-lakṣaṇa*" (the particular) and "*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*" (the universal), the author says that "*sva-lakṣaṇa*" is "*artha-kriyā-śakti*" (a power of producing an effect) and that it alone is real.[69] The concept of "*artha-kriyā*" is unfamiliar to Dignāga, but it is an important criterion for the distinguishing of "*sva-lakṣaṇa*" from "*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*" in Dharmakīrti's system of thought.[70] Again, in explaining Dignāga's definition of "*kalpanā*" (conceptual construction), Jinendrabuddhi says that even a cognition which is not actually associated with a word should be regarded as *kalpanā* insofar as it has the potentiality of verbal designation.[71] This explanation is obviously based upon Dharmakīrti's definition of *kalpanā* as set forth in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu*.[72] That Jinendrabuddhi is a post-Dharmakīrti scholar is confirmed by the fact that he mentions the name of Dharmakīrti in the verse of salutation at the beginning of the *Viśālāmalavatī*.[73] Apart from this, nothing is known for certain about him.[74] Sometimes he is identified with the

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 152. The personal relationship between Dignāga and Īśvarasena is doubtful, because the latter is known as a teacher of Dharmakīrti, whose dates are circa 600–660 A.D.; see Frauwallner, "Landmarks," p. 141. Some aspects of Īśvarasena's theory are known from the works of Dharmakīrti and his commentators; cf. E. Steinkellner, "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund," *WZKSO* Bd. X (1966), 73–85.

[68] *Viśālāmalavatī-nāma Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Sde-dge ed., Tohoku No. 4268; Peking ed., vol. 139, no. 5766. Henceforward I use the abbreviation: *PST*.

[69] *PST*, Sde-dge ed., 13a.7 (Peking ed., 15a.8): "de la raṅ gi mtshan ñid ni gaṅ don gyi bya ba nus pa ste, de kho na dṅos poḥo."

[70] See below, Section 1, n. 14.

[71] *PST*, Sde-dge ed., 18a.7–18b.1 (Peking ed., 21a.6): "ḥdir yaṅ sbyor bar byas zin pa kho naḥi śes pa rtog pa brjod par ḥdod pa ma yin gyi, ḥo na ci ṣe na, gaṅ yaṅ sbyor ba byas zin pa ma yin pa de la yaṅ ruṅ bar snaṅ ba de yaṅ yin no."

[72] *NB*, I, 5: *abhilāpa-saṁsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā*; *PVin*, 252b.4: "rtog pa ni brjod pa daṅ ḥdrer ruṅ ba snaṅ baḥi śes pa ste." See Section 1, n. 27.

[73] *PST*, Sde-dge ed., 1b.7–2a.1 (Peking ed., 2a.6–2b.1):

"*chos kyi grags pa* daṅ ni gṣan rnams kyiḥaṅ
lugs las cuṅ zad ṅes par bsdus byas nas
de las mthoṅ bar gyur paḥi phyogs kyis kyaṅ
ḥbad pas raṅ gis mṅon par brtag par bya."

[74] Durvekamiśra mentions the name of Jinendrabuddhi in his *Hetubinduṭīkāloka* (G. O. S. no. CXIII, Baroda, 1949), p. 405.19. Durvekamiśra is said to have been a student of Jitāri, the preceptor of Atīśa, and to have flourished during the last quarter of the tenth and the first half of the eleventh century; see Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Introduction to his G. O. S. edition of *Hetubinduṭīkā* of Arcaṭa with *Āloka*, pp. xii–xiii. See also Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 323.

Jinendrabuddhi who was the author of the *Nyāsa*, but this identification is no more than a conjecture. As we do not possess any other work of the same author, it is hard to draw any conclusion in this regard.

There is a commentary on *PS*(*V*) by the great Tibetan scholar Darma Rinchen.[75] However, I have not utilized it since I thought that the examination of it might serve to clarify only the Tibetan interpretation of Dignāga's thought.

The reason why such an important text as *PS*(*V*) has not been well preserved may be explained as follows. In the seventh century, Dharmakīrti, a pupil of Īśvarasena, worked out the *Pramāṇavārttika* on the basis of *PS*(*V*). This work of Dharmakīrti's is not a mere commentary on *PS*(*V*), but rather an exposition of the author's own thoughts. The topics dealt with by Dignāga are discussed therein in full detail by the sharp intellect of Dharmakīrti, and new philosophical problems which were current at the latter's time are taken up for investigation. Thus, the *Pramāṇavārttika* is much richer in contents and more penetrative in arguments than *PS*(*V*). The initial verse of *PS*, in which Dignāga made salutation to the Buddha and expressed his purpose for composing his treatise, is enlarged by Dharmakīrti into as many as 287 verses, which form a separate chapter independent of the Pratyakṣapariccheda in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Dignāga's theory of the two means of cognition, which is expounded in the kārikā 2a–c in *PS*, chapter I, is discussed by Dharmakīrti in 75 verses, wherein the unreality of the universal (*sāmānya*) is proved with acute dialectics. In this manner, the first section of *PS*, chapter I, which consists of eleven verses excluding the verse of salutation, is amplified to the extent of 541 verses in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. After this grand work of Dharmakīrti's appeared, it came to take the place of *PS* in the academic world and was carefully studied by the Bauddhas as well as by the rival schools. By the post-Dharmakīrti commentators, *PS* was often referred to as the words of the *mūlācārya*, but it was no longer the basic text of Buddhist learning.

There is no doubt that *PS* had a great influence on pre-Dharmakīrti scholars of different schools. Uddyotakara wrote the *Nyāyavārttika* in order to defend the Naiyāyika position against the attack of Dignāga, the wrong logician (*kutārkika*).[76] Among the Vaiśeṣikas, Praśastapāda seems to have owed much to Dignāga in the building up of his theories.[77] The *Yuktidīpikā*, a commentary on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, took up Dignāga's theory for criticism.[78] A vehement

[75] *A Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism*, ed. by Y. Kanakura *et al.*, Sendai, 1953, No. 5437: "*Tshad-ma mdoḥi rnam-bśad.*"

[76] *NV*, p. 1.5–8:

yad akṣapādaḥ pravaro munīnāṁ śamāya śāstraṁ jagato jagāda
kutārkikâjñāna-nivṛtti-hetuḥ kariṣyate tasya mayā nibandhaḥ.

[77] See Th. Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, I, 346, n. 2, etc. See also Section 4, n. 16.

[78] *Yuktidīpikā*, pp. 39.19, 40.12–15.

attack on *PS* was made by the Mīmāṁsaka master Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Ślokavārttika* and by the Jaina scholar Mallavādin in his *Dvādaśāranayacakra*.[79]

S. C. Vidyabhusana was the first, I believe, to introduce *PS* to scholars of Indian philosophy in his *History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic*.[80] After the publication of that monumental work, attempts were made by H. N. Randle and other scholars to collect Sanskrit fragments of *PS*(*V*) quoted in the treatises of the Naiyāyikas and other schools. These attempts truly helped scholars toward clarification of some important points of Dignāga's theory. Mention is to be made, above all, of the *Buddhist Logic* by Th. Stcherbatsky. In this elaborative study of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*, the learned author made frequent references to *PS*, and translated a portion of it together with *PST*. Owing to the successful result of R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana's second expedition to Tibet, we are now in possession of the Sanskrit text of the *Pramāṇavārttika* along with some commentaries on it.[81] In addition to the fact that the *Pramāṇavārttika* gives us clues to the understanding of Dignāga's arguments, its commentaries benefit us a great deal by providing many verses and passages of *PS*(*V*). In the course of my study of *PS*(*V*), I certainly have owed much to the efforts so far made by these different scholars.[82]

[79] The views of Kumārila and of Mallavādin are often referred to in my footnotes in Sections 1, 2, and 6. Cf. R. Iyengar, "Kumārila and Dignāga," *IHQ*, 3 (1927), 603–606.

[80] This was published in 1909, and later incorporated into *A History of Indian Logic* (*Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools*), Calcutta, 1921. The article by the same author, "Dignāga and his Pramāṇasamuccaya," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. I, no. 9 (1905), has not been accessible to me.

[81] *The Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti*, ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1938; *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, with a commentary by Manorathanandin*, ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1937; *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam* (*Svārthānumānapariccheda*), *Svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā ṭaṭṭīkayā ca sahitam*, ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Allahabad, 1943; *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṁkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta, being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam*, deciphered and edited by R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. I, Patna, 1953; *Svārthānumāna-pariccheda by Dharmakīrti*, ed. by Dalsukhabhai Malvaniya, Hindu Vishvavidyālaya Nepāl Rājya Sanskrit Series, vol. II, Varanasi, 1959; *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, The First Chapter with the Autocommentary, Text and Critical Notes*, by R. Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma XXIII, Rome, 1960.

[82] S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta, 1921, pp. 274–289; H. N. Randle, *Fragments from Dignāga*, London, 1926; Rangaswami Iyengar, "Kumārila and Dignāga," *IHQ*, 3 (1927), 603–606; G. Tucci, "On the Fragments from Dignāga," *JRAS* (1928), 377–390; Lü-ch'êng, "Chi liang lun shih," *Nai hsüeh*, vol. 4 (1928); E. Frauwallner, "Bemerkungen zu den Fragmenten Dignāgas," *WZKM* Bd. 36 (1929); H. R. Iyengar, *Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter I, with vṛtti, ṭīkā, and notes, edited and restored into Sanskrit*, Mysore, 1930; G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, Heidelberg, 1930; Th. Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, vol. II, app. IV; D. C. Chatterjee, "A Note on the Pramāṇasamuccaya," *ABORI* No. 11; Frauwallner, "Frag. Bud. Log." (1933); R. Iyengar, "Bhartṛhari and Diṅnāga," *JBBRAS* new series, XXVI (1951), 147–149; Frauwallner, "Vas. Vād." (1957); Frauwallner, "Klass. Sāṁkh." (1958); Frauwallner, "Dig. W. E." (1959); Masatoshi Nagatomi, "The Framework of the Pramāṇavārttika, Book I," *JAOS*, 79 (1959), 263–266. H. Kitagawa has made a Japanese translation with annotations of the main portions of *PSV*, Chs. II, III, IV, and VI; see *Indo Koten-Ronrigaku no Kenkyū—Jinna no Taikei—* (A Study of Indian Classical Logic—Dignāga's

The Pratyakṣapariccheda is composed of six sections. In the first section Dignāga expounds his own theories; in the second to the sixth sections, he examines respectively the views of the *Vādavidhi* and those of the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhyas, and Mīmāṁsakas. According to the topic dealt with, I have divided each section into paragraphs, A, B, C, and so on, and then further subdivided some of these paragraphs.

Although the Tibetan Bstan-ḥgyur preserves the Kārikā texts, Vk and Kk, separately from the texts accompanied by the Vṛtti, K and V, it is hard to believe that the translations of the Kārikās were made independently of the Vṛtti. Some lines in Vk and Kk are apparently taken from the Vṛtti. I shall cite some examples. (1) Both Kk and Vk have the following two 7-syllable lines after Section 1, k. 8cd: "tshad ma ñid du ḥdogs pa ste / bya ba med pa yaṅ yin no."[83] The first line expresses in different wording the same idea as that stated in k. 8d: "ḥbras bu ñid du yod tshad ma (*pramāṇaṁ phalam eva sat*)." The second line only serves to make explicit the meaning of k. 8c: "byas daṅ bcas par rtogs paḥi phyir (*savyāpāra-pratītatvāt*)." Thus, I imagine that these two lines were not originally included in the Kārikās.[84] (2) Section 1, k. 11c is intended to prove that cognition has a twofold appearance (*dvi-rūpa*) from the fact of the later recollection of the previous cognition. Since the proposition that cognition has a twofold appearance has been established in k. 11ab from another fact, k. 11c simply states: "dus phyis dran pa las kyaṅ ṅo (*smṛter uttarakālaṁ ca*)." Commenting on this, the Vṛtti says: "*tshul gñis* ñid do ṣes ḥbrel lo (*dvi-rūpatêti sambandhaḥ*). . . . deḥi phyir yaṅ śes pahi tshul gñis ñid grub pa yin no. *raṅ rig pa ñid du* yaṅ ṅo." But, both Kk and Vk put the following line after k. 11c: "tshul gñis raṅ rig pa ñid du." Obviously the italicized words in the Vṛtti were mistakenly regarded as forming part of the kārikās. (3) In Section 2, the *Vādavidhi* definition of perception is referred to in the following two lines of Kk and Vk: "don de las skyes rnam par śes / mṅon sum yin ṣes bya ba ḥdir." Seeing that in the remaining sections Dignāga verbally quotes the opponent's sūtra without trying to transform it into verse, we expect here too the verbal quotation of the *Vādavidhi* definition which runs: "*tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam.*" Even by adding "*ity atra*," which corresponds to "ṣes bya ba

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System—), Tokyo, 1965. Muni Jambuvijaya has reconstructed many portions of *PS*(*V*) into Sanskrit, fully utilizing the Sanskrit materials in which *PS*(*V*) is referred to. Some parts of his reconstruction have been published in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, G. O. S. no. 136, Baroda, 1961, app. 7, pp. 153–219. Other parts will be published shortly as an appendix to his edition of the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* of Mallavādin with its commentary by Siṁhasūri.

83 The Tibetan text originally reads: "bya ba med paḥaṅ ma yin no." I have emended the text for the reason mentioned in Section 1, n. 58.

84 See Section 1, n. 1.58.

ḥdir," it is impossible to change this definition into verse. Thus, I think it better not to recognize these two lines as forming part of the kārikās.[85] Moreover, as the result of the elimination of these two lines, the number of the kārikās in this section becomes just four instead of four and a half. (4) In Section 4, Ef, there is perhaps an omission of a part of the kārikā in Kk and Vk.[86] All these examples seem to show that Kk and Vk were prepared by extracting the kārikās from the text accompanied by the Vṛtti. On this supposition, I have omitted some lines in Kk and Vk, and, in consequence, acknowledged that the Pratyakṣapariccheda is composed of forty-four kārikās: that is, 12, 4, 4, 4, 9, and 11, respectively, in the first to the sixth sections. I have not prepared a separate translation of the Kārikās, but have mentioned in a footnote whenever I have eliminated lines from Kk and Vk.

To our regret, both K and V can hardly be recognized as reliable translations. Without having recourse to other related materials, one cannot properly read them. K and V differ considerably from each other, especially in Sections 5 and 6. On the whole, K is better than V, but in not a few cases V provides a better reading. Sentences quoted fully or partially in *PST* do not always agree with either K or V. Therefore, it is indispensable for a proper understanding of Dignāga's arguments to conjecture as far as possible the original Sanskrit form through a comparison of K with V and with *PST*, when this quotes the text. In this connection, we must utilize fully the related Sanskrit materials. As stated already, many verses and passages of *PS*(*V*) are quoted in the commentaries of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. Besides, the Naiyāyikas and other schools frequently quote verbatim from Dignāga with the intention of criticizing his view. On the other hand, in the sections where Dignāga examines the views of other schools, he quotes from their sūtras or from other sources which are in our possession in Sanskrit. All these Sanskrit materials help us greatly toward making K and V readable. I put the Sanskrit fragment, whenever it is available, in notes to my translation. With the help of these Sanskrit sources, we can often determine where the Tibetan translators differed in interpretation and how they misunderstood the original text. I here cite a few examples.

First, K and V differ considerably in Section 2, Dc, k. 3. Fortunately, the *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* furnishes us with the first half of this kārikā in Sanskrit: "*yad-ābhāsā na sā tasmāc citâlambaṁ hi pañcakam.*"[87] This is rendered by K and V respectively as follows: (K) "gaṅ ṣig snaṅ ba de las min / lṅa po bsags pa dmigs paḥi phyir"; (V) "ji ltar snaṅ ba de yod min / de yi phyir na . . . / sems

[85] See Section 2, n. 2.8.
[86] See Section 4, n. 4.43.
[87] See Section 2, n. 2.25.

kyi dmigs pa lṅa rnams so." Why there is this notable difference can be explained as follows by reference to the above-cited Sanskrit fragment: (a) V took the word "*tasmāt*" as a conjunction, and punctuated the text to read: "*yad-ābhāsā na sā, tasmāt* . . .," while K correctly understood it as referring to the word "*tatas*" in the *Vādavidhi* definition of perception. (b) V mistook "*cita*" in the sense of "*saṁcita*" for "*citta*." Second, the agreement of K and V does not always mean that both are correct: in some cases both K and V present the same unreadable translation or make the same mistake. K and V agree in translating the last sentence of Section 3, Cb, as follows: "yul gyi skad cig ma dag las bar daṅ bcas pa daṅ lhag par ḥdsin pa." However, the word "yul gyi skad cig ma" (*viṣaya-kṣaṇa*) does not make sense in this context. The kārikā 2b which precedes this sentence is quoted in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* as: "*na śaktir viṣayêkṣane.*" By means of this source, we come to understand that K and V are alike in mistaking "*viṣayêkṣaṇa*" for "*viṣaya-kṣaṇa.*"[88] Finally, in Section 4, Ba, there is a quotation of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, X, 4: "*tayor* (=*saṁśaya-nirṇayayor*) *niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣa-laiṅgikābhyāṁ jñānābhyāṁ vyākhyātā.*" This is translated by both K and V as follows: "the tshom daṅ gtan la phebs paḥi śes pa dag *las* grub pa ni." This translation shows that the genitive "*tayos*" (=*saṁśaya-nirṇayayos*) is wrongly taken for the ablative by the Tibetan translators.[89]

The difference between K and V is not of such a kind as to make us suppose that they are based on different Sanskrit texts. Excess or deficiency of material is not found in either of the two. The difference is solely that of understanding. On the other hand, *PST* has a few sentences which are obviously quoted from the Vṛtti but are located neither in K nor in V.[90] This fact shows that the Sanskrit text used for K and V was somewhat defective. However, we need not go so far as to consider K and V to be based on a seriously corrupted text. The sentences missing in K and V and found in *PST* are not essential for the understanding of Dignāga's arguments. And, excepting a few in *PST*, there is no fragment which is acknowledged as a passage of *PS*(*V*) but is not to be located in K and V.

In preparing my translation, I have made it a principle to follow the text literally. I have used K as the basic text, but by constant reference to V, *PST*, and other sources, I have made considerable emendations in K, which are mentioned in the notes. Since Dignāga's arguments are put down in condensed expressions, I have supplemented words and sentences in brackets [ ] in order to make the meaning clearer. This was done on the basis of *PST* and other relevant sources. Sanskrit words put in parentheses ( ) are either taken from Sanskrit sources or reconstructed from the Tibetan. In principle, I put substantives and

88 See Section 3, n. 3.28.
89 See Section 4, n. 4.8.
90 See Section 3, n. 3.13; Section 4, n. 4.60.

adjectives in their stem form, disregarding gender, number, and case: for example, "the cognition is nonerroneous (*avyabhicārin*)" instead of "... (*avyabhicāri*)," "atoms (*paramâṇu*)" instead of "... (*paramâṇavas*)." When constituting a plural form either in the text or in a note, I simply added "s" to the original form: for example, "the four *pratyaya*s" instead of "... *pratyayās*." Verbs are given either in the root form or in the third person, singular form. In the notes, I have made frequent reference to the *Pramāṇavārttika*, as well as to those non-Bauddha works in which Dignāga is criticized, in order to make clear the position that Dignāga occupies in the history of Indian philosophy.

Translation

SECTION 1. EXPOSITION OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

A. *k. 1.* Saluting Him, who is the personification of the means of cognition, who seeks the benefit of [all] living beings, who is the teacher, the *sugata*, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the [*Pramāṇa-*]*samuccaya*, uniting here under one head my theories scattered [in many treatises].[1]

At[2] the beginning of the treatise, here [in this verse], I express praise in honor of the Worshipful [Buddha] in order to produce in [the hearts of] men faith in Him who, because of His perfection in cause (*hetu*) and effect (*phala*), is to be regarded as the personification of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa-bhūta*).[3] There [in the above statement], "cause" means perfection in intention (*āśaya*) and perfection in practice (*prayoga*). Perfection in intention means the [Buddha's] taking as His purpose the benefit of [all] living beings (*jagad-dhitaiṣitā*). Perfection in practice means [His] being the [true] teacher (*śāstṛtva*) because He teaches all people. "Effect" means the attainment of His own objectives (*svârtha*) as well as those of others (*parârtha*). Attainment of His own objectives is [evidenced] by [His] being *sugata* in the following three senses:[4] (i) that of being praiseworthy (*praśastatva*), as is a handsome person (*surūpa*),[5] (ii) the sense of being beyond a return [to *saṁsāra*] (*apunar-āvṛtty-artha*), as one who is fully cured of a fever (*sunaṣṭa-jvara*), and (iii) the sense of being complete (*niḥśeṣârtha*), as is a jar wholly filled (*supūrṇa-ghaṭa*). These three senses [of His title "*sugata*"] distinguish the Buddha's attainment of His own objectives from that of non-Buddhists of subdued passions (*vīta-rāga*), from the attainment of those who are undergoing religious training (*śaikṣa*), and from that of those who are no longer in need of religious training (*aśaikṣa*).[6] Attainment of the objectives of others is [seen from His] being a protector (*tāyitva*) in the sense of [His] saving the world.

Saluting the teacher who is endowed with such merits, the author will compose the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* or the Collected Writings on the Means of Cognition by gathering [passages] from the *Nyāyamukha* and other of his treatises[7] in order to establish the means of valid cognition. The purpose [of the work] is to reject the theories concerning the means of cognition maintained by others and to

elucidate the virtues in his own theories concerning the means of cognition,[8] since there are divergent opinions with regard to [the nature, number, object, and result of] the means of cognition,[9] on which depends the clear understanding of the object to be cognized.[10]

B. Now,

> *k.* 2*a*–b_1. the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely,] perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).[11]

They are only two,[12] because

> *k.* 2b_2–c_1. the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects.[13]

Apart from the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference only the universal.[14]

What[15], then, of those [cognitions] which cognize a thing of color, etc., in such an aspect as evanescent, etc.,[16] or which repeatedly (*asakṛt*) cognize one and the same object?[17]

Certainly there are such cognitions, but

> *k.* 2c_2–d_1. there is no [need for admitting an] other separate means of cognition for [cognizing] the combination of the [two] above-mentioned [aspects of the object];[18]

[In the case of the cognition which cognizes a thing of color, etc., as noneternal, firstly,] one cognizes the inexpressible particularity (*avyapadeśya*=*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), color-ness (*varṇatva*). Then, by means of the operation of the mind (*manas*), one relates [the color-ness] to [the universal,] noneternity (*anityatā*), and expresses [the resulting cognition in the judgment] "the thing of color, or the like, is noneternal."[19] Hence [for this kind of cognition] there is no need of any other means of cognition.

> *k.* 2d_2–3*a*. nor [is there any need for a separate means of cognition] in the case of recognizing (*abhijñāna*) [an object] again and again;[20]

Although there are cognitions which repeatedly cognize one and the same object, [cognitions of that sort require] no [postulate of a] separate means of cognition.[21] Why?

> *k.* 3b_1. because [if a separate means of cognition were to be accepted as necessary, then] there would occur the fallacy of infinity (*aniṣṭhā*).[22]

If every sort of cognizing were [to involve] a [different] means of valid cognition, the means of valid cognition would have to be infinite in number.

> *k. 3b*$_2$. for instance, [such mental faculties as] recollection (*smṛta*) and the like [would have to be recognized as separate means of valid cognition].[22]

The word "*smṛta*" [in the verse] has the same meaning as "*smṛti*" (recollection).[23] Such mental faculties as recollection, desire (*icchā*), anger (*dveṣa*), etc., since they operate on an object once cognized, are not independent means of valid cognition. So, here [recognition should not be considered as a separate means of valid cognition].[24]

C. Among these [two means of cognition]

> *k. 3c.* perception (*pratyakṣa*) is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanā*);[25]

The cognition in which there is no conceptual construction is perception. What, then, is this conceptual construction?

> *k. 3d.* the association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing].[26]

In the case of arbitrary words (*yadṛcchā-śabda*, proper nouns), a thing (*artha*) distinguished by a name (*nāman*) is expressed by a word [such as] "*Ḍittha.*" In the case of genus-words (*jāti-śabda*, common nouns), a thing distinguished by a genus is expressed by a word [such as] "*go*" (cow). In the case of quality-words (*guṇa-śabda*, adjectives), a thing distinguished by a quality is expressed by a word [such as] "*śukla*" (white). In the case of action-words (*kriyā-śabda*, verbal nouns), a thing distinguished by an action is expressed by a word [such as] "*pācaka*" (a cook, to cook). In the case of substance-words (*dravya-śabda*), a thing distinguished by a substance is expressed by a word [such as] "*daṇḍin*" (a staff-bearer) or "*viṣāṇin*" (horned, a horn-bearer).[27]

Here, [with regard to action-words and substance-words,] some maintain that what is expressed [by the words "*pācaka*," "*daṇḍin*," etc.] is [a thing] distinguished by a relationship [such as that of an action to its agent, that of a substance to its possessor, and the like].[28]

On the other hand, some others hold that what is expressed [in all these cases] is a thing qualified only by words which denote no real entity (*artha-śūnya-śabda*).[29]

[In any case,] that which is devoid of such conceptual construction is perception.[30]

Daa–1. For what reason, then, is it [viz., perception] called "*pratyakṣa*"

[literally, belonging to each sense-organ (*akṣa*)] and not "*prativiṣaya*" [literally, belonging to each object], despite the fact that it is dependent on both [the sense-organ and the object]?[31]

> *k. 4ab.* it is named after the sense-organs because they are its specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*).[32]

[It is] not [named] after the object such as color, etc. The reason is that the object is common (*sādhāraṇa*) [to many cases], for it is a cause of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) and perceptions in other persons (*anya-saṁtānika-vijñāna*) [as well as of one's own perception]. We find that a designation is generally by means of a specific [cause]; for example, [we use expressions like] "the sound of a drum" or "a sprout of barley" [to indicate a certain sound or a certain sprout, instead of calling it "the sound of a stick" or "a sprout of the earth," although the stick or the earth is also a cause].[33]

Thus, it is established that perception is free from conceptual construction.[34]

Daa–2. In an Abhidharma treatise, too, the following is stated:[35] "One who has the ability to perceive perceives something blue (*nīlaṁ vijānāti*), but does not conceive that 'this is blue' (*nīlam iti vijānāti*)."[36] "In respect to an object, he has the sense of the object itself (*artha-saṁjñin*), but does not possess any notion of its name (*dharma-saṁjñin*)."[37]

Dab. If perception is absolutely devoid of conceptual construction, then why is it [stated in the Abhidharma treatise] that "the five kinds of sense-cognition take aggregates [of atoms] as their object"?[38] [An aggregate (*saṁcita*) of atoms is cognizable only by the conceptual construction which binds together the perceptions of several individual atoms. It seems, therefore, incongruous to hold that perception is free from conceptual construction and yet cognizes an aggregate of atoms.] Again, it is mentioned [in the Abhidharma treatise] that "these [sense-cognitions] take a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as their object insofar as it is the particular in the form of a [cognizable] sphere (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇa*) and not in the form of a [component] substance [viz., an atom] (*dravya-svalakṣaṇa*)."[39] How is this to be understood?

> *k. 4cd.* there [in the above-cited Abhidharma passages], that [perception], being caused by [the sense-organ through its contact with] many objects [in aggregation], takes the whole (*sāmānya*) as its sphere of operation in respect to its own object.[40]

Since it [viz., perception] is caused by [the sense-organ through its contact with] many substances [viz., atoms in aggregation], it is said, in respect to its sphere of operation, that it takes the whole as its object; but [the sense is] not [that it operates] by conceptually constructing a unity within that which is many and

separate.[41] [Therefore, the definition that perception is free from conceptual construction is not inconsistent with the statements in the Abhidharma treatises.]

Dac. Further, we hold:[42]

> *k. 5.* a thing possessing many properties cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the sense. The object of the sense is the form which is to be cognized [simply] as it is and which is inexpressible.[43]

Thus, in any case, perception caused by the five kinds of sense-organs is devoid of conceptual construction (*avikalpaka*).

Here our distinguishing [various kinds of perception] is in response to the view of others. However, all [kinds of perception] are indeed free from conceptual construction.[44]

Db.

> *k. 6ab.* there is also mental [perception, which is of two kinds:] awareness of an [external] object and self-awareness of [such subordinate mental activities as] desire and the like, [both of which are] free from conceptual construction.[45]

The mental [perception] which, taking a thing of color, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (*anubhava*) is also free from conceptual construction.[46] The self-awareness (*sva-saṁvedana*) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc., is [also recognized as] mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense-organ.[47]

Dc. Likewise,

> *k. 6cd.* the yogin's intuition of a thing in itself unassociated (*avyatibhinna*) with the teacher's instruction [is also a type of perception].[48]

The yogin's intuition which is not associated (*avyavakīrṇa*) with any conceptual construction of the *āgama* (the authoritative words of the teachers) and which apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception.[49]

Dd. If the self-awareness of desire, etc., is perception, then even the awareness of conceptual construction (*kalpanā-jñāna*) should be considered as perception.[50] Indeed it is so.

> *k. 7ab.* even conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal awareness, is admitted [as a type of perception]. However, with regard to the [external] object, [the conceptual construction is] not [admissible as perception], because it conceptualizes [the object].[51]

When it [viz., conceptual construction] is directed toward an object, it is not perception, any more than desire or the like.[52] However, the internal awareness [of conceptual construction] is not [itself a conceptual construction], and hence there is no harm [in admitting it as a type of perception].

E. *k. 7cd–8ab.* erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection, and desire are not true perceptions and are accompanied by obscurity (*sataimira*).[53]

Erroneous cognition (*bhrānti-jñāna*) is not a true perception because it arises conceptually constructing, for example, water, etc., out of such things as vapor floating over sand. Cognition of empirical reality (*saṁvṛti-saj-jñāna*) is not a true perception because it superimposes something extraneous upon things which are only empirically true (*saṁvṛti-sat*), and thus functions through the conceptualization of forms of these [extraneous things]. Inference and [the cognition which is] its result, etc., are not perceptions because they arise through the conceptualization of what formerly has been perceived.[54]

F. And

k. 8cd. [we call the cognition itself] "*pramāṇa*" [literally, a means of cognizing], because it is [usually] conceived to include the act [of cognizing], although primarily it is a result.[55]

Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (*pramāṇa-phala*) differs from the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).[56] The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and [thus] is understood to include the act [of cognizing] (*savyāpāra*). For this reason, it is metaphorically called *pramāṇa*, the means of cognition,[57] although it is [ultimately speaking] devoid of activity (*vyāpāra*).[58] For instance, an effect is said to assume the form of its cause when it arises in conformity with its cause, although [in fact] it is devoid of the act [of assuming the form of its cause].[59] Similar is the case with this [resulting cognition].

G. *k. 9a.* or [it can be maintained that] the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (*svasaṁvitti*) is here the result [of the act of cognizing]—[60]

Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself [as subject] (*svâbhāsa*) and that of the object (*viṣayâbhasa*). The cognizing of itself as [possessing] these two appearances or the self-cognition (*svasaṁvitti*) is the result [of the cognitive act].[61] Why?

k. 9b. because the determination of the object (*artha-niścaya*) conforms with it [viz., with the self-cognition].[62]

When a cognition possessing [the form of] an object (*saviṣayaṁ jñānam*) is itself the object to be cognized, then, in accordance with the nature of the self-cognition, one conceives that [secondary] object (*artha*) as something either desirable or undesirable.[63]

When, on the other hand, only an external thing is [considered to be] the object, then

> *k. 9c–d*$_1$. the means of cognizing it is simply [the cognition's] having the form of the object;

For, in this case, we overlook the true nature of the cognition as that which is to be cognized by itself, and [claim that] its having the form of a thing is our means of knowing that [thing]. Why? Because [we may say of] the thing [that]

> *k. 9d*$_2$. it is known only through this [viz., through the cognition's having the form of it].

Whatever form of a thing appears in the cognition, as, for example, something white or non-white, it is an object in that form which is cognized.[64]

Thus, [it should be understood that] the roles of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and of the object to be cognized (*prameya*), corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition, are [only] metaphorically attributed (*upacaryate*) to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case,[65] because [in their ultimate nature] all elements of existence, [being instantaneous,] are devoid of function (*nirvyāpāra*).[66]

The same idea is stated [in the following verse].

> *k. 10.* whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (*prameya*). The means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and [the cognition which is] its result (*phala*) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another.[67]

Ha. How, then, is it understood that cognition has two forms?[68]

> *k. 11ab.* that cognition has two forms is [known] from the difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that [cognition];[69]

The cognition which cognizes the object, a thing of color, etc., has [a twofold appearance, namely,] the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself [as subject]. But the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object has [on the one hand] the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with

the object and [on the other hand] the appearance of itself. Otherwise, if the cognition of the object had only the form of the object, or if it had only the form of itself, then the cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object.[70]

Hb. Further, [if the cognition had only one form, either that of the object or of itself,] then the object which was cognized by a preceding cognition could not appear in a succeeding cognition. Why? Because that [object of the preceding cognition does not exist when the succeeding cognition arises and] could not be the object of the latter.[71] Hence it is proved that cognition has two forms.

Hc–1. [That cognition has two forms follows]

> *k. 11c.* later also from [the fact of] recollection—[72]

This [expression] "later also from [the fact of] recollection" (in *k. 11c*) refers back to "cognition has two forms" (in *k. 11ab*). Some time after [we have perceived a certain object], there occurs [to our mind] the recollection of our cognition as well as the recollection of the object. So it stands that cognition is of two forms.[73] Self-cognition is also [thus established].[74] Why?

> *k. 11d.* because it [viz., recollection] is never of that which has not been [previously] experienced.[75]

It is unheard of to have a recollection of something without having experienced [it before]. For instance, the recollection of a thing of color, etc. [does not arise unless the thing of color or the like has been experienced].

Hc.2. Some may hold that cognition also, like a thing of color, etc., is cognized by means of a separate cognition.[76] This is not true because

> *k. 12a–b*$_1$. if a cognition were cognized by a separate cognition, there would be an infinite regression—[77]

An infinite regression would result if a cognition were to be cognized by a separate cognition.[78] Why?

> *k. 12b*$_2$. because there is a recollection of this [separate cognition] too.[79]

It must be admitted that this cognition by which the [previous] cognition is cognized is [also] later recollected. [The later recollection of this separate cognition does not arise unless it is experienced.] So, if it should be that this [separate] cognition is experienced by the third cognition [so that it may be recollected], there would be an infinite regression.

Hc–3. *k. 12cd.* [further,] in such a case, there could be no motion [of cognition] from one object to another. But actually such [a movement of cognition] is accepted.[80]

Therefore, self-cognition must be admitted. It itself is a result [of the act of cognizing].

In this way it is established that perception is free from conceptual construction.

SECTION 2. EXAMINATION OF THE *VĀDAVIDHI* DEFINITION

A. Next, [the theories of] perception as set forth by others shall be examined.

> *k. 1.* The *Vādavidhi*[1] is not [a work] of the teacher [Vasubandhu]. Or, [granted that it is his work,] it is affirmed [by Vasubandhu] that the quintessence [of his thought] is not [revealed in it].[2] Because [in another work of Vasubandhu] some things are explained differently. Accordingly, we will make examination [of the theories expounded in the *Vādavidhi*].

The *Vādavidhi* is not a work of the teacher Vasubandhu.[3] Or, [even if we accept the general opinion that it is the work of Vasubandhu] it is recognized by the teacher [himself] that the quintessence [of his thought] is not expounded therein.[4] In the *Vādavidhāna*[5] [another work of the teacher's] some things are explained differently [from in the *Vādavidhi*].[6] Therefore, the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and other topics [dealt with in the *Vādavidhi*] will be also briefly examined by us.[7]

B. "Perception is a cognition [produced] from that object" (*tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam*).[8] In this [*Vādavidhi* definition of perception],

> *k. 2ab.* if the words "that object" mean "any object" [i.e., the *ālambana-pratyaya*, as opposed to other causes of cognition], [we must point out that] it [viz., the perceptual cognition] is not [produced] exclusively from that [object].

If the word "*tatas*" (from that [object]) is held to mean "[from] the all-inclusive *pratyaya*" [i.e., the *ālambana-pratyaya*, "any object as a cause of cognition"],[9] [then the definition does not hold good]. It is true that a cognition produced from a certain object [as its cause] is [then] designated according to [the name of] that [object], but it is not [produced] from that [object] alone (*tata eva*).[10] It cannot be [asserted] that a cognition is produced only from the *ālambana-pratyaya* because there is an established theory (*siddhānta*) that "the

mental activity (*citta*) and subordinate mental activities (*caitta*) are [caused] by the four [*pratyaya*s]."[11]

C. *k. 2cd.* if [the words mean] "just that object (*ālambana*)," then the cognitions produced by recollection, etc., also [must be included under perception]. [This follows because] they [also] are not related to any other [object].

If the words "from that object" are held to mean "[from] that very object [whose name is applied to designate the cognition],"[12] then [the definition will be too wide (*ativyāpti*), as it will include] cognitions derived from recollection (*smṛti*), inference (*anumāna*), affection (*abhilāṣa*), etc., [which are also related only to those objects whose names are applied to them and] do not depend on other objects.

[It may be argued that the cognition derived from inference is not related merely to that object by whose name it is designated. For instance, in the case of fire being cognized by means of inference, the cognition is related not only to fire but also to smoke and to the invariable connection between smoke and fire, for the fire is inferred from the perception of smoke and the remembrance of its invariable connection with fire.[13] Accordingly, the definition of perception as being caused by a specific object is sufficient to distinguish perception from inference. Against this justification we assert that the inferential] cognition of fire and the like does not take [the inferential mark (*liṅga*) such as] smoke, or other factors [e.g., the invariable connection between the mark and its possessor (*liṅgin*), i.e., smoke and fire,] for its objects.[14]

D. With reference to color and the like, one should state what is meant by "the object of cognition" (*ālambana*):[15] whether [as some hold] the "object of cognition" is that with the appearance of which the cognition of this [color or the like] arises,[16] or whether [as others hold] it is the things as they are [i.e., the atoms of color, etc.,] which become the cause of the cognition, although they present [to the cognition] an appearance different from themselves.[17]

Da-1. What will follow from the above?

If [it is held, according to the first alternative, that] a cognition arises as a reflection of a certain [gross] appearance [of an external object], then [the upholders of this theory must admit that] "the five kinds of sense-cognition (*pañca vijñāna-kāyāḥ*) take the aggregates [of atoms] for their object."[18] [The aggregate of atoms, however, is not a real entity (*dravya-sat*), but an empirical reality (*saṁvṛti-sat*).] Accordingly, they recognize a mere empirical reality as the

object of cognition. [We thus conclude that what they consider as perception is not true perception.][19]

Da–2. It is held [by some others] that a cognition consisting of representations [of homogeneous atoms], for example, [atoms of] something blue, is perception because it is a "cognition produced from that object [viz., from many atoms of something blue]" (*tato 'rthād vijñānam*).[20] Thus, the form (*ākāra*) of a real entity (*dravya-sat*) [i.e., an atom of something blue] is found in [each of] these [representations],[21] although in the gathering (*samudāya*) [of many atoms, i.e., in the seen object] there is [only] empirical reality (*prajñapti-sat*).[22] [If this should be the case,] the form of a real entity would also be found in what appears as substance (*dravya*) [such as a jar, etc.], or [as attribute (*guṇa*), such as] number, etc., [or as any other entity,] since it is these [atoms as real entities] that appear as substance, etc.[23]

Db. The fault of [assuming, for instance, a jar as] a real entity can be avoided by maintaining that they [viz., the individual atoms, which exist in the real sense, are the object of cognition since they] form the cause of cognition, although [in] cognition [the cause] appears differently [from in its real form]; because that [viz., the object] does not consist in such [forms as a jar and the like]. [However, there is also a difficulty in this theory.] Were this [theory] to be accepted, it would be impossible to apply the name of the object to designate [a cognition] in conformity with [the *Vādavidhi* statement:] "A certain [cognition produced] from a certain [object] is designated according to the name of that [object]." No cognition grasps each individual [atom]. [Accordingly, a cognition cannot be named after the object.] Each of these [individual atoms] become, when they gather together, the cause [of cognition],[24] but not [as] the aggregate [of atoms]; because it [viz., the aggregate] exists only in the conventional sense (*vyavahāra*) [and is devoid of reality in the ultimate sense].

Dc. The same [idea] is stated [in the following verse].

> *k. 3.* That [cognition] which possesses the appearance of a given [gross form] is not produced "from that [external object]"; because [in the case of a gross form's being cognized] the five kinds of sense-cognition take for their object the aggregate [of atoms, which, being unreal, has no faculty of presenting its form in a cognition]. [On the other hand,] if [a cognition be produced] from an object, that [object] must be [a real entity, and what is real is] unnamable in the ultimate sense [because

> it is an invisible atom]. [Hence the cognition produced from that object cannot be named after the object.][25]

This is a summarizing verse (*antara-śloka*).

Dd. [If that which forms a cause of cognition, although it assumes an appearance different from its real form, is to be recognized as the object, then] there would be also the absurd conclusion that even the visual sense and the other [senses] would be [admitted as] objects [of cognition]. This is because they also exist, in the ultimate sense, in different forms [from those appearing in a cognition], and [yet they] become the cause of such cognitions as the representations of something blue, etc., or of a double moon, etc.[26]

E. *k. 4a–b_1.* it [viz., a cognition] cannot be designated without reference to the nature of its object.[27]

A cognition [is designated according to the name of its object as, for instance, "a cognition of color" (*rūpa-jñāna*), "a cognition of taste" (*rasa-jñāna*), etc., and] can never be designated without reference to the nature of its object.

> *k. 4b_2–d.* however, it is designated according to the universal feature of this object. [For instance, the word "color" (*rūpa*) in "a cognition of color" (*rūpa-jñāna*) stands not for a particular color but for the universal, color-ness (*rūpatva*).] Accordingly, [the object of cognition is] inexpressible [in the ultimate sense].

The objects of the five kinds of sense-cognition are denoted by [the word expressing] their universal feature (*sāmānya-rūpa*), but not their particular feature (*sva-rūpa*). The objects are called "color," etc., in conformity with their universal feature. [However, their particularity is never expressed in words. Therefore,] the objects of the five kinds of sense-cognition are [essentially] inexpressible. Such is [the true meaning of] the *Vādavidhi* [definition of perception].[28]

SECTION 3. EXAMINATION OF THE NYĀYA THEORY

A. The Naiyāyikas say, "That cognition which is produced by the contact of sense and object, which is inexpressible (*avyapadeśya*), nonerroneous (*avyabhicārin*), and of a determinate nature (*vyavasāyâtmaka*) is perception."[1]

B. In this [definition], too, the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) ["inexpressible," etc.] are not adequate[2] [because]

> *k. 1ab*. in regard to that which is produced through [the contact of] sense and object, there cannot be expressibility and the like.[3]

Ba. It is admitted that where there is a possibility of deviation [from a rule], a qualifier should be used [in a statement of that rule]. [However] sense-cognition never takes that which is expressible (*vyapadeśya*) as its object since that which is expressible is necessarily the object of inference (*anumāna*).[4] [Therefore,] there is no [possibility of] deviation in the inexpressibility [of a sense-cognition].[5] Thus, one should not make use of the qualifier ["inexpressible"].

Bb. Nor is there a possibility of [sense-cognition's] having an erroneous object[6] because an erroneous cognition [necessarily] has as object an illusion produced by the mind (*mano-bhrānti*).[7]

Bc–1. "Determination" (*vyavasāya*) means "ascertainment" (*niścaya*). Such is not possible [for the sense-cognition] because it is not experienced without the apprehension of [such notions as] "cow,"[8] etc., [notions] which are associated with [qualifiers such as] a universal (*sāmānya*), etc.[9]

Bc–2. [If the Naiyāyikas claim that the term *vyavasāya* in the sūtra is not used in the sense of "ascertainment,"[10] for example,] if [they claim that] the wording is in order to rule out cognition that does not correspond to a real thing (*ayathârtha-jñāna*) and the like,[11] [we answer that] even so the qualifier ["*vyavasāyâtmaka*"] is not appropriate. [It is inappropriate because sense-cognition cannot disagree with a real thing and] also because there is no [possibility of its] deviating [into such disagreement].[12] Every sense-cognition apprehends just its own object [without superimposing anything upon it].

Bc–3. By this [argument] the alternative [interpretation of the qualifer "*vyavasāyâtmaka*"] mentioned [by the Naiyāyikas] is also refuted, namely, that in [the compound] "*vyavasāyâtmaka*" [the latter member "*-ātmaka*" does not necessarily mean "having the nature of," but may mean "having something as a result," and that, thus, the meaning of "*vyavasāyâtmaka*" in the sūtra is that] *vyavasāya* (determination) is the result (*phala*) [of sense-cognition].[13] Sense-cognition [which pertains only to a thing itself] cannot result immediately in a cognition disagreeing with a real thing.[14] [Therefore, it makes no sense to say that the determination of an object by removing a cognition disagreeing with a real thing is the result of sense-cognition.][15]

Bd. Further, if [the Naiyāyikas insist that] the terms "*avyapadeśya*," etc., are [mentioned in the sūtra not] in order [to obviate the deviation but] to describe the nature (*svarūpa*) of that cognition, [their argument is] not right. Because, the matter to be stated [in the sūtra] is [not the nature of sense-cognition but] the definition of perception, and because that [definition] could be established simply by [characterizing perception as a cognition produced from] the contact of sense and object.[16] If the nature of [sense-] cognition were the matter to be described, then it would also be necessary to describe it as a [kind of] attribute (*guṇa*),[17] as not capable of composing a substance (*dravyânārambhaka*),[18] as inactive (*niṣkriya*),[19] and as not having ether (*ākāśa*) etc. for its object[20] [because the nature of sense-cognition can also be shown by these predicates]. Thus, there would be the fault of implying too much (*atiprasaṅga*).

Ca. If [it is maintained that] perception is in all cases[21] produced by the [direct] contact (*saṁnikarṣa*) [of sense and object] then, of color (*rūpa*) and sound (*śabda*)

> *k. 1cd.* there would be neither apprehension from a distance (*sāntara-grahaṇa*) nor [apprehension] of that which exceeds (*adhika*) [the sense-organ in size], inasmuch as a cognition is [produced only by] direct contact (*prāpti*) [of a sense with its object].[22]

Because, with regard to those objects which [are grasped only when they] have no distance [from the corresponding sense-organ], for example, odor (*gandha*), we experience neither apprehension from a distance nor apprehension of that which exceeds the sense-organ [in size].[23]

Cb. [The Naiyāyikas may argue as follows:] [24]..."Since [in some cases] the sense goes out [from its physical basis to meet the object], it certainly stands to reason [to say that perception is always produced by the direct contact of sense and

object]. Two senses [viz., sight and hearing] go forth from their physical bases (*adhiṣṭhāna*).[25] Therefore, it is possible for them to grasp the object even if it is distant [from] or larger [than themselves]." If [they argue] thus, [we reply that] this [argument] is also untenable because [firstly]

> *k. 2a.* the sense does not go out from its basis.

"It is an accepted fact that" is to be supplied. The sense remains at the very place of its [physical] basis, since it is to this basis that a medical treatment and so on is directed.···[24] Accordingly, it is by the sense itself [which abides in the physical basis and not by the outgoing sense-faculty] that the object at a distance is grasped.

[Secondly,][26]··· even if the sense were to go out [from its physical basis]

> *k. 2b.* it could not [in that case] perceive an object.···[26]

Otherwise, it would grasp an object even when the basis [of the sense] is covered over.[27] Therefore, both visual and auditory senses while residing in their internal bases perceive the object[28] without coming into direct contact [with it], and it is for this reason that they are able to grasp an object which is distant from them or larger.

Da. If the senses were limited [in number] to five only[29]

> *k. 2c.* pleasure (*sukha*), etc. must be uncognizable—[30]

As for the use of "or," one may understand from the word "or" [an alternative difficulty, namely,] that there would be a different number of means of cognition [from the four *pramāṇas* listed by the Naiyāyikas]. [That is to say,] since that [process] through which one knows, without an inferential mark (*liṅga*) or the like, his own [internal experiences,[31] such as] pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), volition (*prayatna*), is not a means of cognition [within the Nyāya definition,] it would follow that either pleasure, etc., are uncognizable, or, in the case of that [process] being [admitted as] a means of cognition, a separate means of cognition must be added.

> *k. 2d.* or there must be another sense [to be recognized in addition to the five mentioned in the sūtra, viz.,] the mind (*manas*).[32]

Or, it should be stated that the mind is a sense, so that that [cognition of pleasure, etc.,] produced by its contact may be [claimed to be] a perception.[33]

Db. *k. 3a.* if [it is said by the Naiyāyikas]: "That [theory that the mind is a sense] is accepted [by us] because [it is] not rejected [in our text]"—[34]

"If a theory of others is not denied [in one's own school], it is tenable. As there is no denial [in our sūtra of the theory] that the mind is a sense, it is indeed accepted [by us]."[35] If such [a justification is offered, we raise the following objection]: Inasmuch as [their assertion] that the mind is a sense is based on the theory of other schools,

> *k. 3b.* it would be useless to make a noise about the other senses [since mention is made also of them in the texts of other schools].[36]

If it is considered [by the Naiyāyikas] that the mind, being mentioned in another['s text], is a sense on the ground of its not being denied [to be a sense in their own sūtra], then the explanatory statement [in their sūtra] that the organs of scent (*ghrāṇa*), etc., are called senses would be useless because that could be established merely by not denying [the theory of another school concerning the five senses].[37]

Ea. If the cognition (*jñāna*) [itself] were to be [considered as] the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*),[38] [then, there would be a difficulty] for [the Naiyāyikas who are] upholders of the theory that the result (*phala*) is distinct [from the means].

> *k. 3c.* inasmuch as the object [according to Nyāya doctrine] is determined (*niścita*) [by the cognition which is now defined as the means], there would be no result [distinct from the means].[39]

[According to the Naiyāyikas,] the cognition which is of determinate nature (*vyavasāyâtmakaṁ jñānam*) is a means of cognition. When such a means of cognition operates, it [naturally] apprehends the object [determinately], and therefore there would be no result [other than the means of cognition itself].[40]

Eb–1. [The Naiyāyikas advance a further argument:] "The apprehension of a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa-jñāna*) is a means of cognition." If they consider the apprehension of a qualifier, such as a universal (*sāmānya*) and the like, to be a means of cognition, and that of a qualified (*viśeṣya-jñāna*), such as a substance (*dravya*) and so on, to be [cognition as] the result,[41] then, that [resulting cognition could]

> *k. 3d.* not [be one] in respect to the qualifier, because it [viz., the qualifier that is apprehended by a means of cognition] is different [from the qualified represented in the resulting cognition].

The qualifier and the qualified are distinct from each other.[42] It is unreasonable that a means of cognition should take one thing for its object and the resulting cognition another. [For instance,] we never see the cutting down (*chidā*) of a

palāśa tree by an axe (? bśags pa) the aim of whose cutting is a *khadira* tree.[43]

Eb–2. [The Naiyāyikas may argue that] since it [viz., the apprehension of the qualifier] is the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the apprehension of the qualified, it may [be supposed to] take the qualified as well for its object. If [they argue] thus, [they are] wrong because there would be the fault of implying too much (*atiprasaṅga*). For, if this were the case, all factors of the act [of cognizing] (*kāraka*) would be without distinction [recognized as means of cognition]. The reason is that, since these [*kāraka*s, e.g., the cognizer indicated by the nominative case, the object indicated by the accusative case, the locus of cognition indicated by the locative case,] are causes (*kāraṇa*) of the cognition of the qualified (*viśeṣya-jñāna*), [like the apprehension of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa-jñāna*),] they would be the means (*karaṇa*) of that [resulting cognition of the qualified].[44] Therefore, it is reasonable [to consider] that that which is said to possess the act (*vyāpāra*) [of cognizing] in respect to an object [i.e., the cognition as the means (*karaṇa*) of cognizing an object] is itself the result (*phala*) of that [act of cognizing].[45]

Ec. Moreover, [the Naiyāyika assumption that the qualifier and the qualified are apprehended respectively by the means of cognition and the resulting cognition meets a difficulty in the following point.]

> *k. 4a*$_1$. even there [viz., in the case in which the apprehension of a qualifier is present, it may be that] there is not [any resulting cognition].[46]

[There are cases in which,] even though the qualifier is apprehended, there is no resulting cognition. [For instance, when we look at a cow in the twilight, we apprehend its universal feature (*sāmānya*), i.e., its qualifier. However, unless we apprehend its particulars (*viśeṣa*), we cannot get the resulting cognition of a cow.[47] And, so long as there is no resulting cognition] there cannot be a means of cognition either. [Thus, it is unreasonable to assume that the cognition of a qualifier is a means of cognition.]

Ed.

> *k. 4a*$_2$. if it is said [by the Naiyāyikas] that it [viz., the apprehension of the qualifier] is double—

[The Naiyāyikas may argue as follows:] "The apprehension of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa-jñāna*) itself has two [aspects]: a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the object to be cognized (*prameya*). For instance, when one [such as a yogin] cognizes only his own self, [the self is] the object to be cognized (*prameya*) and the cognizer (*grāhaka*)."[48] If such a statement [is made]

> *k. 4b*. it is not right. [Because] it would follow that [the apprehension of] the qualified is also [double].

If this were the case, the apprehension of the qualified (*viśeṣya-jñāna*) also would have two aspects: a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the object to be cognized (*prameya*). If [the Naiyāyikas,] in spite of [holding] a distinction between the cognition (*jñāna*) and the object (*jñeya*), [hold that] it [viz., the apprehension of the qualified] is both a means of cognition and the object to be cognized, [we must point out that] it is only when the cognition is [regarded as our school regards it, namely as] a self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*),[49] that one and the same entity has two aspects, as [when] the self (*ātman*) [cognizes itself]. It is therefore unreasonable to maintain that the apprehension of the qualifier has two [aspects] like the self.[50]

Ee. [The Naiyāyikas may reply:] "In that case [we will prove the distinction between the means of cognition and the result from another viewpoint]: When an object is cognized, there is the cessation of nescience (*ajñāna*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), and wrong knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*) [just as the lighting of a lamp results in the cessation of darkness].[51] That [cessation] is the result [to be distinguished from the means of cognition]." This also is untenable [because]

> *k. 4c.* nescience, etc., are not [found] everywhere.

In any case, it is not everywhere that nescience, etc., [which are to be removed,] are definitely present.[52] For a cognition is produced in some cases merely by willing (*ābhoga-mātra*) [the cognition of an object].[53]

Even if we admit the existence of nescience and the like

> *k. 4d.* [their] cessation (*nivṛtti*) cannot be the result because it is [a kind of] absence.

The cessation [of nescience, etc.,] means the absence (*abhāva*) of nescience, etc. What is absent cannot be a result, for it cannot be cognized.

Thus, in any case, the Naiyāyika's [theory of] perception is untenable.

SECTION 4. EXAMINATION OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY

A. For the Vaiśeṣikas, there is a definition, mentioned in the Sūtra,[1] of perception in respect to substance (*dravya*),[2] [which is made meaningful] by a certain relation [to the preceding sūtras].[3] It says: "That [cognition] which is brought about by contact of the soul (*ātman*), the sense (*indriya*), the mind (*manas*), and the object (*artha*) is [perception as] a separate one [of the *pramāṇa*s]."[4]

Some [of the Vaiśeṣikas] consider that [the cognition as] a result (*phala*) is distinct from the *pramāṇa*, the means of cognition.[5] They claim that the contact between sense and object (*indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa*) is the means of cognition since it is the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) [of perceptual cognition].[6] But there are others [of the Vaiśeṣikas] who hold that the contact between soul and mind (*ātma-manaḥ-saṁnikarṣa*) is the means of cognition since it is the predominant [cause] (*pradhāna*).[7]

Ba. Inasmuch as [perception is defined] in the above manner, that [definition] is inconsistent with what is stated [in the following sūtra]: "The rise of doubt (*saṁśaya*) and ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) has been explained by [the sūtra mentioning the rise of] perceptual and inferential knowledges."[8] The knowledge brought about through ascertainment is not identical with the knowledge produced from the contact of the four [factors, i.e., the soul, the sense, the mind, and the object,] because ascertainment is preceded by conceptual construction[9] whereas perception [produced from the contact of the four factors] is the simple presentation of the object (*viṣayâlocana-mātra*).[10] By the contact of the four [factors], the simple presentation of the object [itself free of any qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*)] arises. How could there be [room for] conceptual construction [in this immediate experience (*anubhava*) of the object]? [Accordingly, the sūtra which attempts to treat the knowledge brought about through ascertainment as identical with the knowledge brought about through perception is inconsistent with the sūtra that defines perceptual knowledge as one produced from the contact of the four factors.]

Bb. In the case of those who claim that the contact of sense and object is the means of cognition, [if they disregard the conceptual construction involved in ascertainment and claim that ascertainment also arises from the contact of

sense and object,] the extended application (*atideśa*) of the term ["contact of sense and object" (*indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa*) to the case of ascertainment] is not admissible. [If it were to be admitted, even doubt (*saṁśaya*) and inference (*anumāna*) would be regarded as cognitions produced by the contact of sense and object, because in the cases of these cognitions the sense comes into contact with a real object, namely, a general feature of a thing or a thing that is an inferential mark of another thing.[11] Again, they may argue that the sense grasps an object with its qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) such as genus (*sāmānya*) and the like, since these are inherent (*samaveta*) in the object,[12] and that hence there arises ascertainment by the mere contact of sense and object. To such an argument we reply:] According to the view of those who claim that the contact of sense and object is the means of cognition, it would follow [that no doubt could arise, much less be removed by ascertainment, because] when a man had a desire to apprehend [an object with the question] "what is this?" he would grasp the object wholly since there would be contact [of his senses] with all factors [constituting the object].[13]

C. Also, for those who claim the contact of soul and mind [to be the means of cognition, there will arise a difficulty;] there is difference in respect to object [between the means of cognition and the resulting cognition, since the soul has the mind and the mind has the soul for their respective objects when the means of cognition operates, whereas the result produced by this means is the cognition of an external object]. Therefore, [the criticism that] we have already pronounced [against the Naiyāyikas will also be applicable to this theory]: "It is not admissible that the means of cognition pertains to one object whereas the resulting cognition pertains to another."[14]

D. Further, [if the contact of sense and object is the means of perceptual cognition], the [Vaiśesika] statements describing [perception as] "dependent on genus (*sāmānya*) and species (*viśeṣa*)" [in various instances of our perceiving substance, attribute, and action] and [as] "dependent on substance, attribute, and action" [in certain instances of our perceiving substance] would be incorrect.[15] Because the cognition produced by contact of sense and object has

> *k. 1ab.* no relation to the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) [of the object] since it [viz., the cognition] has for its purpose the mere presentation of the object (*viṣayâlocana*).[16]

Since sense-cognitions apprehend merely their respective objects, it is impossible that they are related to the qualifiers [of the objects, such as genus and the like]. [In those cases in which an object is cognized as dependent upon genus, etc.,] it is after having perceived the two elements [namely, the object itself and

the qualifier], surely, that one conceives by means of conceptual construction the relation (*sambandha*) [of these two elements] in the following manner: "this [object] possesses this genus (*idam asya sāmānyam*)," "this [object] possesses this substance (*idam asya dravyam*)," etc. [Thus, in fact, the object is conceived as the "possessor of (*-mat*, *-vat*)" or "locus (*adhikaraṇa*, *āśraya*) of" the genus, as the "possessor of" or "locus of" substance, etc.] Then, by the elision of the suffix expressing possession (*matub-lopa*) or by the ascription of identity (*abhedôpacāra*) [between the object itself and its description as the "possessor of" or "locus of" substance, etc.], the object is grasped [as "existent (*sat*)," "horned (*viṣānin*)," etc.].[17] Moreover, that qualifier is consistent [only] with the mental cognition, since it is called forth by remembrance.[18] Otherwise, [if the cognition which relates the two separately perceived things were to be regarded as perception, then,] even the cognition "the sweet-scented (*surabhi*) tastes sweet (*madhura*)"[19] would be [accepted as] perception. This, however, is unreasonable because [in this case] the qualifier [i.e., the sweet taste] and the qualified [i.e., the sweet scent] are grasped by different senses [namely, the gustatory and olfactory senses]. [Thus, the cognitions which are dependent upon genus and species or which are dependent upon substance, attribute, and action cannot be identified with the cognition produced by the sense which operates merely upon the object itself.]

Ea. [In answer to the above objection, the Vaiśeṣikas may argue as follows. "That an object is grasped by means of two perceptions does not necessarily mean that it is not a single entity. For example, we see that] one and the same substance (*dravya*) is grasped by [two] different senses [visual and tactual]."[20] If such [were the case], it would follow that

> *k.* $1c_1$. [it is] not [a] single [entity];[21]

[If it were to be admitted that the substance is apprehended by different senses, then] it would be manifold, like color and other entities. In regard to [objects that are different, such as] color, etc., we never experience them as single in spite of their being grasped by different senses.[22]

> *k.* $1c_2$. otherwise there would be no difference (*abheda*) of color and other objects [from one another].[23]

[On the other hand,] if it [viz., the substance] were to be admitted as [a] single [entity] (*abhinna*) in spite of its being apprehended by different senses, it would

follow that [different entities, such as] color, etc., would [also] be non-different (*abhinna*), like substance.

Eb. *k. 1d*$_1$. if [the Vaiśeṣikas say:] "It is known from experience [that a substance, although grasped by different senses, is a single entity]," [24]

[The Vaiśeṣikas may argue as follows:] "From experience we do know that, although a substance is grasped by different senses, the cognition [that it is a substance] remains the same (*abhinna*), just as being (*sattā*) or attribute-ness (*guṇatva*), [which are grasped by different senses because of their inherence in all perceptible things or in all attributes,[25] are always recognized as the same being or attribute-ness]; [26] [27]··· [as for various objects such as] color, etc., [a non-different cognition is] never [experienced]. Hence it is established that it [viz., a substance] is single while they [viz., color, etc.] are manifold." ···[27] If they argue in this way, [we should answer as follows:] Admittedly we do experience undifferentiated cognition (*abhinnaṁ jñānam*) [of substance]. Nevertheless,

k. 1d$_2$. such [a cognition] is not given by the senses—[28]

Such a cognition is not the apprehension by means of one sense [e.g., the visual sense] of the object of another sense [e.g., the tactual sense]

k. 2a. because the variety of the senses would [then] be useless.[29]

If we allow one sense the power (*śakti*) to grasp the object of another sense, then it would be useless to recognize various senses for [various objects, such as] color, etc.[30]

Ec. If the following [argument were put by the Vaiśeṣikas]: "Since there really exists variety [blue, yellow, etc.] among colors and other [objects], a sense would not be able to grasp [this variety, if it were bound to one object]"; that [argument] would be untenable. If you ask why, [we reply:] Because a sense, namely

k. 2b. that which has power over its own object, has so even over different varieties [of that object].[31]

According to your view, the varieties of an object that is peculiar [to a particular sense], for example, [the varieties of color, which is peculiar to the visual sense, such as] blue [yellow,] etc., likewise number, [quantity,] etc., are uniformly capable of being grasped by the one [visual] sense, despite the fact that they are differentiated;[32] but they never become the object of another sense. By "the object of another sense" is meant, for example, the tangible (*sparśa*), which is distinct from color (*rūpa*), for it is the object [of the tactual

sense,] not of the visual sense.[33] [Thus, the substance that is the object of the tactual sense can never be the object of the visual sense.][34]

If the substance grasped by the tactual sense were grasped as well by the visual sense, then one should certainly admit that even the object of another sense becomes the object peculiar to the visual sense; hence follows the absurdity that one would grasp by the visual sense even those [objects] which are different [from color], such as the tangible, in the same manner as [he grasps colors, such as] blue, etc.

Accordingly, the difference (*bhinnatva*) [of objects] is not the cause (*kāraṇa*) of their being grasped by different senses (*anekêndriya-grāhyatva*)[35] [—two different objects may be grasped by one and the same sense, as for instance, blue and yellow—]; rather, the non-grasping [by one sense] of the objects of another sense [is the cause]. [Hence there are different senses corresponding to different objects, and hence it is unreasonable to claim that a substance can be grasped by different senses.]

Ed. Should an object, even though it is not differentiated (*abhinna*), be grasped by many senses, then of every [different object,] color, and the rest

k. 2c. [each] would be grasped by all the senses.

just as a [single] substance [is grasped by different senses]. If such were the case, color and [each of] the other [objects] would not be objects of [i.e., peculiar to] one particular sense (*an-ekêndriya-grāhya*).[36]

Ee. [The Vaiśeṣikas may try to uphold their position as follows:] "There is no such fault [with us]. Color and other objects, in having each its peculiar property (*viśeṣa*), are determinative (*niyāmaka*) of these [sense-cognitions]. Because of the absence of such [a peculiar property] the sense-cognitions [other than the visual] do not deviate into [apprehending] blue color. [That is to say, since blue color lacks the peculiar property of being tangible, the tactual sense does not deviate into the apprehension of blue.]"[37] To such [an argument we reply]: "How do these [objects such as color] become determinative [of the sense-cognitions]?" [They may answer:] "That which is devoid of color-ness (*rūpatva*) is not grasped by the visual sense. In the same manner, tangible objects, etc., are also determinative of [the senses] taking their respective objects."[38] If this were the case, then any functioning (*vṛtti*) of the visual and the tactual senses would be[39]

k. $2d_1$. not [possible] on substance, etc.

Since it is recognized [by you] that substances, [attributes such as] number (*saṁkhyā*), etc.,[40] and actions are devoid of color-ness (*rūpatva*) and tangi-

bility (*sparśatva*), it would be impossible to grasp them by the visual sense or the tactual sense.

Ef. [To meet the above criticism] it may be argued [by the Vaiśeṣikas]: "That in which color-ness (*rūpatva*) resides is the object of the visual sense. Accordingly,[41] the same [principle holds] in respect to [the objects of the other senses,] for example, the tangible (*sparśa*): there is a peculiar property [viz., tangibility (*sparśatva*) residing in the tangible] that is determinative [of the sense-cognition].[42] In the case of such [entities] as substance there is no determination in this way [of the sense-cognition] since [the peculiar property of the object of a particular sense,] for example, color-ness, does not reside [in them]. [Accordingly, substance, etc., can be grasped by any sense.]"

> *k.* $2d_2$–$3a_1$. if such [is your argument], [you are] not [in conformity to your doctrine]. [Your sūtra states:] "because of the absence [in one object of the peculiar property of another object]."[43]

[In the above Vaiśeṣika argument] there is contradiction with the sūtra which reads: "[Because of absence] there is no deviation." [By this sūtra] it is meant that the non-deviation [of the sense-cognitions from their respective objects] is because of an absence, for example, the absence of color-ness in sound, but not because of a presence, for example, the presence of color-ness in color.

Eg. This false construction [of the Vaiśeṣikas] is [not only in contradiction with the sūtra but is] also untenable from a theoretical standpoint (*yukti*). Because

> *k.* $3a_2$–b_1. non-grasping is [nothing other than] absence (*abhāva*).[44]

[That the thing in which color-ness is present becomes an object peculiar to the visual sense implies that it is] not grasped by the other senses (*indriyântareṇâgrahaṇam*), [which again] implies the absence (*abhāva*) of grasping (*grahaṇa*). How could that [absence] be produced by color-ness, etc.? Absence of grasping should result from absence of a cause, [whereas presence of color-ness, etc. cannot be the cause of absence]. Thus, it is unreasonable [to hold] that such factors as color-ness are determinative [of the sense-cognitions].

Eh. Suppose [the Vaiśeṣikas were to argue] as follows: "In respect to substance, etc., we experience a non-different cognition [that it is a substance, whether we grasp it by the visual sense or by the tactual sense]. How could there

be that [non-different cognition, if substance were not single]?" If so, [we answer that]

> *k. 3b*$_2$. it [viz., the non-different cognition] takes for its object something else [than substance, viz., something conceptually constructed].[45]

By the visual and the tactual senses separate (*bhinna*) objects [i.e., visible and tangible] are perceived. There [then] arises another cognition through remembrance (*smaraṇa-jñāna*), which grasps [an object] regardless of [its] difference [from another], taking for its object the [conceptually constructed] whole (*samudāya*) to which those individual objects are [thought to be] associated,[46] [and it is known that this cognition is mediated by remembrance,] since such a cognition does not arise if there have not been [previous] perceptions of color, etc. [It is by this cognition that the objects of different senses are cognized as the same substance.]

[The Vaiśeṣikas have cited the instances of being (*sattā*) and attribute-ness (*guṇatva*) to show that the object grasped by different senses is not always manifold.[47] However, a man cognizes being and attribute-ness] in a manner similar [to that stated above: that is to say], after [a man's] perceiving by the corresponding senses the separate (*bhinna*) objects [e.g., existents and attributes] which are to be qualified (*viśeṣya*) [by "being" and "attribute-ness"],[48] there arises [in him] a mental cognition (*mānasaṁ jñānam*), which does not make distinction among all the objects [since it cognizes the universal, conceptually constructed from those objects by] excluding other things (*arthântara-vyavaccheda*).[49] [Thus,] being and attribute-ness are never perceived directly [by the senses]. Since that [cognition of the universal] is not [admitted as perception even] by implication (*upalakṣaṇa*), [the chain] that these [being and attribute-ness] are grasped by perception is merely a fatuous notion (*abhimāna*) of bad philosophers (*kutārkika*).

Fa–1. *k. 3c.* if it were admitted that both [the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the qualified (*viśeṣya*)] are objects of the same [sense]—[50]

[The Vaiśeṣikas may argue as follows:] "It should be admitted that the qualifier and the qualified are necessarily objects of the same sense because if that [viz., the qualifier] is not apprehended, there is no cognition of this [viz., the qualified]." Should that be the case

> *k. 3d.* there would follow that which is inadmissible.

If both [the qualifier and the qualified] were [admitted to be] objects of the same sense [the consequence would be as follows]: Since [the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* states that] substances, attributes, and actions [inhere in and so] are possessed of

substance (*dravyavat*),[51] [substance will be the qualifier of substances, attributes, and actions.[52] Accordingly, substances would be grasped by those senses that grasp attributes. There are five senses, each grasping one of such attributes as color (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), etc. Thus,] substance would be the object of all [five] senses (*sarvêndriya*), like being.[53] [This conclusion, however, cannot be admitted even by the Vaiśeṣikas.][54]

In the same way [it would follow that substance is perceivable by all the senses] since [substance is a qualifier of being according to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*:] "being is not a substance because it possesses one substance (*eka-dravya-vattvāt*)," [55] and being [according to the Vaiśeṣikas] is cognized by all the senses.[56]

Fa–2. [The Vaiśeṣikas may vindicate their view as follows:] "It is because being occurs in substance (*dravye vrttiḥ*) that it is said to 'possess one substance (*eka-dravya*)' or 'to be accompanied by that [one substance] (*tadvat*),' [not because of its occurrence in attributes, etc. On the other hand, it is only when being occurs in attributes that it is apprehended by all five senses, not when it occurs in substance.[57] Thus, the case in which being is qualified by a substance and the case in which being is the object of all the senses must not be confused.]" If such [is their argument], it is incorrect because [according to Vaiśeṣika doctrine] being is [one and] not differentiated (*abhinna*).[58] [As it is] undifferentiated, being is everywhere, and [its residing] in [all] existent things such as substance cannot be denied. Thus, it is stated [in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*] that "since it is present [not only in substance but also] in attributes and actions, it is neither action nor attribute." [59] If only that [being] which occurs in substance is "possessing one substance (*eka-dravya*)," whereas that which occurs in other entities is not "possessing one substance," then it would be differentiated. [This, however, contradicts the Vaiśeṣika doctrine.]

Fb. Further, when there is by visual perception the cognition "[this] fire is hot," [if qualifier and qualified were grasped by the same sense], the tangible ["hot"] would also be the object of the visual sense [since it is the qualifier of fire]. [This is also untenable.][60]

Thus, [the Vaiśeṣika argument] that substance, like being and attribute-ness, is not differentiated in spite of its being grasped by different senses is unreasonable.

Ga. [The following counter-argument may be made by the Vaiśeṣikas:] "If [you criticize our view] thus, [we will point out that] in your assertion that they [viz., the qualifier and the qualified] are different (*anya, bhinna*) because they are objects of different senses (*bhinnêndriya-grāhya*)

k. $4a_1$. [there is an] inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) [cause (*hetu*)];

Because, [in the first place,] it is seen that there is a distinction (*bheda*) among substance, attribute, and action, and a distinction among blue, [yellow,] and other [colors], even though they are the objects of one and the same sense (*ekêndriya-grāhya*).[61] [In the second place,] it is also seen that, even without a difference of the sense (*indriya-bheda*), distinction among blue, [yellow,] and other colors results from the difference of cognition (*grahaṇa-bheda*). If *y* is present even where there is no *x*, then *x* is not the cause (*kāraṇa*) of *y*. Therefore, the "difference between the senses (*indriya-bheda*) [which grasp respectively the qualifier and the qualified]" is not the cause of the "difference (*anyatva*, *bhinnatva*) [between the qualifier and the qualified]."[62] If such [is the Vaiśeṣika argument, we reject their first statement by saying],[63]

> *k.* $4a_2$. this matter has been explained [by us] in a different manner.

We say that it [viz., the object] is "manifold (*aneka*)" because it is "grasped by different senses (*bhinnêndriya-grāhya*)," not that it is "single (*eka*)" because it is "grasped by one sense (*ekêndriya-grāhya*)." If the latter [were our assertion], there would be [the fallacy of] an inconclusive [cause] (*anaikāntika*). What we hold is not [that] "only because of the nature of being grasped by different senses (*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatvād eva*)" [is there] "manifold-ness (*anekatva*)," but [that "because of the nature of being grasped by different senses (*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatvāt*)" there is] "necessarily manifold-ness (*anekatvam eva*)."[64] Therefore, [our cause is] not inconclusive.

[To the second argument we answer as follows:][65] You say "even without a difference of the sense" [in order to show that there is another cause of "manifold-ness" than "being grasped by different senses"]. [However,] here [in our reasoning]

> *k. 4b*. it has not been stated that everything [that is manifold] is in the probandum (*sādhya*).

We have not said that "all that is manifold" (*sarvam anekam*) is so "because of the difference of the senses" (*indriya-bhedāt*, *bhinnêndriya*[-*grāhya*]*tvāt*), but that those [objects] in respect to which there is a "difference of the senses" (*indriya-bheda*) are "manifold" (*aneka*). Accordingly, it is not denied by us that "the difference of cognitions" (*grahaṇa-bheda*) is also a cause of "manifold-ness" (*anekatva*).[66]

Gb. Further,

> *k. 4cd*. if [it is found that] even though the sense [that grasps them] is the same, there is [still] a difference [between objects] because of the difference of cognitions, then, in the alternative

> [viz., in the case that the senses that grasp them are different],
> how could there be non-difference [between objects]?

Since the manifold-ness (*nānātva, anekatva*) [of the objects] is asserted on the basis of a difference of cognitions (*buddhi-bheda, grahaṇa-bheda*) even without a difference of the senses (*indriya-bheda*), there can be no chance of claiming [the object to be] one when there is a difference of the senses as well as a difference of the cognitions.

H. It should be understood that [the Vaiśeṣika theory of] perception of attribute (*guṇa*), etc., is also set aside by this [refutation of their theory of perception of substance (*dravya*)]. Because that [sort of perception, viz., perception of attributes, etc.,] also arises [according to the Vaiśeṣikas] from the contact of the four factors, etc.,[67] through the medium of a relation [of the attribute, etc.,] to an abode (*āśraya*)[68] [of the attribute, with which abode the senses or mind may come in contact].

Further, the fact that cognition does not always arise from contact (*saṁnikarṣa*) [of the sense and the object] has [already] been duly explained in the section that examines the Nyāya theory of perception.[69]

Thus, [we conclude that] the Vaiśeṣika [theory of] perception is also defective.

SECTION 5. EXAMINATION OF THE SĀṂKHYA THEORY

A. The followers of Kapila (the Sāṁkhyas) maintain that "the functioning (*vṛtti*) of the auditory and other senses is perception (*pratyakṣa*)."[1] They state: "The functioning of the auditory, tactual, visual, gustatory, and olfactory senses, which is controlled by the mind (*manasâdhiṣṭhita*) and which operates in order to [obtain] an apprehension of sounds, tangible objects, colors, tastes, and odors, respectively, is perception as a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*)."[2]

Ba. If [this view which] they [hold] were to be accepted, the sense-organs would be

k. 1a$_1$. infinite in number;

They hold that, since a sense does not take for its object those things that are to be apprehended by another sense, each sense works [only] on its own object.[3] [Since they also hold that all objects are equally composed of three *guṇa*s[4] it follows that] the distinction among the classes (*jāti*) of sounds (*śabda*) and other such [objects] is simply due to the increase (*upacaya*) and decrease (*apacaya*) of the three *guṇa*s. Thus, [the object of each sense,] for example, sound, although it is one [insofar as it is the sound-class], is [also differentiated into an] infinite [variety of sounds][5] simply because of the increase and decrease of the [three] *guṇa*s, and therefore the senses which apprehend these [sounds] must be admitted to be infinite in number.

Bb. *k. 1a*$_2$. or, only one sense-organ [would apprehend all objects].

[The Sāṁkhyas may assert the following:] "In that case [i.e., in the case of apprehending various sounds], since they [viz., sounds] are equally [composed of] the three *guṇa*s, they are grouped under one and the same [sound-] class, [thus being apprehended by the auditory sense]." If that were the case, not only various sounds but also tangibles and other objects would be apprehended [by the same sense]; therefore, there would be only one sense-organ [to apprehend all sorts of objects, and the other sense-organs would be useless]. Because, in all different objects, the three *guṇa*s [of which they are composed] are not different.[6] The sound-class, because of which it is said that this [auditory sense] works only

on sound and not on tangibles and other objects, does not exist as [something] different from the three *guṇa*s, since the three *guṇa*s are the same everywhere.

Ca. [The Sāṁkhyas may argue as follows:] "Why [do you say that there is] not [a distinction among the various classes of objects composed of the three *guṇa*s], when there is a distinction between sounds and other objects according to the difference of the configuration (*saṁsthāna*) of *sattva* and the other [*guṇa*s]. There is the same configuration of the *guṇa*s in the [various sounds which belong to the same] sound-class, [which is thus] distinguished from tangibles and other objects [which have their own configurations, differing class by class].[7] It is this [sound-] class that becomes the object on which the auditory sense works. The same [explanation] applies to tangibles and other objects. Therefore, no such fault as pointed out [by you] can be imputed to us." Even if that were the case, there would still be common objects of the visual and the tactual senses, since of [certain] configurations [of objects] there is

k. $1b_1$. apprehension by two [senses].[8]

It is a fact of experience that such configurations as "long" (*dīrgha*) and the like are cognized by the tactual sense as well as the visual sense. Thus, there is an incompatibility with the functioning of each sense [only] on its own object.[9]

Cb. Further, [if the Sāṁkhya theory were true,] sounds and other such [objects] would not be apprehended by the auditory and other [senses] because there is, of configuration,

k. $1b_2$. an absence from the range of three [senses].

A configuration (*saṁsthāna*)[10] [can be grasped only by the visual and the tactual senses and] is not found to be grasped by the [other three senses, viz.,] auditory, gustatory, and olfactory. Therefore, [the objects of these three senses, i.e.,] sound, taste, and odor, would not be recognized as being directed to the sense (*pratyakṣa*).

Cc. If it were admitted that there is a distinctive feature of a class [of objects and that that distinctive feature is] constituted by the configuration [belonging to that class], then [with] various configurations [such as "long" (*dīrgha*), "short" (*hrasva*), etc., we should find that]

k. $1c_1$. they would furnish a single object.

[It is held by the Sāṁkhyas that the sound of a *vīṇa*, of a drum, and all other sounds, although they are different from each other, are grasped by the same auditory sense, inasmuch as they are within the boundary of the sound-class.[11] That is to say, they recognize that] without going beyond [the boundary of] the

class of objects corresponding to a certain sense, there are many different [sub-] classes within that [class, each with its own configuration]. Therefore, many [different] configurations would be recognized as one and the same object.

Cd. [Further, if a class of objects were to be distinguished from another class of objects by its configuration, then] in spoons, ornaments, etc., of the same configuration, which are [made of different materials, such as] gold, [silver,] etc., there would be [12]

*k. 1*c_2. an absence of distinction.

[Likewise, objects belonging to different classes,] gold and sound, for example, would [also] belong to the same class, because, [according to the Sāṁkhyas,] they [derive from a uniform source and so must] have the same configuration.[13] In that case there could be no working [of each sense] on its own object.

D. The functioning (*vṛtti*) of a sense [on its object] may imply either (a) the apprehension of the mere [configuration of the] class [of objects] (*jāti-mātra*),[14] or (b) the apprehension of the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the class, i.e., [the three *guṇa*s, which are of the nature of] *sukha* (pleasure) and the others [viz., *duḥkha* (pain) and *moha* (delusion)].[15]

Daa. In the first case, if there is apprehension of the mere [configuration of the] class [of objects], then there would be

k. 1d. non-apprehension of the characteristic feature (*svarūpa*)

of the object.[16] If there were apprehension [by the sense-organ] of the mere configuration (*saṁsthāna*) [peculiar to the class] of sound or of any other object, there would follow the absurdity of [its] never apprehending the object distinctly as *sukha*, etc., in its characteristic feature. For it is a fact of experience that, insofar as a man apprehends indistinctly only the configuration [of an object], he does not apprehend the characteristic feature of that object. [For instance, a man who perceives merely a cowlike shape in the twilight has no distinct perception of a cow itself.][17]

Dab. If [on the other hand] there is apprehension only of a [certain] configuration, then there would be

*k. 2*a_1. non-apprehension of the difference among objects [belonging to different classes].

[That is to say,] there would be no apprehension of the distinction between sound (*śabda*) and other [objects].[18] In the same way, there would be no apprehension of the difference between [objects belonging to the same class], for example, the sound of a *vīṇa* and that of a drum (*bherī*) because there is no difference of configuration between them.

Dac. [The Sāṁkhyas may argue that since there is a difference of configuration among the objects included in the same class, one could apprehend an object as distinct from another.[19] We criticize this argument as follows:]

> *k.* $2a_2$–*b.* [the senses would be] possessors, like the mind (*manas*), of [the faculty of] conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) on the object.

From their apprehension of the different individuals (*viśeṣa*) which possess as qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) the class that forms the peculiar object [of each sense],[20] they [viz., the senses] would [necessarily be recognized to] possess [the faculty of] conceptual construction on their objects, [a faculty] like the functioning of the mind (*manas*).[21]

Dba. If [it is claimed that] they apprehend *sukha*, etc., which are the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the configuration [of the class of objects],[22] even then

> *k.* $2c_1$. they would be in that [same] condition.

that is to say, they [viz., the senses] would possess [the faculty of] conceptual construction, [a faculty] like the functioning of the mind.[23]

Dbb. If it [viz., a sense] apprehends [the three *guṇa*s, which are of the nature of] *sukha*, etc., it must apprehend [them] either (a) individually (*pratyekam*) or (b) in unity (*samudāya*).

Dbb–a1. Here, in the first alternative, [we must point out that] there can be no individual apprehension [of the three *guṇa*s, viz., *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*,] for the following reason. Since a sense functions directly on its own object, sound and such [objects] are apprehended [by the sense], but

> *k.* $2c_2$. not *sattva*, etc.[24]

Neither *sattva* nor the [two] other [*guṇa*s, viz., *rajas* and *tamas*] is [to be regarded as] sound itself or any other object.[25] Therefore, they are not the objects to be apprehended through the functioning of the auditory and other senses.

Dbb–a2. [The Sāṁkhyas may reply as follows:]

> *k. 2d.* "no, because there is no difference [of *sattva*, etc., from the objects of the senses]."

[They hold the view that] since *sattva*, etc., are not [essentially] different from sound and other such [objects of the senses], they are apprehended [by the senses] like sound, etc. [However, this view is also subject to our criticism as follows:]

> *k. 3a.* if [it were maintained that there is] no difference [between the three *guṇa*s and the objects of the senses], [it would]

possibly [follow that the objects of the senses are] not effects (*kārya*) [of the three *guṇa*s].[26]

If sound, etc., were not different from [the three *guṇa*s, viz.,] *sattva*, etc., then sound, etc., which are indistinguishable [from the three *guṇa*s], would not be [recognized as] the effects (*kārya*) [of the latter].[27] At the same time, [the three *guṇa*s,] *sattva*, etc., would not be [recognized as] the cause (*kāraṇa*) of sound and other such [objects]. [Moreover, in the above argument of the Sāṁkhyas] there is an inconsistency with the [following] statement [of their own]:[28] "When *sattva* appears as an effect in the form of sound, it is established that it is the essence of that sound [or that the sound is sattvic]," and so on.[29] Since [they assert that] there is essentially no distinction between cause [e.g., *sattva*, etc.] and effect [e.g., sound, etc.], [it would follow] either [that] *sattva* and other such [*guṇa*s] are not distinct from each other, or [that] sound is not [recognized as forming] one [class of objects]. It was in view of taking this [alternative conclusion] into consideration that we used the term "possibly" [in the verse].[30]

Dbb–a3. Furthermore,

> *k. 3b.* even if there were no difference [between the three *guṇa*s as cause and sound, etc., as effect], [there would still be a fault because of] inapprehensibility [of the *guṇa*s].

Even if [we admit that the triad of *guṇa*s which is of the nature of] *sukha* [with *duḥkha* and *moha*] is not [essentially] different from sound and other such [objects], [we must point out that] none [of the three *guṇa*s] is apprehended [by the senses], because the atoms of sound, etc., [which are also the cause of sound, etc., and therefore essentially not different from sound, etc.][31] are recognized [by the Sāṁkhyas] to be inapprehensible [by the senses]; so also [those entities which form a series of causes of sound and other objects, namely,] the *tanmātra*s [as well as *ahaṁkāra*, *mahat*, and *prakṛti*,[32] are inapprehensible by the senses].[33] That which is [essentially] not different from the object of a sense does not always become the object of a sense, because the apprehension of effect-ness (*kāryatva*) and the like [which are essentially not different from objects of sense] would imply the absurdity that a sense can take a universal (*sāmānya*) for its object.[34]

Thus, in [the matter of] the first alternative, [it has been proved that] there is no individual apprehension [of the three *guṇa*s by the senses].

Dbb–b1. [To take the second alternative,] if there were apprehension [of the three *guṇa*s] in unity, then

> *k.* $3c_1$. there would be various aspects (*nānâkāra*).

to each functioning (*vṛtti*) of a sense. The apprehension of an object [defined by

the Sāṁkhyas as composed of the three *guṇa*s and therefore] possessing different aspects could not be of single aspect because such [an apprehension] would be unable to determine an object [so defined]. [And yet,] it is a fact of experience that it *is* single when it is [an apprehension] of sound and such [objects]. [Therefore, a sense does not apprehend the three *guṇa*s in unity].

Dbb–b2. If *sukha*, etc., were their objects, the senses would have

> *k.* $3c_2$. unity of object—

The senses would all take the same object, and there could be no [doctrine of their] taking each its own object, because in different objects *sukha*, etc., are of the same kind (*jāti*). Consequently, there would be the absurdity already mentioned that there need be only one sense.[35]

Dbb–b3. "Did we not say that what one apprehends is [a class (*jāti*) of object] distinguished [from other objects] by its configuration (*saṁsthāna*)?"[36] If [the Sāṁkhyas speak] thus, [we reply:] Indeed you spoke in that way, but what you said does not prove to be correct. Why?

> *k.* $3d_1$. because there would be no apprehension by conformity (*anuvidhāna*) [of the sense to the configuration of the object].[37]

Since there is apprehension [by the visual sense] of one and the same class (*jāti*) [of objects], for example, color [variously,] in accordance with the difference among many configurations [of different colors, such as blue, yellow, etc.],[38] the conformity [of a sense] to [only] one configuration is not experienced. In this [difficulty], if [it is claimed by the Sāṁkhyas that] the classes [of objects] are distinguished [from each other] according to difference of configuration, there would follow the absurd conclusion mentioned before that the senses would be infinite in number.[39]

Ea. Further, in regard to this [point],

> *k.* $3d_2$–$4a$. when a certain Sāṁkhya [teacher] holds that there is difference [of configuration between the *guṇa*s composing one class of objects and the *guṇa*s composing another]—

[Mādhava, who is called] the destroyer of the Sāṁkhya (*sāṁkhya-vaināśika*)[40] because of his holding a theory that goes beyond the limit of the older Sāṁkhya doctrine, says, "From the three [*guṇa*s] composing sound (*śabda*), the three [*guṇa*s] composing tangibles (*sparśa*) and other objects are different in kind (*jāti*).[41] [Because] it is unreasonable that there should be apprehension by different senses of that which [by reason of the uniformity of its cause] is uniform. Thus, [we should admit that] among the objects of the senses there is a difference

in kind among [the three component *guṇa*s which are of the nature of] *sukha*, etc. It is because of this [difference] that each sense functions only on its own objects." In this [theory] also

> *k. 4b.* there is implied the absurdity that the senses are infinite in number.

since it is not different [from the above-refuted theory] insofar as [the apprehension of] the varieties [within the class of objects] peculiar to each [sense] are concerned.[42]

Eb. Now, if one is to go beyond the doctrine of the elders [of the Sāṁkhya school] in order to establish that [the three *guṇa*s which are of the nature of] *sukha*, etc., vary with the classes of senses as well as of objects, then by a clearer argumentation we will expatiate on these ideas [of Mādhava].[43]

> *k. 4cd.* the atoms differ everywhere [i.e., in different classes of effects], possessing each its respective nature. They are [called] the *pradhāna*s.

Sukha, *duḥkha*, and *moha*, likewise sounds, tangibles, and other such [objects] are distinguished from each other in accordance with the difference of class (*jāti-viśeṣa*). The atoms which [when combined] turn into all of these [above-mentioned classes of effects] are called the *pradhāna*s (primordial entities).[44]

> *k. 5ab.* according to their varying combinations they [viz., the atoms] characterize the nature of their effects.

[If we explain Mādhava's ideas] in this manner, it will be understood that according to combinations which vary [from class to class] there are [different] effects, each possessing its own nature but not going beyond the boundary of a particular class, and that these [effects] become the objects of the senses.[45]

Ec. [Mādhava's theory should be criticized in regard to the following point:]

> *k. 5cd.* since an atom possesses three characters,[46] how can we acknowledge an effect [produced by the combination of atoms] to be undifferentiated?

[For example,] there arises an undifferentiated cognition of sound in the form "[this is] a sound," which is different from [the variegated cognition of] *sukha*, etc. This [undifferentiated cognition] could not be if there were several different characters [of the sound]. If one asks why [this criticism is directed against Mādhava, we reply]:

> *k. 6ab.* it is inadmissible that entities which are heterogeneous [even if they join together] should transform themselves (*pariṇāma*) [into a single effect].

It cannot be that there is a single effect from the combination of three [heterogeneous] factors because the numerical classes [of cause and effect] would differ. [There are cases where heterogeneous components, e.g., sugar and water, are combined to produce an effect to which we give a single name, e.g., "a drink" (*pāna*).[47] But,] although a single word may be used, the nature [of the thing referred to] need not be single.

Ed. Further, [Mādhava argues as follows:] "With reference to [such entities as] sound which possesses three characters,[48] the [particular character, viz.,] *sukha*, or the like [of the sound] that a man utter[49] or desires to grasp is what becomes the object of [the auditory] sense.[50]

> *k. 6cd.* since we do not admit [the cognition of] two characters [in an effect], it is established that an effect is of one character.

If [we admit that] there occurs through the auditory sense a cognition of *sukha* and the others [viz., *duḥkha* and *moha*] as the case may be, without regard to any apprehension of sound [in general],[51] it will be established that this [cognition is of an object which] is of one character, namely, just that [*sukha*, etc., that has been cognized]. If one asks why, [we answer:]

> *k. 7ab.* although things are possessed of various characters, [the one that is regarded as] the object of a sense is distinguished [from others].

Although sound, etc., are possessed of various characters, only that character in respect to which a cognition arises[52] is [to be recognized as] the object of a sense. Thus, [the object of a sense possesses] only one character." [Now,] the same [principle] would hold for tangibles and other such [objects]. [That is to say, a man would apprehend those objects as *sukha*, *duḥkha*, or *moha*, not as tangibles, etc., possessing the three characters; consequently, all kinds of objects would be apprehended by the same sense.][53] Therefore, this [theory of Mādhava] is inappropriate.

> *k. 7cd.* therefore, from its dethroning the [view of the older] Sāṁkhyas, [Mādhava's doctrine of] "the possession [by atoms] of each its own nature" is excellent.[54]

Setting aside the view of the renowned older Sāṁkhya [teachers], it is argued [by Mādhava] that the distinction of class (*jāti-viśeṣa*) among the effects [i.e., sounds, tangibles, etc.] results necessarily from [the distinction among atoms possessing] their respective natures. This [much] is excellent.[55] This being held, it is reasonable [to say] that heterogeneous effects are not formed [by atoms of the same kind]. [However, the doctrine] that the three (*guṇa*s) form that [atom] which possesses only one quality, is not [excellent].

F. If perception (*pratyakṣa*) is [defined as] the functioning of a sense (*indriya-vṛtti*) only insofar as it apprehends sounds and such [objects],[56] then that [functioning of the mind (*mano-vṛtti*)] which takes all cognizable things for its object[57] would not come under the heading of [any] means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).[58] If one asks why, [we reply:]

> *k. 8ab.* [the Sāṁkhyas are at fault] because there is no direct statement [in the Sāṁkhya text] that the functioning [of the mind,] which takes everything for its object, is a means of cognition.[59]

Although the apprehension by the mind of the functioning of the senses lacks an inferential mark (*liṅga*) [which would permit us to assign this sort of apprehension to inference] or other [character, namely a testimonial word, which would allow us to assign it to verbal cognition],[60] still, there is no statement that [the functioning of] the mind as a [kind of] sense is a [perceptual] means of cognition. Accordingly, there is an "insufficiency [of definition]" (*nyūnatā*) [to be charged to the Sāṁkhyas]. The apprehension of the functioning [of the senses on their objects] is not included [by the Sāṁkhyas] under any of their [three] means of cognition.

G. [The Sāṁkhyas may argue as follows:] "There is no fault [to be imputed to us]. [We claim that] the apprehension of the functioning [of a sense by the mind] is [nothing other than] a recollection (*smṛti*), as are [the apprehensions of] desire (*rāga*) and the like.[61] As [we] stated, recollection is a particular kind of apprehension of perception.[62] Therefore, sense-cognitions [first] perceive the external objects; there then arises an immediately ensuing recollection by the mind of this functioning of the senses." If [they argue] thus, [we reply:]

> *k. 8c.* there is no recollection [by the mind of the functioning of the senses] because there has [previously] been no experience [by the mind of that functioning].

It is unreasonable [to hold] that there is an immediately ensuing recollection by the mind of the functioning of a sense because the mind has not previously experienced that [functioning].

H. *k. 8d.* if [it were held that] both [sense and mind] function simultaneously—

If [the Sāṁkhyas argue that] the sensory apprehension and the mind which experiences (*anubhava*) [the former] operate[63] simultaneously,[64] [we reply that] under such an assumption [the mind which is characterized as] the possessor of the object (*viṣayin*) would not possess the object (*viṣaya*) as its cause (*nimitta*).[65]

[Even if it were admitted that the mind recollects the sensory apprehension,][66]

> *k. 9a*$_1$. that [apprehension by the mind] is still not [mentioned in the Sāṁkhya text as] "a means of cognition."[67]

Since the mind which experiences [the functioning of] a sense is still not mentioned [in the Sāṁkhya text] as a means of cognition, it cannot be proved to be a means of cognition even when it occurs [in that manner]. Therefore, [the Sāṁkhyas fall into] the same situation [as mentioned before, that is to say], an insufficiency of definition.[68] Since [in our doctrine] there is self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*), it is not inconsistent [for us] to say that we recollect desire and other [internal experiences that were self-cognized before].[69] [However, for the Sāṁkhya who do not accept the theory of self-cognition] to state that "the recollection is a particular kind of apprehension of perception,"[70] is [like] the walking of a blind man [who has had no previous view of the road].[71]

I. [It has been shown that the mind cannot recollect the functioning of the senses.] Such being the case, neither can there be an immediately ensuing recollection of an object of the senses,[72] because there has been no experience [of that object] by the mind. An external object is never experienced by the mind previously [to its being recollected by the mind].[73]

[The doctrine that the mind recollects an external object would result in]

> *k. 9a*$_2$*–b*. either violation [of Sāṁkhya theory] or else [some absurdity]. If it [viz., the functioning of the mind] were a recollection (*smṛti*), it would be apprehending something different [from what has been apprehended by the sense].[74]

Since there is experience [by the mind] only of the functioning of the senses, [the above doctrine would lead to] either [the absurdity of] recollection without [previous] experience[75] or violation [of Sāṁkhya theory]. The words "or else" have been used in order to express these alternatives. If one asks how there is violation [of Sāṁkhya theory, we reply]: If the mind (*manas*), which arises simultaneously with the functioning of a sense on the external object, were admitted as apprehending [the same object], then the [Sāṁkhya theory expressed in the following] statement would be violated: "In case two senses were thought to serve one and the same purpose, there would be no effectiveness (*sāmarthyatva*) [of a sense]."[76]

J. [The Sāṁkhyas may attempt to defend their theory as follows:] "There is no such fault [in our text]. In order to show that recollection is a subsequent apprehension (*adhyavasāya*), there is specific denial [in our text] of the 'simultaneity' [of the functioning of the mind and sense]. As against the theory of

simultaneity, the question concerning apprehension is put [in our text as follows]: "Do a sense and the mind apprehend the external objects simultaneously?"[77] [The question was raised] because of the preceding passage: "when the mind functions at the present time together with a certain sense," and so on.[78] [That is to say, the Sāṁkhya allows that there are cases where the mind and a sense-organ are active at the same time, but claims that the mind does not function on the same object as the sense except subsequently.] Even if [the Sāṁkhyas defend their theory] thus, [we say:]

> *k. 9c.* if there is proof [offered by the Sāṁkhyas] that the recollection of an [external] object is [a] subsequent [apprehension of what has been previously experienced]—

If it is denied [by the Sāṁkhyas] that the mind functions simultaneously [with a sense], taking an [identical] external thing for its object, in order to prove that recollection is [a] subsequent [apprehension of an object which has been experienced before], then

> *k. 9d₁.* it will be incompatible.

with the following statement [given by them]: "By the mind one subsequently apprehends (rjes su ṣen pa, *anuvyavasāya*) what has been apprehended by a sense; in the same manner, by a sense one clearly apprehends (yaṅ dag rig pa, *saṁvedana*) what has been apprehended by the mind."[79]

K. If, again, the mind were to function directly on an external object, then, in that case

> *k. 9d₂.* the other senses would be useless.[80]

The other senses [than the mind] would be useless for [the apprehension of] an external object because the purpose of *puruṣa* would be fulfilled by the mind alone.

Thus, the perception of the Sāṁkhyas is not [to be recognized as] a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) since it is unable to apprehend definitely the specific feature of an object.

SECTION 6. EXAMINATION OF THE MĪMĀṀSAKA THEORY

A. The Mīmāṁsakas say: "When a man's senses are in contact with something existent (*sat*), there is the rise of a cognition; that [cognition] is perception."[1]

Ba. In reference to this [definition of perception], we argue as follows:

> *k. 1*. if [the Mīmāṁsakas say that the term] "*sat*" (something existent) is [mentioned in the sūtra] in order to exclude "*asat*" (the nonexistent), [they are] not right; [because] it is naturally understood [from the term "contact" (*samprayoga*) that "*asat*" is excluded]. Invariably contact [with a sense] is possible only for "*sat*" [and not for "*asat*"].[2]

It [therefore] is improper to mention [the term] "*sat*" (something existent) in order to negate [the contact of the senses with] "*asat*" (something nonexistent).

Bb.

> *k. 2a*. if [the Mīmāṁsakas assert that the term "*sat*" is mentioned in the sūtra] in order to indicate the counterparts (*pratiyogin*) [of the senses]—

"If the statement [of the sūtra] were [abbreviated to] 'when the senses are in contact [there is the rise of cognition],' one would wonder with what they come in contact. [Now] we understand that they come in contact with their counterparts and it is in order to [show] this that [the word] '*sat*' is mentioned [in the sūtra]." If [the Mīmāṁsakas argue] thus, [we reply:] Even if that should be the case,

> *k. 2b*. it is by mentioning [the names of] those [objects] which are specified (*viśeṣya*) by the senses [that one should indicate the counterparts].

Only those objects of the senses which are specified [by the corresponding senses, i.e., color (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), etc.,] are properly called the counterparts of the senses. [Therefore the Sūtrakāra should have stated explicitly that man's senses are in contact with color, etc., instead of implying these counterparts of the senses ambiguously by the word "*sat*."][3]

Bc. [The Mīmāṁsakas may argue as follows:] "Here, [in the sūtra, not merely the contact of the senses with objects, such as color, but] also the contact of the soul (*ātman*) with the mind (*manas*) [and that of the mind with the senses][4] are implied [by the term 'contact.' Although mention is made of 'senses' only, 'senses' must be taken as synecdoche (*upalakṣaṇa*).[5] Therefore, the Sūtrakāra implied] by the term '*sat*' [also those factors with which the soul or the mind comes in contact] as well [as the objects of sense]." If [the Mīmāṁsakas argue] thus, [we say that] this also is untenable [because]

> *k. 2cd.* the capacity [of the soul and other factors of cognition] for contact is only [for contact] with "*sat*." This has been proved.[6]

It has been proved that the soul (*puruṣa* = *ātman*) and other factors [i.e., the mind and the senses] come in contact only with "*sat*."[7] Therefore,[8] they never operate upon "*asat*."

[The Mīmāṁsakas may cite as an example the case of a traveler in the desert who sees a mirage of water that really does not exist. This example seems to show that a sense is able to come in contact with something unreal (*asat*). Thus, they oppose our argument that the soul, mind, and senses operate only upon "*sat*."[9] However, we are ready to reply to this Mīmāṁsaka objection.] Nothing is in contact with such objects as a mirage (*mṛga-tṛṣṇā*) and the like, which appear as objects of perception[10] but do not [really] exist. Rather, [the perception of a mirage is produced through the following process:] a certain spot [in the desert] is in a peculiar condition at a certain time because of the heat of the sun. When this [spot] comes in contact with the faculty of sight,[11] there arise spontaneously the inexpressible [cognition] (*avyapadeśya*) and the illusive mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) in sequence,[12] although there is no [real] object. [Such being the case, there is no contact of the visual sense with an unreal object (*asat*) even in the case of seeing a mirage.] Therefore, to use the word "*sat*" for the purpose of excluding this [kind of contact with an unreal object (*asat*)] is not appropriate.

Bd–a. *k. 3ab.* if it [viz., the word "*sat*"] is held to mean that [object] to which a sense is bound (*śliṣṭa*) or for which a sense possesses a special aptitude (*praśastatā*)—

"A sense is said to be bound (*śliṣṭa*) to a given [object], since it does not operate on any other [object]. Therefore, the contact (*samprayoga*) [of a sense] is with that [object to which it is bound and it is this sort of contact that is implied by the expression '*sat-samprayoga*']. Also, when [the faculty of] a sense has a special aptitude (*praśastatā*) for a given [object], that [given object] is

called appropriate (*samyak*) because of its compatibility (*yogyatā*) [with the sense]. It is contact with such [an object that is meant by the expression '*sat-samprayoga*']."[13] If such is the argument [of the Mīmāṁsakas, we reply]:

> *k. 3cd.* in this matter, other things also are bound [to a sense].
> A special aptitude lies also in eye ointment (*añjana*) and the like.

The words "in this matter" [in the verse] are [used] in order to refer to the [above] argument [of the Mimāṁsakas]. [One cannot interpret the word "*sat*" along these lines to refer to the objects of a sense because] not merely the object [of a sense] but also other things, such as the atoms [constituting the sense], are bound to the sense. [Further,] if it [viz., the word "*sat*"] were held to indicate a special aptitude of the sense [for a certain object], then eye ointment (*añjana*), foot unguent (*padâbhyaṅga*), and the like would also have this aptitude.[14] It would follow therefore that perception would arise from a contact with such [materials].

Bd–b. [The Mīmāṁsakas may counter this criticism by saying:] "This conclusion does not follow for the following reason. For example, from the statement '[It is called] a cow because it goes' (*gacchatîti gauḥ*), it does not follow that other things which go are [also] cows.[15] In the same way, it is only the object [of a sense] that is [called] '*sat*' because of being bound [to the sense], not other things [which are also bound to the sense]. The same explanation should be given in the matter of special aptitude." If such an argument is made [by the Mīmāṁsakas], [we reply that] the reference is dissimilar [to the case] because

> *k. 4ab.* if they [viz., the Mīmāṁsakas] reason in this manner by virtue of the commonly known usage [of words], [we answer that] the word ["*sat*"] is not so used for the object of a sense.[16]

It is commonly known (*prasiddha*) that the word "*go*" (a cow) is applied [only] to a cow by reason of the *gamana* (going) [of a cow, although there are other things which are also characterized by *gamana*]. However, it is not commonly accepted[17] that the word "*sat*" is applied [only] to the object of a sense by reason of its being "bound" [to the sense] or because of a "special aptitude" [which the sense has for the object]. Therefore, even if it is argued [by the Mīmāṁsakas] in the above manner, it is not appropriate to use [the word] "*sat*" [in their definition].

C. *k. 4cd–5ab.* if there were direct contact [of the senses] with all objects,[18] then, inasmuch as there could be no interval [between sense and object], those cognitions which we experience

of color and sound where there is an interval or where there is an excess of size [of object over sense] would be impossible.[19]

If [it were held that] the senses come in direct contact with all objects,[20] then, in the case of color (*rūpa*) and sound (*śabda*), there would be neither apprehension from a distance nor apprehension of that which exceeds [the senses in size]; [we say this] because in the case of that [sort of object] which is not distant [from the sense], for example, odor (*gandha*), we never experience such [types of apprehension].[21]

Da. *k. 5cd–6a*$_1$. [a Mīmāṁsaka has set forth the following view:] "Apart from the assemblage (*samudāya, saṁghāta*) of causes of cognition as mentioned above, from what means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) could it [viz., a cognition] come?"[22]

The Vṛttikāra[23] holds the view that [cognition as] the result (*phala*) is different [from the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*)], and states that since there is no result other than the rise of a cognition (*buddhi-janman*), that from which a cognition arises is [to be regarded as] perception (*pratyakṣa*) [as a means of cognition].[24] On this matter he adds that there is no cause (*kāraṇa*) of cognition which could be called perception apart from the contact (*samprayoga*), as mentioned above, of the soul and other factors [viz., mind, sense-organ, and object], which is accompanied by impression (*saṁskāra*).[25] This view is also untenable.

k. 6a$_2$. if it [viz., perception] were no more than this—

If merely the assemblage of the causes [of cognition] were to be called perception, [then]

k. 6b. what would be the use of [the words] "the rise of a cognition" (*buddhi-janman*) [in the sūtra]?[26]

In that case, it should have been [simply] stated [by the Sūtrakāra] that "a man's sense and other factors [viz., mind and soul] which are in contact with something existent are perception." Since you take it [viz., the assemblage of the causes of cognition] to be "that from which there arises [the cognition]," what would be the use of the words "the rise of a cognition" (*buddhi-janman*) [in the sūtra's definition]?[27]

Db. Furthermore,

k. 6cd–7ab. in case the contact of object, sense, mind, and soul, as accompanied by impression, were [to be held] to produce a cognition, why should the expression "*pratyakṣa*" [which singles out the sense (*akṣa*) alone] be applied to the assemblage [of all these factors]?

The assemblage of all these [causes of cognition cannot be called "*pratyakṣa*" since it] does not function in close connection with each sense (*akṣam akṣam prati vartate*).[28]

[Against this criticism the Vṛttikāra may object as follows:] "Even that contact of sense and object which has been recognized [by you] as '*pratyakṣa*'[29] does not function in close connection with the sense since it resides in both [factors, i.e., sense and object]." [In answer to this objection, we say that] one should not think thus. [As we have already stated, the contact of sense and object can properly be called "*pratyakṣa*" for the reason that the sense alone is the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) of perception.][30]

Dc. "Perception is that by means of which an ascertainment (*niścaya*) in the form of 'this is a cow' or 'this is a horse' arises in regard to 'this' [immediately perceived object]."[31] This statement [of the Mīmāṁsakas] is also untenable.

> *k. 7cd–8ab.* one cognizes an object as a cow or the like when it is associated with cow-ness (*gotva*) and other such [qualifiers]. [But] sense-cognition (*akṣa-buddhi*) has no ability (*śakti*) to bring about the association [of the qualifier] with the [perceived] thing. [Therefore, sense-cognition cannot result in the ascertainment of an object.]

According to your view, sense-cognition is able to perceive cow-ness (*gotva*) and also to perceive the [thing which is the] abode (*āśraya*) of that cow-ness,[32] but not to relate them together.[33] Insofar as there is no relation [between them], there cannot be the ascertainment of [an object as] a cow, etc. [by perception]. Therefore, in all cases of [our cognizing] a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) with a qualified (*viśeṣya*) or a name (*abhidhāna*) with an object named (*abhidheya*), there is [involved] a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) produced by the mind (*manas*), which ascribes identity (*abhedôpacāra*) [to the two factors],[34] and [there is] not sense-cognition. If you ask why, [we reply:]

> The object of the sense (*indriya-gocara*) is the form (*rūpa*) which is to be cognized [simply] as it is (*svasaṁvedya*) and which is inexpressible (*anirdeśya*).[35]

Although the object of the sense is [conceived through conceptual construction as] the possessor of many properties,[36] it appears to the sense as something particular (*asādhāraṇa*). Therefore, it [viz., the object] is a cause of the rise of a cognition which possesses the form of that [particular object]. This [object of the sense] is, as it were, [a part of] the cognition itself, and [therefore] is self-cognizable.[37] It is impossible to describe this [object] as having such and such a nature because what is expressible is that which possesses a universal for its object.

Dd. Furthermore, if a thing were to become the object of sense-perception in its universal aspect also, then everything would be the object [of a sense].

> *k. 8cd.* if it [viz., sense-cognition] were established as a cognition of a thing in all its aspects, then it could not be called perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa-buddhi*).[38]

The word "*pratyakṣa*" (perception) may be applied to a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), to a cognition (*jñāna*), and to an object (*viṣaya*).[39] Of these [three applications] the application to a means of cognition is primary (*mukhya*), to the others secondary (*upacāra*). Among these [secondary applications], an object is called "*pratyakṣa*" in the secondary sense since it is cognized by *pratyakṣa*. Cognition is figuratively called "*pratyakṣa*" since it occurs in dependence upon the sense (*akṣaṁ prati vartate*) and therefore is equivalent to [the sense-faculty which is] a means of cognition.[40] If one apprehends by a cognition the universal aspect (*sāmānyâkāra*) of color (*rūpa*) and other [objects], then that cognition should not be [called] *pratyakṣa* [i.e., a cognition depending upon the sense (*akṣaṁ prati*)],[41] since it occurs independently of the sense by the ascription [to an unreal universal] of identity [with the object of a sense].[42]

If it were admitted that a [sense-] cognition of all aspects of a thing takes place, then there would be cognition [by a sense] of the attribute-ness (*guṇatva*) and being (*sattā*) in color and other such [things]. Consequently, there would be apprehension [by one sense] of the object of another sense, and [the presence of] many senses would be useless. This has already been discussed.[43] Therefore, the sphere within which a sense operates (*indriya-gocara*) is limited by nature to specific (*asādhāraṇa*) objects. Thus, in any case, [the Mīmāṁsā statement] "that from which a cognition arises is perception" is not appropriate.

De.

> *k. 9a.* if one holds to "the rise of cognition" (*buddhi-janman*) [as a definition of perception]—

"It is our doctrine that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is nothing but the rise of a cognition of something." Anticipating this thought [of the Mīmāṁsakas], we reply [as follows]: [If that were the case,] by those [Mīmāṁsakas] who maintain that the result is different [from the means of cognition],[44]

> *k. 9b.* a result that is different [from this means] could not be found.

If you ask why, [we answer:]

> *k. 9cd.* inasmuch as the cognition itself has arisen, there would be no result other than that [cognition].

That which results from the means of cognition is the apprehension (*adhigama*) [of an object], which, however, is nothing other than the cognition (*buddhi*)

itself. Therefore, were the cognition [itself to be regarded as] a means of cognition, there could be no result [to be distinguished from the means of cognition].

Df. *k. 10a–c.* if the "rise" (*janman*) were different from the cognition, there would be inherence (*samavāya*) [of a cognition] in its own cause (*kāraṇa*) [i.e., the soul (*ātman*)]. Even if this [inherence] were [admitted to be] a means of cognition, what [result] could come from that [inherence which is eternal]?[45]

[The Mīmāṁsakas do not define "rise" (*janman*) in their sūtras. Accordingly, what they mean by the term must be discovered from the definitions of other schools.][46] The Vaiśeṣikas hold that the "rise" (*janman*) of a result is either the inherence (*samavāya*) [of the result] in its own cause (*kāraṇa*) or the inherence of being or some other [characterizing] property in it.[47] Here in either case, it would be held [by the Mīmāṁsakas] that [sense-] cognition arises from inherence (*samavāya*),[48] whereby inherence would become *pratyakṣa* (the means of perception). However, it [viz., inherence] can never arise since it is eternal.[49] Therefore it cannot be a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) by either alternative.[50]

> *k. 10d.* if [on the other hand,] the "rise" (*janman*) were not different [from the "cognition" (*buddhi*)], then it would be useless to mention it.

If the "rise" were not different from the "cognition," the cognition itself would be perception, and it would therefore be useless to mention the term "rise."[51]

E. *k. 11ab.* if the soul (*puṁs*=*puruṣa*) should come to be modified at the time when a cognition arises, then the soul would be noneternal.[52]

If [it were maintained that] at the moment of the rise of a cognition the soul (*puruṣa*) changes its previous state and becomes a cognizer (*pramātṛ*), then the soul must be [recognized as] transient (*anitya*). This [assumption], however, is inadmissible [for the Mīmāṁsakas who maintain the eternity of the soul].

> *k. 11cd.* if [on the other hand] the soul should remain unmodified [even when a cognition arises], it could not be a cognizer (*pramātṛ*).[52]

If the soul were unchangeable, then, even at the moment of the rise of a cognition, the soul would remain the same as in its [previous] state of being a noncognizer (*apramātṛ*), and it could not be a cognizer (*pramātṛ*).[53]

Thus I have stated, concerning perception as understood by other schools, that it cannot be a means of valid cognition and that these views [of other schools] are faulty.

Notes to the Translation

NOTES

Section 1. Exposition of the Theory of Perception

1.1. *Vibhūti*, p. 518.26–27 (cf. p. 108[1]):
pramāṇa-bhūtāya jagad-dhitaiṣiṇe
praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine
pramāṇa-siddhyai sva-matāt samuccayaḥ
kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ.

PVBh, p. 3.6 and *AKV*, p. 7.5–6 quote the first half of this verse.

Dignāga and his successors are generally called the Vijñānavādins of the logical tradition (*nyāyânusāriṇo vijñānavādinaḥ*), as distinguished from the Vijñānavādins of the Scriptural tradition (*āgamânusāriṇo vijñānavādinaḥ*), by which appellation the older teachers of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school are called; see Obermiller, *The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation*, p. 99. Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid. This critical attitude he inherited from the Buddha, who used to exhort His disciples not to accept any of His words merely out of reverence but to examine them carefully, just as people examine the purity of gold by burning it in fire, cutting it, and testing it on a touchstone; see *TSP*, p. 12.19–20:
tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ
parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṁ mad-vaco na tu gauravāt.

See also Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, I, 77; Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. xl ff. Dignāga is convinced that he is following the teaching of the Buddha in expounding the theory of knowledge. He begins his treatise with a salutation to the Buddha who "is to be recognized as the personification of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa-bhūta*)"; see below, n. 1.3. It is reported by Bu-ston that Dignāga inscribed this verse on a rock in a cavern. As he recorded his praise of the Buddha and his determination to establish the true theory of knowledge, various omens are said to have appeared; see Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyuṅ) by Bu-ston*, part II, p. 150. No inscription, however, has so far been discovered to attest to the authenticity of this report. Dharmakīrti attaches great importance to this verse, by which, he thinks, the essential standpoint of the Bauddha Logicians is made clear. In *PV*, he gives a detailed explanation of each epithet of the Buddha mentioned in Dignāga's verse (see n. 1.2). In consequence, the verses discussing the *pramāṇa-siddhi* (establishment of the means of valid cognition) form a separate chapter independent of the Pratyakṣapariccheda in *PV*.

1.2. For this passage of the *Vṛtti*, see *PVBh*, p. 3.12–18: *atra bhagavato hetu-phala-sampattyā pramāṇa-bhūtatvena stotrâbhidhānaṁ śāstrâdau . . . tatra hetur āśaya-prayoga-sampat. . . . āśayo jagad-dhitaiṣitā. prayogo jagac chāsanāt śāstṛtvam. phalaṁ sva-parârtha-sampat. svârtha-sampat sugatatvena trividham artham upādāya, praśastatvaṁ surūpavat* [text: *svarūpavat*], *apunarāvṛtty-arthaṁ sunaṣṭa-jvaravat, niḥśeṣârthaṁ supūrṇa-ghaṭavat. parârtha-sampat jagat-tāraṇāt tāyitvam. . . . evaṁ-bhūtaṁ bhagavantaṁ praṇamya . . . pramāṇâdhīno hi prameyâdhigamo . . .* See also *ibid.*, pp. 115.31–32, 116.5–6.

The following table sums up Dignāga's praise of the Buddha as expressed in *k. 1* and its *Vṛtti*. The figures in parentheses indicate the verses of *PV*, II, dealing with the same topic.

- *bhagavat* = *pramāṇa-bhūta* (3–36)
  - *hetu-sampad*
    - *āśaya-sampad* ‖ *jagad-dhitaiṣitā* (36–133ab)
    - *prayoga-sampad* ‖ *śāstṛtva* (133cd–141ab)
  - *phala-sampad*
    - *svârtha-sampad* ‖ *sugatatva* (141ab–147ab)
    - *parârtha-sampad* ‖ *tāyitva* (147cd–282ab)

See M. Nagatomi, "The Framework of the Pramāṇavārttika, Book I," *JAOS*, 79, 266; E. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's," *Asiatica: Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig, 1954, p. 143.

1.3. The term "*pramāṇa-bhūta*" is used in a double sense. First, it means "authoritative" or "standard," and in this sense the Buddha (Bodhisattva Siddhārtha) is called "*pramāṇa-bhūta*" in the *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmann, pp. 319.3 ff.: *atha khalu . . . sthāvarā-nāma mahā-pṛthivī-devatā . . . bodhisattvam etad avocat . . . tvam eva sadevakasya lokasya parama-sākṣī-bhūtaḥ pramāṇa-bhūtaś cêti.* Dignāga characterizes the authoritativeness of the Buddha as *hetu-phala-sampad.* Second, it has the more technical meaning, "to have come into existence" (*bhūta*) as a "means of valid cognition" (*pramāṇa*). According to Jinendrabuddhi, the Buddha has a similarity (*sādharmya*) to *pramāṇa*, since he is *avisaṁvāda* and has made known the truth of *catur-ārya-satya* which was not known, just as *pramāṇa*s are *avisaṁvāda* and make known an unknown object (*anadhigatârtha-gantṛ*). He further remarks that "*-bhūta*" affixed to "*pramāṇa*" is meant to reject *īśvara* and other *pramāṇa*s which are maintained by others to be eternal (*abhūta* = *nitya*); see *PST*, 2a.3 ff. (2b.4 ff.). See also *PVV*, p. 9.11 ff.: "*tadvat pramāṇaṁ bhagavān*" (*PV*, II, 9a). *tadvat bhagavān pramāṇam, yathâbhihitasya satya-catuṣṭayasyâvisaṁvādanāt tasyaiva parair ajñātasya prakāśanāc ca. yady evaṁ namaskāra-śloke pramāṇāyêty evâstu "pramāṇa-bhūtāya" iti kim artham ity āha, "abhūta-vinivṛttaye bhūtôktiḥ"* (*PV*, II, 9b–c). *bhūta-śabda-nirdeśo 'bhūtasya nityasya nivṛtty-arthaṁ nityam pramāṇaṁ nāstîty arthaḥ*;

Vibhūti, p. 10[2]: *nityam īśvaraṁ Naiyāyikāḥ āhuḥ, āsaṁsāram ekam pratisattvaṁ buddhiṁ pramāṇam āhuḥ Sāṁkhyāḥ.*

1.4. *Sugata* (*lit.*, well-gone) is counted among the ten titles of the Buddha in the sense that He has well attained the enlightenment; see *Mvy.*, 1–10. This title of the Buddha is explained here as implying His three merits—*praśastatā*, *apunarāvṛttitva*, and *niḥśeṣatā*—which are, respectively, the attributes of *surūpa*, *sunaṣṭa-jvara*, and *supūrṇa-ghaṭa*, each of which contains the prefix "*su-*" as in "*su-gata.*" See *PVV*, p. 59.7–8: *su-śabdasya trividho 'rthaḥ, praśastatā surūpavat, apunarāvṛttiḥ sunaṣṭa-jvaravat* [text: *anaṣṭa-*°], *niḥśeṣatā ca supūrṇa-ghaṭavat* [text: *apūrṇa-*°]; *DhP*, p. 3.11 ff. See also *PV*, II, 141cd–147ab. Manorathanandin explains that *praśastatā* distinguishes the Buddha from *bāhya-vīta-rāgas*, *apunarāvṛttitva* from *śaikṣas*, and *niḥśeṣatā* from *aśaikṣas*; see *PVV*, p. 107.5–8: *ye laukika-bhāvanā-mārgeṇa vīta-rāgā bāhyā atattva-darśinas tebhyaḥ tattva-darśitvād adhikaḥ. ye śaikṣā abāhyāḥ parihāṇi-dharmāṇas tebhyo 'punarāvṛttyā. ye câśaikṣāḥ śrāvakā aprahīṇa-kleśa-vāsanā asākṣāt-kṛta-sarvâkāra-vastavas tebhyo niḥśeṣa-pratītyā.*

1.5. *Mahāvastu*, I, 92, 13, and *Avadānaśataka*, I, 188, 1 ff., relate the story of Surūpa, a legendary king, who, in exchange for religious instruction, gave up his son, his wife, and himself to be eaten by an ogre. His religious ardor is praiseworthy. However, here "*surūpa*" is to be taken as a common noun according to Durvekamiśra, who states, in explaining "*praśastatā*," that those who make a living by their beauty of form are called *surūpa*; see *DhP*, p. 3.15: *surūpā rūpâjīvāḥ*. Dharmakīrti explains the meaning of "*praśasta*" (<*pra-√śaṁs*, to praise) by the word "*śasta*" (< *√śas*, to destroy) in *PV*, II, 142ab:

duḥkhasya śastaṁ nairātmya-dṛṣṭeś ca yuktito 'pi vā.

1.6. There are eight classes of "sage" (*ārya-pudgala*) among the Buddhist disciples (*śrāvaka*), namely, *srotāpatti-pratipannaka*, °*-phalaka*, *sakṛdāgami-pratipannaka*, °*-phalaka*, *anāgami-pratipannaka*, °*-phalaka*, *arhat-pratipannaka*, and *arhat*. Of these, *arhat* is called *aśaikṣa*, because he has extinguished the influence of passions (*āsrava-kṣaya*) and no longer needs religious training. The other seven, who are to study further in order to attain *arhat*hood, are called *śaikṣa*; *AK*(*Bh*), ch. VI.

1.7. Among Dignāga's works now available (see my Introduction), the same theories expounded in *PS*(*V*) are found in *Abhidharmakośa-Marmadīpa* (see below, nn. 1.31–33, 39, passim), *Ālambanap.* (see below, nn. 1.61, 2.17), *Hetucakraḍamaru* (see *PS*(*V*), III, K 131a.5–132a.2, V 45b.5–46a.7 = 48b.5–49b.1), and *NMukh*. As will be noted, many verses and passages of *NMukh* are found rearranged in *PS*(*V*); see Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga.*

1.8. In each chapter of this treatise, Dignāga, after elucidating his own theory, refutes the views of the *Vādavidhi* and those of the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhyas, and Mīmāṁsakas.

1.9. The theories maintained by other schools contradict one another in their discussion of the number (*saṁkhyā*), the nature (*svarūpa*), the object (*viṣaya*, *gocara*), and the result (*phala*) of the means of cognition; see *PST*, 11b.1 (13a.4–5):

"ḥgal baḥi rtogs pa (=*viruddha-pratipatti*) ni log par rtogs pa (=*vipratipatti*) rnams te, phan tshun ḥgal baḥi mtshan ñid byed paḥi phyir ro"; *ibid.*, 11b.7 (13b.4): "de la ḥbras bu daṅ raṅ gi ṅo bo daṅ yul daṅ graṅs la log par rtogs pa bṣi rnams te." See also *TSP*, p. 366.14: *tatra pramāṇe svarūpa-phala-gocara-saṁkhyāsu pareṣāṁ vipratipattiś catur-vidhā*; *PVV*, p. 110.6; *NBT*, p. 35.1 ff. Dignāga's theory is unique on each of these four points: (1) He recognizes perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) as the only two means of cognition, and does not admit verbal testimony (*śabda*), identification (*upamāna*), etc. as independent means of cognition; see below, n. 1.11. (2) He characterizes perception as "being free from conceptual construction" (*kalpanâpoḍha*), and does not recognize determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) as a kind of perception; see below, n. 1.25. (3) He sharply distinguishes the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), which are respectively the objects of perception and inference. He denies the reality either of the universal as an independent entity or of the particular as qualified by the universal; see below, n. 1.14. (4) Rejecting the realist's distinction between the means and the result of cognition, he establishes the theory of nondistinction between the two; see below, n. 1.55.

1.10. Dignāga's statement that a clear understanding of *prameya* (=*artha*) depends upon *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇâdhīnaḥ prameyâdhigamaḥ*) has an affinity with the opening statement of *NBh*: *pramāṇato 'rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*. However, Dignāga differs radically from the Naiyāyikas in his understanding of the nature of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. While the Naiyāyikas hold the view that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are real entities (*padârtha*), Dignāga shares the Vijñānavāda view that they are of ideated character; see below, n. 1.61. The possibility of apprehending *prameya* by means of *pramāṇa* is denied by Nāgārjuna on the ground that both, being mutually conditioned, lack independent substantiality; see *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, kk. 31–33; *Vaidalya-prakaraṇa*, Peking ed., 114b.4–6. Nāgārjuna's argument is intended to reveal the transcendental truth of universal emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The Vijñānavādins, however, stress that the intuition of transcendental truth (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*, *lokôttara-*°) is reflected in empirical knowledge which apprehends wordly phenomena (*savikalpa-jñāna*, *laukika-*°). In such knowledge concerning wordly phenomena, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* must be postulated. On the basis of this Vijñānavāda doctrine, Dignāga establishes his theory of knowledge which asserts that both *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are factors immanent in knowledge itself; see below, n. 1.61. Accordingly, his theory does not conflict with Nāgārjuna's argument against the substantiality of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. A later extreme transcendentalist, Candrakīrti, makes an attack on Dignāga's proposition "*pramāṇâdhīnaḥ prameyâdhigamaḥ*," asserting that there is nothing to be apprehended in the ultimate sense; see *Prasannap.*, p. 58.14 ff., but this criticism does not fundamentally affect Dignāga's standpoint.

1.11. *PVBh*, p. 169.3; *Vibhūti*, p. 140[2]; *NC(V)*, p. 88.3 (18):
pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca pramāṇe

Dignāga gives the etymological explanation of *pratyakṣa* in *NMukh* as follows:

akṣam akṣaṁ praiti vartata iti pratyakṣam (*pratyakṣa* is so named because it occurs in close connection with [*prati*] each sense faculty [*akṣa*]); cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.17: 現現別轉故名現量, cited in *TSP*, p. 373.26; *DhP*, p. 38.26; *Prasannap.*, p. 72.1 ff. This etymology is repudiated by Candrakīrti on the ground that it could yield the absurd conclusion that cognition which has a sense-organ (*akṣa*) for its object (*prati*) is *pratyakṣa*; see *Prasannap.*, p. 72.1–3: *yas tv akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣa-śabdaṁ vyutpādayati tasya jñānasyêndriyâ-viṣayatvād viṣaya-viṣayatvāc ca na yuktā vyutpattiḥ.* (Stcherbatsky wrongly attributes Candrakīrti's citation to Praśastapāda, in *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 159, n. 4. His definition of *pratyakṣa* differs slightly from that above; see *PBh*, p. 552.28: *akṣam akṣaṁ pratītyôtpadyata iti pratyakṣam.*) The following Nyāya etymology might meet Candrakīrti's criticism: *akṣasyâkṣasya prati-viṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam* (*pratyakṣa* is the function of each sense-organ [*akṣa*] toward [*prati*] its object). Actually Dignāga bases his etymological explanation upon the Abhidharmic doctrine that perception, although caused by sense and object, is named after the sense, which is its specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*), but not after the object. The above-cited etymology in *NMukh* is preceded by "*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatvāt*" (*TSP*, p. 373.26); and Dignāga expresses the same thought in *PS*(*V*); see below, Section 1, nn. 1.32, 1.33, and Section 6, *Db*. Besides *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatva* of the sense, another reason for naming perception after the sense, viz., *āśrayatva* of the sense, is mentioned by Vasubandhu in *AK*, I, 45:

> *tad-vikāra-vikāritvād āśrayāś cakṣur-ādayaḥ*
> *ato 'sādhāraṇatvāc ca vijñānaṁ tair nirucyate.*

The idea that the sense is the basis (*āśraya*) of perception is noticed in Dharmottara's etymology of *pratyakṣa*; see *NBT*, p. 38.1; *pratyakṣam iti pratigatam āśritam akṣam* (*pratyakṣa* means that [cognition] which belongs to or rests on a sense). However, the etymologies given by Dignāga and Dharmottara cannot include such cases as *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, *yogi-pratyakṣa*, and *svasaṁvedana*, which are independent of the sense. Hence Dharmottara distinguishes between the etymological origin and the actual meaning. After offering his etymology of the term "*pratyakṣa*," he states that all sorts of direct awareness (*sākṣātkāri-jñāna*) are actually implied by the word "*pratyakṣa*"; see *NBT*, p. 38.3–6: *akṣâśritatvaṁ ca vyutpatti-nimittaṁ śabdasya, na tu pravṛtti-nimittam. anena tv akṣâśritatven-aikârtha-samavetam artha-sākṣātkāritvaṁ lakṣyate. tad eva śabdasya pravṛtti-nimittam. tataś ca yat kiṁcid arthasya sākṣātkāri-jñānaṁ tat pratyakṣam ucyate;* and *DhP*, p. 39.7–8: *atha pratigatam āśritam akṣam ity asyām api vyutpattau mānasa-svasaṁvedana-yogi-pratyakṣāṇāṁ na syāt pratyakṣa-śabda-vācyatêty āha "akṣâśritatvam . . ."*

Anumāna (*anu*-$\sqrt{}$*mā*+*ana*) literally means a means of cognition which is preceded by some other cognition. According to the Naiyāyikas, that which precedes *anumāna* is perception of a mark (*liṅga*) and of the invariable connection between this mark and its possessor (*liṅgin*); see *NBh*, ad I, i, 5: *liṅga-liṅginoḥ sambandha-darśanaṁ liṅga-darśanaṁ ca.* Thus, the prefix "*anu-*" is taken by the Naiyāyikas to mean "*paścāt*" (afterwards) or "*-pūrvaka*" (preceded by); see *NS*, I, i, 5: *tat-pūrvakaṁ trividham anumānam;* and *NBh*, ad I, i, 3: *mitena*

liṅgenârthasya paścān mānam anumānam. Dignāga, however, interprets differently the meaning of "*anu-*." His definition of *anumāna* for one's own self (*svârthânumāna*) is: "tshul gsum paḥi rtags las rjes su dpag par bya baḥi don (K: rjes su dpag paḥi don) mthoṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de ni raṅ gi don gyi rjes su dpag paḥo" (That apprehension of an object which is based upon the triple-conditioned inferential mark is *svârthânumāna*); *PSV*, II, K 109a.2–3, V 27a.5 (27b.7); see *NB*, II, 3: *tatra svârtham* (*anumānam*) *tri-rūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñānaṁ tad anumānam.* The prefix "*anu-*" is thus replaced by the ablative case-ending and is taken as implying a logical ground.

Since Dignāga regards determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), which perceives a thing as associated with a universal (*jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti*), as a kind of *anumāna*, the terms "*pratyakṣa*" and "*anumāna*" in this treatise are to be understood as standing respectively for direct, unmediated cognition or immediate awareness and indirect, mediated cognition. In translating, for the sake of convenience, I employ the term "perception" as an equivalent for *pratyakṣa*, and "inference" for *anumāna.*

1.12. The number and kinds of means of cognition recognized by different schools of Indian philosophy are as follows: the Cārvākas, one means: perception (*pratyakṣa*); the Vaiśeṣikas, two means: perception and inference (*anumāna*); the Sāṁkhyas and a branch of the Naiyāyikas, three means: verbal testimony (*śabda*), in addition to the above two; the Naiyāyikas, four means: identification (*upamāna*), together with the above three; the Prabhākara-Mīmāṁsakas, five means: implication (*arthāpatti*), in addition to the above four; the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins, six means: negation (*abhāva*), together with the above five; the Paurāṇikas, eight means; possibility (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*), together with the above six; see Randle, *Ind. Log.*, p. 305. The doctrines recognizing *aitihya*, *arthāpatti*, *sambhava*, and *abhāva* as independent means of cognition had been criticized in *NS*, II, ii, 1 ff., and in Dignāga's day, the Nyāya theory of four means of cognition was the most authoritative. Among the Bauddhas, the author of the *Fang pien hsin lun* (T. 1632, *Upāyahṛdaya* or *Prayogasāra*), a Hīnayānist preceding Nāgārjuna, admits four means as maintained by the Naiyāyikas, and the older school of the Yogācāras excludes *upamāna* therefrom, without mentioning any reason.

Dignāga does not recognize *śabda* as an independent means of cognition. According to him, the cognition derived from *śabda* indicates its own object through the "exclusion of other objects" (*anyâpoha*). This process of excluding other objects is the function of *anumāna*; see *PS*, V, *k. 1* (cited in *TSP*, p. 441.6–7, trans. in *Bud. Log.*, I, 459):

na pramāṇântaraṁ śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat
kṛtakatvâdivat svârtham anyâpohena bhāṣate.

As regards *upamāna*, Dignāga gives the following arguments: If the cognition identifying an object with its name is derived from hearsay, as, for example, from hearing the words "a *gavaya* is similar to a cow," then the process of cognizing is just the same as in the case of *śābda.* If, on the other hand, the identification of the object with its name is made by the cognizant himself, then it must be admitted that he relates two things separately perceived through the operation

of the mind. This process of cognizing through the operation of the mind is *anumāna*. Hence *upamāna* cannot be recognized as an independent means of valid cognition; see *PSV*, V, K 169b.4–5, V 78a.5–6 (84a.2–3): "re ṣig ñe bar ḥjal ba ni ba laṅ daṅ ba min dag ḥdra bar rtogs paḥi don can yin na, de la gṣan las thos nas rtogs na sgra las byuṅ ba yin la, raṅ ñid kyis yin na ni don gñis tshad ma gṣan gyis rtogs na, yid kyis ḥdra bar rtog par byed pa yin la, de yaṅ tshad ma gṣan ma yin no." In this way, Dignāga includes *śabda* and *upamāna* in *anumāna*, and admits *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* as the only two means of valid cognition; see *NMukh*, p. 3b.10–11: 唯有現量及與比量. 彼聲喻等攝在此中. 故唯二量.

In respect to the number of *pramāṇa*s, the Vaiśeṣikas are in accord with Dignāga. However, it should be noted that there is an inconsistency in the Vaiśeṣika theory of two *pramāṇa*s. The Vaiśeṣikas claim that determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* in later terminology), which results from the association of a determinant with an immediate sense-datum, is a kind of *pratyakṣa* (*VS*, VIII, 6–7). On the other hand, they regard *śabda*, the apprehension of an object by means of words, as a kind of *anumāna* (*VS*, IX, 18–19). Dignāga bases his theory of two *pramāṇa*s on a radical distinction between two *prameya*s (see below, n. 1.14). His theory which is consistently logical may be clearly distinguished from the Vaiśeṣika theory.

1.13. *Vibhūti*, p. 140[2]; *PVBh*, p. 213.6; *NC*(*V*), p. 88.3 (20):
lakṣaṇa-dvayam
prameyam . . .

See also *PV*, III, 1a–b_1: *mānaṁ dvividhaṁ viṣaya-dvaividhyāt* and *PV*, III, 63:
na pratyakṣa-parokṣābhyāṁ meyasyânyasya sambhavaḥ
tasmāt prameya-dvitvena pramāṇa-dvitvam iṣyate.

1.14. *PVV*, p. 132.7–8; *PVBh*, p. 169.9: *na hi sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyām anyat* [*aparam* in *PVBh*] *prameyam asti*. *PVBh*, p. 169.9–10: *sva-lakṣaṇa-viṣayaṁ hi pratyakṣaṁ sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ*. I have inserted the particle "*hi*" on the authority of *PST*, 14b.2–3 (16b.6–7): "*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ni* ṣes pa la sogs pas te, *ni*ḥi sgra ni ṅes par gzuṅ baḥi don can no. raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can mṅon sum kho na daṅ spyiḥi mtshan ñid kyi yul can rjes su dpag pa kho na ste." Cf. *NC*(*V*), p. 88.3–89.1 (p. 88.18–24): *na hi sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti. sva-lakṣaṇa-viṣaya-niyataṁ pratyakṣam, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣaya-niyatam anumānam.* By the expression "*pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ*," Dignāga means that he will deal with the distinction between *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* at the beginning of *PS*(*V*), ch. II; cf. K 109a.4–109b.5, V 27a.7–27b.7 (27b.8–28b.2).

According to the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas, every existing thing, with the exception of the extreme universal (*para-sāmānya*) and the extreme individual (*antya-viśeṣa*), possesses both generality (*jāti* = *sāmānya*) and individuality (*vyakti*). In perceiving a thing, one perceives it, at the first moment, vaguely, without differentiating *jāti* and *vyakti* [*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*], but later on, determinately, conjoining differentiated *jāti* and *vyakti* [*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*]. Dignāga does not assent to this view. He makes an essential distinction between

sva-lakṣaṇa and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, the former being the particular individuality which can never be generalized or conceptualized and the latter being the universal which is conceptually constructed by the mind through generalizing from many individuals without regard for their particularity. The former is real, while the latter lacks reality. As each is incompatible with the other, there cannot be anything which possesses both *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* at the same time. Corresponding to this essential distinction between two kinds of *prameya*, there is a radical distinction between the two means of cognition (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*): *pratyakṣa* which grasps *sva-lakṣaṇa* exclusively and *anumāna* which grasps *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* exclusively. This theory is evidently set up in opposition to the Nyāya view of the coalescence of different means of cognition (*pramāṇa-samplava*), i.e., the view that the same object can be cognized by any of the four kinds of *pramāṇa*; see *NBh*, ad I, i, 3. The elaborate arguments made by Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra on this point are precisely traced by Stcherbatsky, and no further remark is necessary here; see *Bud. Log.*, II, 301 ff.

Dharmakīrti sets up the following criteria to distinguish *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*: *sva-lakṣaṇa* (a) has a power to produce effects (*artha-kriyā-śakti*), (b) is specific (*asadṛśa*), (c) is not denotable by a word (*śabdasyâviṣayaḥ*), and (d) is apprehensible without depending upon other factors such as verbal conventions, while *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (a) has no power to produce effects, (b) is common to many things, (c) is denotable by a word, and (d) is not apprehensible without depending upon other factors such as verbal conventions; see *PV*, III, 1–2. The concept of *artha-kriyā* is unfamiliar to Dignāga. Dharmakīrti adds further detailed discussions to prove the unreality of *sāmānya*, and states that *sva-lakṣaṇa* alone is the object to be cognized in the ultimate sense; see *ibid.*, III, 53d: *meyaṁ tv ekaṁ sva-lakṣaṇam.* That there are two sorts of *prameya* implies that *sva-lakṣaṇa* is apprehended in two ways, as it is (*sva-rūpeṇa*) and as something other than itself (*para-rūpeṇa*), but not that there is real *sāmānya* apart from *sva-lakṣaṇa*. Thus, the distinction between *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is the result of a changed perspective; see *ibid.*, III, 54cd:

tasya sva-para-rūpābhyāṁ gater meya-dvayaṁ matam.

1.15. For this passage of the *Vṛtti*, see *PVBh*, p. 227.8: *yat tarhîdam anityâdibhir ākārair varṇâdi gṛhyetaitat katham*; *Vibhūti*, p. 140[2]: *yat tarhîdam . . . gṛhyate 'sakṛd vā*; *ibid.*, p. 139[3]: *asakṛd vā.* On the basis of these fragments, the original may be reconstructed as: *yat tarhîdam . . . gṛhyate 'sakṛd vā tat katham.*

1.16. The meaning of the question raised here is as follows: In seeing a patch of color which exists momentarily and then disappears, one has a cognition of the noneternity of color (*varṇasyânityatā*). Similarly, in hearing a fading sound, one has a cognition of the noneternity of sound (*śabdasyânityatā*). Cognitions of this sort cannot be *pratyakṣa*, because *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, i.e., noneternity, is cognized. Nor can they be *anumāna*, because there is no inferential mark (*liṅga*) from which the noneternity of color, sound, etc. is to be inferred. Hence the need for admitting the third *prameya*, in which *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* are combined. Cf. *PV*, III, 76:

prameya-niyame varṇânityatā na pratīyate
pramāṇam anyat tad-buddhir vinā liṅgena sambhavāt.

1.17. This question refers to the case in which a man who has perceived a fire before, upon perceiving its smoke, has re-cognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of the same fire. This process of re-cognizing the same fire is not *pratyakṣa*, since the re-cognition is produced by perceiving the mark (*liṅga*), smoke. But it is not *anumāna* either, because what is re-cognized is the particular fire, and not fire in general, as inferable from the mark, smoke. In this regard, the Sāṁkhyas set forth the theory of *viśeṣa-dṛṣṭam anumānam*, and say that the particular is inferable from its likeness (*sāmya*) to the particular (*viśeṣa*) perceived before (*dṛṣṭa*); cf. *PST*, 17a.3 (19b.6): "gaṅ gi phyir *graṅs can pas* khyad par mthoṅ ba rjes su dpag paḥi mtshan ñid du brjod de"; *ibid.*, Peking ed., 141b.7–8: "rjes su dpag pa rnams pa gñis ṣes pa ste, de la khyad par mthoṅ ba ni, gaṅ gi tshe me daṅ du ba ḥbrel pa mthoṅ nas, du ba de kho nas me de kho naḥi yaṅ daṅ yaṅ du me de kho na ḥdiḥo ṣes yod pa ñid du rtogs par byed paḥo"; Frauwallner, "Klass. Sāṁkh.," p. 90. This type of *anumāna* is called by Śabarasvāmin *pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa-sambandham anumānam* as distinguished from *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa-sambandham anumānam* (see *ŚBh*, p. 10.11–15), and, according to Kumātila, it was expounded by Vindhyavāsin (*ŚV*, Anumāna, 141–143, quoted in *TSP*, ad *TS*, 1443–1445). Dignāga's theory of a sharp distinction between the objects of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* is hardly applicable to the case of re-cognition. Cf. *PST*, 15a.1–3 (17a.6–17b.1); *PV*, III, 77a–c:

viśeṣa-dṛṣṭe liṅgasya sambandhasyâpratītitaḥ
tat pramāṇântaram . . .

1.18. *Vibhūti*, p. 140²:

. . . tasya saṁdhāne na [text: *saṁdhānena*] *pramāṇântaram . . .*

1.19. *PVBh*, p. 236.13–14: *sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyāṁ hy avyapadeśya-varṇatvābhyāṁ varṇādi gṛhītvânityatayā cânityaṁ varṇâdîti manasā saṁdhatte.* Cf. *PVV*, p. 140.9–12: "*yojanād varṇa-sāmānye nâyaṁ doṣaḥ prasajyate*" (*PV*, III, 79cd). *vikalpakena jñānenânityatāyā* "*varṇa-sāmānye yojanād ayaṁ*" *sāmānya-viśeṣâtmaka-prameya-grāhaka-pramāṇântarâbhyupagama-lakṣaṇo* "*doṣo na prasajyate.*" *na hi viśeṣo 'nityatayā yojyate . . .*

1.20. *Vibhūti*, p. 140²; *PVBh*, p. 242.29:

. . . na ca
punaḥ punar abhijñāne.

See *TAV*, p. 56.9: . . . *punaḥ punar abhijñānaṁ* [text: *abhidhānaṁ jñānaṁ*] *na pramāṇam.*

1.21. Dharmakīrti denies the possibility of re-cognizing the particular *viśeṣa* on the ground that it is in a state of flux. Further, he points out that the object of *viśeṣa-dṛṣṭam anumānam* is not *viśeṣa*, inasmuch as it is grasped through *dṛṣṭa-sāmya*; see *PV*, III, 118:

viśeṣa-pratyabhijñānaṁ na pratikṣaṇa-bhedataḥ
na vā viśeṣa-viṣayaṁ dṛṣṭa-sāmyena tad-grahāt.

and III, 119–122; *PST*, 17b.1 ff. (20a.5 ff.). The Naiyāyikas do not admit re-cognition as valid knowledge, since, like recollection (*smṛti*), it is produced only

by an impression (*saṁskāra*) of past experience, and is not dependent upon any *pramāṇa*.

1.22. *Vibhūti*, p. 140[2]; *PVBh*, p. 242.29:
aniṣṭhâsakteḥ smṛtâdivat.

1.23. *PST*, 17a.7 (20a.3): "*dran pa kho na dran paḥo* ṣes pa dṅos po la kta byas paḥi phyir ro." According to a rule of Pāṇini, participles in "*-ta*," when used in the neuter gender, are admitted as nouns of action; *Pāṇ.*, III, iii 114: *napuṁsake bhāve ktaḥ* (ex., *hasitam*, *jalpitam*). Metri causa, "*smṛta*" is used instead of "*smṛti*" in the verse.

1.24. See *TAV*, p. 56.8–9: *yad uktam "smṛtîcchā-dveṣâdivat pūrvâdhigata-viṣayatvāt punaḥ punar abhijñānaṁ* [text: *abhidhānaṁ jñānaṁ*] *na pramāṇam" iti . . .*

The Bauddhas are in concert with the Mīmāṁsakas in defining *pramāṇa* as *anadhigatârtha-gantṛ pramāṇam* [*pramāṇa* is the agent of apprehension of an object which is not yet apprehended]; see *PST*, 17a.5 (20a.1): "ma rtogs paḥi don rtogs par byed pa po tshad maḥo"; *NBT*, p. 19.2: *ata eva cânadhigata-viṣayaṁ pramāṇam.* This definition is criticized by Akalaṅka as follows: A lamp at the moment of being lit possesses the same capacity to illuminate objects as the lamp at a later moment. Likewise, the capacity of a cognition to apprehend an object is the same, whether it be the first moment of the cognition or a later moment. Just as the lamps at different moments are equally called "lamp," so the cognitions apprehending the same object at different moments should be equally recognized as "*pramāṇa*." Had the Bauddhas' statement that the object, being in a state of flux, is renewed in each moment successfully vindicated their definition of *pramāṇa* as "*anadhigatârtha-gantṛ pramāṇam*," Dignāga's statement that the re-cognition of the same object is not *pramāṇa* would have proved improper; see *TAV*, p. 56.1–9. Vācaspatimiśra also rejects the above definition of *pramāṇa* for the reason that it cannot include a case in which a stable object is cognized by a series of perceptions (*dhārāvāhika-vijñāna*); see *NVTT*, p. 21.6 ff.

1.25. *Vibhūti*, p. 174[1]; *TAV*, p. 53.29:
pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham.

Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.14: 現量除分別 ; *NV*, p. 41.19: *apare tu manyante "pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham" iti*; *NVTT*, p. 153.20: *samprati Dignāgasya lakṣaṇam upanyasyati—apara iti*; *NC(V)*, p. 59.2 (15–16): *ghaṭâdi-kalpanâpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣam*; *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 39.19.

Dignāga is not the first to describe *pratyakṣa* as free from *kalpanā*=*vikalpa*. Vindhyavāsin, an elder contemporary of Vasubandhu, for example, defines *pratyakṣa* as *śrotrâdi-vṛttir avikalpikā*; see *Saṁmatitarkap.*, p. 533.2; *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā*, p. 24.13; Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, pp. 145, 149, and his definition is regarded by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa as virtually identical with the Bauddha definition, cf. *NMañj*, p. 93.10–11. Dignāga, however, provides a logical basis for this definition by sharply distinguishing *sva-lakṣaṇa* from *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*; see above, n. 1.14. He does not approve of

adding any superfluous terms to *kalpanâpoḍha* in defining *pratyakṣa*; see below, Section 3, *B*.

The characteristic feature of *kalpanā*, as will be noted below (n. 1.27), consists in the association of an immediate awareness with a word. *Pratyakṣa* which is free from *kalpanā* is inexpressible by a word. Uddyotakara objects to the defining of *pratyakṣa*, which should be inexpressible, by the words "*pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham.*" He points out that neither the words "*pratyakṣa*" and "*kalpanâpoḍha*" nor the sentence "*pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham*" can denote *pratyakṣa*: if *pratyakṣa* could be denoted by either of these words or by the sentence, it could not be free from *kalpanā*. He further observes that, if the word "*kalpanâpoḍha*" were held to mean "inexpressible in its specific feature" (*svarūpato na vyapadeśyam*), then everything would be regarded as *pratyakṣa*, because a word expresses only the general feature (*sāmānyâkāra*) of a thing and not its specific feature (*viśeṣâkāra = svarūpa*). However, it would not be proper to say that a thing is "inexpressible" because its specific feature is inexpressible. A brāhmaṇa may be spoken of by the word "man," although this word does not express his specific feature. On the other hand, it would be self-contradictory to assert that the specific feature of *pratyakṣa* is expressed by the word "*kalpanâpoḍha*," since "*kalpanâpoḍha*" signifies that the specific feature of *pratyakṣa* is inexpressible. Lastly, if the word "*kalpanâpoḍha*" were understood to express nothing, the definition would have to be regarded as utterly useless; see *NV*, pp. 41.22–43.5. To this objection Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla give the answer: by defining *pratyakṣa* as "*kalpanâpoḍha*" it is implied that *pratyakṣa* is *avikalpaka*, but not that it is *anabhidheya*; therefore, there is no fault in describing *pratyakṣa* by the word "*kalpanâpoḍha*"; cf. *TS*(*P*), 1239–1242.

Dharmakīrti follows Dignāga in defining *pratyakṣa* as *kalpanâpoḍha* in *PV*, III, 123a, but he adds the term "*abhrānta*" to this definition in *NB*, I, 4, and *PVin*, 252b.3.

1.26. *TSP*, p. 368.23; *NV*, p. 41.19; *TAV*, p. 53.29:

. . . *nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā.*

Cf. *NC*, p. 59.2–60.1: *atha kā kalpanā. nāma-jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dravya-svarūpâpanna-vastv-antara-nirūpaṇânusmaraṇa-vikalpanā.*

1.27. *TSP*, p. 369.23–25; *NVTT*, p. 153.22–154.3: *yadṛcchā-śabdeṣu hi nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍitthêti, jāti-śabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti, guṇa-śabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti, kriyā-śabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti, dravya-śabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viṣāṇîti.*

According to Dignāga, a thing, which in itself is essentially inexpressible, comes to be expressed by a word only when it is associated with a name (*nāman*) and other factors. Conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) means nothing other than this process of associating a name, etc., with a thing. Dignāga classifies the factors to be associated with a thing for the sake of verbal designation into five categories: *nāman*, *jāti*, *guṇa*, *kriyā*, and *dravya*, which respectively function in producing *yadṛcchā-śabda*, *jāti-ś.*, *guṇa-ś.*, *kriyā-ś.*, and *dravya-ś.* His classification of *śabda* seems to have been adopted from the Vaiyākaraṇas, who classify *śabda* into four categories; cf. *MBh*, p. 19.20–21 (ad *Pāṇ*, I, i, 2, *Vārt.* 1):

catuṣṭayī śabdānāṁ pravṛttiḥ, jāti-śabdā guṇa-śabdāḥ kriyā-śabdā yadṛcchā-śabdāś caturthāḥ. As regards "*dravya-śabda*," we do not find the term in *MBh*, but Dignāga's identifying *viṣāṇin* as a *dravya* shows that he bases his explanation upon *MBh*, p. 1.6 ff., where Patañjali asks the question "*atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ?*" and then rejects a *pūrvapakṣa* as follows: *kiṁ yat tat sāsnā-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viṣāṇy-artha-rūpaṁ sa śabdaḥ? nêty āha, dravyaṁ nāma tat.* Patañjali proceeds to reject some other views: *yat tarhi tad iṅgitaṁ ceṣṭitaṁ nimiṣitaṁ sa śabdaḥ? nêty āha, kriyā nāma sā. yat tarhi tac chuklo nīlaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ kapilaḥ kapota iti sa śabdaḥ? nêty āha, guṇo nāma saḥ. yat tarhi tad bhinneṣv abhinnaṁ chinneṣv acchinnaṁ sāmānya-bhūtaṁ sa śabdaḥ? nêty āha, ākṛtir nāma sā.* Here Dignāga follows the pattern of *MBh* in his use of the terms "*kriyā*," "*guṇa*," and "*jati*" (=*ākṛti*). As a *kriyā-śabda*, "*pācaka*" is used in a verbal sense, as an infinitive, through application of *Pāṇ*, III, iii, 10: *tumun-ṇvulau kriyāyāṁ kriyârthāyām* [ex. *bhoktuṁ vrajati* = *bhojako vrajati*].

Śāntarakṣita argues that from the viewpoint of the Bauddhas, who deny the reality of such categories as *dravya*, all words are to be regarded either as arbitrary words inasmuch as they are simply products of the desire to communicate (*vivakṣā*), or as genus-words inasmuch as they stand for what is common to many individual moments or entities: even in the case of applying the name "Ḍittha" to an object, the object itself is associated with the genus "*ḍitthatva*," which is a generalization of the innumerable moments that constitute the series of the individual *Ḍittha*; see *TSP*, ad 1226. Thus Śāntarakṣita says that Dignāga is only following the general usage of words in classifying *śabda* into five categories; see *TS*, 1227–1228. Praśastapāda also classifies the qualifiers or distinguishers (*viśeṣaṇa*) of *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* into five categories, but his categories differ from those employed by Dignāga, inasmuch as they are based upon Vaiśeṣika doctrine; see *PBh*, p. 553.2–5; Randle, *Ind. Log.*, pp. 107ff.

Dignāga is close to the Vaiyākaraṇas in maintaining that conceptual construction is inseparable from verbal expression. The Vaiyākaraṇa theory of the inseparable relation between conception and word is clearly set forth in *Vākyap.*, I, 124:

> *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdânugamād ṛte*
> *anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena gamyate.*

Kamalaśīla, in explaining Śāntarakṣita's definition of *kalpanā* as "*abhilāpinī pratītiḥ*" (*TS*, 1214), quotes *Vākyap.*, I, 122:

> *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabda-vyapāśrayā*
> *yāṁ pūrvâhita-saṁskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate.*

This shows the affinity between the Vaiyākaraṇas and Dignāga's school in regard to the theory concerning the relation of *kalpanā* and verbal expression. In this respect, Dignāga differs from Vātsyāyana who distinguishes knowledge itself from the verbal designation of the object; see Randle, *Ind. Log.*, pp. 119–120.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla lay importance on the expression "*ucyate*" [(a thing . . .) is expressed (by a word)] in the above passage of *PSV*, and consider it as evidence for Dignāga's understanding of *kalpanā* as being inseparably related to word (*nāman* = *śabda*), and not to genus, etc. (*jāty-ādi*); see *TS*(*P*), 1233.

According to their interpretation, "*nāman*" in Dignāga's definition of *kalpanā* must be distinguished from "*jāty-ādi.*" They say that *jāty-ādi-yojanā* is a heretical theory which should be discarded, because *jāti*, etc., were not recognized by Dignāga as real entities. Thus they consider that Dignāga's own interpretation of *kalpanā* is *nāma-yojanā*; *ibid.*, 1219–1221. Or, even if *jāti*, etc., were admitted provisionally as entities, it must be noted that these are related to a thing only through the medium of *nāman*; *ibid.*, 1224–1225. After elaborating these arguments, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla conclude that the association with word (*nāman*) is the distinctive feature of Dignāga's definition of *kalpanā*. These arguments, however, even if they are not actually false in their conclusion, seem not to be faithful to the original thought of the above passage.

Dharmakīrti is more cautious than Dignāga in defining *kalpanā* as "a cognition of representation which is *capable of* being associated with a verbal designation"—which definition also includes the conceptual construction of infants and dumb persons who have the potentiality of verbal expression although they do not utter an actual word; cf. *NB*, I, 5: "*abhilāpa-saṁsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā*"; *PVin*, 252b.4: "rtog pa ni brjod pa daṅ ḥdrer ruṅ ba snaṅ baḥi śes pa ste." Jinendrabuddhi, taking Dharmakīrti's definition into consideration, explains as follows: "ḥdir yaṅ sbyor bar byas zin pa kho naḥi śes pa rtog pa brjod par ḥdod pa ma yin gyi, ḥo na ci ṣe na, gaṅ yaṅ sbyor bar byas zin pa ma yin pa de la yaṅ ruṅ bar snaṅ ba de yaṅ yin no"; *PST*, 18a.8–18b.1 (21a.6).

1.28. When the *kriyā-śabda* "*pācaka*" or the *dravya-śabda* "*daṇḍin*" is applied to a certain thing, the thing is distinguished by the relationship as indicated by the suffix *ṇvul* (*-aka*) or *ini* (*-in*). Jinendrabuddhi seems to push the analysis further by introducing the concept of "*śabda-pravṛtti-nimitta*" (efficient cause of verbal expression). His explanation may be summarized as follows: (1) The *bhāva-pratyaya* suffixed to *samāsa*, *kṛt*, and *taddhita* implies *kriyā-kāraka-sambandha* (the relation of action to a factor of action), and other relations. Cf. *Tattvabodhinī* ad *Siddhāntakaumudī* 1781 (=*MBh*, V, i, 119): . . . *Hari-ṭīkāyāṁ yad uktaṁ "samāsa-kṛt-taddhiteṣu sambandhâbhidhānam bhāva-pratyayena" iti.* (2) *pācaka*=*pac*+*ṇvul* is *kṛt*, and *daṇḍin*=*daṇḍa*+*ini* is *taddhita*. (3) The *bhāva-pratyaya*, when suffixed to any word, expresses the efficient cause of the application of that word to a certain thing. In support of (3), Jinendrabuddhi quotes *MBh*, V, i, 199: *yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabda-niveśaḥ tad-abhidhāne tva-talau.* Thus, his contention is that the *bhāva-pratyaya* "*-tva*" suffixed to *pācaka* or *daṇḍin* expresses the above-mentioned relation and at the same time is deemed to be the efficient cause of the application of the word "*pācaka*" or "*daṇḍin*" to a thing distinguished by that relation; cf. *PST*, 18b.5–19a.1 (21b.4–7).

1.29. *TSP*, p. 371.11–12: "*anye tv artha-śūnyaiḥ śabdair eva viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate.*"

Although the text begins with "*anye tu*," it is evident that Dignāga introduced this sentence here with the intention of making his own point clear. The Naiyāyikas and other realists are of the opinion that genus, quality, etc., which, in the preceding passage (see n. 1.27), are considered to be the factors of verbal designation, are *padârtha*s or real entities. But, according to Dignāga,

they are simply conceptual constructions denoting no real entities: what is denoted by the genus-word "cow" is not any real entity "cowness," but really the "exclusion of non-cows" (*anya-vyāvṛtti*). This point is discussed in detail in *PS*(*V*), ch. V. Cf. *TS*(*P*), 1229:

te tu jāty-ādayo nêha lokavad vyatirekiṇaḥ
ity etat pratipatty-artham "anye tv" ity-ādi varṇitam.

. . . *anya iti bauddhāḥ. artha-śūnyair iti jāty-ādi-nirapekṣair apoha-mātra-gocaraiḥ śabdaiḥ.* Cf. also *PST*, 19a.1 (21b.7–8): "*gṣan rnams ni don gyis stoṅ pa rnams kyis* ṣes pa raṅ gi lugs bzaṅ po ston te, don de rigs la sogs paḥi khyad par daṅ bral ba rnams kyis ṣes paḥi don to."

1.30. *TSP*, p. 373.26: *yatraiṣā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣam.* Cf. *Vibhūti*, p. 174[1].

1.31. *Vibhūti*, p. 175[5]; *PVBh*, p. 277.24: *atha kasmād dvayâdhīnāyām utpattau pratyakṣam ucyate na prativiṣayam.* (The reading given in the text of *PVBh*: (*vi*)*ṣayâdhīnāyam* is incorrect.)

It is generally accepted by the Bauddhas that *vijñāna* (consciousness, cognition) is dependent for its production upon the sense-organ (*indriya*) and the object (*viṣaya*); cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, 72 ff.; *ibid.*, IV, 33, 67, 86, *passim*: *cakkhuṁ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-viññāṇam*, quoted in *Ālambanap.*, ad k. 7cd; *NC*, p. 82.2–5; *Prasannap.*, pp. 6.3, 567.7–8, *passim*. In *AKBh*, Vasubandhu asks why *vijñāna* is called *cakṣur-vijñāna*, etc., in accordance with the name of the sense and not with that of the object—cf. *AKBh*, p. 12b.18 ff: 何因識起俱託二緣. 得所依名在根非境. —and gives the following answers: (1) According as the sense is strong or weak, *vijñāna* becomes clear or dim. Therefore the sense should be regarded as the basis (*āśraya*) of *vijñāna*. (2) The sense is the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*) of *vijñāna*. For example, when a man experiences a visual perception (*cakṣur-vijñāna*), its specific cause must be his own visual sense (*cakṣur-indriya*), since the object, *rūpa*, etc., is the cause of visual perception in other persons too, as well as of mental perceptions (*mano-vijñāna*) in himself and others. For these two reasons, *vijñāna* is named after the sense and not after the object; cf. *AK*, I, 45:

tad-vikāra-vikāritvād āśrayāś cakṣur-ādayaḥ
ato 'sādhāraṇatvāc ca vijñānaṁ tair nirucyate.

The question raised in the above passage is concerned with the name given to perception in general, and not with that of individual *vijñāna*. However, from *k. 4ab* and its *Vṛtti*, it is obvious that Dignāga here makes reference to *AK*(*Bh*).

Cf. *PV*, III, 191:

sākṣād vijñāna-janane samartho viṣayo 'kṣavat
atha kasmād dvayâdhīna-janma tat tena nôcyate.

PVV, p. 176.4–6 (ad *PV*, III, 191cd): "*atha dvayâdhīna-janma*" *viṣayêndriyôtpatti* "*tad*" *indriya-jñānam indriyenôcyate vyapadiśyate pratyakṣam iti. pratigatam akṣaṁ pratyakṣam indriyâśritam ity arthaḥ.* "*kasmāt*" *punar viṣayeṇa* "*nôcyate*" *prativiṣayam iti.* See also Section 6, *Db*.

1.32. *Vibhūti*, p. 177[10]; *TAV*, p. 53.30:
asādhāraṇa-hetutvād akṣais tad vyapadiśyate.

Of the two reasons given by Vasubandhu for naming *vijñāna* after the sense, the second one, *asādhāraṇa-hetutva*, is mentioned by Dignāga in the above verse. In *NMukh*, too, Dignāga says: *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatvād akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam*; cf. n. 1.11.

Dharmakīrti states that the name of a thing should be taken from its indicator (*gamaka*). For example, if a sprout is named "a sprout of barley" (*yavâṅkura*), no one would mistake it for a sprout of rice. If, on the other hand, it were named "a sprout of earth" (*pṛthivy-aṅkura*), then this name could be just as easily understood to refer to a sprout of rice as to a sprout of barley. Thus, it is the *asādhāraṇa-hetu*, that is to be regarded as the "indicator." Following Dignāga, Dharmakīrti considers that the sense (*akṣa*) is the "indicator" of a perception; cf. *PV*, III, 192:

samīkṣya gamakatvaṁ hi vyapadeśo niyujyate
tac câkṣa-vyapadeśe 'sti tad-dharmaś ca niyogyatām.

1.33. *PVBh*, p. 278.18: *viṣayo hi mano-vijñānânya-saṁtānika-vijñāna-hetutvāt sādhāraṇam*; *ibid.*, p. 278.12: *asādhāraṇena* [text: *sādhāraṇena*] *vyapadeśo dṛṣṭo bherī-śabdo yavâṅkura iti.* Cf. *AKBh*, p. 12b.26–12c.2 (*AKV*, p. 87.20 ff.): 彼及不共因　故隨根說識(*AK*, I, 45cd, cf. n. 31) . . . 及不共者謂眼唯自眼識所依. 色亦通爲他身眼識 (*anya-cakṣur-vijñānasyâpi*) 及通自他意識所取. . . 識得名隨根非境. 如鼓聲及麥芽等 (*yathā bherī-śabdo yavâṅkuraḥ*).

Candrakīrti, directly after quoting Dignāga's etymology of *pratyakṣa* (see above n. 1.11), refers to the following argument: *atha syāt, yathôbhayâdhīnāyām api vijñāna-pravṛttāv āśrayasya paṭu-mandatânuvidhānād vijñānānāṁ tad-vikāra-vikāritvād āśrayenaiva vyapadeśo bhavati, cakṣur-vijñānam iti. evaṁ yady apy artham arthaṁ prati vartate tathâpy akṣam akṣam āśritya vartamānaṁ vijñānam āśrayeṇa vyapadeśāt pratyakṣam iti bhaviṣyati. dṛṣṭo hy asādhāraṇena vyapadeśo bherī-śabdo yavâṅkura iti*; *Prasannap.*, p. 72.4–7. In the last sentence ("*dṛṣṭo hi* . . .") Candrakīrti is following Dignāga's words very closely, like him citing "*bherī-śabda*" and "*yavâṅkura*" as examples of "*asādhāraṇena vyapadeśaḥ.*" However, in the preceding lines he does not explain that the sense is *asādhāraṇa-hetu* of perception. He only makes reference to *AK*(*Bh*), I, 45ab, where Vasubandhu states that *vijñāna*, which changes (*vikāra*) as the sense grows stronger or weaker (*paṭu-mandatânuvidhāt*), is named after the sense as *cakṣur-vijñāna*, etc. Of the two reasons mentioned by Vasubandhu for naming *vijñāna* after the sense (cf. n. 1.31), Dignāga bases his argument on the second one, whereas Candrakīrti, in criticizing Dignāga's theory, quotes the first one. Thus, Candrakīrti's use of the examples is inappropriate. Uddyotakara also uses the example of "*yavâṅkura*" in his explanation of the contact of sense and object (*indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa*, *NS*, I, i, 4) as *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa* of perception; see *NV*, p. 32.22: *ṛtv-ādi-kāraṇa-saṁnidhānāt prādurbhāvann aṅkuro na ṛtv-ādibhir vyapadiśyate 'pi tv asādhāraṇena bījena vyapadiśyate yavâṅkura iti.* See also *AKV*, p. 87.23–28; *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti* (G.O.S. No. 38), p. 35.19 ff.

1.34. That *pratyakṣa* is free from conceptual construction is proved by *pratyakṣa* itself, that is to say, by *svasaṁvedana*. See *PV*, III, 123ab:

pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati.

Dharmakīrti gives the following illustration: A man may have perception of a thing of color even when his mind is drawn from all external objects and remains inactive; from this fact it is self-evident that *pratyakṣa* is free from conceptual construction by the mind; *ibid.*, III, 124:

saṁhṛtya sarvataś cintāṁ stimitenântarâtmanā
sthito'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam īkṣate sâkṣajā matiḥ.

See also *PST*, 19b.6 ff. (22b.7 ff.); *TS(P)*, 1243; *Bud. Log.*, I, 151–152.

1.35. Jinendrabuddhi says here that *kalpanâpoḍhatva* of *pratyakṣa* can be established not only by *pratyakṣa* itself but also by *āgama*; *PST*, 21a.1 (24a.3). This, however, does not mean that *āgama* is an independent means of cognition.

1.36. *AKV*, p. 64.22–23; *Prasannap.*, p. 74.7–8; *NC*, pp. 60.3–61.1; *NCV*, p. 81.20: *cakṣur-vijñāna-samaṅgī nīlaṁ vijānāti no tu nīlam iti* [*nohati* instead of *no tu* in *AKV*, Wogihara ed., but *AKV*, N. N. Law ed. (Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 31) p. 74.23 reads *no tu*].

The expression "*nīlaṁ vijānāti*" implies that one has an immediate awareness of the object itself. On the other hand, "*nīlam iti vijānāti*" implies that one forms a perceptual judgement by associating a name with the object perceived. Thus, the above Abhidharma passage expresses the thought that perception is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanâpoḍha*). Kamalaśīla claims that the expressions "*nīlaṁ vijānāti*" and "*no tu nīlam iti* (*vijānāti*)" imply respectively that perception is nonerroneous (*abhrānta*) and that it is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanâpoḍha*); see *TSP*, p. 12.21–24: *tatra pratyakṣasya lakṣaṇaṁ bhrānti-kalpanābhyāṁ rahitatvam, tac ca bhagavatôktam eva. yad āha—"cakṣur-vijñāna-samaṅgī* [text: °-*saṅgī*] . . . " *tathā hi nīlaṁ vijānātîty anenâviparīta-viṣayatva-khyāpanād abhrāntatvam uktam, no tu nīlam ity anena nāmânuvid-dhârtha-grahaṇa-pratikṣepāt kalpanā-rahitatvam.* It is obvious that he hopes by this interpretation to find support in the Abhidharma passage for the definition of *pratyakṣa* given in *NB*, I, 4: *pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham abhrāntam*, which he adopts, following Śāntarakṣita, cf. *TS(P)*, 1214. The same interpretation is given in *NB-Pūrvapakṣasaṁkṣepa*; see La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannap.*, p. 74, n. 6.

1.37. *NC(V)*, p. 61.4 (19–20): *arthe 'rtha-saṁjñī, na tv arthe dharma-saṁjñī.*

The term "*dharma*" implies particular *citta-viprayukta-saṁskāra-dharma*s, namely, *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*; *NC(V)*, p. 62.3 (18–25): *evam abhidharme uktam "dharmo nāmôcyate nāma-kāyaḥ pada-kāyo vyañjana-kāyaḥ"*; *PST*, 21a.2–4 (24a.4–6). To have *dharma-saṁjñā* in respect to an object means to apprehend the object by its name. On the other hand, *artha-saṁjñā* means *artha-svarūpa-saṁjñā*. Thus, the distinction between *artha-saṁjñā* and *dharma-saṁjñā* corresponds to the distinction between "*nīlaṁ jānāti*" and "*nīlam iti jānāti.*"

1.38. *NCV*, p. 79.15–16: *yat tarhîdaṁ "saṁcitâlambanāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyā" iti tat kathaṁ yadi tad ekato na vikalpayati.* Cf. *PVV*, p. 176.20: *nanu "saṁcitâ-*

lambanāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyā" iti siddhāntaḥ; *NC*(*V*), p. 64.1 (13–14): *uktaṁ vo 'bhidharma eva "saṁcitâlambanāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyāḥ.*" Cf. also *NCV*, pp. 65.18, 80.27, 102.5.

In *Ālambanap.*, kk. 1–5, as well as in *Viṁś*, k. 11 and *Vṛtti*, and *TriṁśBh*, ad k. 1, realists are divided into three groups according to their theories concerning the object of cognition (*ālambana*). The first group maintains that the object of cognition is a *dravya* (substance), viz., an individual atom (*paramâṇu*) or an *avayavin* (a substance possessing parts), the second that it is the aggregate (*saṁcita*) of atoms, and the third that it is the gathering (*saṁghāta*) of atoms. It is obvious that the theory here referred to is that of the second group, which is reported by Kuei-chi to be the Vaibhāṣikas; see *Wei shih êrh shih lun shu chi*, T. 1834, p. 992c.8–10. In explaining the theory of the second group, Sthiramati (*TriṁśBh*, p. 16.20–21) and Vinītadeva (*Ṭīkā* on *Viṁś*, Peking ed., *Tib. Trip.*, no. 5566, 219b.1) quote the sentence "*saṁcitâlambanāḥ* . . ." The same *siddhānta* is referred to as follows in *AKBh* p. 12a.26–28: 傳說...五識決定積集多微方成所依所緣性故 (*saṁcitâśrayâlambanatvāt*, *AKV*, p. 86.9–10).

1.39. *AKBh*, ad I, 10 (quoted in *NC*, p. 78, n. 5 from a yet unpublished manuscript, which is being deciphered by P. Pradhan. Chinese version, p. 3a.9–11); *AKV*, p. 28.10–16; *PVBh*, p. 280.7–8; *NC*, pp. 86.2, 93.3; *NCV*, p. 79.18: *āyatana-svalakṣaṇam praty ete svalakṣaṇa-viṣayā na dravya-svalakṣaṇaṁ prati.*

In this sentence, *āyatana* stands for *bāhyâyatana*, i.e., a gross form which is perceivable by the sense-organ, while *dravya* stands for an individual atomic element. See *PST*, 21a.7–21b.1 (24b.2–3); *Vibhūti*, p. 176[4]: *yac ca Vasubandhunôktam āyatana-svalakṣaṇaṁ cakṣur-grāhyatvâdi tat prati jñānāni svalakṣaṇa-viṣayāṇi, na dravya-svalakṣaṇam* [text: *dravyaṁ sva*°] *praty eka-paramâṇu*(*m*).

In *AKBh*, after enumerating the varieties of *rūpa*, Vasubandhu says that eye-perception is caused sometimes by a single *dravya* (here *dravya* does not mean an atom, since a single atom is invisible), as in the case of perceiving something blue, and sometimes by many *dravya*s, as in the cases of perceiving from a distance a military array, a collection of jewels, etc.; see *AKBh*, ad I, 10 (Chinese version, p. 3a.3–6): *yad etad bahu-vidhaṁ rūpam uktaṁ tatra kadācid ekena dravyeṇa cakṣur-vijñānam utpadyate yadā tat-prakāra-vyavacchedo bhavati, kadācid bahubhir yadā na vyavacchedaḥ tadyathā senā-vyūham aneka-varṇa-saṁsthānaṁ maṇi-vyūhaṁ vā dūrāt paśyataḥ.* It may be argued that, inasmuch as sense-cognitions are caused by many objects, they could be considered to take *sāmānya* for their object and not *svalakṣaṇa*; *ibid.* (Chinese version, p. 3a.9–10): *nanu caivaṁ samastâlambanatvāt sāmānya-viṣayāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyāḥ prāpnuvanti, na svalakṣaṇa-viṣayāḥ.* Thus, Vasubandhu claims in the above-cited passage that the object of sense-cognition is to be regarded as *svalakṣaṇa*, even when it is formed by many elements.

1.40. *PVBh*, p. 279.10; *PVV*, p. 176.20–21; *NC*, p. 93.5; *NCV* (p. 86.9), 89.27 (p. 94.12), pp. 97.26–27, 99.26–27, 102.24–25:

tatrânekârtha-janyatvāt svârthe sāmānya-gocaram.

In this verse, "*anekârtha*" means the atoms in aggregation or the things forming a group, which are called *saṁcita* or *āyatana-svalakṣaṇa* in the

preceding Abhidharma passages. The sense-organ does not take a single atom nor a single member of the group for its object, but grasps many atoms or things simultaneously. Thus, the object of the sense is the totality of individual atoms or things. The word "*sāmānya*" in this verse implies this totality, but not the *sāmānya* which is assumed by the Naiyāyikas and others to exist over and beyond the individuals.

This idea of Dignāga's is fully elaborated by Dharmakīrti in *PV*, III, 194-230, on the basis of the Sautrāntika theory that individual atoms, which are imperceptible, come to possess, when they gather together, a pre-eminent quality (*atiśaya*), which enables them to present a certain form in a cognition. See also *AbhD*, k. 317.

1.41. *NC*, pp. 86.10, 93.6; *NCV*, p. 91.9–10: *aneka-dravyôtpadyatvāt tat svâyatane sāmānya-gocaram ity ucyate, na tu bhinneṣv abheda-kalpanāt.*

Mallavādin vehemently attacks the thought that the sense-cognition is caused by "*anekârtha*" or that it takes "*sāmānya*" for its object; see *NC*, p. 86.6 ff. The main points of his arguments are as follows: (1) The cognition which takes *sāmānya* for its object is not *pratyakṣa*. If it were admitted as *pratyakṣa*, then it would follow that *anumāna* also would be a type of *pratyakṣa*, since it has *sāmānya* for its object. (2) The expression "*svârthe sāmānya-gocaram*" incurs a self-contradiction, like the expression "my father is a pure celibate," because "*svârtha*" of the sense-organ is *svalakṣaṇa* which is perceived immediately, whereas "*sāmānya*" is to be cognized only through an inferential mark. (3) If "*sāmānya*" were held as the object of *pratyakṣa*, then there would be no *svalakṣaṇa*. Thus the theory of the radical distinction between the two *pramāṇa*s would become baseless. Two *pramāṇa*s would apprehend the same *prameya*, or *pratyakṣa* would be regarded as a kind of *anumāna*. (4) When we perceive "*anekârtha*," for example, many leaves on a tree, they are perceived as individuals, each possessing its own color and shape, but not as a "*sāmānya*" different from individual leaves. There is no such "*sāmānya*" that is distinct from individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) and might be called "*saṁghāta*," "*avayavin*," etc. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that "*sāmānya*" becomes the object of *pratyakṣa*. (5) "*Sāmānya*" as the aggregate (*saṁcaya*) of atoms is unable to produce a cognition, since the aggregate of atoms, according to Dignāga, is an empirical reality (*saṁvṛti-sat*) distinct from a real entity (*dravya*=*paramârtha-sat*), which alone has the faculty of producing a cognition. (6) Granted that a cognition takes the aggregate of atoms for its object, that cognition cannot be recognized as *pratyakṣa*, because a cognition of an empirical reality (*saṁvṛti-saj-jñāna*) is a kind of *pratyakṣâbhāsa*; see below n. 1.53. (7) If *pratyakṣa* were caused by "*anekârtha*," then it would be indistinguishable from *anumāna*, since the latter is also produced from "*anekârtha*," that is to say, from an inferential mark, etc. After raising these objections to *k. 4cd*, Mallavādin proceeds to criticize Dignāga's examinations of the theories concerning the object of cognition. In Section 2 as well as in *Ālambanap.*, Dignāga repudiates the theories (1) that the object of cognition is the aggregate (*saṁcita*) of atoms, (2) that it is the gathering (*saṁghāta*) of atoms, and (3) that it is a single atom; see Section 2, *D–Dc* and n. 2.17. Mallavādin points out the inconsistency of Dignāga's views

set forth here in *k. 4cd* and in Section 2. The thought expressed in *k. 4cd* is that many atoms in aggregation or things forming a group are perceived at once as a variegated whole, but not as a single entity distinct from individuals. This thought is close to the theory (2) repudiated in Section 2 and in *Ālambanap.*, which is called "*anekâkārârtha-vāda*" by Jinendrabuddhi; see Section 2, n. 2.20.

1.42. I have emended K to conform to *PST*, 22b.2 (25b.6–7): "*smras paḥaṅ* (*āha ca*) ṣes pa . . ." K is close to V, which may be reconstructed as "*tam evārtham āha.*" But *k.* 5 does not express exactly the same thought as that of the preceding passages. Jinendrabuddhi states: setting aside the wrong views in respect to the object [of perception], [the author] concludes that [perception is] *avikalpa* [in the following verse], *PST*, 22a.2–3 (25b.7): "spyod yul las log par rtogs pa bsel ṣiṅ rnam par rtog pa med pa ñid de kho na gṣuṅ ḥdsugs te."

1.43. *PVBh*, p. 298.1:

dharmiṇo 'neka-rūpasya nêndriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ
svasaṁvedyam anirdeśyaṁ rūpam indriya-gocaraḥ.

Vibhūti, p. 189[1]: *naika-rūpasya* instead of *aneka-rūpasya*, inserts *tu* after *svasaṁvedyam*. The latter half is quoted in *TSP*, p. 293.1–2, and also in *NCV*, p. 669.23, where the reading is *svalakṣaṇam* instead of *svasaṁvedyam*. This verse is identical with *NMukh*, p. 3b.18–19: 有法非一相 根非一切行 唯內證離言 是色根境界, and Dignāga repeats the latter half in Section 6, *Dc*.

When one cognizes a pot possessing blue color (*varṇa*), round shape (*saṁsthāna*), and other properties (*dharma*), this cognition is not produced directly by his sense-organ. The properties of an object are to be admitted as the products of conceptual construction. An object comes to be recognized as being of blue color only when it is excluded (*vyāvṛtta*) from non-blue things, and this process of the exclusion from other things is nothing other than conceptual construction. In the same manner, that object comes to be recognized as being of round shape, or as possessing the properties P, Q, etc., according to whether it is excluded from non-round-shaped things, or non-Ps, non-Qs, etc. Thus, many different properties of the object are mentally constructed through these exclusions from other things, and consequently the object comes to be conceived as the possessor of many properties. By the sense-organ, however, one perceives the object in itself (*svasaṁvedya*) and not in all its aspects (*na sarvathā*), i.e., as a possessor of such and such properties.

Dharmakīrti sets forth the same idea in *PV*, III, 231:

sarvato vinivṛttasya vinivṛttir yato yataḥ
tad-bhedônnīta-bhedo sā dharmiṇo 'neka-rūpatā.

and III, 232–238. See also *ibid.*, III, 108:

vyāvṛtteḥ sarvatas tasmin vyāvṛtti-vinibandhanāḥ
buddhayo 'rthe pravartante 'bhinne bhinnâśrayā iva.

1.44. See *PVBh*, pp. 252.24, 335.15: "*viśeṣaṇaṁ lakṣaṇe para-matâpekṣaṁ, sarve tv avikalpakā eva.*" K, V, and *PST*, 24a.3 (27b.1) have no equivalent for *lakṣaṇe*, but all have "ḥdir" (=*atra*) instead. Thus, originally this passage must have been: "*atra viśeṣaṇaṁ para-*° . . ." Perhaps *lakṣaṇe* is, as will be seen below, Prajñākaragupta's or his predecessor's interpretation of "*atra.*"

Jinendrabuddhi takes the term "*viśeṣaṇa*" as synonymous with *viśeṣa* (distinction) or *bheda* (division) (khyad par daṅ bye brag daṅ bye ba ṣes pa ni rnam graṅs so) and gives the following explanation: Since *pratyakṣa* has been defined above in *k. 3c* as being free from conceptual construction, it is not strictly necessary to state anew the natures of each particular sort of *pratyakṣa*. However, since wrong views are held respecting each, Dignāga has deliberately made separate mention of each with the intention of removing these wrong views; see *PST*, 24a.1–6 (27a.7–27b.5). Jinendrabuddhi also alludes to another interpretation, according to which "*viśeṣaṇa*" refers to the qualifier of *pañcêndriya-pratyakṣa*, i.e., *avikalpaka*, "being devoid of conceptual construction." There are some who maintain that *indriya-pratyakṣa* in certain cases is *savikalpaka*. It was with the view to setting aside this mistaken theory that Dignāga stated that *pañcêndriya-pratyakṣa* is *avikalpaka*. However, Jinendrabuddhi does not accept this interpretation. He says that if the qualifier "*avikalpaka*" were understood to refer to *para-mata*, then the definition of *pratyakṣa* in *k. 3c* would also be understood to refer to *para-mata* [*kalpanâpoḍha*=*avikalpaka*], and the statement of *sva-mata* could be found nowhere; *ibid.*, 24a.6–24b.2 (27b.5–28a.1).

Prajñākaragupta understands that *atra* refers to the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of *pratyakṣa* (see the above-cited passage in *PVBh*), and that *viśeṣaṇa* refers to the qualifier "*abhrānta*." Thus, his construction of this passage is as follows: the qualifier ["*abhrānta*" (nonerroneous)] in the definition [of *pratyakṣa*] is [employed] in response to the views of others, but all nonerroneous cognitions (*sarve 'bhrāntāḥ pratyayāḥ*) are, indeed, free from conceptual construction. He alternatively construes the latter half as: all cognitions which operate in the form of immediate awareness (*sarve sākṣātkaraṇâkāra-pravṛttāḥ pratyayāḥ*) are . . ., or, all cognitions caused by the senses (*sarve 'kṣa-jāḥ pratyayāḥ*) are . . ., *PVBh*, p. 252.21–28. As errors (*bhrānti*) occur only in conceptually constructed (*savikalpaka*) cognitions, "being free from conceptual construction" (*kalpanâpoḍha*) is enough to define *pratyakṣa*, from the viewpoint of *sva-mata*. But, the term "*abhrānta*" is also adopted in the definition in order to remove the prevailing wrong view that considers some *savikalpaka* cognitions as *pratyakṣa*. This interpretation by Prajñākaragupta, however, is irrelevant, since Dignāga defined *pratyakṣa* simply as *kalpanâpoḍha* and did not recognize the necessity for adding any other qualifier to it; see above, n. 1.21, and below, Section 3, *B* ff. Prajñākaragupta seems to have regarded Dharmakīrti's definition in *NB*, I, 4 (*PVin*, 252b.3)—*pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham abhrāntam*—as the standard definition of *pratyakṣa*; see *PVBh*, p. 245.13.

1.45. *PVBh*, p. 303.23; *Vibhūti*, p. 191[3]:
mānasaṁ cârtha-rāgâdi-sva-saṁvittir akalpikā.

According to Jinendrabuddhi, the compound *artha-rāgâdi-sva-saṁvitti* should be analyzed into *artha-saṁvitti* and *rāgâdi-sva-saṁvitti*; see *PST*, 24b.4–5 (28a.3–4): "*don* gyi sgra ḥdi ni śes byaḥi rnam graṅs so. ḥdod chags la sogs pa rnams kyi raṅ ni *chags la sogs raṅ* ṅo. . . . *don daṅ chags la sogs raṅ* ṅo de rig pa ni *don daṅ chags la sogs raṅ rig* pa ste." On the other hand, Prajñākaragupta takes "*sva-*" as meaning "*svarūpa*," and writes as follows: *mānasam apy artha-rāgâdi-svarūpa-saṁvedanam akalpakatvāt pratyakṣam, anubhavâkāra-pravṛtteḥ*;

PVBh, p. 303.24. Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.20–21: 意地亦有離諸分別唯證行轉. 又於貪等諸自證分...皆是現量. Dharmakīrti distinguishes *svasaṁvedana* of *rāga*, etc., from *mānasa-pratyakṣa* in his classification of *pratyakṣa*; see *NB*, I, 7–11: *tat* (=*pratyakṣaṁ*) *caturvidham*: *indriya-jñānam*: ... *mano-vijñānam*: *sarva-citta-caittānām ātma-saṁvedanam*: ... *yogi-jñānaṁ cêti*.

1.46. *Vibhūti*, p. 191[3]: *mānasam api rūpâdi-viṣayâlambanam* [text: °-*viṣayam*] *avikalpakam anubhavâkāra-pravṛttam*. The presence of "*ālambana*" is evidenced by K, V, and *PST*. According to Jinendrabuddhi, the compound *rūpâdi-viṣayâlambanam* is a bahuvrīhi of which the prior portion (*rūpâdi-viṣaya*) is a genitive of material (*vikāra-ṣaṣṭhī*); see *MBh*, II, ii, 24 (ex., *suvarṇa-vikāro 'laṁkāro yasya suvarṇâlaṁkāraḥ*). Thus, he analyzes it as: *yasyâlambanaṁ rūpâdi-viṣaya-vikāraḥ* (*rūpâdi-viṣayāṇāṁ vikāraḥ*); see *PST*, 25a.2–4 (28b.2–3). Following this interpretation, we may translate the above passage as follows: The mental perception whose object is a derivative from the object [of the immediately preceding sense-perception, viz.,] a thing of color, etc., and which operates in the form of immediate experience is also free from conceptual construction.

It is obvious that, in giving the above explanation, Jinendrabuddhi is influenced by Dharmakīrti's treatment of the problems of mental perception. Two problems respecting mental perception of objects are: (1) If the mind perceives the same object that had been perceived by the immediately preceding sense, this mental perception could not be recognized as *pramāṇa*, because *pramāṇa* is defined as *anadhigatârtha-gantṛ*; see above, n. 1.20. (2) If, on the other hand, the object of the mental perception were absolutely different from that of the sense-perception, then even blind and deaf persons would be able to perceive color and sound, for their minds are not defective like their senses. It is not clear whether Dignāga was aware of these two problems, but they are mentioned in Dharmapāla's commentary on *Ālambanap.*; see *Kuan so yüan yüan lun shih*, T. 1625, p. 889b.4–8. Dharmakīrti solves these difficulties in the following way: (1) What is perceived by means of mental perception is the object in the moment that immediately follows the moment of sense-perception. Therefore mental perception is held to be *anadhigatârtha-gantṛ*. (2) Mental perception is conditioned by the immediately preceding sense-perception as its *samanantara-pratyaya*. Accordingly, blind and deaf persons who have no sense-perception are unable to have mental perception; see *PV*, III, 243–244; *NB*, I, 9; *PVin*, 256a.8–256b.2. See also *PV*, III, 239–248; *Bud. Log.*, II, 311 ff.

The reason for postulating mental perception of external objects is variously discussed by post-Dharmakīrti scholars. (1) Some accept it only because it is canonically established. The following *āgama* is quoted in justification of mental perception: *dvābhyāṁ bhikṣavo rūpaṁ gṛhyate, kadācit cakṣuṣā tad-ākṛṣṭena manasā ca*; see *NBT-Ṭippaṇī* (Bibliotheca Buddhica, XI), p. 26.10–11; *Tarka-bhāṣā*, p. 9.17–18. Dharmottara clearly states that there is no means to prove mental perception. He accepts it simply because he sees no harm in admitting it, insofar as it is of such nature as is explained by Dharmakīrti; see *NBT*, p. 63.1–2: *etac ca siddhānta-prasiddhaṁ mānasaṁ pratyakṣam, na tv asya prasādhakam asti pramāṇam. evaṁ-jātīyakaṁ tad yadi syāt na kaścid doṣaḥ syād iti vaktuṁ*

lakṣaṇam ākhyātam asyêti. Jitāri omits mental perception in his classification of perception; see *Hetutattvanirdeśa*, p. 273. (2) Some maintain that mental perception is a process intermediate between sense-perception and conceptual construction. According to the *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* theory (see above n. 1.14), sense-perception and mental construction are two radically different means of cognition. However, if mental perception, which is perceptual on the one hand and mental on the other, were not postulated, sense-data could never have been combined with mental construction, with the consequence that human activities based upon verbal expressions in respect to objects could never have taken place; see *DhP*, p. 62.29–31: *iha pūrvaiḥ—bāhyârthâlambanam evaṁ-vidhaṁ mano-vijñānam astîti kuto 'vaseyam ity āśaṅkya, tad-abhāve tad-balôtpannānāṁ vikalpānām abhāvād rūpâdau viṣaye vyavahārâbhāva-prasaṅgaḥ syād ity uktam.* This view was held by Jñānagarbha, etc.; *ibid.*, p. 266 (notes on p. 62): "*iha pūrvaiḥ*"—*tad astîti kuto 'dhigatam ity āśaṅkya vikalpôdayād iti sādhanaṁ Jñānagarbheṇôktam; . . . ācārya-Jñānagarbha-prabhṛtīnāṁ mānasa-siddhaye yat pramāṇam upanyastaṁ vikalpôdayād iti . . .* (3) Some consider that mental perception is the intellectual intuition of persons who, by repeated practice of meditation upon the true state of all things (*samasta-vastu-sambaddha-tattvâbhyāsa*), have attained omniscience (*sarva-jñatva*); *TS(P)*, 3381–3389. Such mental perception may be regarded as identical with *yogi-jñāna*; see *TSP*, p. 396.1. However, according to Dharmottara, there is a difference between mental perception and the yogin's perception. The former is conditioned by the preceding sense-perception whereas the latter is unconditioned. Sense-perception is the *samanantara-pratyaya* in the case of mental perception, but it is the *ālambana-pratyaya* in the case of yogin's perception, for a yogin has insight into what other persons perceive. See *NBT*, p. 59.2–3: *īdṛśenêndriya-vijñānenâlambana-bhūtenâpi yogi-jñānaṁ janyate. tan nirāsârthaṁ samanantara-pratyaya-grahaṇaṁ kṛtam.* It is hard to determine which of the above three interpretations is most faithful to Dignāga's thought.

1.47. *PVBh*, p. 305.17–18: *rāga-dveṣa-moha-sukha-duḥkhâdiṣu ca* [text omits *ca*] *sva-saṁvedanam indriyânapekṣatvān mānasaṁ pratyakṣam.* See *PST*, 25b.3 (29a.3): "ḥdod chags la sogs pa rnams la *yaṅ* raṅ rig paḥo"; *Vibhūti*, p. 229[1]: *rāgâdiṣu ca . . .*; *ibid.*, p. 194[1]: *rāgâdi-sukhâdiṣu . . .*

See also *PV*, III, 249–280.

1.48. *Vibhūti*, p. 191[3]; *TAV*, p. 54.14–15:

yogināṁ guru-nirdeśâvyatibhinnârtha-mātra-dṛk.

Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.21: 諸修定者離教分別. . .是現量.

1.49. *Vibhūti*, p. 203[1]: *yoginām apy āgama-vikalpâvyavakīrṇam artha-mātra-darśanaṁ pratyakṣam.*

The cognition derived from the *āgama* (= *śabda*) is a kind of *anumāna*; see above n. 1.12. Akalaṅka points out that Dignāga, who states that *pratyakṣa* functions in close connection with the senses (*akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartate*) (see n. 1.11), has no right to regard the yogin's intuition as a kind of *pratyakṣa*, since it has nothing to do with the senses, *TAV*, p. 54.13–14: *syān matam—yogino*

'tîndriya-pratyakṣaṁ jñānam asty āgama-vikalpâtītam, tenâsau sarvârthān pratyakṣaṁ vetti. uktaṁ ca "yoginām . . ." (PS, I, 6cd) iti. tan na. kiṁ kāraṇam. arthâbhāvat. "akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartate" iti pratyakṣam, na câyam artho yogini vidyate akṣâbhāvāt. To meet this objection, Dharmottara distinguishes the actual meaning of *pratyakṣa* from its etymological meaning; see above n. 1.11. See also *PV*, III, 281–287.

1.50. In introspection, one becomes aware of one's own cognition. This internal awareness of cognition is similar in nature to the internal awareness of desire, etc.

1.51. *PVV*, p. 204.15; *PVBh*, p. 331.19; *ŚVK*, pt. I, p. 258.11; *NR*, p. 131.18:
kalpanâpi svasaṁvittāv iṣṭā nârthe vikalpanāt.

Dignāga expounds the theory that each cognition has a twofold appearance: the appearance of an object (*arthâbhāsa*) and that of itself as subject (*svâbhāsa*). As such, cognition cognizes itself while cognizing an object; see below n. 1.61. *Kalpanā* means the association of a word with a thing perceived; see above n. 1.26. The cognizing of an object through *kalpanā* is *anumāna*, and not *pratyakṣa*. But, whether it is *anumāna* or *pratyakṣa*, the essential nature of the cognition is the same, that is, it is self-cognized; see *PS*, ch. II, *k. 1c* (cited in *Vibhūti*, p. 524.2): *pūrvavat* (=*pratyakṣavat*) *phalam*. In this process of self-cognition, there is no *kalpanā*. Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.23–26.

Dharmakīrti expounds the same thought in *PV*, III, 287:
śabdârtha-grāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṁ tatra kalpanā
svarūpaṁ ca na śabdârthas tatrâdhyakṣam ato 'khilam.

1.52. Desire for an object which was formerly experienced as pleasurable is not perception, whereas our internal awareness of desire is perception; see n. 1.47.

1.53. *PVBh*, p. 332.20; *NCV*, p. 64.9–10:
bhrānti-saṁvṛti-saj-jñānam anumānânumānikam
smārtâbhilāṣikaṁ cêti pratyakṣâbhaṁ sataimiram.

Vibhūti, p. 205[1]: *ābhilāpikam* instead of *ābhilāṣikam*; *Saṁmatitarkap.*; p. 527.1–2: *saṁvṛti-saṁjñānam* instead of °*-saj-jñānam*. Cf. *TSP*, p. 394.20–21: "*bhrānti(ḥ) saṁvṛti(ḥ)sājñānam anumāna-" ity ādinā pratyakṣâbhāsa-nirdeśād . . .* (This reading must be corrected to conform to the above-cited verse.)

Jinendrabuddhi explains that four kinds of *pratyakṣâbhāsa* are mentioned in this verse: (1) *bhrānti*, (2) *saṁvṛti-saj-jñāna*, (3) *anumāna, ānumānika, smārta, ābhilāṣika*, and (4) *sataimira*; see *PST*, 27b.2–28b.2 (31a.5–32a.8). The word "*sataimira*" is interpreted by him as meaning cognitions caused by the defect of sense-organ, such as *timira* (eye-disease); *ibid.*, 28b.2 (32a.7–8): "*rab rib bcas* (*sataimira*) ṣes pa ḥdis dbaṅ po la ñe bar gnod pa las skyes pa rab rib la sogs paḥi śes pa (*indriyôpaghāta-jaṁ timirâdi-jñānam*) mṅon sum ltar snaṅ ba bṣi pa gsuṅs so." However, in the *Vṛtti* on this verse, Dignāga does not mention "*sataimira*" as a kind of *pratyakṣâbhāsa*. He explains only (1), (2), and (3), all of which are produced by *kalpanā*. Dignāga defines *pratyakṣa* as *kalpanâpoḍha* and in the preceding passages he has mentioned various types of *pratyakṣa*. In enumerating here three kinds of *pratyakṣâbhāsa*, he seems to have followed the *Vādavidhi*, in

which it is stated that the definition of *pratyakṣa* given therein effectively rules out *bhrānti-jñāna*, *saṁvṛti-jñāna*, and *anumāna-jñāna;* see Section 2, n. 2.8. Thus, I take the word "*sataimiram*" as an adjective modifying "*pratyakṣâbham*," but not as mentioning a separate kind of *pratyakṣâbhāsa*.

The above explanation of Jinendrabuddhi is based upon Dharmakīrti's interpretation of this verse as developed in *PV*, III, 288–300. Dharmakīrti clearly states that there are four kinds of *pratyakṣâbhāsa*, three produced by *kalpanā* and one produced by the defect of sense-organ; see *PV*, III, 288:

tri-vidhaṁ kalpanā-jñānam āśrayôpaplavôdbhavam
avikalpam ekaṁ ca pratyakṣâbhaṁ catur-vidham.

According to him, the word "*sataimira*" is mentioned by Dignāga in order to make an exception (*apavāda*) to his definition of *pratyakṣa* as *kalpanâpoḍha*, since cognitions produced by the defect of sense-organ are *kalpanâpoḍha* and yet are not true *pratyakṣa*. Thus, "*sataimira*" is taken as meaning "*indriyôpaghāta-jaṁ jñānam*"; *ibid.*, 293:

apavādaś caturtho 'tra tenôktam upaghāta-jam
kevalaṁ tatra timiram upaghātôpalakṣaṇam.

When examining the Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa* "*indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣôtpannaṁ jñānam . . . avyabhicāri . . .*," Dignāga states that the qualifier "*avyabhicārin*" is unnecessary for the reason that the cognition produced by *indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa* is free of *vyabhicāra* which is caused by taking the illusion produced by *manas* for the object; see Section 3, *Bb*. This statement of Dignāga's inclines us to believe that Dignāga attributed errors only to *manas* and that he admitted *indriya-jñāna* as absolutely free from error. However, Dharmakīrti argues that Dignāga was aware of the *pratyakṣâbhāsa* caused by the defect of sense-organ, referring to a passage (see Section 2, *Dd*) wherein Dignāga states that *indriya* is the cause of cognitions of *nīla*, *dvi-candra*, etc.; see *PV*, III, 294:

mānasaṁ tad apîty eke teṣāṁ grantho virudhyate
nīla-dvi-candrâdi-dhiyāṁ hetur akṣāny apîty ayam.

He further proceeds to disprove the notion that an error is caused only by *manas*, in the following manner: If the erroneous perception of *dvi-candra* were held to be caused by *manas*, this would involve the following absurd conclusions: (1) It would be removed even when the defect of the *indriya* is not cured, as the erroneous mental cognition of a snake for what is really a rope is removed simply by the close examination of the object; (2) It would not be removed even when the defect of the *indriya* is cured; (3) A man whose *indriya* is sound would also perceive a *dvi-candra* if he were to hear about it from a man who had a defective *indriya*; (4) It would not be immediate to *indriya* but would be mediated by remembrance; (5) The image of *dvi-candra* would not be clear; cf. *ibid.*, 297–298:

sarpâdi-bhrāntivac câsyāḥ syād akṣa-vikṛtāv api
nivṛttir na nivartteta nivṛtte 'py akṣa-viplave
kadācid anya-saṁtāne tathaivârpyeta vācakaiḥ
dṛṣṭa-smṛtim apekṣeta na bhāseta parisphuṭam.

In defining *pratyakṣa* in *NB* as well as in *PVin*, Dharmakīrti employs the term "*abhrānta*" besides "*kalpanâpoḍha*" in order to rule out erroneous cogni-

tions caused by *timira*, etc.; see *NB*, I, 4; *PVin*, 252b.3–4; *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 192.16–21 (see Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, II, 17, n. 3, 18, n. 1), and post-Dharmakīrti scholars follow him; see *PVBh*, p. 245.13; *TS*, 1214, 1312, etc. However, as mentioned above, Dignāga defines *pratyakṣa* simply as *kalpanâpoḍha* and regards the qualifier "*avyabhicārin*" in the Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa* as unnecessary. As I see it, Dignāga did not take into consideration errors caused by defective sense-organs when he defined *pratyakṣa* and when he mentioned *pratyakṣâbhāsa* in the above verse. Perhaps later on Dignāga's definition was subjected to criticism which recognized that *manas* is not the only cause of erroneous cognitions, and this criticism propelled Dharmakīrti into making an extended interpretation of Dignāga's thought. This may be clear from the fact that some commentators did not follow Dharmakīrti and put a different interpretation on Dignāga's thought. As to why Dignāga did not use the term "*abhrānta*" in his definition of *pratyakṣa*, they urged the following explanation: Even erroneous cognitions, such as the cognition of a yellow conch-shell for what is really a white conch-shell, are to be recognized as *pratyakṣa* inasmuch as they are not inconsistent in producing effects (*artha-kriyâvisaṁvāda*). Thus, they take the word "*sataimira*" in the above verse of Dignāga's as derived from *timira* in the sense of "*ajñāna*," but not as meaning "*indriyôpaghāta-jaṁ jñānam*"; see *TS* and *TSP*, 1324:

> *pīta-śaṅkhâdi-buddhīnāṁ vibhrame 'pi pramāṇatām*
> *artha-kriyâvisaṁvādād apare sampracakṣate.*

kecit tu sva-yūthyā evâbhrānta-grahaṇaṁ nêcchanti, bhrāntasyâpi pīta-śaṅkhâdi-jñānasya pratyakṣatvāt. ata evâcārya-Dignāgena lakṣaṇe na kṛtam abhrānta-grahaṇam. "bhrānti- . . ." ity-ādinā pratyakṣâbhāsa-nirdeśād avisaṁvādi-kalpanâpoḍham ity evaṁvidham iṣṭam ācāryasya lakṣaṇam. "sataimiram" iti tu timira-śabdo 'yam ajñāna-paryāyaḥ. . . . timire bhavaṁ taimiraṁ visaṁvādakam ity arthaḥ. See also *PVBh*, pp. 252.29–253.2; Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, I, 153–161.

1.54. *PVBh*, p. 332.25–27: *tatra bhrānti-jñānaṁ mṛga-tṛṣṇâdiṣu toyâdi-kalpanā-pravṛttatvāt pratyakṣâbhāsam. saṁvṛti-saj-jñānaṁ*[1] *saṁvṛti-satsv arthântarâropāt tad-rūpa-kalpanā-pravṛttatvāt pratyakṣâbhāsam.*[2] *anumāna-tat-phalâdi-jñānaṁ pūrvânubhūta-kalpanayêti na pratyakṣam.* [I have inserted [1] and [2]. K and V have [2], but not [1]. Without these, the passage is liable to be construed as: *bhrānti-jñāna* is *pratyakṣâbhāsa*, because (1) *mṛga-tṛṣṇâdiṣu . . . pravṛttatvāt*, (2) *saṁvṛti-satsu . . . pravṛttatvāt*. This construction is not appropriate.]

Jinendrabuddhi explains the distinction between *bhrānti-jñāna* and *saṁvṛti-saj-jñāna* as follows: the former is produced by the superimposition upon the object of a thing which one has seen before, whereas the latter is produced by the superimposition of what is unreal upon the object; see *PST*, 28a.4–6 (31b.8–32a.3). For "*saṁvṛti-sat*," see below, n. 2.17. See also *NMukh*, p. 3b.26–3c.1.

1.55. *Vibhūti*, p. 221[1]; *PVBh*, p. 349.5; *NMañj*, p. 66.20; *ŚVV*, p. 138.17; *Saṁmatitarkap.*, p. 529.12:

> *savyāpāra-pratītatvāt pramāṇam phalam eva sat.*

Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.21–23: 又於此中無別量果. 以即此體似義生故似有用故假設爲量.

In asserting the identity of *pramāṇa-phala* and *pramāṇa* in this verse, Dignāga is basing his thought upon *sākāra-jñāna-vāda*, the theory that the cognition possesses the form (*ākāra*) of the object within itself. The cognition as *pramāṇa-phala* is the apprehension of an object (*viṣayâdhigati*). If, as maintained by the *anākāra* (or *nirākāra*)-*jñāna-vādins*, the cognition were formless (*nirākāra*) while the object had form (*ākāra*), then the cognition itself (*anubhava-mātra*), as distinguished from the object, would remain the same whether it cognized something blue or something yellow or any other object. Accordingly, the cognition as the apprehension of an object must be admitted to be *sākāra*: it *has assumed* the form of an object (*viṣayâkārâpanna*). The *sākāra* cognition is thus understood to possess the function (*vyāpāra*) of *assuming* the form of an object. For this reason Dignāga considers it as *pramāṇa*, although primarily it is *phala* in its aspect as the "apprehension" (*adhigati*) of an object. See *TSP*, p. 399.13–16: *jñānaṁ hi viṣayâkāram utpadyamānaṁ viṣayaṁ paricchindad iva savyāpāram ivâbhāti. ayam evârtha-prāpaṇa-vyāpāro jñānasya . . . tasmāt sākāram eva jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ na nirākāram iti . . .*

Dharmakīrti, in a detailed commentary on the above verse (*PV*, III, 301–319), disproves the theories which hold that the sense-organ, the contact of sense and object, or the simple reflection of an object (*ālocana*) is *pramāṇa*. The suffix "*-ana*" of the word "*pramāṇa*" signifies "*karaṇa*," the instrument or, according to Pāṇini, the predominant cause; see *Pāṇ*., I, iv, 42: *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam*. (The Bauddhas follow this definition; see *PV*, III, 311; *PVBh*, p. 344.29; *NBT*, p. 84.6–7.) Dharmakīrti states that, among the various causes which contribute to a result, the latest one is the predominant cause. The sense-organ, etc. is related to the resulting cognition only mediately (*vyavadhānena*). Thus, Dharmakīrti, in support of Dignāga's theory, concludes that the latest and the predominant cause of the resulting apprehension of an object is nothing other than the fact that the cognition possesses the form of an object (*meya-rūpatā*). He also criticizes the view which holds *viśeṣaṇa-jñāna* to be the *pramāṇa* of the resulting *viśeṣya-jñāna*. This same view is attacked by Dignāga himself in Section 3, *Eb-1*.

The theory that the cognition is *sākāra* is held by the Sautrāntikas and some Yogācāras. (The Yogācāras are divided into *sākāra-vijñāna-vādins* and *nirākāra-vijñāna-vādins*.) Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla distinguish the views of the two schools concerning *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*. The Sautrāntikas admit the existence of an external object (*bāhyârtha*). Thus, the similarity (*sārūpya*) of the form represented in a cognition to that of the object is held to be *pramāṇa* of the resulting *viṣayâdhigati*. The Yogācāras, on the other hand, maintain that the object is merely the appearance of an object (*viṣayâbhāsa*) in the cognition. Accordingly, *viṣayâdhigati* is nothing other than the cognition of the cognition itself, i.e., self- cognition (*svasaṁvitti*). This ability (*yogyatā*) of the cognition to cognize itself is considered as *pramāṇa* of the resulting self-cognition, because it is the predominant cause of the latter; see *TS*(*P*), 1344. The difference between the views of the two schools is discussed by Dignāga in the following passages of the text. However, the theory set forth here that the *sākāra* cognition is both *pramāṇa-phala* and *pramāṇa* is amenable to both schools (*ubhaya-naya*). See also *NB*, I, 18–19; *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 40.12–15.

1.56. Dignāga criticizes the view recognizing *pramāṇa* as distinct from *pramāṇa-phala* in Section 3, *Ea-Ee*, and in Section 6, *Da*. In *NBh*, introd. to I, i, 1, Vātsyāyana distinguishes the four factors of cognition, namely, *pramātṛ*, *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *pramiti* (*pramāṇa-phala*). Further, in *NBh*, ad I, i, 3, after explaining that *pratyakṣa*(*-pramāṇa*) is the operation (*vṛtti*) of each sense-organ upon its own object, he states that, according as the operation is in the form of contact (*saṁnikarṣa*) or of cognition (*jñāna*), the result (*pramiti*) is cognition or the mental attitude to discard or accept or disregard the object (*hānôpādānôpekṣā-buddhi*). Thus, it is clear that Vātsyāyana considered *pramāṇa-phala* to be distinct from *pramāṇa*. But, in view of the fact that Uddyotakara gives no answer to Dignāga's criticism while Kumārila makes a counter attack, it is supposed that the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* was originally discussed by the Mīmāṁsakas. Vācaspatimiśra does not make any particular remark on this problem in *NVTT*, but he takes it up in his *Nyāyakaṇikā*, a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka* of the Mīmāṁsakas; see below, n. 1.57.

1.57. Kumārila objects to this theory of nondistinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*. He cites the instance of cutting down a tree with an axe. The instrument, axe, is distinct from the resulting cutting down (*chidā*) of the tree. The distinction between instrument and result is thus universally accepted. Likewise, Kumārila observes, *pramāṇa*, the instrument of cognition, must be distinguished from the cognition produced by means of it; see *ŚV*, IV, 74, 75 (*TSP*, p. 399.4–6):

viṣayaikatvam icchaṁs tu yaḥ pramāṇaṁ phalaṁ vadet
sādhya-sādhanayor bhedo laukikas tena bādhitaḥ.
chedane khadira-prāpte palāśe na chidā yathā
tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā saha naikatā.

The same objection is made by Akalaṅka in *TAV*, p. 56.12–14: *loke pramāṇāt phalam arthântara-bhūtam upalabhyate. tadyathā chetṛ-chettavya-chedana-saṁnidhāne dvaidhī-bhāvaḥ phalam. na ca tathā svasaṁvedanam arthântara-bhūtam asti. tasmād asya phalatvaṁ nôpapadyate.* Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also reproaches Dignāga as follows, for his confusion of the instrument and the result: When we say that Caitra mows rice with a scythe or that a man perceives a pot with his eyes, the subject, the object, and the instrument are presented to our consciousness as distinct from the action itself. Actually the word "*pramāṇa*" is sometimes used in the sense of "*pramā*," and "*karaṇa*" in the sense of "*kṛti*." However, it is not admissible to regard "*pramāṇa*" and "*pramā*" or "*karaṇa*" and "*kṛti*" as one and the same thing: the instrument and the result reside always in different loci (*adhikaraṇa*); see *NMañj*, p. 66.20 ff. References to the theory in question made by Vācaspatimiśra in *Nyāyakaṇikā*, pp. 254.12–260.22, and by Udayana in *NVT-Pariśuddhi*, pp. 152–155, are studied by Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, II, app. IV, 352 ff. The Bauddhas are ready to answer the above objections as follows: Since all entities are, absolutely speaking, instantaneous, the relation of the producer and the produced (*utpādyôtpādaka-bhāva*) cannot be established between two entities. It, therefore, is not proper to consider the instrument of cognition as an entity distinct from and producing the resulting cognition. The relation of *pramāṇa* and *phala* is to be understood as that of the

determiner and the determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāva*). When we have a distinct cognition of something blue, this cognition is recognized as being determined—the cognition of something blue and not of something yellow (*nīlasyêdaṁ saṁvedanaṁ na pītasyêti*)—and this determination is made by the appearance (*ākāra*) of something blue in the cognition itself; see *TS*(*P*), 1346; *PV*, III, 315; *NBT*, ad I, 18–19.

1.58. Both K and V read "bya ba med paḥaṅ *ma* yin no" (*na tu vyāpārâbhāve 'pi*: but *not* when it is devoid of activity). However, we read in *PV*, III, 307cd, 308, as follows:

dadhānaṁ tac ca tām (=*meya-rūpatām*) *ātmany arthâdhigamanâtmanā*
savyāpāram ivâbhāti vyāpāreṇa sva-karmaṇi
tad-vaśāt tad vyavasthānād akārakam api *svayam.*

According to the Bauddhas, all entities (*dharma*) are ultimately devoid of function (*vyāpāra*), since they are in a state of flux. Thus, the cognition is *akāraka* or *nirvyāpāra* in its essential nature. But, inasmuch as the cognition arises in the form of an object, the function of *taking* (*upā-√dā*) that form and *discarding* (*pari-√tyaj*) another form can be secondarily attributed to the cognition. It is through this function that a cognition is determined as the cognition of something blue and not of something yellow; see above, nn. 1.55, 57. In the light of Dharmakīrti's interpretation, we understand Dignāga's statement as meaning that the resulting cognition is metaphorically called the means of cognition, because it appears as if it had a function, *although it is devoid of function in its ultimate nature.* Thus, the Tibetan text had better be corrected to read "bya ba med par yaṅ yin no" (*vyāpārâbhāve 'pi*). This emendation may be supported by *PST*, 31b.4–5 (35b.7): "ji lta baḥi *bya ba med kyaṅ* de daṅ ldan pa ñid du snaṅ bar ḥgyur ba ci ltar ṣe na . . .," and also by Prajñākaragupta's commentary on *PS*, III, 309; cf. n. 59.

Two seven-syllable sentences—"tshad ma ñid du ḥdogs pa ste" and "bya ba med paḥaṅ ma yin no"—are included in both Kk and Vk. It seems likely that they have been wrongly regarded as forming part of the Kārikās, since they simply express in different wording the same idea as that stated in *k. 8cd.*

1.59. Here again the reading given by both K and V is "bya ba med pa(r) yaṅ *ma* yin pa." Dharmakīrti expresses the same thought in *PV*, III, 309, as follows:

yathā phalasya hetūnāṁ sadṛśâtmatayôdbhavād
hetu-rūpa-graho loke 'kriyāvattve 'pi *kathyate.*

Prajñākaragupta makes clear the meaning of this verse by the example of the newborn child, who, showing similarity to his father (*pitṛ-sadṛśa*), is said to *have taken* the form of his father (*pitṛ-rūpaṁ gṛhṇāti*), although, in fact, he has no such function as *taking* (his father's form) (*vinâpi grahaṇa-vyāpāreṇa*); *PVBh*, p. 344.11–12. The same illustration is given by Manorathanandin too; *PVV*, p. 211.10: "*hetu-rūpa-graho kathyate*" *pitū rūpaṁ gṛhītaṁ sutenêtyādi.* Thus, the Tibetan text must be corrected to read "bya ba med par yaṅ yin pa . . . (*vyāpārâbhāve 'pi*)."

1.60. *Vibhūti*, p. 221[1]:

sva-saṁvittiḥ phalaṁ vâtra.

PVBh, p. 349.7[1]; *Vibhūti*, p. 215[1]; *ŚVK*, pt. I, p. 237.22: *ca* instead of *vā*. *NR*, p.

158.17: *câsya* instead of *vâtra*. It is worth noting that both *ŚVK* and *NR* reverse the order of *k. 9ab* and *k. 9cd*. *PVV*, p. 228.12–13: *sva-saṁvittiḥ phalaṁ vêti sūtre* . . . In *k. 8cd* and the *Vṛtti* thereon, the cognition possessing the form of an object, i.e., the apprehension of an object (*viṣayâdhigati*), has been regarded as *phala*. Since an alternative view recognizing *sva-saṁvitti* as *phala* is put forward here, the reading "*vā*" is preferable to "*ca*." Although the Tibetan "*yaṅ*" is used as an equivalent for both "*vā*" and "*ca*," the following statement of Jinendrabuddhi seems to support the reading "*vā*": "sṅa mar yul rig pa ḥbras bur gsuṅs te, deḥi phyir *yaṅ naḥ*i sgra ni rnam par brtag paḥi don can no"; *PST*, 32a.5 (36a.8).

The word "*sva-saṁvitti*" (self-cognition: *sva-saṁvid*, °*-saṁvedana*, *ātma-*°) is expressive of the thought that a cognition is cognized by itself and does not need another cognition to cognize itself. When a man has the cognition of something blue (*nīla*), he has at the same time the awareness of the cognition of something blue (*nīla-dhī*). This awareness is caused by nothing other than the cognition itself. Thus, the cognition, while cognizing an object, cognizes itself, as a lamp illuminates itself (*sva-prakāśa*) while illuminating an object. The definition of *sva-saṁvitti* is given in *TS*, 2012:

svarūpa-vedanāyânyad vedakaṁ na vyapekṣate
na câviditam astîdam ity artho 'yaṁ sva-saṁvidaḥ.

There are divergent views regarding how a cognition is cognized; see Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, I, 164–166; Sinha, *Indian Psychology, Cognition*, pp. 199–221. The Sāṁkhyas maintain that the cognition is a function of *buddhi*, which, evolving from *prakṛti* (primordial matter), is of material nature. As such the cognition is unconscious in itself. It is illumined by *puruṣa*, which alone is self-conscious. The Naiyāyikas put forward the theory of *anuvyavasāya*. When the external sense-organ comes into contact with an object, there arises the apprehension (*vyavasāya*) of the object. This apprehension is unconscious of itself. The awareness of this apprehension is produced as the "subsequent apprehension" (*anuvyavasāya*) through the medium of the internal sense-organ or the mind (*manas*) which takes the first apprehension for its object; see *NBh*, ad I, i, 4: *sarvatra pratyakṣa-viṣaye jñātur indriyeṇa vyavasāyaḥ, paścān manasânuvyavasāyaḥ*. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, a cognition is cognized by another cognition. Kumārila expounds a different view. According to him, a cognition is known not directly, but through inference. When an object is cognized, a peculiar property, namely, "cognizedness" (*jñātatā*), is produced in the object as a result of cognition. As the cognition is an action (*kriyā*), it is not known directly. Thus, Kumārila holds, the cognition is inferred from "cognizedness." The theory of *sva-saṁvitti* is maintained by the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras. It is also shared by the Jainas, the Prabhākara-Mīmāṁsakas, and the Advaita-Vedāntins, although it is modified by each.

1.61. *TAV*, p. 56.10–11: *dvy-ābhāsaṁ hi jñānam utpadyate, svâbhāsaṁ viṣayâbhāsaṁ ca. tasyôbhayâbhāsasya yat sva-saṁvedanaṁ* [text: *saṁvedanam*] *tat phalam*. Cf. *PVV*, p. 228.13–14: *svâbhāsaṁ viṣayâbhāsaṁ ca jñānam utpadyate, tatra yat sva-saṁvedanaṁ tat phalam*; *PVBh*, p. 349.7: *ubhayâbhāsasya vijñānasya sva-saṁvedanam eva phalam.*

That the consciousness (*vijñāna*) itself appears (*ābhāti, pratibhāti, avabhāti, khyāti*) as subject (*svâbhāsa*=*grāhakâṁśa*, °-*ākāra*) and object (*arthâbhāsa, viṣayâ*°=*grāhyâṁśa*, °-*ākāra*) is a principal doctrine of the Yogācāras; see *Madhyāntav.*, I, k. 3; *Mahāy. Sūtrālam.*, ad XI, k. 32, etc. The above passage shows that, in considering *sva-saṁvitti* as *pramāṇa-phala*, Dignāga takes the Yogācāra doctrine for his theoretical basis. See *Vibhūti*, p. 215[1]: *Sautrāntika-pramāṇaṁ sārūpyaṁ bāhyo 'rthaḥ prameyo 'dhigatiḥ phalaṁ vyavasthāpyâdhunā vijñaptau pramāṇa-phala-vyavasthāṁ nirdidikṣuḥ "sva-saṁvittiḥ . . ." iti . . .*

In *Ālambanap.*, Dignāga examines the theories concerning the object of cognition (*ālambana*), and proves that nothing existing in the external world, whether it be a single atom (*aṇu*) or the aggregate (*saṁcita*) of atoms or the gathering (*saṁghāta*) of atoms, can satisfy the necessary conditions that the object of cognition must fulfill; see below, n. 2.17. In conclusion, he supports the Yogācāra doctrine that the object of cognition is nothing other than the appearance of an object in the cognition itself; *Ālambanap.*, k. 6a–c (cited in *TSP*, p. 582.11–12):

yad antar-jñeya-rūpaṁ tu bahirvad avabhāsate
so 'rthaḥ.

He further remarks that what is called the sense (*indriya*) in relation to the object is not the physical organ, but the ability (*śakti*) to produce a cognition (*ibid.*, 7cd) or the ability to cognize the appearance of the object. This ability is considered to be cognition's appearance as itself (*svâbhāsa*) in contrast with its appearance as an object (*viṣayâbhāsa*). When *sva-saṁvitti* is regarded as *pramāṇa-phala*, the role of *pramāṇa*, which takes the cognition for its *prameya*, must be attributed to the *svâbhāsa* of the cognition itself.

Although Dignāga bases the theory of *sva-saṁvitti* on the Yogācāra doctrine, he believes that even the Sautrāntikas will accept the theory that *sva-saṁvitti* is the *pramāṇa-phala*. In his own commentary on *k. 9b*, which follows the above passage, he refers to two different theories: the one recognizing the object as *saviṣaya-jñāna*, and the other as *bāhyârtha*. Evidently, they are respectively the theories of the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas admit that when an external object (*bāhyârtha*) is brought to the cognition (*buddhy-ārūḍha*) and the cognition comes to possess similarity (*sārūpya*) to the form of the object, there arises the awareness of this cognition, viz., *sva-saṁvitti*. Inasmuch as this awareness is held to be *pramāṇa-phala*, the Sautrāntikas should admit that the *prameya* in this case is the cognition itself, and not the external object. However, Dignāga justifies the Sautrāntika view by regarding *sārūpya* (=*viṣayâkāratā*) as the *pramāṇa* by means of which an external object is cognized. The difference between the views of the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras is described in *ŚVV* as follows: *ye 'pi Sautrāntika-pakṣam evaṁ vyācakṣate—bāhyo 'rthaḥ prameyam, vijñānasya viṣayâkāratā pramāṇaṁ sva-saṁvittiḥ phalam iti . . .* [p, 139.11–12], *idānīṁ Yogācāra-pakṣe 'pi . . . teṣāṁ caitad darśanam—bāhyârtho nāsti, vijñānasya viṣayâkāratā prameyā, svâkāratā pramāṇam, sva-saṁvittiḥ phalam iti* [p. 139.19–21]. See also *ŚVK*, part I, pp. 237.18–22, 238.10–14; *NR*, pp. 158.13–17, 159.7–11. The ability to cognize itself or *svâbhāsa* (=*grāhakâkāra*) of the cognition is disregarded by the Sautrāntikas, and *svâbhāsa* and *sva-saṁvitti* are under-

stood by them as bearing the same meaning. Therefore the Sautrāntika view is referred to in *ŚVK*, part I, p. 237.18–20 as follows: *yadi tûcyate . . . dvi-rūpam ekam eva jñānaṁ sva-saṁvittyā viṣayâkāreṇa ca. tad atra sva-saṁvittiḥ phalaṁ viṣayâkāraḥ pramāṇam . . .* Both *ŚVK* and *NR* regard *k. 9* as expressing the Sautrāntika thought and *k. 10* the Yogācāra view. (As noted above, they reverse the order of *k. 9ab* and *k. 9cd.*) This interpretation, it seems to me, is irrelevant, since in the above passage Dignāga mentions "*svâbhāsa,*" "*viṣayâbhāsa,*"and "*ubhayâbhāsasya sva-saṁvedanam.*"

Dharmakīrti criticizes the Sautrāntika theory of *artha-saṁvedana* in *PV*, III, 320–337, and concludes his arguments with the following verse:

tasmād dvi-rūpam asty ekaṁ yad evam anubhūyate
smaryate côbhayasyâsya saṁvedanam phalam.

The word "*dvi-rūpa*" means "*bodha-rūpa*" and "*nīlâdi-rūpa*"; see *PVBh*, p. 391.29; *PVV*, p. 220.24–25, i.e., *svâbhāsa* and *viṣayâbhāsa.*

Kumārila objects to the theory of "*sva-saṁvitti*" as follows: The cognition, while functioning to illumine an object, cannot also function to illumine itself, as one thing cannot possess two functions (*vyāpāra*) at the same time; see *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 184–187; *TS*(*P*), 2013–2016. However, this objection does not damage the position of the Yogācāras, since they do not admit the object independent of the cognition itself.

1.62. *Vibhūti*, pp. 215[1], 221[1]; *TS*, 1328d; *ŚVK*, part I, p. 237.22:

tad-rūpo hy artha-niścayaḥ.

NR, p. 158.17: *tad-dvaye* instead of *tad-rūpo.*

It is evident from the *Vṛtti* on this *pāda* that "*tad-rūpa*" means "*svasaṁvitti-rūpa.*" Quoting this *pāda*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla construe "*tad-rūpa*" as meaning "*viṣayâkāra*" in the cognition; see *TS*, 1328, 1329ab:

yady ākāram anādṛtya prāmāṇyaṁ ca prakalpyate
artha-kriyâvisaṁvādāt "tad-rūpo hy artha-niścayaḥ"
ityādi gaditaṁ sarvaṁ kathaṁ na vyāhataṁ bhavet.

on which *TSP* explains "*tad-rūpa*" as "*jñāna-sthâbhāsa-rūpaḥ.*" This interpretation shows the Sautrāntika tendency. In fact, Kamalaśīla quotes from the *Vṛtti* the passage explaining the Sautrāntika thought, without referring to Dignāga's explanation of the Yogācāra view; *TSP*, ad 1329: "*ādi-śabdena 'yathā yathā hy arthasyâkāraḥ śubhrâditvena . . .' ityādikam ācāryīyaṁ vacanaṁ virudhyata iti darśayati*"; cf. n. 1.64.

The term "*niścaya*" is often used in the sense of "*adhyavasāya*" (judgment), which involves conceptual construction (*vikalpa, kalpanā*); see *Bud. Log.*, vol. II, indices. However, here *artha-niścaya* means not *arthâdhyavasāya* but *artha-vyavasthāpana*, the determination or the establishment of the object. The realist view is that a cognition is determined as the cognition of *x* or that of *y* according as the object is *x* or *y*, whereas Dignāga holds the view that an object is determined as *x* or *y* according as *sva-saṁvitti* is *x* or *y*.

1.63. The reading of both K and V: "de daṅ rjes su mthun paḥi raṅ rig pa . . . (*tad-anurūpa-svasaṁvittiḥ . . . =saviṣaya-jñānânurūpa-svasaṁvittiḥ . . .*)" is not acceptable, because *k. 9b* is intended to show that the object conforms to *sva-saṁvitti*, but not that *sva-saṁvitti* conforms to the object. The translation is

based upon the reading given in *PST*, 32b.4 (36b.7), 33a.2 (37a.5–6), 33a.3 (37a.7–8), 33a.6 (37b.2): "raṅ rig pa daṅ rjes su mthun par (paḥi) ḥdod paḥam mi ḥdod paḥi don rtogs par byed do (*svasaṁvitty-anurūpa iṣṭo 'niṣṭo vârthaḥ pratīyate*)."

This passage is understood as proving that *sva-saṁvitti* is *phala* from the Yogācāra viewpoint. The Yogācāras do not admit the existence of the external object. They note that the object of the cognition in a dream has no corresponding reality, that one and the same object is variously cognized by different persons, etc., and they assert that the object is essentially immanent in the cognition. Here Dignāga observes that when a man is aware that something blue appears in his cognition, this thing of blue in the cognition is conceived as the object. As there is no object, for the Yogācāras, apart from this appearance of something blue in the cognition, it is established that the awareness of the cognition of something blue, i.e., *sva-saṁvitti*, is the result of the act of cognizing the object.

The same argument is set forth by Dharmakīrti in *PV*, III, 339–340:

yadā saviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ jñānâṁśe 'rtha-vyavasthiteḥ
tadā ya ātmânubhavaḥ sa evârtha-viniścayaḥ
yadîṣṭâkāra ātmā syād anyathā vânubhūyate
iṣṭo 'niṣṭo 'pi vā tena bhavaty arthaḥ praveditaḥ.

It is evident, from comparison with Dignāga's explanation, that these two verses refer to the Yogācāra view. Both Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin state that k. 340 would be acceptable to the Sautrāntikas, who diverge from the Yogācāras in not admitting the *saviṣayatā* of *jñāna* as mentioned in k. 339; see *PVBh*, p. 392.13 ff.: *api ca bāhyam artham abhyupagacchatām api sva-saṁvedanam eva phalam. yataḥ "yadîṣṭâkāra . . . praveditaḥ"* . . .; *PVV*, p. 222.1 ff.: *bahir-artha-naye 'pi buddhi-vedanasyaivârtha-vedanatvāt tathā "yadîṣṭâkāra . . ."*

1.64. *PVBh*, p. 393.27–30: *yadā tu bāhya evârthaḥ prameyas tadā*
viṣayâkārataivâsya pramāṇam
tadā hi jñānaṁ svasaṁvedyam api svarūpam anapekṣyârthâbhāsataivâsya pramāṇam. yasmāt so 'rthaḥ
tena mīyate
yathā yathā hy arthasyâkāraḥ śubhâditvena jñāne pratibhāti (niviśate) tat-tad-rūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pratīyate.

[*viṣayâkārataivâsya pramāṇaṁ tena mīyate*: quoted in *ŚVK*, I, 237.21; *NR*, p. 158.16. *tadā*: text, *tathā*; *PVBhT* (Tibetan version of *PVBh*, Peking ed., Tib. Trip. No. 5719, 70b.5), ḥdi ltar; K, V, *PST*, 33b.2 (37b.7): deḥi tshe. *yathā yathā*: text, *yathā*; *PVBhT*, ji ltar; K, V, *PST*, 33b.5 (38a.2), ji lta ji ltar. *jñāne*: text, *PVBhT*, omit; K, V, *PST*, 33b.7 (38a.4), śes pa la. *niviśate*: K, V, omit; *PST*, 33b.7 (38a.4), ṅes par gnas pa; *PVBhT*, gnas pa. *tat-tad-rūpaḥ*: text, *tad-rūpaḥ*; *PVBhT*, deḥi raṅ bṣin du: K, V, de daṅ deḥi ṅo boḥi. *sa viṣayaḥ*: K, V, yul daṅ bcas pa (=*saviṣayaḥ*).]

Cf. *Vibhūti*, p. 224², 236¹: *yadā tu bāhya evârthaḥ prameyaḥ* . . .; *TSP*, p. 395.18–19: *yathā yathā hy arthasyâkāraḥ śubhrâditvena saṁniviśate tad-rūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pramīyate.*

In the above passage Dignāga refers to the views of the Sautrāntikas, who hold that the object of cognition exists in the external world. Inasmuch as the cognition is held to take an external thing for its object, it is improper to say that *sva-saṁvitti* is the result of the cognitive process, since *sva-saṁvitti* signifies that the cognition itself is the object of cognition. But Dignāga believes that the cognition is self-cognized even in that case. Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's position as follows: Even if there is an external object, it is thought to exist only in conformity to the cognition, and not by its own nature. It is not that the cognition conforms to the object which exists by itself prior to the cognition; *PST*, 33a.2 (37a.5): "phyi rol gyi phyogs la yaṅ myoṅ ba ji lta ba bṣin kho nar don rtogs kyi don ji lta ba bṣin myoṅ ba ni ma yin no ṣes sṅar [cf. 32a.2] kho nar bśad zin to." This observation is very close to the Yogācāra theory in denying the independence of the object from the cognition. Similarity to the Yogācāra theory is even more notable in *PV*, III, 341:

vidyamāne 'pi bāhye 'rthe yathânubhava eva saḥ
niścitâtmā svarūpeṇa nânekâtmatva-doṣataḥ.

The meaning of "*svarūpeṇa na* . . ." is understood as follows: If the object exists by itself, the absurdity would be implied that a single object has various natures (*anekâtmatva-doṣa*), since it is cognized variously by different persons. This is exactly the reasoning advanced by the Yogācāras in proof of their theory of the non-existence of the external object (*anartha*); see *Mahāy. Saṁgr.*, p. 148.1–2 (Lamotte, *La Somme*, II, 250–251), quoted in *Upādāyap.*, p. 887b.4, but it is here adopted to prove that *sva-saṁvitti* is *pramāṇa-phala* from the Sautrāntika viewpoint. To conclude, when a man is aware of a pot in his cognition, it is the cognition of a pot that is cognized, and not a pot as an external object; but, insofar as there is such awareness, a pot is thought to exist in the external world. That *artha-niścaya* is in accordance with *sva-saṁvitti* (*k. 9b*) is thus established even when *prameya* is considered to be *bāhyârtha*; see *PV*, III, 346:

tasmāt prameye bāhye 'pi yuktaṁ svânubhavaḥ phalam
yataḥ svabhāvo 'sya yathā tathaivârtha-viniścayaḥ.

If it is the case that the cognition of a pot is cognized, then there must be, immanent in the cognition, the self-cognizing faculty, which functions as *pramāṇa*, taking the pot-formed cognition for *prameya* and producing *sva-saṁvedana* as *phala*. This is how the Yogācāras explain the theory of *sva-saṁvitti*. However, the Sautrāntikas have a limitation: they uphold the doctrine that *prameya* is an external thing. If the Sautrāntikas, in concert with the Yogācāras, had recognized the self-cognizing faculty, i.e., *svâbhāsa*=*grāhakâkāra*, as *pramāṇa*, their doctrine would have been violated, because *grāhakâkāra* does not take the external thing for *prameya*. Accordingly, within the doctrinal limitation of the Sautrāntikas, Dignāga considers that the cognition's taking the form of an object (*viṣayâkāratā*) should be regarded as *pramāṇa*, the external object being cognized by means of it and it being self-cognized. However, Dignāga remarks that the essential nature of the self-cognizing cognition is disregarded in the justification of the Sautrāntika doctrine.

Dharmakīrti sets forth the same argument in *PV*, III, 347:

tadârthâbhāsataivâsya pramāṇaṁ na tu sann api
grāhakâtmâparārthatvād bāhyeṣv artheṣv apekṣate.

He further argues that, since we have awareness of the external object only when its form appears in the cognition, there is no apprehension of the external object (*artha-saṁvedana*) apart from the cognition of the cognition itself (*sva-saṁvedana*); *ibid.*, III, 348–350. Touching on the same topic, Kamalaśīla states that *viṣayâdhigama*=*artha-saṁvedana* is *pramāṇa-phala* from the Sautrāntika viewpoint; see *TSP*, p. 398.19–20: *bāhye 'rthe prameye viṣayâdhigamaḥ pramāṇa-phalam, sārūpyaṁ tu pramāṇam. sva-saṁvittāv api satyāṁ yathâkāram asya prathanāt.*

The above justification of the Sautrāntika theory has a weakness which is pointed out by Kumārila in *ŚV*, IV, 79ab:

pramāṇe viṣayâkāre bhinnârthatvān na yujyate.

If it is held that *pramāṇa* is *viṣayâkāra* while *phala* is *sva-saṁvitti*, then it would follow that *pramāṇa* and *phala* take different things for their respective objects (*bhinnârtha*): the former would take an external thing for its object, whereas the latter would take the cognition. In Section 3, Dignāga himself criticizes the Naiyāyika view that *pramāṇa* and *phala* are *bhinnârtha*, saying that the axe aimed at a *khadira* tree does not produce the cutting down of a *palāśa* tree as a result. Kumārila employs the same criticism against Dignāga's justification of the Sautrāntika theory.

1.65. See *PVBh*, p. 393.30–31: . . . *-ākāra-bhedena pramāṇa-prameyatvam upacaryate.*

For Dignāga, there is only the one fact of *sva-saṁvitti*: this cognitive phenomenon itself is not differentiated into subject and object nor into act and result. His belief is based upon the *vijñapti-mātra* theory of the Yogācāras, according to whom, such expressions as *ātman*, *dharma*, and the like, which are supposed to denote the subject and the object, are mere metaphors (*upacāra*) applied to the transformation of the consciousness (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*); cf. *Triṁś*, k. 1a–c:

ātma-dharmôpacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate
vijñāna-pariṇāme 'sau.

In reality, they maintain, there is neither subject not object: these are products of the imagination (*parikalpita*, *utprekṣita*). By attaining (*pariniṣpanna*) detachment from the imaginary subject and object (*grāhya-grāhaka-rahita*), a man comes to realize the state of pure consciousness (*vijñapti-mātra*), in which there is no differentiation between subject and object; see *Triṁś*, k. 20 ff., etc. The state of pure consciousness has no duration, as it is not an entity existing by its own nature. One state exists under certain conditions (*paratantra*) and in the next moment is replaced by another; see n. 1.66. With this theory of *vijñapti-mātra* as background, Dignāga considers that the undifferentiated fact of *sva-saṁvitti* is metaphorically differentiated into *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

Kamalaśīla ascribes the following statement to "ācārya," i.e., Dignāga: "*tatrâpi hi pratyakṣôpacāro 'viruddhaś cakṣur-ādiṣu tat-kāraṇeṣu.*" Neither K nor V has the corresponding passage. According to Kamalaśīla, this statement expresses the thought that, after one has understood the relation between *pramāṇa* and *phala* as that of the determiner and the determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāva*); see above, n. 1.56, he may metaphorically call the sense-organ a *pramāṇa*, although it is generally known as the cause (*kāraṇa*) or the producer (*utpādaka*) of the resulting cognition; cf. *TSP*, ad k. 1349.

1.66. *PVBh*, p. 366.7: *nirvyāpārāḥ sarva-dharmāḥ.*

The fundamental teaching of the Buddha that all existent things are non-eternal (*aniccā sabbe saṅkhārā*, *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IX, 6, 6, etc.) is developed by the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras into the theory of universal momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), the theory that everything is liable to destruction at the very moment of its origination; see *Mahāy. Sūtrālam.*, XVIII, 82–91, etc. Being in a state of flux, a thing cannot possess any function (*vyāpāra*). Cf. *TSP*, p. 399.12–13: *yasmān na pāramārthikaḥ kartṛ-karaṇâdi-bhāvo 'sti, kṣaṇikatvena nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇām.* Similar expressions are often found in *TSP*; *naiva tu kaścit kaṁcid yojayati, nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇām* (p. 369.11–12); *nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇāṁ na paramārthataḥ kasyacit kenacid grahaṇam* (p. 570.15).

1.67. *NMañj*, p. 67.30–31; *ŚVK*, part I, p. 238.13–14:

yad-ābhāsaṁ prameyaṁ tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ
grāhakâkāra-saṁvittī trayaṁ nâtaḥ pṛthak-kṛtam.

Vibhūti, p. 221[1]: *grāhya-grāhaka-saṁ°* instead of *grāhyâkāra-saṁ°* (cf. *ibid.*, p. 229[1]). *ŚVV*, p. 139.22–23; *NR*, p. 159.9–10: *°-saṁvittyos* instead of *°-saṁvittī.*

In this verse the Yogācāra view is clearly expounded. "*Yad-ābhāsam*" means that a cognition has "*viṣayâbhāsa = grāhyâkāra*," and "*saṁvitti*" implies "*sva-saṁvitti.*" In his commentary on *Triṁś*, Dharmapāla cites this verse as evidence of Dignāga's theory of the triple division of *vijñāna*, viz., *grāhyâkāra*, *grāhakâ°*, and *sva-saṁvitti*, which Dharmapāla criticizes while presenting his own fourfold division theory (證自證分 *svasaṁvit-saṁvedana?* besides the above three); cf. *Cheng wei shih lun*, p. 10b.13–16: 如集量論伽他中說 似境相所量 能取相自證 即能量及果 此三體無別 ; La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hsüan-tsang*, I, 131. This fourfold division theory is not referred to in later Sanskrit sources. Dharmakīrti treats the problem of the distinction between *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *phala* from the Yogācāra viewpoint in *PV*, III, 354–367. The following verse in which the triple division of *vijñāna* is clearly established, is cited with particular frequency:

avibhāgo 'pi buddhy-ātmā viparyāsita-darśanaiḥ
grāhya-grāhaka-saṁvitti-bhedavān iva lakṣyate. (354)

Cf. *PVin*, 263a.5–6; *ŚVV*, pp. 243.21–22, 269.18–19; *NR*, p. 272.14–15; *ŚVK*, part II, p. 98.18–19; *Yogabhāṣyaṭīkā* (*Tattvavaiśāradī*), ad IV, 23 (*Ānandāśrama* Skt. Ser., p. 198.23–24); *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, ad I, 20 (H. O. S. 2, p. 15.16–17); *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* (Govt. Oriental Ser., Poona), II, 206–207, etc.

Kumārila attacks the above verse of Dignāga. One cannot assume that there is *svâkāra* without ascertaining it, he says. However, in order to ascertain *svâkāra*, it would be necessary to postulate another *svâkāra* and so forth *ad infinitum*. His conclusion is that there is no *svâkāra* apart from *sva-saṁvitti*; *ŚV*, IV, 80–82. Akalaṅka also gives a criticism of the same verse. According to him, the theory that one thing has many appearances (*ākāra*) is maintainable only by the Jainas who hold the *anekânta-vāda*; see *TAV*, p. 56.19–21: *syād etat—grāhaka-viṣayâbhāsa-saṁvitti-śakti-trayâkāra-bhedāt pramāṇa-prameya-phala-kalpanā-bheda iti. tan na. kiṁ kāraṇam. ekānta-vāda-tyāgāt.* "*ekam anekâkāram*" *ity etaj jainendraṁ darśanam, tat katham ekānta-vāde yujyate.*

1.68. *PVBh*, p. 425.13; *kathaṁ punar jñāyate* [text: *jāyate*] *dvi-rūpaṁ vijñānam iti.* [*jñāyate*: *PVBhT*, 105a.4: śes; K, V: rtogs par bya.]

The term "*dvi-rūpa*" means *svâbhāsa* and *viṣayâbhāsa* mentioned in the *Vṛtti* on *k. 9a*. The Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vaibhāṣikas are unanimous in holding that the cognition simply represents the form (*ākāra*) of an external object but does not in itself possess any form (*nirākāra*). The cognition, as such, has only *svâbhāsa*, which remains the same regardless of the variety of the objects to be cognized. Or, the cognition, in which an object is represented, has only *arthâkāra*, for it has no *ākāra* of its own. Thus, for those *nirākāra-jñāna-vādin*s, the cognition is "*eka-rūpa*," of one form. In the following passages Dignāga advances some reasonings to prove that the cognition is "*dvi-rūpa*" and thus to establish the theory of *sva-saṁvitti*. Cf. *PV*, III, 368–425.

1.69. *PVBh*, pp. 403.17, 425.12; *Vibhūti*, p. 234[2] (cf. p. 244[6]):
viṣaya-jñāna-taj-jñāna-viśeṣāt tu dvi-rūpatā.
ŚVV, p. 267.14; *NR*, p. 299.11: *ghaṭa-jñāna-°* instead of *viṣaya-jñāna-°*. Cf. *Vākyap.*, III, i, 105.

1.70 *PVBh*, p. 403.18–20: *viṣaye rūpâdau yaj jñānaṁ tad artha-svâbhāsaṁ. viṣaya-jñāne tu yaj jñānaṁ tad arthânurūpa-jñānâbhāsaṁ svâbhāsaṁ ca. anyathā yadi viṣaya-jñānam arthâkāram eva syāt svâkāram eva vā viṣaya-jñāna-jñānam* [text: *viṣaya-jñānam*; *PVBhT*, 80b.8: yul śes paḥi śes pa; K, V: śes pa śes pa; *PST*, 36b.2 (41a.4): śes paḥi śes pa] *api tad-aviśiṣṭaṁ syāt.*

To make clear the meaning of this passage, I use the following symbols:

viṣaya-jñāna $= C_1$	*viṣaya-jñāna-jñāna* $= C_2$
svâbhāsa in $C_1 = S_1$	*svâbhāsa* in $C_2 = S_2$
arthâbhāsa in $C_1 = O_1$	*arthâbhāsa* in $C_2 = O_2$

According to Dignāga, $C_1 = (S_1—O_1)$, $C_2 = (S_2—O_2)$. [— indicates relation] Since C_2 takes C_1 for its object, $O_2 = (S_1—O_1)$. Therefore, $C_2 = (S_2—(S_1—O_1))$. Thus, C_2 is distinguishable from C_1.

Now, in case the cognition had only *arthâkāra* (= °*ābhāsa*), then $C_1 = O_1$, and $C_2 = O_2$. Since C_2 takes C_1 for its object, $O_2 = O_1$. Therefore, $C_2 = C_1$. Thus, *viṣaya-jñāna-jñāna* would be indistinguishable from *viṣaya-jñāna*. If, on the other hand, the cognition had only *svâkāra* (= °*ābhāsa*), then $C_1 = S_1$, and $C_2 = S_2$. However, since the cognition which does not possess the form of an object within itself remains the same at all time, $S_2 = S_1$. Therefore, $C_2 = C_1$. See *PV*, III, 385–386:

ādyânubhava-rūpatve hy eka-rūpaṁ vyavasthitam
dvitīyaṁ vyatiricyeta na parāmarśa-cetasā
artha-saṁkalanâśleṣā dhīr dvitīyâvalambate
nīlâdi-rūpeṇa dhiyaṁ bhāsamānaṁ puras tataḥ.

See also *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 111, 112ab:
ekâkāraṁ kila jñānaṁ prathamaṁ yadi kalpyate
tatas tad-viṣayâpy anyā tad-rūpaiva matir bhavet
ghaṭa-vijñāna-taj-jñāna-viśeṣo 'to na sidhyati.

In the same manner, the third and the succeeding cognitions C_3, $C_4 \ldots C_n$ are distinguishable from the preceding ones only when they are acknowledged to possess "*dvi-rūpa*." The formulas are as follows:

$$C_3 = (S_3—O_3) = (S_3—(S_2—O_2))$$
$$\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots$$
$$C_n = (S_n—O_n) = (S_n—(S_{n-1}—O_{n-1}))$$

($S_3 \ldots S_n$ and $O_3 \ldots O_n$ respectively stand for *svâbhāsa* and *arthâbhāsa* in $C_3 \ldots C_n$.) C_2, $C_3 \ldots C_n$ are constituted by adding another *ākāra* to the preceding C_1, $C_2 \ldots C_{n-1}$. This is clearly expressed by Dharmakīrti in *PV*, III, 379–380:

tac cânubhava-vijñānenôbhayâṁśâvalambinā
ekâkāra-viśeṣeṇa taj-jñānenânubadhyate
anyathā hy atathā-rūpaṁ kathaṁ jñāne 'dhirohati
ekâkārôttaraṁ jñānaṁ tathā hy uttaram uttaram.

Cf. *PVBh*, p. 407.7–9 (ad *PV*, III, 380): *tathā hy uttaram uttaram ekaikenâkāreṇâdhikam adhikaṁ bhavati nânyathā. tathā hi pūrvakeṇa nīlaṁ gṛhītaṁ tad-uttareṇa nīla-jñānaṁ tad-uttareṇa nīla-jñāna-jñānaṁ tad-uttareṇâpi tad-adhikam iti niścinoti. tad etad anyathā na syāt.*

This theory of the "accumulation of *ākāra*" (*ākāra-pracaya*) is referred to by Kumārila in *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 112cd–114ab:

grāhakâkāra-saṁvittau tv ākāra-pracayo bhavet
jāyate pūrva-vijñānaṁ dvy-ākāraṁ yatra tat punaḥ
tasyâtmīyaś ca pūrvau ca viṣaya-sthāv upaplutau
pareṣv ākāra-vṛddhyaivaṁ pūrvebhyo bhinnatā (*tathā*).

Kumārila, who holds that the difference between cognitions is due to the difference between objects (*grāhya-bheda-nibandhanaḥ saṁvitti-bhedaḥ*), does not recognize the necessity for admitting the accumulation of *ākāra*; *ibid.*, 115–117.

1.71. *PVBh*, p. 409.1–2: *na côttarôttarāṇi jñānāni pūrva-pūrva-jñāna-viṣayâbhāsāni* [K, V: sṅar rin du ḥdas paḥi yul snaṅ ba (=*pūrva-viprakṛṣṭa-viṣayâ°*); *PST*, 37a.4–5 (41b.8): sṅa ma . . . rin ba yin] *syus tasyâviṣayatvāt.*"

According to the Bauddhas, nothing has stability or duration. A thing cognized by a cognition ceases to exist before the succeeding cognition arises. Hence, on the assumption that an external object is represented in the *nirākāra* cognition, the form of the object in the preceding cognition would never appear in the succeeding cognition. This, however, is contrary to our experience. When it is admitted that the cognition is "*dvi-rūpa*," the structures of the succeeding cognitions can be shown by the following formulas. (The symbols are the same as those used in n. 1.70.)

$$C_2 = (S_2—O_2) = (S_2—(S_1—O_1))$$
$$C_3 = (S_3—O_3) = (S_3—(S_2—(S_1—O_1)))$$
$$\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots$$
$$C_n = (S_n—O_n) = (S_n—(S_{n-1}—(S_{n-2}— \ldots (S_1—O_1))))$$

It is thus clear that O_1, the appearance of an object in C_1, appears in $C_2, C_3, \ldots C_n$.

1.72. *PVBh*, p. 425.5; *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 118a; *ŚVV*, p. 267.15; *ŚVK*, part II, p. 144.18; *NR*, pp. 209.12, 301.13–14:

smṛter uttara-kālaṁ ca.

1.73. *Vibhūti*, p. 244[4]: *yasmāc cânubhavôttara-kālaṁ viṣaya iva jñāne smṛtir utpadyate tasmād asti dvi-rūpatā jñānasya.*

The argument advanced in *Hb* was primarily intended to prove that the cognition has *arthâkāra* within itself. Here, by the fact of the recollection of a past cognition, Dignāga proves that the cognition has *svâkāra* along with *arthâkāra.* The recollection is caused by the impression (*saṁskāra*) of previous experience. The *nirākāra-jñāna-vādin*s, who hold that an external object is experienced by the cognition which is in itself unconscious of itself, must find it difficult to explain the fact of recollection of a past cognition in the form "I remember that I cognized this object." As the cognition, according to them, has not been experienced before, it cannot have left an impression able to give rise to recollection. The recollection of a past cognition is explainable only by admitting that the cognition is cognized by itself. From this it necessarily follows that the cognition has *svâkāra.*

This reasoning is referred to by Kumārila in *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 114cd, and refuted, *ibid.*, 118:

smṛter uttara-kālaṁ cêty etan mithyaiva gīyate
tadaiva hy asya saṁvittir arthāpattyôpajāyate.

For Kumārila, the recollection is of the object only and not of the cognition. The past cognition is merely inferred from the recollection of the object by means of *arthāpatti* (hypothetical inference); see below, n. 1.79.

1.74. *PVBh*, p. 425.20, 426.18: *svasaṁvedyatā ca.*

That the cognition has *svâkāra* along with *arthâkāra* implies that the cognition is cognized by itself. Thus the fact of recollection of a previous cognition is proof also of self-cognition; see *PST*, 38b.3 (43a.8): "dus phyis dran pa las śes paḥi tshul gñis pa ñid grub pa ḥbaḥ ṣig tu mzad kyi, ḥon kyaṅ raṅ rig pa yaṅ ste . . ."; *PV*, III, 426:

dvairūpya-sādhanenâpi prāyaḥ siddhaṁ svavedanaṁ
svarūpa-bhūtâbhāsasya tadā saṁvedanêkṣaṇāt;

ibid., III, 485a–b_1: *smṛter apy ātma-vit siddhā jñānasya.* See also *Madhyamakāvatāra* (ed. by De la Vallée Poussin, Bib. Bud., IX), pp. 167–168.

1.75. *PVBh*, p. 425.5; *ŚVV*, p. 267.15; *NR*, p. 299.12:

na hy asāv avibhāvite.

ŚVK, part II, p. 144.18: *avibhāvitaḥ* instead of *avibhāvite.*

This statement may also be put thus: Whatsoever is recollected has been experienced before. The recollection is an effect (*kārya*) of the previous experience

(*anubhava*). Thus the reason "*smṛteḥ*" (*k. 11c*) is *kārya-hetu* (cf. *NB*, II, 15; *Bud. Log.*, II, 67), and effectively proves that the cognition itself has been experienced or self-cognized before; *PST*, 38b.4–5 (43b.2).

In *Viṁś*, ad k. 17, the Sautrāntikas criticize the *vijñapti-mātra* doctrine which denies the existence of external objects, arguing that the fact of recollection of an object proves the existence of the external object, which one has experienced before. In reply to this criticism, Vasubandhu states that the *vijñapti* which has the appearance of the object within itself is later recollected by *mano-vijñāna*; see *Viṁś*, p. 9.1–8.

1.76. The Naiyāyikas hold that a cognition is not self-luminous but illuminated by another cognition; see n. 1.60. The example of the lamp, which the Bauddhas cite to illustrate the self-luminous nature of cognition, is used by them to explain their theory that a cognition is cognized by another cognition; see *NBh*, II, i, 18: *yathā pradīpa-prakāśaḥ pratyakṣâṅgatvād dṛśya-darśane pramāṇam, sa ca pratyakṣântareṇa cakṣuṣaḥ saṁnikarṣeṇa gṛhyate, pradīpa-bhāvâbhāvayor darśanasya tathā-bhāvād darśana-hetur anumīyate, tamasi pradīpam upādadīthā ity āptôpadeśenâpi pratipadyate, evaṁ pratyakṣâdīnāṁ yathā-darśanaṁ pratyakṣâdibhir evôpalabdhiḥ*. The use of the lamp metaphor as an illustration of the *svaprakāśa* theory (cf. *NS* and *NBh*, II, i, 20) is not authorized in the Nyāya school; see *NVTT*, p. 371.5–7: *ye tu—pradīpa-prakāśo yathā na prakāśântaram apekṣate evam pramāṇāny api pramāṇântaram anapekṣamāṇāny api santi bhaviṣyantîty ācārya-deśīyā manyante.*

1.77. *Vibhūti*, p. 271[5]; *ŚVV*, p. 247.23, 284.20:

jñānântareṇânubhave 'niṣṭhā.

ŚVK, part II, p. 103.18–19; *NR*, p. 277.15: *hîṣṭā* instead of *aniṣṭhā*. *NR*, p. 321.9: *anubhāvo* instead of *anubhave*; *aniṣṭas* instead of *aniṣṭhā*.

Inasmuch as there is a later recollection of C_1 (C stands for cognition), it must be admitted that C_1 is cognized in some way. If it is held that C_1 is cognized by C_2, then it necessarily follows that C_2 is cognized by C_3, and C_3 by C_4, and so forth. Because C_2, C_3, ... are also later recollected (*k. 12b₂*). Thus the Naiyāyikas are inevitably led to the absurd conclusion that an endless series of cognitions follow from a single cognition of an object. See *PV*, III, 513, 514ab:

jñānântareṇânubhave bhavet tatrâpi ca smṛtiḥ
dṛṣṭā tad-vedanaṁ kena tasyâpy anyena cet imām
mālāṁ jñāna-vidāṁ ko 'yaṁ janayaty anubandhinīm.

TSP, p. 565.13–17: *kim ca yadi jñānântareṇânubhavo 'ṅgīkriyate tadā tatrâpi jñānântare smṛtir utpadyata eva jñāna-jñānaṁ mamôtpannam iti, tasyâpy apareṇânubhavo vaktavyaḥ, na hy ananubhūte smṛtir yuktā, tataś cêmā jñāna-mālāḥ ko 'nanya-karmā janayatîti vaktavyam. na tāvad arthas tasya mūla-jñāna-viṣayatvāt. nâpîndriyâlokau tayoś cakṣur-jñāna evôpayogāt. nâpi nirnimittā, sadā sattvâdi-prasaṅgāt*; *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 187cd, 188 (see also *ibid.*, 27):

anyena vânubhave [texts: *anubhāve*] *'sāv anavasthā prasajyate*
tatra tatra smṛtiṁ dṛṣṭvā sarvânubhava-kalpanā
ekena tv anubhūtatve sarvaṁ tatraiva sambhavet.

1.78. The Naiyāyikas are often charged with this absurdity; see *Yogabhāṣya*, ad IV, 21: "*cittântara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgaḥ* . . ." (*Sūtra*). *atha cittaṁ cec cittântareṇa gṛhyeta buddhi-buddhiḥ kena gṛhyate, sâpy anyayā sâpy anyayêty atiprasaṅgaḥ.* The same criticism of the Nyāya theory offered in *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* and *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is explained in Sinha, *Indian Psychology, Cognition*, pp. 214–220.

1.79. *Vibhūti*, pp. 261[5], 271[5]; *ŚVV*, pp. 247.23, 284.20, 286.11; *NR*, pp. 277.15, 321.17:

tatrâpi hi smṛtiḥ.

ŚVK, part II, p. 103.22: *ca* instead of *hi*; *ibid.*, p. 168.16 omits *hi.*

Kumārila vehemently attacks this argument in *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 189–196. He observes that it is contrary to the experience of an ordinary person to argue that an endless series of cognitions, C_1, C_2, C_3, . . . are recollected. He explains the cause of the recollection of the cognition by his theory that a cognition is inferred from its result, i.e., *jñātatā* (cognizedness); see above, n. 1.60. Immediately after an object has been cognized, the cognition is inferred from *jñātatā* by means of *arthāpatti* (hypothetical inference): if there had been no cognition, there could not be *jñātatā*. C_1 is thus cognized by C_2, that is to say, *jñātatā* is produced on C_1. Again from this *jñātatā*, C_2 is inferred by means of *arthāpatti*. In this way there arise a certain number of cognitions, each cognizing the preceding one, so long as the cognizer attempts to apprehend the cognition. As many cognitions as are thus cognized may be recollected later, but not an endless series; see *ŚVK*, part II, p. 168.11–13 (ad k. 191): *yadi tv artha-jñātatânyathânupapattyā jñānam avagamya punas taj-jñātatā-vaśena tad-viṣayaṁ jñānântaraṁ kalpayati, punaś cânenaiva krameṇa yāvac-chramaṁ jñānāni jñātāni, tato yāvaj-jñāta-smaraṇād nânavasthā.* Kumārila also disagrees with the view that there is a recollection of the cognition itself similar to the recollection of the object. According to him, what is recollected is always the object and never the cognition. From the recollection of the object, the previous cognition is inferred by means of *arthāpatti*: if this object had not been cognized before, there could be no recollection of it. It is through this process that the past cognition comes to be recollected; see *ibid.*, p. 168.17–18 (ad k. 192) *artho hi smaryate. tat-smaraṇânyathânupapattyā ca tasya prāg jñātatvam eva kalpyate, tato 'pi prācīna-jñāna-kalpanā.*

1.80. *ŚVV*, p. 247.24; *ŚVK*, part II, p. 103.25; *NR*, p. 277.16, 322.20:

viṣayântara-saṁcāras tathā na syāt sa cêṣyate.

Vibhūti, p. 261[5]: *cêkṣate* instead of *cêṣyate*; *TS*, 206ab: *gocarâ°* instead of *viṣayâ°*; *ŚVV*, p. 285.20: *tadā* instead of *tathā*. Cf. *Vibhūti*, p. 271[5].

Cf. *PV*, III, 514cd:

pūrvā dhīḥ saiva cen na syāt saṁcāro viṣayântare.

TSP, p. 565.17–27: *saiva pūrva-dhīr uttarottarām buddhiṁ janayatîti ced āha—* "*gocarântara-saṁcāras* . . ." (*TS*, 2026ab). *evaṁ hi viṣayântara-saṁcāro na prāpnoti. tathā hi pūrva-pūrvā buddhir uttarôttarasya jñānasya viṣaya-bhāvenâvasthitā pratyāsannā côpādāna-kāraṇatayā tāṁ tādṛśīm antar-aṅgikāṁ tyaktvā kathaṁ ca bahir-aṅgam arthaṁ gṛhṇīyāt.*

Dharmakīrti develops the discussion as follows: Inasmuch as we admit the movement of the cognition from one object to another, the series of cognitions must be broken at a certain point. If this is the case, the last in the series of cognitions is not cognized by any other cognition. But this conclusion is untenable. Since all cognitions are of the same nature, the last one must also be cognized, so that it may be recollected. If the opponents insist that the last one is not cognized, then they must admit that no cognition is ever cognized by another cognition and, in consequence, deny the fact of the recollection of the cognition. If, on the other hand, they state that the last cognition is cognized by itself, then they have to accept the theory of self-cognition; see *PV*, III, 539–540:

viṣayântara-saṁcāre yady antyaṁ nânubhūyate
parânubhūtavat sarvânanubhūtiḥ prasajyate
ātmânubhūtaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nânubhūtaṁ paraiḥ yadi
ātmânubhūtiḥ sā siddhā kuto yenaivam ucyate.

See also *TS*, 2026cd–2028:

gocarântara-saṁcāre yad antyaṁ tat svato 'nyataḥ
na siddhyet tasya câsiddhau sarveṣām apy asiddhatā
ataś cândhyam aśeṣasya jagataḥ samprasajyate
antyasya tu svataḥ siddhāv anyeṣām api sā dhruvam
jñānatvād anyathā naiṣāṁ jñānatvaṁ syād ghaṭâdivat.

TSP, p. 566.17–22: *athâpi syād ekam antyaṁ jñānam ananubhūtam asmṛtaṁ câstāṁ ko doṣaḥ syād ity āha—"gocarântara- . . ."* (*TS*, 2026cd–2028) *iti. svasaṁvitter anabhyupagamān na svataḥ siddhatā, nâpi parataḥ, anavasthā-doṣāt, tasyântasyâsiddhau satyāṁ pūrvakasyâpy asiddhiḥ, apratyakṣôpalambhakatvāt. tataś cârthasyâpy asiddhir iti na kadācit kiṁcid upalabhyeta. tataś cândhyam āyātam aśeṣasya jagataḥ. athântasya yathôkta-doṣa-bhayāt svasaṁvittyā svata eva siddhir abhyupagamyate tadā tadvad eva sarvasya jñānatvâviśeṣāt svasaṁvid astu.*

As noted above (n. 1.79), Kumārila considers that the series of cognitions is finite. The successive cognitions arise not spontaneously but by man's exertion, and hence the series may be broken. As one ceases to see an object when one's eyes tire of looking at it or when they turn to another object, so one ceases to apprehend the cognition when one tires of this exertion or when one cognizes another object. Hence the cognition surely moves from one object to another; *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 193:

yāvac-chramaṁ ca tad-buddhis tat-prabandhe mahaty api
śramād rucyânya-samparkād vicchedo viṣayeṣv iva.

Section 2. Examination of the *Vādavidhi* Definition

2.1. The identity of the *Rtsod pa sgrub pa* with the *Vādavidhi* can be proved on the basis of the following materials: (1) *PSV*, K 114b.4, V 41a.3–4: "*Rtsod pa sgrub par* 'med [text: byed] na mi ḥbyuṅ baḥi don mthoṅ ba de rig pa ni rjes su dpag paḥo'"; *HBT*, p. 69.12–13: *ata evâcārya-padair "nântarīyakârtha-darśanaṁ tad-vido 'numānam" iti*; *HBT-Āloka*, p. 317.12–19: ācārya-padair *ity ācārya-Vasubandhum abhisaṁdhāyôktam. "nântarīyaka- . . ." iti . . .* Vādavidhau *Vādavidhi-saṁjñike prakaraṇe.* (2) *PSV*, K 126a.3, V 41b.3–4: "*Rtsod pa sgrub par* ni 'bsgrub par brjod pa tsam dam bcaḥ ba' -r ḥgyur pa . . ."; *NV*, p. 117.20: *yady api Vādavidhau "sādhyâbhidhānaṁ pratijñā" iti pratijñā-lakṣaṇam uktam . . .* See Iyengar, "The Vādavidhi and the Vādavidhāna of Vasubandhu," *Adyar Library Bulletin*, XVII, 9–19; Frauwallner, "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ," Anhang I, Fragment 10, 2.

The *Vādavidhi* is generally ascribed to Vasubandhu; see above (1) and below, n. 2.8. Shên-tai reports that three logical treatises were composed by Vasubandhu; see *Li mên lun shu chi* (理門論述記), T. XLIV, 77b.28–29: 言「論式 (*Lun shih*) 等」則等取論軌 (*Lun kuei*) 及論心 (*Lun hsin*). 此三論並世親 (Vasubandhu) 所造. Among these, *Lun kuei* corresponds to the *Vādavidhi*. The fragments of the *Vādavidhi* cited in *PSV* and *PST* have been collected and arranged in their proper order by Frauwallner, "Vas. Vād.," Anhang I.

2.2. K and V differ in positioning the negative: K sñiṅ po *ṅes par ma dgoṅs* so, V ṅes par *sñiṅ po med par* dgoṅs. V agrees with *PST*, 39b.3 (44b.1); *sñiṅ po med* ces ṅes pa ḥaṁ, and *ibid.*, 33b.4 (44b.3) de la *sñiṅ po med par* ṅes pa skyes so.

2.3. Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's hesitation in ascribing the *Vādavidhi* to Vasubandhu in the following manner: In view of the fact that the other works of Vasubandhu are not faulty, the *Vādavidhi*, which is faulty, cannot be accepted as a work of Vasubandhu. Even though the *Vādavidhi* is generally reported to be Vasubandhu's work, hearsay hardly justifies something as fact, for there is no dearth of groundless assertions. Forming a conclusion concerning the authorship of a book of dubious ascription merely on the ground of a current report is not a commendable procedure; *PST*, 39b.2–4 (44a.7–44b.2).

2.4. On this point, Jinendrabuddhi says: Granted that the *Vādavidhi* is a work of Vasubandhu, he must have composed it at a time when his knowledge was still imperfect. Later, when he came to acquire more advanced knowledge, he came to the conclusion that the kernel of his thought was not contained in the *Vādavidhi*; *PST*, 39b.4 (44b.2–3). Wên-kuei, a disciple of Hsüan-tsang, gives

the same account; see *Yin ming ju chêng li lun shu* (因明入正理論疏), Dainippon Zokuzōkyō, LXXXVI, p. 337a.7–10: 集量論中陳那云. 論軌論...其論非是世親造. 或是世親未學時造. 學成已後造論式論...不異我義; see also Ui, *Bukkyō Ronrigaku*, pp. 178–179.

Worth noting is the fact that Dignāga was uncertain of the authorship of the *Vādavidhi*, which was traditionally accepted as a work of Vasubandhu. Siṁhasūri recognizes Vasubandhu as the *guru* of Dignāga; *NCV*, p. 96.4–6: *idānīṁ Vasubandhoḥ sva-guroḥ "tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam" iti bruvato yad uttaram abhihitam . . . Dinnena (= Dignāgena) Vasubandhu-pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇaṁ dūṣayatā* . . . Bu-ston and Tāranātha also report that Dignāga was a direct disciple of Vasubandhu; Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyuṅ) by Bu-ston*, part II, p. 149; Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien*, p. 131. However, considering the above fact, the historical authenticity of Siṁhasūri's statement as well as of the Tibetan records is open to question. Stcherbatsky remarks that Dignāga expressed here in a polite way his disagreement with his teacher; *Bud. Log.*, I, 33, n. 1.

2.5. K reads "*rtsod pa sgrub par* (*Vādavidhau*) cha śas gṣan du . . ." But the work referred to here could not be identical with the *Vādavidhi* because Dignāga affirms that its theories differ from those of the *Vādavidhi*. K has been corrected on the basis of *PST*, 39b.5–6 (44b.4): "*rtsod pa sgrub par byed pa la* (*Vādavidhāne*) gṣan du cha śas . . ."

That the *Vādavidhāna* is a work of Vasubandhu is clear from the following passage of the *Vādanyāyaṭīkā*, p. 142.13–14: *nanu câyaṁ vāda-nyāya-mārgaḥ sakala-loka-nibandhana-bandhunā Vādavidhānâdāv ācārya-Vasubandhunā mahārāja-pathī-kṛtaḥ*. Cf. Iyengar, "The Vādavidhi and the Vādavidhāna of Vasubandhu" (n. 2.1). Among Vasubandhu's three logical treatises (see above, n. 2.1), *Lun shih* corresponds to the *Vādavidhāna*. Sanskrit fragments of the *Vādavidhāna* have been collected by Frauwallner; "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam," pp. 281 ff.

2.6. Jinendrabuddhi says that in the *Vādavidhāna* Vasubandhu's theories are presented in a faultless manner; *PST*, 39b.5 (44b.2). The extant fragments of the *Vādavidhāna* seem to present a more advanced logical position than does the *Vādavidhi*. In *NMukh*, Dignāga refers to the *Vādavidhāna* twice without criticism; *NMukh*, 1a.9: 此多言於論式等說名能立 *ibid.*, 6a.2–3: 又此類過失言詞我自朋屬論式等中多已制伏.

2.7. According to Jinendrabuddhi, the theories to be examined are those concerning *pramāṇa*, *pramāṇâbhāsa*, *jāti*, and *tad-uttara*; *PST*, 39b.7 (44b.6). In fact, we find the *Vādavidhi* theories criticized in ch. I (*pratyakṣa-pariccheda*), ch. II (*svârthânumāna-p.*), ch. III (*parârthânumāna-p.*), ch. IV (*dṛṣṭānta-dṛṣṭāntâbhāsa-p.*), and ch. VI (*jāti-p.*) of *PS*(*V*).

2.8. Cf. *NV*, p. 40.16: *apare punar varṇayanti "tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam" iti*; *NVTT*, p. 150.7–8: *tad evaṁ pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇaṁ samarthya Vāsubandhavaṁ tāvat pratyakṣa-lakṣanaṁ vikalpayitum upanyasyati "apare punar" iti*; *NCV*, p. 96.4: *idānīṁ Vasubandhoḥ sva-guroḥ "tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam" iti bruvato* . . .

Although Kk and Vk have two seven-syllable lines ("don de las skyes rnam par śes / mṅon sum yin ṣes bya ba ḥdir"), I assume that these did not originally form part of the Kārikās (see Introduction, p. 17).

The *Vādavidhi* definition of perception and the following explanatory passages are fully quoted by Jinendrabuddhi in *PST*, 39b.7–40a.4 (44b.6–45a.4): "don de las rnam par śes pa mṅon sum (*tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam*) ṣes pa, yul gaṅ gis rnam par śes pa tha sñad bya ba de kho na las gal te de skye ṣiṅ gṣan las ma yin la, de las gṣan las kyaṅ ma yin paḥi śes pa de mṅon sum ste (*yasyârthasya yad vijñānaṁ vyapadiśyate yadi tata eva tad bhavati nârthântarād bhavati tat pratyakṣam*; cf. *NV*, p. 40.17–18). [Since the Tibetan translation of this passage begins with "*yul gaṅ gis*"; cf. *PST*, 39b.7 (44b.6), 40b.7 (45b.8), 42b.6 (48a.2), 43a.4 (48b.1), 43a.6 (48b.4), perhaps the first two words were originally "*yenârthena*" instead of "*yasyârthasya*".] dper na gzugs la sogs paḥi śes pa daṅ bde ba la sogs paḥi śes pa bṣin ṣes paḥo. ḥdis ni ḥkhrul paḥi śes pa (*bhrānti-jñāna*) bsal te, dper na ña phyis la dṅul gyis śes pa lta buḥo. de ni dṅul gyis dṅul gyi śes paḥo ṣes tha sñad byed la de dṅul las skye ba yaṅ ma yin gyi, ña phis kho nas de bskyed par bya baḥo. kun rdsob paḥi śes pa (*saṁvṛti-jñāna*) yaṅ ḥdis gsal te, de ltar ni bum paḥi śes pa [text repeats bum paḥi śes pa] ṣes pa ḥdi ltar de bum pa la sogs pa rnams kyis tha sñad bya ṣiṅ, de de rnams las ḥbyuṅ ba ni ma yin te, de rnams ni kun rdsob tu yod pa ñid kyis rgyu ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir ro. gzugs la sogs pa de ltar yaṅ dag par ṣen pa rnams kho na las de ḥbyuṅ ṅo. rjes su dpag paḥi śes pa (*anumāna-jñāna*) yaṅ ḥdi kho nas bsal te, du baḥi śes pa daṅ ḥbrel ba dran pa dag las kyaṅ de byuṅ gi me kho na las ma yin pas so. de las ḥbyuṅ ba kho na ste mi ḥbyuṅ ba ni ma yin no ṣes pa ḥdi yaṅ ḥdir don du mṅon par ḥdod do." Cf. Frauwallner, "Vas. Vād.," Anhang I, Fragment 9; German trans., *ibid.*, p. 18. See also *NV*, pp. 40.16–41.18.

2.9. The word "rkyen kun" (*sarva-pratyaya*) should not be interpreted as *sarve pratyayāḥ*, i.e., the four *pratyaya*s (see below, n. 2.11). It means *sarva-dharma-svarūpaḥ pratyayaḥ* (chos kun gyi raṅ bṣin can gyi rkyen), namely, *ālambana-pratyaya*; see *PST*, 40a.7–40b.1 (45a.5–7). See also *AK*, II, 62c: *ālambanaṁ sarva-dharmāḥ*. This verse of *AK* means that the *ālambana-pratyaya*s of the six *vijñāna*s and the accompanying mental activities are respectively all *rūpa*s, all *śabda*s, all *gandha*s, all *rasa*s, all *sparśa*s, and all *dharma*s; cf. *AKBh*, p. 37a.29–37b.5.

According to the opinion referred to here, the word "*tatas*" in the *Vādavidhi* definition of perception is used in order to distinguish *ālambana-pratyaya* from the other *pratyaya*s. This is called *niścita-pratyaya-pakṣa* (rkyen ṅes paḥi phyogs) by Jinendrabuddhi; *PST*, 40b.3 (45b.2–3).

2.10. The *Vādavidhi* explains its definition of perception as follows: "If a certain cognition, which is designated according to the name of a certain object, is [produced] only from that [object] (*tata eva*) and not from any other object (*nârthântarāt*), then that [cognition] is perception"; see above, n. 2.8.

2.11. *AK*, II, 64a: *caturbhiś citta-caittā hi.*

The four *pratyaya*s effective to produce a cognition are: (1) *hetu-pratyaya*, i.e., five *hetu*s (*sahabhū-h.*, *sabhāga-h.*, *sampraykuta-h.*, *sarvatraga-h.*, *vipāka-h.*;

see *AK(Bh)*, II, 49 ff.), (2) *samanantara-pratyaya*, i.e., immediately preceding *citta* and *caitta*s, (3) *ālambana-pratyaya*, i.e., all *dharma*s (see above, n. 2.9), and (4) *adhipati-pratyaya* (= *kāraṇa-hetu*), i.e., all *dharma*s except the *citta* and *caitta*s which are being produced; see *AKBh*, p. 37c.10–13; La Vallée-Poussin, *L'Abhidh.*, I–II, 309–310.

The contradiction of the doctrine as established in *AK* (*siddhānta-virodha*) is pointed out by Dignāga.

2.12. See *PST*, 40b.4–5 (45b.4–5): "*yul tsam* ṣes pa . . . *tsam* kyi sgra dmigs pa gṣan rnam par gcod par byed do." This second interpretation of the word "*tatas*" in the *Vādavidhi* definition of perception is called, as distinguished from the first (see above, n. 2.9), *niścitâlambana-pakṣa* (dmigs pa ṅes paḥi phyogs) by Jinendrabuddhi; *PST*, 40b.3 (45b.3).

2.13. This point is discussed in the *Vādavidhi* as follows: "The inferential cognition (*anumāna-jñāna*) is also ruled out by this [definition of perception]. Because [the inferential cognition of fire, for example,] is produced not from fire alone but also from smoke and the remembrance of the relation [between smoke and fire]"; cf. *PST*, 40a.3–4 (45a.3–4) (see above, n. 2.8).

2.14. See *PST*, 40b.6–7 (45b.7): "*me la sogs paḥi śes pa* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, gal te yaṅ de don gṣan las kyaṅ skye mod, de lta na yaṅ don gṣan de des dmigs pa ma yin la . . ." When fire is inferred from smoke, the resulting cognition is called "cognition of fire" (*agni-jñāna*). It is neither "cognition of smoke" nor "cognition of the invariable connection between smoke and fire." The smoke and its invariable connection with fire are certainly regarded as the objects during the process of inference, but they are no longer the objects when the "cognition of fire" arises.

If the past objects—smoke, etc., for example—are to be regarded as the objects of the "cognition of fire," then recollection, which is caused by the past object, must also be regarded as a kind of perception because it is designated according to the name of that object. If the nonpresence of the object in recollection were the reason for excluding it from perception, then neither the smoke nor its invariable connection with fire would be admitted as the object of the "cognition of fire"; cf. *PST*, 40b.7–41a.4 (45b.5–46a.8).

2.15. *NCV*, p. 96.7: *rūpâdiṣv ālambanârtho vaktavyaḥ.*

PST, 41b.1–2 (46b.2): "gzugs la sogs pa rnams la ni dmigs paḥi don brjod par bya na . . ." is a better translation than K and V. I have emended K to conform to *PST*. Cf. *PST*, 41b.5 (46b.6–7): "*dmigs paḥi don* ṣes pa dmigs paḥi sgraḥi don to (*ālambanârtha ity ālambana-śabdasyârthaḥ*)."

2.16. *NC*, p. 96.1–2: *yad-ābhāsaṁ teṣu jñānam utpadyate tathā ta ālambanam.*

Cf. *NCV*, p. 96.11–13: "*yad-ābhāsaṁ* . . ." . . . *nīla-pītâditvena yathaivâvabhāsante tathaivâlambanam ity etad iṣṭam.* Mallavādin, after quoting the above passage, gives the following explanation: *pratyekaṁ paramâṇurūpasya buddhāv asaṁniveśāt samudaya-kṛta-tan-nirbhāsatayâlambanam iti prāptam*, *NC*, p. 96.2–3. An atom does not singly present its form in a cognition. The form represented in a cognition is that of the aggregate of atoms; hence this latter is recognized as

"*ālambana*." Thus, according to this view, the conformity in appearance (*ābhāsa, ākāra*) to the representation is considered as the necessary condition of "*ālambana*." Cf. *PST*, 41b.5–6 (46b.7–8): "*ci gaṅ snaṅ ba* ṣes pa . . . snaṅ baḥi don dmigs paḥi don du ston to."

2.17. *NCV*, p. 99.29: *yathā vidyamānā anyâbhāsasyāpi vijñānasya kāraṇam bhavanti.*

Cf. *NC*, p. 99.6: *pakṣântarâpattiś caivaṁ yathā te vidyante tathā ta ālambanam iti.* According to this second view, that object which forms the cause (*kāraṇa*) of cognition is recognized as "*ālambana*." Cf. *PST*, 41b.6 (46b.8): "*ci ste ji ltar* ṣes pa la sogs pas rgyuḥi don to."

In *Ālambanap.*, Dignāga mentions two necessary conditions which the object of cognition (*ālambana*) must fulfill: first, the object must be the cause (*kāraṇa*) of a cognition, and, second, it must possess the same form (*ākāra*) as that appearing in the cognition. That is to say, a cognition must on the one hand be produced by the object (*tad-utpatti*), and on the other hand have coordination of form with the object (*tat-sārūpya*). To satisfy the first condition, the object must be a real entity (*dravya-sat*), because what is unreal has no faculty of producing a cognition. To meet the second condition, the object must have a gross form (*sthūlâkāra*), because a subtle, invisible form is never represented in a cognition. Taking these two conditions into account, Dignāga examines the views of the realists (1) that the object of cognition is a single atom (*paramâṇu*), (2) that it is the aggregate (*saṁcita*) of atoms, and (3) that it is the gathering (*saṁghāta*) of atoms. According to the Sautrāntikas, any object which is constituted by many elements is considered as *saṁvṛti-sat* (or *prajñapti-sat*, empirically real or nominally existent), because it is no longer cognized when it is destroyed or analyzed by intellect into its elements. That which is neither destroyed nor analyzed into elements is admitted as *paramârtha-sat* (or *dravya-sat*, ultimate reality or real entity). See *AK*, VI, 4:

yasmin bhinne na tad-buddhir anyâpohe dhiyā ca tat
ghaṭâmbuvat saṁvṛti-sat paramârtha-sad anyathā.

Dignāga adopts these Sautrāntika concepts of *saṁvṛti-sat* and *paramârtha-sat* in examining the views of the realists. A single atom may be the cause of a cognition because it is *paramârtha-sat*, but it has no gross form which corresponds to that appearing in the cognition. The aggregate of atoms or the gathering of atoms may have a gross form, but it cannot be the cause of a cognition because it is *saṁvṛti-sat*. Thus Dignāga rejects the views of the realists in toto. Here the realist theories referred to in *Da–1*, *Da–2*, and *Db* correspond respectively to the second, the third, and the first realist theories rejected in *Ālambanap.*

2.18. *Saṁcitâlambanāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyāḥ*; see Section 1, n. 1.38.

2.19. *PST*, 42a.1–2 (47a.3–4): "*kun rdsob tu yod pa kho na la dmigs pa* ṣes pa mṅon sum ma yin pa ñid do ṣes pa lhag maḥo. kun rdsob tu yod pa la dmigs pa ñid ni tshogs pa rdsas su yod pa ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir ro." Cf. Section 1, *E*. Mallavādin directs a similar criticism, and develops his argument as follows: If the aggregate of atoms (recognized as *saṁvṛti-sat*) were to be admitted as the object to be cognized, then there would follow that a cognition is

not that of the object, because *saṁvṛti-sat* has no faculty of producing a cognition. It is generally admitted that there is no "cognition" which is not the "cognition *of* an object," and that a thing is called the "object *of* perception" only when it comes to be cognized through the sense-organ. Those who recognize *saṁvṛti-sat* as the object to be cognized would contradict the generally admitted conceptions of the "cognition" and the "perceivable object" as they would be neglecting the relation between object and cognition. See *NC*, pp. 96.3–97.3: *evaṁ ca sati* [=*paramâṇu-saṁcaya-nīlâdi-nirbhāsatayâlambanatve sati*, *NCV*, p. 96.17] *artha-saṁnikarṣād akṣaṁ prati yad utpadyate taj jñānaṁ pratyakṣam, na tad upapadyate, tasyârthasyâbhāvāt. na ca saṁcayo 'rthaḥ, saṁvṛti-sattvāt. ato nâsāv utpatti-pratyaya iṣyata iti viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatvâbhāvāj jñānatva-pratyakṣatvâbhyupagama-hāniḥ.*

2.20. According to this view, the object of cognition is not a single entity. Although the gathering of many atoms appears as a single entity, it, being a *saṁvṛti-sat*, has no faculty of producing a cognition. It is individual atoms that form the cause of a cognition, and the cognition is constituted by many representations, each of which is produced from an atom. Jinendrabuddhi calls this view "*anekâkārârtha-vāda*" (rnam pa du maḥi don du smra ba); *PST*, 42a.3 (47a.6). Thus when the atoms, which are represented in a cognition, are homogeneous ones, there appears in the cognition as the totality of their representations the form of an object, as in the case of the "cognition of blue." But when the gathering of heterogeneous atoms is taken to be the object, the form that appears in a cognition is not the sum total of representations of atoms but is the product of *kalpanā*: as, for instance, the "cognition of a jar." Cf. *NC*, p. 99.1–3: *athôcyeta—nīlâdi-samudāye dravya-sad-ākāro vidyate, tad-aṇv-ātmakatvāt tathā-sattvāt, tato pratyakṣatvaṁ nyāyam. na tu ghaṭâdy-ākāraḥ, atat-paramâṇutvāt tathâsattvāt.* Vinītadeva ascribes this view to Vāgbhaṭa; *Ṭīkā* on *Alambanap.*, Peking ed., Tib. Trip., No. 5739, 189a.7. Śubhagupta is a later upholder of this theory: see *Bāhyārthas.*, 201a.6–202b.4 (kk. 29–60); *TSP*, pp. 551, 552, 556; Aiyaswami Śastri, *Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti by Dignāga*, p. 104, n.

2.21. Here, Jinendrabuddhi gives two alternative interpretations. *PST*, 42a.5–6 (47a.7–47b.1): "*de rnams la* [="*de dag la*" in K] ṣes pa sṅon po la sogs par snaṅ baḥi śes pa rnams laḥo (*teṣv iti nīlâdy-ābhāseṣu jñāneṣu*) . . . yaṅ na *de rnams la* ṣes pa sṅon po la sogs paḥi rdul phra rab rnams la . . . (*atha vā teṣu nīlâdi-paramâṇuṣu*)."

2.22. Both K and V are unreadable. I have emended K by reference to *PST*, 42a.5 (47b.8): "*de tshogs pa la btags par yod na yaṅ* . . . gal te yaṅ *de btags par yod pa* de lta na yaṅ . . ."

2.23. The cognition of *padârtha*s as enumerated by the Vaiśeṣikas is regarded by Dignāga as *saṁvṛti-saj-jñāna*, a kind of untrue perception. See Section 1, *E*; *PST*, 27b.7–28a.3 (31b.4–8); *NMukh*, p. 3b.28–29: 如是一切世俗有中瓶等數等舉等有性瓶性等智皆似現量. Those who admit the "cognition of blue" as perception (see above, n. 2.20) must also admit the cognition of *padârtha*s—for example, that of a jar (=substance)—as perception, because both blue and a jar are equally constituted by many atoms. See *NC*, p. 98.2–8: . . . *ta eva hi paramâṇavo*

nīlâditvenâbhāsanta iti tad-viṣayaṁ jñānam pratyakṣam iṣṭam, tathā ghaṭa-saṁkhyâdy-ākārebhyaḥ ... paramârtha-sad-ākāro lapsyata iti ghaṭâdi-jñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ syāt, saṁvṛti-sad-ālambanatvāt, nīlâdi-jñānavat. nīlâdi-jñānaṁ vā na pratyakṣaṁ syāt, ghaṭâdi-jñānavat. ta eva hi te paramâṇava ābhāsante. evam ubhayos tulye janakatve kuta etat—nīlâdy-ābhāsaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ na ghaṭâdy-ābhāsam iti; *NC*(*V*), p. 99.3–5 (16–17): "*etac ca tulyam ubhayatrâviśeṣāt.*" *paramâṇu-janyatvād eva nīlâdi-ghaṭâdy-ākāra-pratyakṣayoḥ* ...

2.24. *NC*, p. 99.6–100.1; *NCV*, pp. 101.9, 101.16, 103.10, 104.8: *pratyekaṁ ca te samuditāḥ kāraṇam.*

Being a *dravya-sat*, each individual atom has a *śakti* of producing a cognition. This *śakti* becomes manifest when many atoms gather together, as the *śakti* of litter-carriers becomes manifest when they cooperate in carrying a litter. If the *śakti* is not immanent in each individual, the gathering of many individuals does not come to possess it, as in the case of the assembly of blind persons. *NC*, p. 101.2–7: *nanu ca pratyekam eva te samuditāḥ kāraṇam, tathā-santa eva samuditāḥ paramâṇavaś cakṣur-ādi-jñānôtpatti-hetutvād ālambanam, tad-avasthānāṁ jñānôtpādana-śakty-abhivyakteḥ, cakṣur-ādi-paramâṇūnām iva. na hy eka indriya-paramâṇur viṣaya-paramâṇur vā vijñānam utpādayitum alam, na tat-samudāyaḥ, prajñapti-sattvāt. pratyeka-kāraṇatāyām aṇūnāṁ samudāye darśana-śakti-vyaktiḥ, śibikā-vāhaka-samudāya-vahana-śaktivat, andha-paṅktivat pratyekâdarśana-vailakṣaṇyena.*

2.25. The first half of this verse is quoted in *PVBh*, p. 339.17: *yad-ābhāsā na sā tasmāc citâlambaṁ* [text: *cittâlambaṁ*] *hi pañcakam.* The first *pāda* is identical with *Ālambanap.*, k. 2a, quoted in *Bāhyārthas.*, 201b.2 (k. 34a): "gaṅ ltar snaṅ de de las min." It seems that V wrongly took "*tasmāt*" in the verse as a conjunction. Obviously "*tasmāt*" stands for "*tatas*" in the *Vādavidhi* definition of perception. K can be interpreted as "[the cognition] is not [produced] from that [object] which has a [gross] appearance." However, from the above Sanskrit fragment, we see that "*sā*" is omitted in K. *PST*, 43a.1 (48a.5): "*gaṅ snaṅ* (*ba*) *de ni de bas* [=*las*] *min*" is a better translation. I have emended K to conform to the above-mentioned Sanskrit fragment.

2.26. *PVV*, pp. 206.26–207.2 (cf. *PVBh*, p. 336.16): *cakṣur-ādīnām apy ālambanatva-prasaṅgaḥ, te 'pi hi paramârthato 'nyathā vidyamānā nīlâdy-ābhāsasya dvi-candrâdy-ābhāsasya ca jñānasya kāraṇī-bhavanti.* In reference to this Sanskrit passage, "dmigs (pa)" (*upalabdhi*) in K and V must be corrected to read "mig (pa)" (*cakṣus*).

Cf. *NC*, p. 100.2–4: *evaṁ-vidhâlambanatāyāṁ ca dhūmo 'gni-pratyakṣa-jñānâlambanaṁ syāt, tathā vidyamānatve 'nyathâbhāsasyâpi jñānasya kāraṇī-bhavanāt, tvad-ukta-pratyakṣâlambanavat. cakṣur-ādy api vâlambanaṁ syāt.*

2.27. *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 245cd:
na cârtha-rūpād bhedena dhiyām asti nirūpaṇam.
Cf. *Vākyap.*, III, i, 106.

2.28. Dignāga vindicates the *Vādavidhi* definition by reinterpreting the text in the light of his own theories. See Section 1, *C*.

Section 3. Examination of the Nyāya Theory

3.1. *NS*, I, i, 4: *indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣôtpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyâtmakaṁ pratyakṣam.*

As is remarked by Jinendrabuddhi, the qualifiers "*avyapadeśya*" and "*avyabhicārin*" can be interpreted in two ways: (1) If they are regarded as bahuvrīhi compounds, they mean "(the cognition) possessing no expressible (object)" and "(the cognition) possessing no erroneous (object)." In this case, "*vyapadeśya*" and "*vyabhicārin*" refer to the object. (2) If they are regarded as tatpuruṣa compounds, they mean that the cognition is "inexpressible" and "nonerroneous"; in this case "*avyapadeśya*" and "*avyabhicārin*" refer to the nature of cognition; *PST*, 44b.2–4 (49b.8–50a.2). Dignāga criticizes the first interpretation in *Ba* and *Bb*, and the second in *Bd*. In the bahuvrīhi compound "*vyavasāyâtmaka*," the latter member "*-ātmaka*" signifies "having the nature of" or "having . . . as a result"; *ibid.*, 44b.4 (50a.3). In *Bc–1* and *Bc–2*, Dignāga takes up the first interpretation, and the second in *Bc–3*. The extant commentaries of *NS* do not distinctly mention these two different interpretations of the three qualifiers.

Jinendrabuddhi refers to the theory of five varieties of "*indriyârthasaṁnikarṣa*," namely, *saṁyoga*, *saṁyukta-samavāya*, *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, *samavāya*, and *samaveta-samavāya*; *ibid.*, 44a.1–44b.1 (49a.7–49b.7). For this theory, see Section 4, n. 4.13. He further notes that the term "*jñāna*" mentioned in the sūtra is used in order to distinguish *pratyakṣa* from *sukha*, etc., which are also produced by *indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa*; *ibid.*, 44b.1 (49b.7–8). This statement agrees with *NV*, p. 36.22–23: *atha jñāna-grahaṇaṁ kim artham. sukhâdi-vyavacchedârtham. indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣāt sukha-duḥkhe api bhavatah, tad-vyudāsârtham āha—jñānam iti.*

3.2. According to V: This [definition] is not appropriate either, [for] these qualifiers are unnecessary.

3.3. *PVBh*, p. 338.17:

indriyârthôdbhave nâsti vyapadeśyâdi-sambhavaḥ.

Both K and V incorrectly render the first compound into: "*dbaṅ po las byuṅ don blo la(s).*" *PST*, 44b.4 (50a.3): "*dbaṅ don las byuṅ* ṣes pa . . ." agrees with the Sanskrit. The word "*indriyârthôdbhava*" implies "*indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣôdbhava*"; see *ibid.*, 44b.5 (50a.4): "*dbaṅ po daṅ don* smos pa ni de phrad pa ñe bar mtshon paḥi don to."

3.4. Dignāga makes a radical distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, which have the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) respectively for their objects. The particular is inexpressible (*avyapadeśya*,

anirdeśya), while the universal is a product of conceptual construction (*kalpanā*), which is inseparably related to verbal expression; cf. Section 1, nn. 1.25, 1.27.

3.5. K: "bstan par bya ba yin pa ñid la yaṅ . . ." may be construed as follows: There is no [possibility of] deviation [of the sense-cognition] into an expressible [cognition]. However, *PST*, 45a.4 (50b.4): "tha sñad du bya ba ma yin pa ñid laḥaṅ ḥkhrul ba med pa ste," makes better sense, and so I have corrected K by inserting "ma." V: Therefore, one should not mention a qualifier of that which does not deviate [from the rule].

It may be worth noting that Vātsyāyana interprets the meaning of "*avyapadeśya*" as distinguishing *jñāna* itself from a designation (*vyapadeśa*) of the object; cf. *NBh*, I, i, 4: *yad idam anupayukte śabdârtha-sambandhe 'rtha-jñānaṁ na tan nāma-dheya-śabdena vyapadiśyate, gṛhīte 'pi ca śabdârtha-sambandhe 'syârtha-syâyaṁ śabdo nāma-dheyam iti, yadā tu so 'rtho gṛhyate tadā tat pūrvasmād artha-jñānāt na viśiṣyate, tad artha-vijñānaṁ tādṛg eva bhavati. . . . tasmād aśābdam artha-jñānam indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣôtpannam iti.* We may consider Dignāga's discussion in *Bd* as referring to this interpretation of Vātsyāyana's.

3.6. A different reading is suggested in *PST*, 45b.2 (51a.2): "ḥkhrul baḥi yul ñid la yaṅ ma yin te (*vyabhicāri-viṣayatve 'pi na*)." This agrees in style with the expression in *Ba*: "bstan par bya ba ma yin pa ñid la yaṅ ḥkhrul ba yod pa ma yin te (*avyapadeśyatve 'pi na vyabhicāraḥ*)." The omission of "ḥkhrul ba yod pa" (*vyabhicāra*) before "ma yin te" is to avoid repetition. However, to agree perfectly with *Ba*, "*mi* ḥkhrul baḥi yul ñid la yaṅ" should replace "ḥkhrul baḥi yul ñid la yaṅ," since *NS*, I, i, 4, states that the sense-cognition is "*avyabhicārin*." My translation is based on K. If we adopt the reading in *PST*, the translation may be as follows: Nor is there [deviation from a rule] into taking that which is erroneous for its object. According to V: "Illusiveness" cannot be the qualifier [of the sense-cognition]. Perhaps "ḥkhrul baḥi khyad par ñid" (*vyabhicāri-viśeṣaṇatva*) is a misrendering of "*vyabhicāri-viṣayatva*" (ḥkhrul baḥi yul ñid). Otherwise "ḥkhrul baḥi . . ." should be corrected to read "mi ḥkhrul baḥi . . . ," since the qualifier in *NS*, I, i, 4, is *avyabhicārin* and not *vyabhicārin*.

3.7. *PVBh*, pp. 253.2, 338.10: *mano-bhrānti-viṣayatvād vyabhicāriṇaḥ.* I have emended K to conform to this Sanskrit fragment.

This statement inclines us to believe that Dignāga attributed errors to *manas*; cf. Section 1, n. 1.53. It may be argued by the Naiyāyikas that the qualifier "*avyabhicārin*" is necessary in order to exclude the *vyabhicāra*s which are caused not by *manas* but by a defect of the sense-organ. Jinendrabuddhi rejects this view by arguing as follows: *NS*, I, i, 4, does not state simply that the cognition produced by the sense (*indriya-jaṁ jñānam*) is *pratyakṣa*. There, the *pratyakṣa* cognition is characterized as being produced by "the contact of a sense and an object" (*indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa*). A defective sense-organ does not come into proper contact with an object. Therefore, the *vyabhicāra*s caused by the defect of the sense-organ are excluded by the words "contact . . . with an object"; cf. *PST*, 45b.6–7 (51b.6–8): "dbaṅ po ñe bar bcom pa las skyes paḥi gaṅ ḥkhrul baḥi yul can zla ba gñis la sogs paḥi śes pa de yaṅ mṅon sum ñid du ḥgyur ba ma yin nam, deḥi phyir de bsal baḥi ched du de gdon mi za bar byaḥo ṣe na, de

yod pa ma yin te, don daṅ phrad pa smos pa kho nas de spaṅs paḥi phyir ro. gṣan du na dbaṅ po las sykes pa ṣes pa ḥdi ltar brjod par bya bar ḥgyur gyi, dbaṅ po daṅ don phrad pa las byuṅ ba ṣes bya ba ni ma yin te, de la rnam par gcad par bya ba med paḥi phyir ro." The same discussion is found in *PVBh*, p. 338.14–15: *nanv artham antareṇêndriya-mātrād yad utpadyate tasyâpi vyabhicāritā tat kiṁ "mano-bhrānti-viṣayatvād" iti vacanam. na. tasyârtha-grahaṇena nirākṛtatvāt* . . .

3.8. V reads "dri" (*gandha*, smell) instead of "ba laṅ" (*go*, a cow) in K. The following explanation by Jinendrabuddhi supports K: "*de ma brtags par* ṣes pa ṅes pa ni ḥdi lta buḥi ṅo bo ni ba laṅ kho na ste, rta ma yin no ṣes pa yin ṣiṅ, de yaṅ ji srid du ba laṅ ñid la sogs paḥi spyi la rnam par rtog par mi byed daṅ, des de daṅ ldan par sbyor bar mi byed pa de srid du ñe bar skye ba ma yin pa kho naḥo"; *PST*, 46a.3–4 (51b.4–5).

3.9. For Dignāga, all is *kalpanā* (conceptual construction) as soon as *nāman*, *jāti* (=*sāmānya*), etc., have been associated with an immediate sense-datum. Sense-perception is free from *kalpanā*; cf. Section 1, n. 1.27.

3.10. *PST*, 46a.7 (51b.8–52a.1): "ḥdir *ṣen paḥi* sgra ṅes paḥi rnam graṅs ma yin gyi, ḥo na ci ṣe na, yaṅ dag paḥi don ḥdsin paḥi rnam graṅs so."

3.11. The expression "and the like" (*ādi*) implies that cognition which carries doubt (*saṁśaya*) in regard to the object; cf. *PST*, 46a.6 (51b.8): "*sogs paḥi* sgras the tshom gyi śes pa gzuṅ bar byaḥo." Vātsyāyana says that the qualifier "*vyavasāyâtmaka*" is mentioned in order to distinguish *pratyakṣa* from *anavadhāraṇa-jñāna*=*saṁśaya*; cf. *NBh*, i, i, 4: *dūrāc cakṣuṣā hy ayam arthaṁ paśyan nâvadhārayati dhūma iti vā reṇur iti vā. tad etad indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣôtpannam anavadhāraṇa-jñānaṁ pratyakṣam prasajyata ity ata āha—vyavasāyâtmakam iti.*

3.12. Both K and V are incorrect in not putting a śad after "ma ḥkhrul baḥi phyir yaṅ." This phrase does not continue to the following sentence, but simply affords a reason for the preceding statement. The implication of "yaṅ" (*api*) is explained by Jinendrabuddhi as follows: "*yaṅ* gi sgra las dbaṅ poḥi blo la don ji lta ba ñid ma yin pa mi srid paḥi yaṅ phyir ro"; *PST*, 46b.1 (52a.2). My translation is based on this explanation, although I admit that this seems rather forced. Jinendrabuddhi remarks that "yaṅ" is omitted in some texts; *ibid.*, 46b.4–5 (52a.6–7): "ḥgaḥ ṣig tu *yaṅ* gi sgra mi ḥdon te, de la don ni, de lta na yaṅ khyad par ci ltar mi rigs śe na, gsuṅs pa, *ma ḥkhrul baḥi phyir* ṣes pa ste, don ji lta ba ñid kyi dbaṅ poḥi śes pa la ḥkhrul ba med paḥi phyir ro ṣes paḥi don to."

3.13. My translation is based on K. However, *PST*, 46b.6 (52a.8): "*ṣen paḥi ḥbras bu can* ṣes ṣen pa ḥdiḥi ḥbras buḥo ṣes tshig rnam par sbyar ro (*vyavasāya-phalam iti vyavasāyaḥ phalam asyêti vigrahaḥ*)" allows us to conjecture that the original Sanskrit was something like: *vyavasāyâtmakam iti vyavasāya-phalam.* Thus, "ṣen paḥi bdag ñid ces pa ni ṣen paḥi ḥbras bu can yin no" may be a

better Tibetan translation. Muni Jambuvijaya's Sanskrit reconstruction is: *vyavasāyâtmakaṁ jñānaṁ vyavasāya-phalam*; *App. to VS*, p. 210.5. However, K, V, and *PST* have no equivalent for *jñānam*.

Following the above-cited passage of *PST*, we read: "ci ltar so sor brjod ce na, gsuṅs pa, *yod na ni ma yin te* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste"; *PST*, 46b.6 (52a.8–52b.1). The portion in italics seems to be quoted from the *Vṛtti*. However, both K and V have no corresponding sentence.

3.14. According to V: Because only the cognition corresponding to the object, etc., is the direct result [of the sense-object contact].

3.15. Cf. above n. 3.9.

3.16. In the classical systems of India, it is generally accepted that the function of a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) is to differentiate the definendum from anything which differs from it. For example, Vātsyāyana says: *uddiṣṭasyâtattva-vyavacchedako dharmo lakṣaṇam*; *NBh*, I, i, 2. Cf. B. K. Matilal, "The Intensional Character of Lakṣaṇa and Saṁkara in Navya-Nyāya," *Indo-Iranian Journal*, VIII/2 (1964), 86, n. 7. The expression "*indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣôtpannam*" is enough to define *pratyakṣa*, since it differentiates *pratyakṣa* from *anumāna*, etc. Cf. *PST*, 47b.2–3 (53a.5–6).

3.17. See *VS*, I, i, 6: *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ . . . buddhayaḥ* (=*jñānāni*) . . . *guṇāḥ*.

3.18. See *VS*, I, i, 8–9: *dravyāṇi dravyântaram ārabhante. guṇāś ca guṇântaram.*

3.19. See *VS*, V, ii, 23–24: *dik-kālāv ākāśaṁ ca kriyāvadbhyo vaidharmyān niṣkriyāṇi. etena karmāṇi guṇāś ca vyākhyātāḥ.* See also *VS*, VII, ii, 17: *niṣkriyatvāt.* This sūtra is interpreted by Candrānanda as follows: If *śabda* were held to come into contact with *artha*, it would reach the *artha*: but *śabda* has no [action of] "going," because, [being] a *guṇa*, [it] has no action (*artha-saṁyoge sati śabdo 'rtham prāpnuyāt, niṣkriyatvāc ca guṇasya gamanâbhāvaḥ*). Praśastapāda uses the term "*niṣkriya*" when describing the characteristic features of *guṇa*; *PBh*, p. 429.6–7: *rūpâdīnāṁ guṇānāṁ sarveṣāṁ guṇatvâbhisambandho dravyâśritatvaṁ niṣkriyatvam aguṇavattvaṁ ca.*

3.20. Ether (*ākāśa*) can be cognized only through inference from sound (*śabda*); see *VS*, II, i, 24–26.

3.21. I have added "thams cad du" to K, since it is found in V and also in *PST*, 48a.2 (53b.6).

3.22. *NVTT*, p. 118.2 (Randle, fragment C); *ŚVK*, vol. I, p. 222.25; *NR*, p. 146.13–14:

sāntara-grahaṇaṁ na syāt prāptau jñāne [*sthānâ°* in *NR*] *'dhikasya ca.*

Neither K nor V coincides with this Sanskrit fragment. I have translated the verse from the Sanskrit, but have not emended the Tibetan text.

The Naiyāyikas maintain, in agreement with most of the other philosophical schools, that all five senses come into direct contact with their respective objects, i.e., that they are *prāpya-kārin*. But the Bauddhas hold that two of the external

senses, visual (*cakṣus*) and auditory (*śrotra*), and the internal sense (*manas*) function without direct contact with their objects (*aprāpya-kārin*), and that these senses perceive objects larger than themselves. The other senses, olfactory (*ghrāṇa*), gustatory (*jihvā*), and tactual (*kāya* = *tvac*), can perceive only such objects as are of the same size and which come into direct contact with them. See *AK*, I, 44:

cakṣu-śrotra-mano 'prāpta-viṣayaṁ trayam anyathā
tribhir ghrāṇâdibhis tulya-viṣaya-grahaṇaṁ matam.

See also *AbhD*, 45cd:
aprāpyârthaṁ manaś cakṣuḥ śrotraṁ ca trīny ato 'nyathā.

Dignāga is not the first to point out the difficulty that the Nyāya theory is faced with in explaining *sāntara-grahaṇa* and *adhika-grahaṇa*. *NS*, III, i, 28–45 treats the problems of *sāntara-grahaṇa* and *adhika-grahaṇa*, where the opponents of the Naiyāyikas say: *mahad-aṇu-grahaṇāt* (sūtra 29), and *aprāpya-grahaṇaṁ kācâbhra-paṭala-sphaṭikântaritôpalabdheḥ* (sūtra 39). These opponents are acknowledged to be the Sāṁkhyas and the Bauddhas; see Ruben, *Die Nyāya-sūtra's*, p. 199, n. 188, p. 201, n. 194. The Sāṁkhyas hold that all *indriyas* are *prāpya-kārin*. But, according to them, *indriyas* are not material but psychical, being evolved from *ahaṁkāra*. Therefore *indriyas* are able to reach out to distant objects and also apprehend objects which are larger or smaller than themselves (*mahad-aṇu-grahaṇa*). The Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that all *indriyas* are material (*bhautika*); *NS*, I, i, 12. Thus, the Sāṁkhyas reprove the Naiyāyikas, saying that material *indriyas* could not be *prāpya-kārin*, nor could they apprehend objects larger or smaller than themselves; cf. *NS*, III, i, 29, cited above; *Yuktid.*, p. 123.9–14: *evaṁ hi sāṁkhya-vṛddhā āhuḥ—āhaṁkārikānîndriyāny arthaṁ sādhayitum arhanti nânyathā. tathā hi kārakaṁ kārakatvād eva prāpya-kāri bhavati. bhautikāni cêndriyāṇi kathaṁ prāpya-kāriṇi dūra-varttini viṣaye bhaveyuḥ. āhaṁkārikāṇāṁ tu teṣāṁ vyāpakatvāt viṣayâkāra-pariṇāmâtmikā vṛttir vṛttimato 'nanyā satī sambhavaty evêti suvacanaṁ prāpya-kāritvam. api ca mahad-aṇu-grahaṇam āhaṁkārikatve teṣāṁ kalpate, na bhautikatve. bhautikatve hi yat-parimāṇaṁ karaṇaṁ tat-parimāṇaṁ grāhyaṁ gṛhṇīyāt.* Among the Bauddhas, there was a controversy as to whether the ability of seeing should be attributed to the *indriya*, which is material, or to *vijñāna*, which is psychical. Those who hold that *vijñāna* has the ability of seeing assert that the *indriya* could not see the object through glass, mica or crystal (cf. *NS*, III, i, 39, cited above), while those who hold that the *indriya* has the ability to see point to the fact that we cannot see an object hidden behind a wall (cf. *NS*, III, i, 40: *kudyântaritânupalabdher apratiṣedhaḥ*); see *AKBh*, p. 10c.23–11a.10. Here Dignāga repeats the same arguments that have been made by his Sāṁkhya and Bauddha predecessors.

Dignāga directs the same criticism against the Mīmāṁsakas who define *pratyakṣa* as *sat-samprayoge* . . . ; see Section 6, *C*. Attempting to counterattack this criticism, Kumārila refers to the above-quoted *k. 1cd* as follows in *ŚV*, IV, 41:

prāpya-grahaṇa-pakṣe 'pi sāntara-grahaṇaṁ kila
adhiṣṭhānâdhikaś cârtho na gṛhyeta tvag-ādivat.

Then, in *ŚV*, IV, 42–51, he proceeds to refute Dignāga, referring to the latter's arguments as set forth here in *Ca–Cb*.

Uddyotakara refers to the Bauddha theory of *aprāpya-kāritva* as follows: *aprāpya-kāriṇī cakṣuḥ-śrotre ity eke. tatra ca nyāyam bruvate—aprāpya-kāri cakṣuḥ, sāntara-grahaṇāt pṛthutara-grahaṇāc cêti*; *NV*, p. 33.16–17. After fully citing the Bauddha arguments, Uddyotakara refutes them in the following manner: (A) If the word "*sāntara-grahaṇa*" were to mean (1) the apprehension of an object which does not come into direct contact with a sense-organ (*aprāptasya grahaṇam*), then the Bauddha reasoning would be: "(*pratijñā*) *aprāpya-kāri cakṣuḥ*, (*hetu*) *aprāpta-grahaṇāt*." Thus, the *hetu* would be nothing other than the repetition of the *pratijñā*. The same word could be interpreted as (2) the apprehension of an object together with the intervening space (*sahântareṇa grahaṇam*). However, the intervening space cannot be perceived, whether it is (a) *ākāśa*, (b) *abhāva*, or (c) any other *dravya*. The reason is: (a) *ākāśa* is invisible, since it does not possess color (*arūpin*); (b) [since *abhāva* resides in its locus (*adhikaraṇa*) and is perceived as a *viśeṣaṇa* of the locus,] *abhāva* independent (*svatantra*) of the locus cannot be perceived; (c) a visible *dravya* that lies between the eye and the object would prevent the eye from reaching the object. Even if "*sāntara-grahaṇa*" be taken as meaning (3) the awareness that there is a distance [between the object and the cognizer] (*sāntara iti grahaṇam*), it cannot be a proof of *aprāpya-kāritva* of the eye, because the cause of this awareness is the distance between the body (*śarīra*) and the object and not the distance between the eye and the object. (B) *Adhika-grahaṇa* is possible simply by the contact of the eye and the object. [According to the Naiyāyikas, the contact of the eye and the object is *saṁyoga* (conjunction), a kind of *guṇa*, whose occurrence (*vṛtti*) is only in a part of the object and not in the whole of it. The Navya-Naiyāyikas call this occurrence "*avyāpya-vṛtti*."] Therefore it is unreasonable to consider "*adhika-grahaṇa*" to be the reason for *aprāpya-kāritva*. See *NV*, p. 34.9–35.10.

3.23. Cf. *TAV*, p. 68.17–18: *yadi prāpya-kāri cakṣuḥ syāt sāntarâdhika-grahaṇaṁ na prāpnoti.* "*na hîndriya-nirantare viṣaye gandhâdau sāntara-grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ nâpy adhika-grahaṇaṁ.*"

K and V nearly coincide with each other. A literal translation of K is as follows: "In the case of [grasping] odor (*gandha*), etc., there is no distance between the object and the sense. [Thus,] although we experience the apprehension [of the object] with no distance, it does not stand to reason [to say] that the sense grasps that which exceeds [itself in size]." This, however, does not make sense. Jinendrabuddhi explains the import of this passage by the following formula: "gaṅ dbaṅ po daṅ bar med pa de dbaṅ po las bar daṅ bcas pa ṣes gzuṅ bar bya ba min ṣiṅ, lhag paḥo ṣes kyaṅ ma yin te, dri la sogs pa bṣin. gzugs daṅ sgra dag kyaṅ de lta buḥo (*ya indriya-nirantaro na sa sāntara iti gṛhyate, nâpy adhika iti. gandhâdivat. rūpa-śabdāv api tathā*)"; *PST*, 48a.5 (53b.8–54a.1). On the basis of this explanation and also of the wording in K and V, I think, accepting Jambuvijaya's suggestion, that "*na hi* . . ." is faithful to the original of this passage. Therefore, I have emended K to conform to the Sanskrit fragment. See *NV*, p. 34.1–3: *apare tu sāntara-grahaṇa-hetuṁ* (text:

°-*grahaṇaṁ hetuṁ) varṇayanti, na hi prāpya-kāriṣu ghrāṇâdiṣu sāntara iti grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ, dṛṣṭaṁ tu cakṣuṣi.*

3.24. See *NVTT*, p. 118.3–5 (Randle, fragment C): *bahir-varttitvād indriyasyôpapannaṁ sāntara-grahaṇam iti ced ata uktam,*

adhiṣṭhānād bahir nâkṣam (k. 2a).

kiṁ tv adhiṣṭhāna-deśa evêndriyam. kutaḥ. tac cikitsâdi-yogataḥ; *TAV*, p. 68.18–20: *atha mataṁ bahir adhiṣṭhānād vṛttir indriyasya, ata upapannaṁ sāntarâdhika-grahaṇam iti. tad ayuktam, yasmād na bahir adhiṣṭhānād indriyam. tatra cikitsâdi-darśanāt. anyathâdhiṣṭhāna-pidhāne 'pi grahaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ*; *ŚV*, IV, 44cd–45:

kecit tayoḥ [=śrotra-cakṣuṣoḥ] śarīrāc ca bahir vṛttiṁ pracakṣate
cikitsâdi-prayogaś ca yo 'dhiṣṭhāne prayujyate
so 'pi tasyaiva saṁskāra ādheyasyôpakārakaḥ.

3.25. According to the Naiyāyikas, the visual sense is not the pupil of the eye (*kṛṣṇa-sāra, golaka*), but the light-ray (*raśmi*) which emanates from the eye to the object; *NS*, III, i, 34: *raśmy-artha-saṁnikarṣa-viśeṣāt tad-grahaṇam*, etc.; Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*, pp. 65 ff. As for the auditory sense, the Nyāya theory is that the sound waves sent by the object are received by the ear-hole and there perceived as sound; cf. *ibid.*, p. 200, n. 189; *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, kk. 165–166. Hence, the only sense which functions outside its physical basis is, according to the Naiyāyikas, the visual sense. But the Sāṁkhyas and the Vedāntins hold that the sense of hearing goes out from its basis and reaches the sound-producing objects; cf. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, ch. I: *cakṣuḥ-śrotre tu svata eva viṣaya-deśaṁ gatvā sva-sva-viṣayaṁ gṛhṇītaḥ, śrotrasyâpi cakṣur-ādivat paricchinnatayā bhery-ādi-deśa-gamana-sambhavāt*; Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 140.

3.26. *NVTT*, p. 118.6: *saty api ca bahir-bhāve*
na śaktir viṣayêkṣaṇe. (k. 2b)

3.27. See *TAV*, p. 68.20, cited above, n. 3.24.

3.28. Both K and V read: "yul gyi skad cig ma dag las (*viṣaya-kṣaṇāt*)." This is obviously a misrendering of *viṣayêkṣaṇāt* (yul ḥdsin paḥi phyir).

3.29. *NS*, I, i, 12: *ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvak-śrotrānîndriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ. NS*, III, i, 46–55, discuss the number of *indriya*s. Among these sūtras, the following two explicitly mention the reason for admitting that the *indriya*s are five in number: sūtra 50: *indriyârtha-pañcatvāt*; sūtra 54: *na* (=*na ekatvam*). *buddhi-lakṣaṇâdhiṣṭhāna-gaty-ākṛti-jāti-pañcatvebhyaḥ.*

3.30. *K. 2cd* is quoted in *NVTT*, p. 146.14:

na sukhâdi prameyaṁ vā mano vâstîndriyântaram.

The Naiyāyikas hold that the attributes (*guṇa*) of *ātman*, i.e., *sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna*, and *jñāna*, become the objects of *manas*.

3.31. Concerning the internal experience of other persons, there is an inferential mark through which one can know it; cf. *PST*, 50b.5 (56b.8): "*raṅ* smos pa ni pha rol gyi rnams la bde ba daṅ rab tu daṅ ba la sogs paḥi rtogs rab tu rñed par sla ba ñid kyi phyir ro."

3.32. See above, n. 3.30.

3.33. In the enumeration of twelve *prameyas* in *NS*, I, i, 9, *manas* is mentioned apart from the *indriyas*. Again, *manas* is not mentioned in *NS*, I, i, 12 (see above, n. 3.29), where the *indriyas* are enumerated, but it is separately mentioned in *NS*, I, i, 16: *yugapaj jñānânutpattir manaso liṅgam*. Hence there arises the objection that the Nyāya definition of perception as being produced by *indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa* is not applicable to the perception of pleasure and other internal experiences through *manas*. Vātsyāyana is aware of this objection. In answer to it, he clearly states that *manas* is a kind of *indriya*, and gives the following reasons for the separate mention of *manas* in the sūtra: Whereas the five *indriyas* are composed of material elements (*bhautika*), have their respective objects (*niyata-viṣaya*) and function as *indriya* only when endowed with certain attributes (*guṇa*) corresponding to their objects (see *NS*, III, i, 65), *manas* on the other hand is immaterial (*abhautika*), takes everything for its object (*sarva-viṣaya*) and functions as an *indriya* without being endowed with any attribute; see *NBh*, I, i, 4.

3.34. *K. 3ab* is quoted in *NVTT*, p. 147.23 (Randle, fragment B):

aniṣedhād upāttaṁ ced anyêndriya-rutaṁ vṛthā.

Cf. *NV*, p. 39.8–11: *apratiṣedhād upāttaṁ tad iti na, śeṣâbhidhāna-vaiyarthyāt. śeṣāny apîndriyāṇi taiḥ paripaṭhitāni tasmāt tāny api na vaktavyāni yady apratiṣedhād upādānaṁ syād iti.*

3.35. See *NBh*, I, i, 4: *tantrântara-samācārāc caitat* (=*manasa indriyatvam*) *pratyetavyam iti. "para-matam apratiṣiddham anumatam" iti hi tantra-yuktiḥ* (cf. *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, ed. by R. P. Kangle, 15.1.41; *Suśruta-saṁhitā*, Uttaratantra, adhy. 65); *NV*, p. 39.7–8: "*tantrântara-samācārāc ca*" (*NBh*). *tantrântare mana indriyam iti paṭhyate. tac cêha na pratiṣidhyate.* For *tantra-yukti*, see Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. V, p. 1032.

3.36. Cf. n. 34. Five *indriyas* are first mentioned by Yājñavalkya (in *Bṛhad. Up.*) and this notion was carried through to the Epic period from where it entered the classical Sāṁkhya and other systems; cf. Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*, p. 203, n. 200, p. 168, n. 42; Frauwallner, *Geschichte d. ind. Phil.*, I, pp. 109, 293, 354, II, pp. 47–48, *passim*.

3.37. Jinendrabuddhi refers to the following argument of the Naiyāyikas: *NS*, I, i, 12, is not intended to enumerate *indriyas*, but simply states that five *indriyas* are material (*bhautika*); therefore it does not mention *manas* which is not material (*abhautika*). This argument is made by Vātsyāyana in *NBh*, I, i, 4 (cf. n. 3.33). Jinendrabuddhi rejects it by saying: If the sūtra were to be interpreted in that manner, the term "*indriyāṇi*" in the sūtra would be useless; the Sūtrakāra should have simply said "*ghrāṇâdīni bhūtebhyaḥ*"; *PST*, 51a.2–4 (57a.6–8).

Uddyotakara says that Dignāga's criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of "*tantra-yukti*." He explains that one should not entirely refrain from stating his own theory simply on the ground that it is propounded in another's text; if his own theory were not expressly stated, there would be no distinction between "one's own theory" and "another's theory"; see *NV*,

p. 39.11–15: *na bhavatā tantra-yuktiḥ parijñāyate. para-matam apratiṣiddham anumatam iti hi tantra-yuktiḥ. na ca yasya sva-mata-parigraho nāsti tasya sva-mataṁ para-mataṁ vā bhidyate. bhavatā ca para-matânurodhena sarvaṁ sva-mataṁ nivāryata iti. tan-nivāraṇāt sva-mataṁ para-matam ity etad eva na syāt. tasmād asti mana indriyaṁ cêti.* See also *NVTT*, pp. 147.25–148.3: *sarvasya tantrântare loke ca siddhatvād avaktavyatāyāṁ sva-matam iti nāsti. vacana-liṅgaṁ hi mata-jñānaṁ na cânumate niṣedha-mātraṁ śakyaṁ kartum, abhāvasya bhāva-nirūpaṇâdhīna-nirūpaṇatvād iti bhāvaḥ.* This explanation, however, does not make clear in which case one should clearly state *sva-mata* and in which case one could accept *para-mata* as *sva-mata* by merely not denying it.

3.38. Henceforward, the term "*jñāna*" in *NS*, I, i, 4, is taken up for examination.

3.39. V is corrupt. It seems that V mistook the introductory passage for a part of the *Kārikās*, and translated it together with *k. 3c* in three seven-syllable lines. In presenting the following Sanskrit reconstruction, Jambuvijaya takes this mistake of V into consideration: *jñānasya ca pramāṇatve 'rthântara-phala-vādino "niścite 'rthe phalâbhāvaḥ"* (*k. 3c*); *App. to VS*, p. 211.16.

3.40. According to V, the last portion of this paragraph is as follows: After such a means of cognition has operated, there would be no [need for the] resulting [cognition which apprehends the object].

Commenting on *NS*, I, i, 4, Vātsyāyana says: *indriyasyârthena saṁnikarṣād utpadyate yaj jñānaṁ tat pratyakṣam.* Here he holds the view that *pratyakṣa* is a cognition. But in the commentary on *NS*, I, i, 3, he interprets the word *pratyakṣa* as *akṣasyâkṣasya prati-viṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*, and continues, *vṛttis tu saṁnikarṣo jñānaṁ vā. yadā saṁnikarṣas tadā jñānaṁ pramitiḥ, yadā jñānaṁ tadā hānôpādānôpekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalam.* This latter interpretation of *pratyakṣa* is not taken into consideration by Dignāga.

3.41. Vācaspatimiśra distinguishes two kinds of *pratyakṣa*—*avikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*—and characterizes the former as the apprehension of the qualifiers, such as *jāti* and the like, unrelated to a thing to be qualified [*a-vyapadeśya* = *a-viśeṣya* = *jātyādi-svarūpâvagāhin*], and the latter as the apprehension of a thing in the qualifier-qualified relation [*vyavasāya* = *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*]; see *NVTT*, p. 125.3–12: *iha dvayī pratyakṣa-jātir avikalpakā savikalpakā cêti. . . . tatrâvikalpakāyāḥ padam avyapadeśyam iti, savikalpakāyāś ca vyavasāyâtmakam iti yāvat. tadyathā ḍittho 'yaṁ gaur ayaṁ śuklo 'yaṁ kamaṇḍalumān ayaṁ gacchaty ayam iti sarvaṁ hi savikalpakaṁ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvena vastuṣu pravartate. avidyamānaṁ vyapadeśyaṁ yasmiṁs tad avyapadeśyaṁ jāty-ādi-svarūpâvagāhi, na tu jāty-ādīnāṁ mitho viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvâvagāhîti yāvat.* This thought is not explicitly set forth by the Naiyāyikas before Vācaspatimiśra. However, it can quite naturally be deduced from *VS*, VIII, 6–7: *sāmānya-viśeṣâpekṣaṁ dravya-guṇa-karmasu. dravye dravya-guṇa-karmâpekṣam.* (The Vaiśeṣika theory of six *padârtha*s is accepted by the Naiyāyikas; see *NBh*, I, i, 9: *asty anyad api dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyāḥ prameyaṁ . . .*)

Dignāga refers to these two sūtras when he examines the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception; see Section 4, *D*. See also Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*, p. 156.

3.42. Taking the first "tha dad pa" as referring to "tha dad phyir" in *k. 3d*, we may construe this sentence, without omitting "las" in K, as follows: The word "different" (in *k. 3d*) means that the qualifier is different from the qualified.

Uddyotakara refers to the view of an *ekadeśin* that a means (*karaṇa*) and the result (*phala*) do not necessarily pertain to one and the same thing. This view is based upon the observation that an axe as the means of cutting down a tree pertains to a part of the tree, while the result, the falling down, is produced upon the tree. Uddyotakara rejects this view, saying: *pramāṇa-phalayor viṣaya-bhedânabhyupagamāt*; *NV*, p. 44.7–20.

3.43. The same argument as that of Dignāga is set forth by Dharmakīrti in *PV*, *III*, 314ab:

nêṣṭo viṣaya-bhedo 'pi kriyā-sādhanayor dvayor.

Cf. *PVBh*, p. 347.6: *na khalu palāśe paraśv-ādi-karaṇa-pravartanaṁ nyagrodhe chidā nirvarttate*; *PVV*, p. 212.23–25: *na hy anyatra paraśu-vyāpāraś chidā cânyatra. iha tu viśeṣaṇe pramāṇa-vyāpāraḥ kriyā ca viśeṣya iti bhinna-viṣayatā katham iṣṭā.*

Kumārila cites the same instance, modifying its implication, to disprove Dignāga's theory of the identity between *pramāṇa* (*pramā-karaṇa*) and *phala*. Kumārila's argument is as follows: If the result (*phala*) itself, e.g., the cutting down of a tree, were to be regarded as the means (*karaṇa*) of cutting down, i.e., an axe, then this would force us to the absurd conclusion that the cutting down of a *palāśa* tree could result from an axe used on a *khadira* tree; *ŚV*, IV, 74–75 (see Section 1, n. 1.57).

3.44. *PST*, 51b.5–7 (58a.4–5): "*ma yin te ha can thal baḥi phyir ro* ṣes pa, gaṅ yaṅ rab tu ḥjal ba po, byed pa po (*kartṛ*) daṅ, gaṅ ba laṅ la sogs paḥi las (*karman*) gṣal bar bya ba daṅ, phyogs gaṅ du yin pa gṣir (*adhikaraṇa*) daṅ, gaṅ las ḥbyuṅ ba ḥbyuṅ khuṅs las (*apādāna*) daṅ, gaṅ gi ched du sbyin pa (*sampradāna*) de yaṅ dgos ched de, ḥdi thams cad kyaṅ khyad par gyi śes pa bṣin du byed par thal lo ṣes paḥi don to." Cf. *MBh*, p. 331.11–13 (ad *Pān.*, I, iv, 42: *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam*): *sādhakaṁ karaṇam itîyaty ucyamāne sarveṣāṁ kārakāṇāṁ karaṇa-saṁjñā prasajyeta. sarvāṇi hi kārakāṇi sādhakāni. tama-grahaṇe punaḥ kriyamāṇe na doṣo bhavati.*

3.45. Jinendrabuddhi explains the import of this sentence as follows: When the act [of cognizing] is seen to be present in a certain cognition in respect to a certain object to be cognized (*jñeya*), and when the act [of cognizing] is understood to be not separated by any other *kāraka* [than the cognition as *karaṇa*], that cognition is *pramāṇa* of that object; *PST*, 52a.2 (58a.8–58b.1): "des na don ḥdir ḥgyur te, śes pa gaṅ ṣig gis śes par bya baḥi las gaṅ la bya ba ston ciṅ byed pa can gṣan gyis bar ma chod paḥi bya ba rtogs paḥi, śes par bya baḥi las de kho naḥi śes pa de tshad maḥo ṣes paḥo." Herein, "de ni (*tat*) deḥi *ḥbras bu* ñid (tasyaiva *phalam*)" in the *Vṛtti* is explained as "śes pa de ni (*taj jñānam*) las de kho naḥi tshad maḥo (*tasyaiva karmaṇaḥ pramāṇam*)." This explanation, however, is somewhat inappropriate, since the subject of discussion here is not

really the relation between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* but that between *pramāṇa* and *phala*. As I understand it, Dignāga mentions here his own view that *pramāṇa* and *phala* are not distinct from each other. According to him, a cognition, when it is regarded as the act of cognizing, is *pramāṇa*, and the same cognition, when regarded as the apprehension of an object, is *pramāṇa-phala*; see Section 1, n. 1.55.

3.46. Both K and V read "*de la yod min.*" However, the following explanation of Jinendrabuddhi proves that there must be a "yaṅ" (*api*) in the verse: "*de la yaṅ* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, . . . *yaṅ* gi sgra ni ṅes par gzuṅ baḥi don te, de kho na la ste khyad par rtogs par bya ba laḥo ṣes paḥi don to"; *PST*, 52a.5–6 (58b.5–6). Accordingly, K and V should be corrected to read "*de la yaṅ med*" or "*der yaṅ yod min.*"

3.47. See *PST*, 52a.6–7 (58b.6–7): "gaṅ gi tshe snaṅ ba ṣan paḥi phyogs su ba laṅ la sogs pa tsam gyi khyad par ḥbaḥ ṣig kho na yoṅs su gcog kyi gsal baḥi bye brag ni ma yin te, de la the tshom za baḥi phyir ṣiṅ . . ." By the apprehension of *sāmānya* and the nonapprehension of *viśeṣa*, there arises a doubt (*saṁśaya*); see *VS*, II, ii, 19: *sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣâpratyakṣād . . . saṁśayaḥ*; *NBh*, I, i, 23: *samānadharmôpapatter . . . viśeṣâpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ*. But a doubt is not a type of valid knowledge (*apramā*), and therefore cannot be regarded as *pramāṇa-phala*.

3.48. *PST*, 52b.2 (59a.1–2): "gaṅ gi phyir rnal ḥbyor pa rnams kyi rnal ḥbyor rdsogs pa na bdag ñid mthoṅ ba rnams kyi de gzuṅ byar yaṅ ḥgyur la ḥdsin pa po (yaṅ) yin pa bṣin no."

The Vaiśeṣikas prove that man perceives his *ātman* from the fact that he has an "I"-consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*) that refers to something other than the body; see *VS*, III, ii, 13: *aham iti pratyag-ātmani bhāvān paratrâbhāvād arthântara-pratyakṣaḥ*. This Vaiśeṣika view is accepted by Uddyotakara; see *NV*, p. 341.9–11: *liṅga-liṅgi-sambandha-smṛty-anapekṣaṁ viṣaya-svabhāvânuvidhāyy aham iti vijñānaṁ rūpâdi-jñānavat pratyakṣam*. However, the early Naiyāyikas hold that the *ātman* is inferable but not capable of being perceived by ordinary persons; see *NBh*, I, i, 10: *tatrâtmā tāvat pratyakṣato na gṛhyate, sa kim āptôpadeśa-mātrād eva pratipadyata iti, nêty ucyate, anumānāc ca pratipattavya iti. katham. "icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānāny ātmano liṅgam iti"* (*NS*). Only a person who has disciplined himself in meditation can perceive his own *ātman*, by means of the peculiar contact between *manas* and *ātman*; see *NBh*, I, i, 3: *yuñjānasya yoga-samādhi-jam ātma-manasoḥ saṁyoga-viśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣa iti*. *VS*(*V*), IX, 13: "*ātmany ātma-manasoḥ samyoga-viśeṣād ātma-pratyakṣam.*" *āhṛtya viṣayebhya indriyāṇi tebhyaś ca mana ātmany eva yadā samādhīyate tadā yoga-ja-dharmâpekṣād ātmântaḥkaraṇa-saṁyogād viśiṣṭāt tatra bhavatāṁ svasminn ātmani jñānaṁ pratyakṣam utpadyate.*

3.49. K, V, and *PST* give different readings [*PST*, 52b.3 (59a.3): "raṅ bṣin khoṅ du chud na ni śes paḥi"]. K and V show that "de ñid dṅos po" (*tad eva vastu*) is the subject of the main sentence. The difficulty is that the genitive "śes paḥi" (*jñānasya*) in K and *PST* can hardly be considered as qualifying "dṅos

po" (*vastu*). Nor can it qualify "bdag ñid" (*ātman*), because it does not make sense to illustrate *jñāna*, the subject matter, by *jñānasyâtmā*. I have followed Jambuvijaya's reconstruction "*svasaṁvittau jñānasya . . .*," which stylistically agrees with *PST*; see *App. to VS*, p. 212.13–14.

3.50. Jambuvijaya reconstructs this last portion of the *Vṛtti* as follows: *viśeṣya-jñānam ātmanā tulyam ity ubhayaṁ na yujyate*; see *App. to VS*, p. 212.14–15. It may be better to place the negative "*na*" before "*viśeṣya-jñānam*," because V seems to have wrongly read the text as: "*na . . . tulyam iti. ubhayaṁ yujyate.*"
The Naiyāyikas recognize four different factors of cognition, namely, *pramātṛ*, *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *pramiti*; see *NBh*, introd. to *NS*, I, i, 1. Dignāga's theory of self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*) or of the identity of *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *pramiti* (see Section 1, nn. 1.60, 1.61, 1.67) is hardly acceptable to them; see *NMañj*, pp. 67–68. The case of one's cognizing his own self, in which *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are identical, is merely exceptional for the Naiyāyikas (see n. 3.48), and their fundamental standpoint cannot be explained by this exceptional case. Rather, the instance of the self's cognizing itself is to be cited by the Bauddhas in proof of their theory of self-cognition; see *PST*, 52b.3–4 (59a.3–5): "bdag ñid kyi dpes ni don gṣan gṣal bar bya ba yin pa la khyad par gyi śes pa rnam pa gñis kar ḥgrub pa ma yin te, . . . raṅ ñid khoṅ du chud pa la yaṅ śes paḥi rnam pa gñis ka ltar na yaṅ tshad ma daṅ gṣal bar bya ba la yaṅ kho bos ḥdod pa kho na ste . . ."

3.51. *PST*, 52b.5 (59a.6): "ji ltar sgrom maḥi mun pa bzlog pa ḥbras bu don gṣan yin pa de bṣin du mi śes pa la sogs pa bzlog pa ḥbras bur ḥgyur ro ṣes ston to." To the best of my knowledge, the Nyāya theory referred to in *Ee* has not been located in a Nyāya text. Praśastapāda classifies cognition in two categories, *vidyā* and *avidyā*. *Saṁśaya* and *viparyaya* are mentioned under the latter category, while *pratyakṣa* is, needless to say, regarded as one of the four *vidyā*s; see *PBh*, p. 520.28–30: *tasyāḥ* (*buddheḥ*) *saty apy aneka-vidhatve samāsato dve vidhe —vidyā câvidyā cêti. tatrâvidyā catur-vidhā, saṁśaya-viparyayânadhyavasāya-svapna-lakṣaṇā*; *ibid.*, p. 552.26–27: *vidyâpi catur-vidhā, pratyakṣa-laiṅgika-smṛty-ārṣa-lakṣaṇā.* However, Praśastapāda does not distinctly state that the removal of *avidyā* is the result to be produced by means of *vidyā*.

3.52. K may be translated as follows: In any case, in respect to nescience, etc., it is false that they are definitely the actual sphere (*dṅos poḥi yul*) [of the operation of a cognition] everywhere. However, the reading "dṅos poḥi yul" (*bhāva-viṣaya*) seems unusual. The existence of the term "*bhāva*" is ascertained by V which reads "ma rtogs pa la sogs pa *las ḥbyuṅ baḥi* ṅes pa," but V has no term corresponding to "yul" (*viṣaya*). *PST* does not quote this passage. I have based my translation on Jambuvijaya's reconstruction: *sarvatra tāvad ajñānâder bhāva-niyamo nāsti*; cf. *App. to VS*, p. 212.17, and have emended K to conform to this reconstruction.

3.53. For the word "*ābhoga*," see Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*. Jinendrabuddhi equates this word with "*manasikāra*"; see *PST*, 52b.6 (59a.7–8): "gzas pa (*ābhoga*) tsam gyis te, yid la byed pa (*manasikāra*) tsam

gyis so." Further, he cites the following example: A man who has a mastery of a skill can accomplish his work by merely willing to do so; *ibid.*, 52b.7 (59a.8–59b.1): "dper na śes rab can kha cig gis bzoḥi gnas ḥgaḥ ṣig la bṣin ḥjig rten gyi śes pa yaṅ śes bya ḥgaḥ ṣig la rtsol ba tsam gyis skyeḥo."

Section 4. Examination of the Vaiśeṣika Theory

4.1. Some Vaiśeṣika commentators define *pratyakṣa* as the contact between sense and object or as that between soul and mind. As these definitions are not found in the Sūtra, Dignāga expressly states that the definition here referred to is the one "mentioned in the Sūtra"; *PST*, 53b.1–2 (60a.3–4).

4.2. Perception of the other *padârthas* presupposes perception of *dravya* to which they are related. *VS*, VIII, 4–5: *guṇa-karmasv asaṁnikṛṣṭeṣu jñāna-niṣpatter dravyaṁ kāraṇaṁ kāraṇa-kāraṇaṁ ca. sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu sāmānya-viśeṣâbhāvāt tata eva* [= *dravya-saṁnikarṣād eva, VSV*] *jñānam*. See also below, *H*.

4.3. Dignāga considers *VS*, III, i, 13 (see n. 4.4, below), as the definition of *pratyakṣa* in respect to *dravya*. *VS*, III, i, 1–14, are intended to prove the existence of *ātman*. In the first two sūtras, it is stated that the universal apprehension (*prasiddhi*) of the objects and the senses is the cause (*hetu*) proving the existence of something different from them: that is, *ātman*. There are some who regard this *hetu* as an *anapadeśa* (a fallacious cause), but the sūtrakāra rejects their views and puts forward the thesis that a known *x* is an inferential mark (*liṅga*) of an unknown *y* when *x* is considered, in relation to *y*, as *saṁyogin* (that which is conjoined with *y*); *samavāyin* (that which is inherent in *y*); *ekârtha-samavāyin* (that which is inherent in the same thing in which *y* is inherent); or *virodhin* (that which is in contradiction to *y*) (sūtras 3–9). Since the objects (= *karman*) and the senses (= *karaṇa*) are *saṁyogin*s of a certain *kartṛ*, one can infer from them *ātman* as *kartṛ*. The sūtrakāra goes on to mention three kinds of *anapadeśa*s: namely, *aprasiddha* = *viruddha* (a contradictory cause), *asat* = *asiddha* (an unreal cause), and *saṁdigdha* = *anaikāntika* (an inconclusive cause) with their respective examples (sūtras 10–12). *VS*, III, i, 13, which Dignāga cites here, is preceded by these arguments.

Jinendrabuddhi remarks that the relation of *VS*, III, i, 13, to the preceding sūtras is variously interpreted by different commentators. He refers to the following two interpretations: (1) The universal apprehension (*prasiddhi*) is nothing other than knowledge (*jñāna*). It therefore follows that it is an attribute (*guṇa*), and is non-eternal (*anitya*). That which is non-eternal has a cause (*kāraṇa*). Thus the sūtra in question indicates the cause of knowledge and also mentions that knowledge as an effect is different from its causes, as a pot as an effect is different from its cause, clay. (2) Since the preceding sūtras explain *anumāna*, one might consider *anumāna* as the only *pramāṇa*. *VS*, III, i, 13, forestalls this by mentioning *pratyakṣa* as a separate *pramāṇa*. As Jinendrabuddhi says, *VS*, III, i, 13, can be understood as providing the definition of *pratyakṣa* according to the second interpretation but not the first. Dignāga's implication when he says "by a certain relation [to the preceding sūtras]" (*kenacit sambandhena*) should be

understood as referring to these different interpretations; *PST*, 53a.3–53b.1 (59b.4–60a.3).

Śaṅkaramiśra's construction differs from the two referred to by Jinendrabuddhi. According to him, *VS*, III, i, 13, is to be taken as stating a nonfallacious inferential mark (*anābhāsaṁ liṅgam*) of the existence of the *ātman*, since the sūtras immediately preceding it (*VS*, III, i, 10–12) are explanations of fallacious inferential marks. Cf. *VSU*, p. 161.14–15: *ātmêndriya-mano* [text: om. *mano*]-*'rtha-saṁnikarṣāt tāvaj jñānam utpadyate tac câtmani liṅgam asiddha-viruddhânaikāntikebhyo 'nyad anābhāsam ity arthaḥ*. Mallavādin considers *VS*, III, i, 13, to be the definition of *pratyakṣa*; *NC*, p. 110.1. Jayantabhaṭṭa also refers to this sūtra as follows: *yad api kaiścit pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇam uktam ātmêndriya-mano-'rtha-saṁnikarṣād yad utpadyate tad anyad anumānâdibhyaḥ pratyakṣaṁ tad api* . . ., *NMañj*., p. 100.11–12. See also *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 39.17. For the interpretation of *VS*, III, i, 13, see also M. Hattori, "Studies of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana (I): On the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, III, i, 13," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (*Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu*), XIV/2 (March 1966), 95–107.

4.4. *VS*, III, i, 13: *ātemêndriya-mano-'rtha-saṁnikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat*.

V and Vk agree with *VS*, Bib. Ind. edition, in omitting "yid" = *manas*. However, this omission is incorrect because the contact is referred to below in *Ba* as that of four factors (*catuṣṭaya-saṁnikarṣa*). In the absence of *manas*, a cognition could not be produced: see *VS*, III, ii, 1: *ātmêndriya-saṁnikarṣe jñānasyâbhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam*. K, Kk, and *PST*, 53a.7–53b.1 (60a.2–3), agree with *VS*, G.O.S. edition. Cf. *PBh*, pp. 553.1, 554.1; *NC*, p. 110.1; *NMañj*, p. 100.11–12.

4.5. The theory that cognition itself is a *pramāṇa* would force us to negate the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*, simply because there is no other *phala* of cognition than cognition itself. See above, Section 3, *Ea*.

4.6. Jinendrabuddhi ascribes this view to Śrāyaska (? śrā ya sa ka) and others; *PST*, 53b.5 (60a.8), but to my knowledge this name is nowhere else attested. *NS*, I, i, 4, defines *pratyakṣa* as *indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣôtpannaṁ jñānam* . . . and, commenting on this sūtra, Vātsyāyana states that the contact of *indriya* and *artha* is the specific cause (*viśiṣṭa-kāraṇa*) of *pratyakṣa*, whereas the contact of *ātman* and *manas* and that of *manas* and *indriya* are also the causes of such other types of cognition as *anumāna*, etc. The same view is set forth in *NS*, *NBh*, II, i, 26: "*pratyakṣa-nimittatvāc cêndriyârthayoḥ saṁnikarṣasya sva-śabdena vacanam.*" *pratyakṣânumānôpamāna-śabdānāṁ nimittam ātma-manaḥ-saṁnikarṣaḥ, pratyakṣasyaivêndriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa ity asamānaḥ, asamānatvāt tasya grahaṇam.*

4.7. This view is held by Rāvaṇa (dbyaṅs can pa) and others; *PST*, 53b.6–7 (60b.2). Rāvaṇa is said to have lived before Praśastapāda and to have written an extensive commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. This commentary is referred to as *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* or *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* in some sources, but it has not come down to us; A. Thakur, in the Introduction to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the Commentary of Candrānanda* (edited by Jambuvijaya), pp. 12–14; Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I (Cambridge, 1922), 306; Frauwallner,

Geschichte d. ind. Phil., II, p. 17. This view is grounded on the following observation: *Ātman* is a main factor of cognition because it is the cognizer (*kartṛ*), has cognition for its inferential mark (*liṅga*), and is the enjoyer (*upabhoktṛ*) of the result of the act of cognizing. *Manas* is also a main factor of cognition, since it takes everything for its object and is present wherever a cognition takes place. Therefore, the contact of *ātman* and *manas* is the most important cause of cognition; *PST*, 53b.7 (60b.2–3).

4.8. *VS*, X, 4: *tayor* [=*saṁśaya-nirṇayayor*] *niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣa-laiṅgikābhyāṁ jñānābhyāṁ vyākhyātā.*

Doubt arises when a man perceives an object not in its specific feature but merely in its general feature, and recollects its specific feature; see *VS*, II, ii, 19: *sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣâpratyakṣād viśeṣa-smṛteś ca saṁśayaḥ.* Doubt, therefore, is similar in nature to inferential cognition which results from perception of an inferential mark (*liṅga:* e.g., smoke) and recollection of the invariable relation between this mark and its possessor (*liṅgin*, fire). When a man perceives directly through his sense-organ the specific feature of the object, his doubt is removed and ascertainment arises: "this is A, and not B." Ascertainment is, therefore, similar to perceptual cognition that is produced by the contact of the sense with a real object. Cf. *VSV*, X, 4; *PST*, 54a.1–3 (60b.4–6).

4.9. The immediate awareness of "this" does not remove the doubt that "this can be either A or B." Thus, ascertainment is formulated as "this is A (and not B)." That is, an object comes to be ascertained as A through the process of relating the immediate sense datum "this" to A. This process is nothing other than *kalpanā* (conceptual construction); see above, Section 1, n. 1.27.

4.10. According to Dignāga, *pratyakṣa* is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanâpoḍha*); see above, Section 1, n. 1.25. The term "*ālocana-mātra*" is used by Praśastapāda to characterize *pratyakṣa*. *PBh*, p. 552.30 ff.: *dravye . . . svarūpâlocana-mātram*; *ibid.*, p. 553.21 ff.: *tatra sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu svarūpâlocana-mātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam. . . . sāmānya-viśeṣa-jñānôtpattāv avibhaktam ālocana-mātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam . . .* However, this is hardly conclusive evidence for inferring that Praśastapāda's terminology was known to Dignāga (see below, n. 4.16). A similar expression is found in *AKBh*, p. 10c.20–22: 若爾眼根不能決度 (*saṁtīraṇa*) 云何名見. 以能明利觀照諸色故 (*rūpâlocanârthena*; *AKV*, p. 80.8–9) 亦名見. Cf. also *Mahābhārata* (Critical edn., Poona), XII, 187.12 = 239.15; *SK*, 28ab; *ŚV*, IV, 112.

4.11. *PST*, 54a.6–54b.1 (61a.3–5): "de ltar ḥgyur mod, yod paḥi don daṅ ḥbrel paḥi dbaṅ la skye ba tsam bsgre bar byed paḥo ṣe na, de ni mi rigs te . . . the tshom daṅ rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa rnams daṅ yaṅ de ltar skye ba mtshuṅs pa ḥthob ste, de rnams kyaṅ spyi la sogs pa yaṅ dag paḥi don daṅ mṅon par ḥbrel paḥi dbaṅ gis skye baḥi phyir na . . ."

4.12. The Vaiśeṣikas recognize the relation of "inherence" (*samavāya*) between each pair of the following five pairs of relata: (1) substance and its parts (*avayavâvayavinau*, e.g., *tantu* and *paṭa*), (2) attribute and substance (*guṇa-guṇinau*, e.g., *rūpa* and *ghaṭa*), (3) action and substance (*kriyā-kriyāvantau*, e.g.,

gamana and *ghaṭa*), (4) generic character and substance, attribute, or action (*jāti-vyaktī*, e.g., *ghaṭatva* and *ghaṭa*), (5) ultimate particularity and eternal substance (*viśeṣa-nityadravyau*, e.g., *viśeṣa* and *paramâṇu*); *VS*, *VSV*, VII, ii, 29; *Tarkasaṁ.*, pp. 96–97.

4.13. Jinendrabuddhi states that the object has no part which is not amenable to perception by means of any one of the five varieties of the contact between sense and object; *PST*, 54b.2 (61a.7). The five kinds of contact of sense and object are: (1) conjunction (*saṁyoga*), by means of which the eye perceives a jar, (2) inherence in the conjoined (*saṁyukta-samavāya*), by means of which the eye perceives the color of a jar, (3) inherence in that which inheres in the conjoined (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), by means of which the eye perceives the generic character residing in the color of a jar, (4) inherence (*samavāya*), by means of which the ear (=*ākāśa*) perceives a sound (=*guṇa* of *ākāśa*), and (5) inherence in that which inheres (*samaveta-samavāya*), by means of which the ear perceives the generic character residing in a sound. Besides the above five, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas recognize another type of sense-object contact: the qualifier-qualified relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*), by means of which absence (*abhāva*) is perceived. To my knowledge, the theory of the sixfold contact was first set forth by Uddyotakara (*NV*, pp. 31.1 ff.) and thenceforward accepted as the established theory by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. Also in his commentary on the examination of the Nyāya theory, Jinendrabuddhi refers to the five varieties of the sense-object contact (see above, Section 3, n. 3.1). It is not clear whether the fivefold contact theory was maintained by some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas or whether Jinendrabuddhi omitted the sixth contact.

4.14. See Section 3, *Eb–1*.

4.15. *VS*, VIII, 6–7: *sāmānya-viśeṣâpekṣaṁ dravya-guṇa-karmasu. dravye dravya-guṇa-karmâpekṣam.*

Jinendrabuddhi gives the following explanation: the term "*sāmānya*" stands for *mahā-sāmānya* (i.e., *sattā*) and the term "*viśeṣa*" implies the other *sāmānya*s (e.g., *dravyatva* and the like); because *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are relative, all *sāmānya*s except *sattā* are, from another viewpoint, *viśeṣa*s; *PST*, 55b.7–56a.2 (62b.8–63a.2). This idea can be found in *VS*, I, ii, 3–5: *sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti buddhy-apekṣam. bhāvaḥ* [=*sattā*] *sāmānyam eva. dravyatvaṁ guṇatvaṁ karmatvaṁ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca.* Praśastapāda calls *sattā* "*paraṁ sāmānyam*" and the other *sāmānya*s "*aparaṁ sāmānyam.*" *PBh*, p. 677.4–19: *sāmānyaṁ dvividhaṁ param aparaṁ ca . . . tatra sattā-sāmānyaṁ param anuvṛtti-pratyaya-kāraṇam eva . . . aparaṁ dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvâdy anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānyaṁ viśeṣaś ca bhavati.*

Perceptions dependent upon *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karman* are respectively exemplified by Jinendrabuddhi as follows: "Substance exists," "[this] substance is earth; [this is] a jar," "[this is] a staff-bearer," "[this is] white," "[he] goes." These examples are similar to those cited by Praśastapāda in *PBh*, p. 553.2–5: *sāmānya-viśeṣa-dravya-guṇa-karma-viśeṣaṇâpekṣād ātma-manaḥ-saṁnikarṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate—sad dravyaṁ pṛthivī viṣāṇī śuklo gaur*

gacchatîti." It seems likely that Jinendrabuddhi here bases his explanation on *PBh*, but this does not mean that Dignāga criticizes Praśastapāda's theory.

4.16. In Ba, Dignāga stated that *pratyakṣa* is "*viṣayâlocana-mātra.*" Here again Dignāga describes the cognition produced by *indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa* as "*viṣayâlocanârtham*" and as free of any qualifier. As mentioned above (n. 4.10), Praśastapāda characterizes *pratyakṣa* in respect to a substance as *svarūpâlocana-mātra*, the mere representation of the object itself unassociated with any qualifier. But he continues: From the contact of soul and mind which is conditioned by the qualifiers, such as genus, species, substance, attribute, and action, there arises *pratyakṣa* in the form "[this] substance exists," "[this substance is] earth," "[this is] the horned," "[this is] white," or "[this] cow goes"; *PBh*, p. 553.2–5 (see above, n. 4.15). Moreover, he says that *svarūpâlocana-mātra* in respect to objects possessing generic and specific features is *pratyakṣa* as the means of cognition, which brings about as the result a cognition taking substance, etc., for its object. *Ibid.*, p. 553.2–23: *tatra sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu svarūpâlocana-mātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam . . . pramitir dravyâdi-viṣayaṁ jñānam.* Clearly, then, Praśastapāda recognizes a distinction between *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* and *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, although he does not use these terms (see *Nyāya-kandalī* [Vizianagram Skt. Ser.], pp. 189–190). Dignāga is in the habit of examining views held by commentators which differ in any respect from the doctrine set forth in the main text: he touches upon the views held by Śrāyaska, Rāvaṇa (cf. above, nn. 4.6, 7), Sāṁkhya-vaināśika = Mādhava (cf. below, Section 5, n. 5.53), and the Vṛttikāra of the Mīmāṁsakas (cf. below, Section 6, n. 6.23). The fact that Praśastapāda's distinction between two types of *pratyakṣa* passes unnoticed by Dignāga allows the probability that he was simply unaware of Praśastapāda's theory. The chronological precedence of Dignāga to Praśastapāda is remarked upon in Frauwallner, "Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram," pp. 71–73; Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, p. 31, n. 58.

4.17. By the sense-organ, an object *x* is perceived as *x* itself unrelated to anything else. As such *x* cannot be denoted by any word. One can denote *x* only by relating it to something else. One might consider that, when such words as "*sat*," "*dravya*," "*viṣāṇin*," "*śukla*," and "*gacchati*" are applied to *x* (see *VSV*, VIII, 6–7), they refer only to *x* and not to any other thing to which *x* is related. In fact, however, *x* is related to *sattā* (= *sāmānya*), *dravyatva* (= *viśeṣa*), *viṣāṇa* (= *dravya*), *śukla* (= *guṇa*), and *gamana* (= *karman*) respectively; *x* is a "possessor of" or "locus (*adhikaraṇa*, *āśraya*) of" *sattā*, etc. To describe *x* as "possessor of" or "locus of" *sattā*, etc., *matup* (*-mat*, *-vat*) should be affixed to *sattā*, etc.; *Pāṇ.*, *V*, ii, 94: *tad asyâsty asminn iti matup.* Thus we form "*sattā-vat*," "*dravyatva-vat*," "*viṣāṇa-vat*," "*śukla-vat*," and "*gamana-vat.*" In these descriptions of *x* it is evident that, along with *x* itself, *sattā*, etc., and *x*'s relation to them (i.e., "possessor of" or "locus of"), are referred to. However, in the ordinary usage of terms, "*sat*," etc., are substituted for "*sattā-vat*," etc.: that is, the descriptions of *x* (i.e., "possessor of" or "locus of" *sattā* etc.) are replaced by words which seemingly refer to *x* only. Consequently, one tends to overlook the mental process of relating *x* itself to *sattā*, etc., and considers that *x* is "perceived" as "*sat*," etc. As for replacing "*sattā-vat*" and "*dravyatva-vat*" by

"*sat*" and "*dravya*," there is the rule "*tattva-vat tad eva*"; Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, p. 36. "*Śukla*" may be substituted for "*śukla-vat*" through application of the rule of the elision of *matup*; *Pāṇ*., V, ii, 94, *Vār*. 3: *guṇa-vacanebhyo matupo luk*. "*Viṣāṇa*" and "*gamana*" cannot take the place of "*viṣāṇa-vat*" and "*gamana-vat*" because words denoting substance and action can never express the possessor or locus of substance and action; *PST*, 56a.5 (63a.6): "bya ba daṅ rdsas kyi ṅo bos rten rtogs pa yod pa ma yin te." Therefore, "*viṣāṇin*" (*viṣāṇa*+*ini*) and "*gacchati*" (*gaccha*+*ti*), which express the possessor or locus of *viṣāṇa* and *gamana* by virtue of a suffix and a personal ending, are used in these cases. Here Dignāga explains the process through which *x* comes to be expressed by the words "*sat*," etc., thereby making it clear that this process is not one of pure perception.

4.18. From Dignāga's viewpoint the qualifiers (*sattā*, etc.) are constructed by the mind (*manas*) which relates the immediate sense-datum to those in the past, through the medium of remembrance. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas hold that *viśeṣaṇa-jñāna* precedes *viśeṣya-jñāna*; Candrānanda ad *VS*, VIII, 7: . . . *dravyâdīnāṁ ca viśeṣaṇatvāt pūrvam upalambhaḥ, tena viśeṣaṇa-buddheḥ kāraṇatvaṁ viśeṣya-buddheḥ kāryatvam*; *NVTT*, p. 125.3–12 (see above, Section 3, n. 3.35). When *viśeṣya-jñāna* arises, *viśeṣaṇa-jñāna* is already in the past. *Viśeṣaṇa*, therefore, must be called forth by remembrance in order to relate it to *viśeṣya*.

4.19. The meaning of K: dri mar (=mṅar) ro, and V: dris (=dri) mṅar ro, is not clear. My translation is based on *PST*, 56b.1 (63b.2): "dri sim po ni mṅar poḥo."

4.20. *PST*, 56b.5–6 (63b.8): "*rdsas dbaṅ po gcig min gyis gzuṅ bar bya ba ñid* ni blta bar bya ba daṅ reg par bya ba yaṅ rdsas so ṣes khas blaṅs paḥi phyir ro." Cf. *NS*, III, i, 1: *darśana-sparśanābhyām ekârtha-grahaṇāt*—[*Ātman* is known to exist as distinct from the senses,] because [we have the awareness that] one and the same thing is grasped by the visual as well as the tactual senses [and this awareness is not produced by the senses]. Commenting on this sūtra, Vātsyāyana states: *darśanena kaścid artho gṛhītaḥ sparśanenâpi so 'rtho gṛhyate—yam aham adrākṣaṁ cakṣuṣā taṁ sparśanenâpi spṛśāmîti, yaṁ câspārkṣaṁ sparśanena taṁ cakṣuṣā paśyāmîti*. Cf. also *NV*, p. 72.15–21 (ad *NS*, I, i, 14: "*gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdāḥ pṛthivy-ādi-guṇās tad-arthāḥ*"): *ubhayam pṛthivy-ādīnām indriyârthatve śāstraṁ yuktiś ca sambhavati. śāstraṁ tāvat "darśana-sparśanābhyām ekârtha-grahaṇād" iti. yuktir api darśana-sparśanayor eka-viṣayatvena pratisaṁdhānam, yam aham adrākṣaṁ taṁ spṛśāmîti dṛṣṭi-sparśana-viṣayā yuktiḥ . . . tasmāt siddhaṁ pṛthivy-ādīni ca guṇāś cêti dvandvaḥ samāsa iti.*

4.21. *K. 1cd–2ab* is quoted in *ŚVK*, I, 266.11–12, as follows:

naikaṁ rūpâdy-abhedo vā dṛṣṭaṁ cen nêndriyeṇa tat
akṣânekatva-vaiyarthyaṁ svârthe bhinne 'pi śaktimat.

K: *min te* has been corrected to read *gcig min* following Kk and V, which agree with the Sanskrit original.

Kumārila criticizes Dignāga's argument contained in this verse in his *ŚV*, IV, 156:

na cânekêndriya-grāhyam bhinnatāṁ pratipadyate
mā bhūd bhinna-śarīrasya grāhyatvād bhinna-rūpatā.

4.22. Jinendrabuddhi summarizes Dignāga's argument in the following *vyāpaka-viruddhôpalabdhi* formula: Whatever is grasped by different senses (*anekêndriya-grāhya*) is not single (*naikam*)—as, for instance, [various entities like] *rūpa*, etc. Substance is also *anekêndriya-grāhya*. [Therefore, substance is not single]; *PST*, 56b.5 (63b.7). For *vyāpaka-viruddhôpalabdhi*, see *NB*, II, 38 (Bib. Ind. edition, II, 39); Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, II, 96.

4.23. *rūpâdy-abhedo vā* (see above, n. 4.21).

4.24. *dṛṣṭaṁ cet* (see above, n. 4.21).

4.25. See *PST*, 57a.4–5 (64a.6–8): "yod pa ñid daṅ yon tan ñid dag gi rten gzugs la sogs pa rnams ni dbaṅ po thams cad pa can rnams te, deḥi phyir de dag kyaṅ dbaṅ po thams cad pa ñid do. ji skad bśad pa 'ḥdis ni yon tan ñid daṅ yod pa ñid la dbaṅ po thams cad paḥi śes par bśad do' [*VS*, IV, i, 14: *etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarvêndriya-jñānaṁ vyākhyātam*] ṣes paḥo." See also *NV*, p. 73.4–7 (ad *NS*, I, i, 14): *indriyāṇi gandha-rasa-sparśa-śabdeṣu tat-sāmānyeṣu ca niyatāni, anyatrâniyatānîti. tatra pṛthivy-ap-tejāṁsi dvîndriya-grāhyāṇi śeṣaś ca guṇa-rāśiḥ sattā-guṇatve ca sarvêndriya-grāhye samavāyo 'bhāvaś ca tathā.*

4.26. *VS*, I, ii, 18: *sal-liṅgâviśeṣād viśeṣa-liṅgâbhāvāc caiko bhāva* [=*sattā*] *iti*. Candrānanda explains this sūtra as follows: "*eka*"*-śabdenâbhedaḥ kathyate, na tu saṁkhyā. liṅgyate 'nenêti liṅgaṁ pratyayaḥ, yena liṅgena "sat" "sat" iti pratyayena pratīyate sattā, tasya sarvatrâviśiṣṭatvād viśiṣṭasya ca pratyayasyâbhāvād abhinnā sattā.* The same kind of argument can also prove that *guṇatva* is *abhinna.*

4.27. According to V: hence [your argument that there follows] the absurdity that [various objects such as] color, etc., are nondifferent [from each other], and [that a substance is] manifold, cannot be proved.

4.28. *nêndriyeṇa tat* (see above, n. 4.21).

4.29. Both K and V read: "*dbaṅ gṣan don med ḥgyur phyir ro.*" *PST*, 57a.5 (64a.8): "*dbaṅ po du ma don med phyir*"; this agrees exactly with the Sanskrit: *akṣânekatva-vaiyarthyam* (see above, n. 4.21).

4.30. For Dignāga, *sparśa* grasped by the tactual sense and *rūpa* which has been grasped by the visual sense are different *svalakṣaṇa*s. Through conceptual construction (*kalpanā*), *sparśa* might be conceived as a *ghaṭa* (=*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), and this *ghaṭa* might be recognized as identical with a *ghaṭa* that has also been conceptually constructed on seeing *rūpa*.

4.31. *svârthe bhinne 'pi śaktimat* (see above, n. 4.21).

4.32. Commenting on this passage, Jinendrabuddhi quotes *VS*, IV, i, 12: *saṁkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṁ saṁyoga-vibhāgau paratvâparatve karma ca*

rūpi-dravya-samavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi; *PST*, 57b.2–3 (64b.6–7). Attributes enumerated herein and actions become the objects of the visual sense only insofar as the substance (*dravya*) in which they inhere is possessed of *rūpa*. However, *rasa*, *gandha*, etc., which are the objects of those senses that are different from the visual sense, are never grasped by the visual sense.

4.33. There is a marked difference between K and V. My translation follows K, reading *gzuṅ ba* instead of *ḥdsin pa*.

4.34. Jinendrabuddhi summarizes the argument in the following *vyāpaka-viruddhôpalabdhi* formula: Whatever is the object of the tactual sense is not the object of the visual sense: as, for example, *sparśa*. Substance is also the object of the tactual sense. [Therefore, substance is not the object of the visual sense.] *PST*, 57b.6–7 (65a.3–4).

4.35. The Vaiśeṣika argument in *Ec* may be formulated as follows: Theory (*pratijñā*)—*rūpa* is grasped by different senses (*anekêndriya-grāhya*). Cause (*hetu*): because it is differentiated (*bhinna*) [into many varieties]. Example (*dṛṣṭānta*): all *bhinna*s are *anekêndriya-grāhya*s: as, for instance, various objects like *rūpa*, *sparśa*, etc. In *Ea*, Dignāga based his argument upon the following proposition: All *anekêndriya-grāhya*s are *bhinna*s (=*aneka*); see above, n. 4.22. The Vaiśeṣikas wrongly converted this proposition. The correct conversion of Dignāga's proposition is: Some *bhinna*s are *anekêndriya-grāhya*s. This permits some *bhinna*s, for example—various colors—to be *ekêndriya-grāhya*s. Dignāga is aware of the fallacy of the Vaiśeṣika argument and points out that *bhinnatva* is not the cause of *anekêndriya-grāhyatva*.

4.36. *PST*, 58a.6 (65b.3–4): "gaṅ gsuṅs pa *de lta na gzugs la sogs pa rnams dbaṅ po du mas gzuṅ bar bya ba rnams su ḥgyur ro* ṣes pa ste, ṅes pas dbaṅ po gcig gis gzuṅ bar bya ba rnams su mi ḥgyur ro ṣes paḥi don to."

4.37. *VS*, IV, i, 11: *tad-abhāvād avyabhicāraḥ*.

This sūtra forms a part in the series of sūtras which discuss perception and nonperception of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, and *viśeṣa*; *VS*, IV, i, 6–14. Sūtra 6 opens the discussion with this statement: Perception takes place in regard to [a *dravya* possessing] magnitude, because of its possession of many atoms and also because of *rūpa* [which resides in it] (*mahaty aneka-dravyavattvād rūpāc côpalabdhiḥ*). Among *guṇa*s, those which are perceived by their corresponding sense-organs are treated separately from the others in view of their perceptibility. Thus, sūtras 9 and 10 state: Perception takes place in regard to *rūpa*, because of its inherence in a *dravya* possessing many atoms and because of the peculiar property of *rūpa* [residing in it]. By [extension of] this [same sūtra], perceptions in regard to *rasa*, *gandha*, and *sparśa* have also been explained (*aneka-dravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpa-viśeṣāc côpalabdhiḥ. etena rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu jñānaṁ vyākhyātam*). Sūtra 11 (*tad-abhāvād avyabhicāraḥ*) is immediately preceded by these two sūtras and followed by the sūtras (12–14) that discuss perception and nonperception in regard to the other *guṇa*s (excluding those *guṇa*s which reside only in *ātman*), *karman*, *sāmānya*, and *viśeṣa*. Candrānanda considers sūtra 11 to refer to the "*rūpa* of an atom" (*paramâṇu-rūpa*), and

construes the sūtra as follows: The *rūpa* of an atom is not perceived "because of the absence of its inherence in a *dravya* possessing many atoms"; hence, "there is no deviation" from the rule of perception in regard to *rūpa*, as mentioned in sūtra 9; *VSV*, IV, i, 11. On the other hand, Śaṅkaramiśra gives the following interpretation of the same sūtra: Although it is inherent in a *dravya* possessing magnitude and *rūpa*, *gurutva* (gravity) is not perceived by the visual sense "because of the absence of that peculiar property of *rūpa* in it"; therefore, "there is no deviation" from the rule that visual perception takes place because of the peculiar property of *rūpa*. Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra differ in taking "*tad*" as referring respectively to "*aneka-dravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyaḥ*" and to "*rūpa-viśeṣa*." These are two characteristics of *rūpa* which are necessary for its perceptibility, as mentioned in sūtra 9. The word "*tad*" may be interpreted in either way. On the other hand, both Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra agree in reading the sūtra as "*tad-abhāvād* (*anupalabdhiḥ*)," "(*tato*) '*vyabhicāraḥ*." This reading appears rather forced. Moreover, Śaṅkaramiśra is wrong in taking the sūtra as referring to *gurutva*, which is not mentioned in *VS*, I, i, 5, where seventeen *guṇa*s are enumerated: *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ saṁkhyāḥ... prayatnāś ca guṇāḥ*. To take "*ca*" in this sūtra as implying *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *sneha*, *saṁskāra*, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *śabda*, is obviously a later consideration; *PBh*, p. 47.17–19: *ca-śabda-samuccitāś ca gurutva-* . . . *-śabdāḥ saptaivêty evaṁ caturviṁśati guṇāḥ*. Cf. *VSV*, I, i, 5; *Tarkasaṁ.*, p. 5, etc. "Because of *y-viśeṣâbhāva* in *x*, there is no *vyabhicāra* of *y-upalabdhi* into *x-upalabdhi*"—this interpretation referred to by Dignāga seems to represent more faithfully the original idea of *VS*, IV, i, 11, although it cannot be located in extant Vaiśeṣika commentaries.

4.38. The word "*rūpa-viśeṣa*" in *VS*, IV, i, 9 (see above, n. 4.37), stands for "*rūpatva*"; *VSV*, IV, i, 9: . . . *rūpa-viśeṣāc ca rūpatvâkhyāt sāmānya-viśeṣād upalabdhiḥ*.

4.39. K punctuates the sentence here: "mig daṅ reg pa dag ḥjug go." V is corrupt, but it suggests that this sentence continues to *k.* $2d_1$ without punctuation. K has therefore been emended.

4.40. In the enumeration of *guṇa*s in *VS*, I, i, 5 (see above, n. 4.37), *saṁkhyā* is mentioned after *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, and *sparśa*. Because "*rasâdi*" or "*gandhâdi*" includes *sparśa*, which possesses *sparśatva*, "*saṁkhyâdi*" is used here.

4.41. Both K and V read: "de lta bas na." This reading is doubtful. *PST* does not have it. Jambuvijaya reconstructs this and the following passage as follows: "*evaṁ sparśâdāv api. evaṁ niyatatvenâsti* [I prefer to adopt the reading "*niyāmakatvenâsti*," which Jambuvijaya gives in a footnote] *viśesaḥ*."—The same is the case with the tangible, etc. Thus the peculiar property [of each object] exists as the determinative [of the sense-cognition]. To conform to this reconstruction, the Tibetan must be corrected to read: "*de bṣin du* reg bya la sogs pa la yaṅ. *de ltar* ṅes pa ñid kyis khyad par yod pa yin no."

4.42. The Vaiśeṣika theory referred to in *Ee* is: Because of the absence of *y-tva* in *x* (*tad-abhāvāt*), the sense corresponding to *x* does not take *y* for its object. Here the Vaiśeṣikas alter the expression "absence of *y-tva* in *x*" to

"presence of *x-tva* in *x*." This alteration, however, is invalid: "presence of *x-tva* in *x*" is not incompatible with "absence of *y-tva* in *x*." Dignāga points out that the alteration of "*tad-abhāvāt*" (because of the absence of *y-tva* in *x*) to "*tad-bhāvāt*" (because of the presence of *x-tva* in *x*) is *sūtra-virodha*.

4.43. There is a substantial difference between Kk and Vk in their renderings of *k. 3a*. Kk: ". . . de lta na (*2d*) gṣan gyi spyod yul ji ltar yin (*3a*)". Vk: ". . . de lta na (*2d*) med phyir gṣan gyi spyod yul min (*3a*)". K and V quote *k. 3a* as follows: "*gṣan gyi spyod yul yin*" (K); "*gṣan gyi yul*" (V). See text *Eh*. From the context, these translations are better than those given in Kk and Vk. Probably, "*ji ltar yin*" in Kk corresponds to "*ji lta ṣe na*" before "*gṣan gyi spyod yul*," and "*min*" in Vk is a mistake for "*yin*." Furthermore, another difficulty arises in both Kk and Vk. According to the arguments developed in *Ef* and *Eg*, the conclusion to be drawn from "*de lta na*" is that of a contradiction of *sūtra* and *yukti*, and not "*gṣan gyi spyod yul*." Imaginably, there is an omission in both Kk and Vk of a line in which a contradiction of *sūtra* and *yukti* is mentioned. Vk suggests that "*med phyir*" forms part of the *Kārikās*. K: ". . . *med phyir / mi ḥkhrul lo ṣe* . . ." hints the same. Taking this "*med phyir*" as standing for "(*tad-*)*abhāvāt*" in *VS*, IV, i, 11, I have placed "*min*" after it because Dignāga points out that the Vaiśeṣika theory given in *Ef* is not "*tad-abhāvāt*." In *Eg*, where a contradiction of *yukti* is discussed, "*mi ḥdsin pa ni med paḥi phyir*" seems from the style to form part of the *Kārikās*. Thus, I reconstitute *k.* $2d_2$*–3ab* as follows:

. . . de lta na
med phyir min mi ḥdsin pa ni
med phyir gṣan gyi spyod yul yin.

Muni Jambuvijaya omits "*med phyir* (*min*)" in his reconstruction of *k.* $2d_2$*–3ab*, which he diffidently presents as follows: . . . *tathā sati* / (*agṛhīter abhāvatvāt kathaṁ ced*) *anya-gocaram*; *App. to VS*, pp. 169, 172.

4.44. This is omitted in Kk and Vk. Cf. above, n. 4.43.

4.45. *PST*, 59a.2 (66a.8): "*gṣan paḥi spyod yul can* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, rdsas las gṣan pa brtags pa kho na ḥdiḥi yul lo ṣes ston to."

4.46. *PST*, 59a.3–4 (66b.2–3), explains that "de daṅ lhan cig rgyu ba [*spyod* pa instead of *rgyu ba* in *PST*]" (*tat-sahacārin*) is a bahuvrīhi modifying "spyi [*tshogs* in *PST*]" (*samudāya*), and that "spyiḥi yul" (*samudāya-viṣaya*) is a bahuvrīhi modifying "śes pa" (*jñāna*). Thus, "spyiḥi yul *la* tha mi dad par . . . śes pa" in K and V are best corrected to read "spyiḥi yul *can gyi* tha mi dad par . . . śes pa."

4.47. *PST*, 59b.3–4 (67a.3–4): "*de bṣin du khyad par can rnams* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, yod pa daṅ yon tan ñid dag gis sṅar ma ṅes par brjod pa de yoṅs su spaṅ baḥi ched du ñe bar bkod pa ste." Cf. *Eb*.

4.48. K: "khyad par can las tha dad pa rnams"—[individual existences and attributes] distinct from qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*)—makes sense. However, Jinendrabuddhi says: "khyad par can rnams ni gzugs la sogs pa rnams so"; *PST*, 59b.4

(67a.4). Therefore I read "khyad par can tha dad pa rnams" (*viśeṣyāṇi bhinnāni*) in agreement with Jambuvijaya (*App. to VS*, p. 172.7), omitting "*las*" in K. V is defective.

4.49. According to Dignāga, individual existences perceivable by the senses are distinct from each other. But when they are contrasted (by means of the operation of *manas*) with nonexistence, they are understood as possessing similarity insofar as they are not instances of nonexistence. The universals, being (*sattā*), attributeness (*guṇatva*), etc., are thus produced by *manas* through the exclusion of nonexistence, nonattribute, etc.

4.50. Dignāga's view set forth in *D* was that two separate (*bhinna*) objects (viz., a thing itself and its qualifier) are related only by means of conceptual construction and never cognized as one (*abhinna*, *eka*) by *indriya-jñāna*. To counterattack this view, the Vaiśeṣikas argued that *bhinnêndriya-grāhya* (=*anekêndriya-*°) could be *abhinna* (=*eka*). Having refuted this argument in *Ea–Eh*, Dignāga now examines the alternative argument put forth by the Vaiśeṣikas that *bhinna* (=*aneka*)—i.e., a thing itself and its qualifier—can be *ekêndriya-grāhya*.

4.51. See *VS*, I, i, 7: *sad anityaṁ* dravyavat *kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānya-viśeṣavad iti dravya-guṇa-karmāṇām aviśeṣaḥ.*

4.52. See *PST*, 60a.4 (67b.5): "ḥdir rdsas daṅ ldan pas yon tan ni khyad par can te, rdsas ni khyad par ro. de las kyaṅ ji ltar yon tan dbaṅ po lṅa pa yin pa de bṣin du rdsas kyaṅ ḥgyur ro."

Because *dravya* is *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of *guṇa*, etc., it is customary to say that *dravya* is *guṇavat*, etc.; *VS*, I, i, 14: *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyi-kāraṇam iti dravya-lakṣaṇam.* When this expression is employed, *guṇa* is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of *dravya*. The possessive suffix *-vat*, however, does not necessarily imply that *x-vat* is a *kāraṇa* of *x*. As a father is called *putravat*, so a son may be called *pitṛvat*. In the case when the *samavāya* relation between *dravya* and *guṇa* is viewed from the side of *guṇa*, *guṇa* is recognized as *dravyavat*. In this case, *dravya* is the qualifier and *guṇa* is the qualified.

4.53. Being is grasped by all of the five senses; see above, n. 4.25.

4.54. The Vaiśeṣikas recognize nine kinds of substances: *pṛthivī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *diś*, *ātman*, and *manas*; *VS*, I, i, 4. Of these, *pṛthivī*, *ap*, and *tejas* are grasped by two sense-organs; see above, n. 4.25. The other six are cognized by inference and not perceived by the sense-organs. Cf. *PBh*, p. 161: *trayāṇāṁ* [=*pṛthivy-ap-tejasāṁ*] *pratyakṣatva-rūpavattva-dravatvavattvāni*; *NV*, p. 72.21–22 (ad *NS*, I, i, 14): *pṛthivy-ādi-grahaṇena pṛthivy-ap-tejāṁsi bāhya-karaṇa-grāhyāny apadiśyante.*

4.55. *VS*, I, ii, 8–9: *dravya-guṇa-karmabhyo 'rthântaraṁ sattā. eka-dravya-vattvān na dravyam.*

Substance (*dravya*) is of two kinds: substance possessing no substance (*adravyaṁ dravyam*), such as *paramâṇu*, *ākāśa*, etc.; and substance possessing

many substances (*aneka-dravyaṁ dravyam*), such as *ghaṭa* and the like. There is no substance that possesses one substance.

4.56. See above, n. 4.25.

4.57. See *PST*, 60a.6–7 (67b.8–68a.1): "rdsas la ḥjug paḥi yod pa gaṅ yin pa deḥi rdsas gcig ni khyad par yin la, ḥdi ni dbaṅ po thams cad pa yaṅ ma yin gyi, ḥo na ci ṣe na, yon tan la ḥjug paḥo."

4.58. *VS*, I, ii, 18: *sal-liṅgâviśeṣād viśeṣa-liṅgâbhāvāc caiko bhāvaḥ*. (See above, n. 4.26.)

4.59. *VS*, I, ii, 10: *guṇa-karmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇaḥ*.
It seems that K read this sūtra incorrectly, as follows: ". . . *na karme* [for *karmaṇi*] *na guṇaḥ*." I have emended K to conform to this sūtra.

4.60. This last sentence, in brackets, is not in K nor is it in V. But its existence is suggested by *PST*, 60b.4 (68a.7): "*de ltar yaṅ ma yin no* ṣes pa ste"; Jambuvijaya, *App. to VS*, p. 172, n. 13.

4.61. Dignāga's reasoning can be formulated as follows.
Theory (*pratijñā*): the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the qualified (*viśeṣya*) are different (*anya, aneka, bhinna*).
Cause (*hetu*): because of their being grasped by different senses (*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatvāt*).
Example (*dṛṣṭānta*): wherever there is *bhinnêndriya-grāhyatva* there is *anyatva* (*anekatva, bhinnatva*)—for example, color and the tangible and other objects.
Here the opponent converts the Example by means of *arthāpatti* as follows: Wherever there is *ekêndriya-grāhyatva* there is *abhinnatva* (*ekatva, ananyatva*). (*Arthāpatti* is a kind of immediate inference by means of contraposition of the original proposition, but in Dignāga's time mere conversion was also recognized as a valid *arthāpatti*; *NBh*, I, i, 34–35; II, i, 1 ff.) Then, the opponent points out that *ekêndriya-grāhyatva* is found not only in *sapakṣa* (positive instance—i.e., that which possesses *abhinnatva*) but also in *vipakṣa* (negative instance—i.e., that which possesses *bhinnatva*: variety of color, for example), and says that the Cause in Dignāga's reasoning is *anaikāntika*. This objection is a kind of *jāti* (fallacious refutation), called *arthāpatti-sama* (the equalizing by means of *arthāpatti*); *PST*, 60b.5 (68a.7–8): "*mthoṅ ba* ṣes pa ḥdis don gyis go ba daṅ mtshuṅs pa (*arthāpatti-sama*) -ḥi lhag chod ñe bar ḥgod do." *Arthāpatti-sama* is defined in *NS*, V, i, 21, as follows: *arthāpattitaḥ pratipakṣa-siddher arthāpatti-samaḥ*. Dignāga explains *arthāpatti-sama* in *PSV*, VI, K 174a.5–6, V 83a.3; *NMukh*, p. 4b.27 ff. (cf. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha*, p. 59).

4.62. In Dignāga's reasoning, the Cause "*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatva*" is a property (*dharma*) of the subject of the Theory (i.e., *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*); thus the Cause is the pervader (*vyāpaka*) of the subject of the Theory. The second objection of the opponent is based on the misunderstanding that "*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatva*" is the pervader of the predicate of the Theory—i.e., "*anya* (*aneka*,

bhinna)." Thus, the opponent thinks that *all* "*bhinnas*" should necessarily have for their cause "*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatva*." He then shows that even when there is no "*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatva*" there is another cause of "*bhinnatva*," and says that the Cause "*bhinnêndriya-grāhyatvāt*" is inconclusive. This objection is also a kind of *jāti*, called *upalabdhi-sama* (the equalizing by means of the cognition [of *sādhya* from another cause]); *PST*, 60b.5–6 (68a.8–68b.1): "*med kyaṅ* ṣes pa la sogs pas . . . ñe bar dmigs par mtshuṅs pa (*upalabdhi-sama*) gñis paḥo." *NS*, V, i, 27, defines *upalabdhi-sama* as follows: *nirdiṣṭa-kāraṇâbhāve 'py upalambhād upalabdhi-samaḥ*. Dignāga explains *upalabdhi-sama* in *PSV*, VI, K 173a.7–173b.1, V 82a.6–82b.1; *NMukh*, pp. 4b.13 ff. (cf. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha*, p. 58). There are two types of *upalabdhi-sama*. As pointed out by Jinendrabuddhi, this is the second type.

4.63. *PST*, 60b.6 (68b.1): "*rnam gṣan du brjod* ces pa la sogs pas don gyis go ba daṅ mtshuṅs pa sel bar byed do."

4.64. The answer to *arthāpatti-sama* is given in *NS*, V, i, 22, as follows: *asya* [=*arthāpati-samasya*] *uttaram—anuktasyârthāpatteḥ pakṣa-hāner upapattir anuktatvād anaikāntikatvāc cârthāpatteḥ*. Cf. *PSV*, VI, K 174a.6–174b.1, V 83a.3–6; *NMukh*, p. 5a.4–6 (cf. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha*, p. 63).

4.65. *PST*, 61a.1 (68b.4): "*thams cad bsgrub par* ṣes pa la sogs pas ñe bar dmigs pa(r mtshuṅs pa) gñis pa sel bar byed do."

4.66. See *NS*, V, i, 28: *asya* [=*upalabdhi-samasya*] *uttaram—kāraṇântarād api tad-dharmâpatter apratiṣedhaḥ*; *PSV*, VI, K 173b.2–6, V 82b.1–5; *NMukh*, p. 4c.24–28 (cf. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha*, p. 62).

4.67. The implication of the expression "the four factors, etc." (*catuṣṭayâdi*), is as follows: in the case of perceiving *rūpa* (=*guṇa*) or *karman*, there is contact of four factors: viz., *ātman*, *manas*, *indriya*, and *dravya* (in which *rūpa* or *karman* resides). In the case of perceiving *śabda* (=*guṇa*), there is contact of three factors: viz., *ātman*, *manas*, and *dravya* (in which *śabda* resides), because *śrotrêndriya* (by which *śabda* is perceived) is nothing other than *ākāśa*, which is *dravya*. In the case of perceiving the *guṇas* of *ātman—sukha*, *duḥkha*, etc., for example—there is contact of two factors only: viz., *ātman* and *manas*; *PST*, 61a.7–61b.1 (69a.4–5); *PBh*, p. 553.5–12: . . . *śabdasya traya-saṁnikarṣāc chrotra-samavetasya tenaivôpalabdhiḥ* . . . *buddhi-sukha-duḥkhêcchā-dveṣa-prayatnānāṁ dvayor ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād upalabdhiḥ*; *NCV*, p. 110.20–21: "*ātmêndriya-* . . ." [*VS*, III, i, 13] . . . *catuṣṭaya-traya-dvaya-saṁnikarṣād utpadyamānaṁ pratyakṣam iti*.

4.68. According to Jinendrabuddhi, *āśraya* of *guṇa*, etc., implies *guṇatva* and *karmatva*; *PST*, 61a.5 (69a.1): "raṅ gi rten can ni, yon tan daṅ las dag gi raṅ gi spyi ste, yon tan ñid daṅ las ñid do." However, I disagree with his interpretation. Cf. *Vyomavatī* on *PBh* (Chowkh. Skt. Ser.), p. 558.16: "*svâśraya-saṁnikarṣāc*" *ca svâśrayeṇa dravyeṇa saṁyuktam indriyaṁ tat-samavāyāt*.

4.69. Both K and V are somewhat defective. K has been emended by comparison with V. The theory that *indriyârtha-saṁnikarṣa* is the means of perceptual cognition is criticized by Dignāga in Section 3, *Ca*, *Cb*, and also in Section 6, *C*.

Section 5. Examination of the Sāṁkhya Theory

5.1. *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 4.10; *NC*, p. 107.4: *śrotrâdi-vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*. This definition is attributed to Vārṣagaṇya; see *Yuktid.*, p. 39.18: *śrotrâdi-vṛttir iti vārṣagaṇāḥ*; *NVTT*, p. 155.19–20: *vārṣagaṇyasyâpi lakṣaṇam ayuktam ity āha—"śrotrâdi-vṛttir"* (*NV*, p. 43.10) *iti*.

Jinendrabuddhi quotes the passage which includes this definition from a Sāṁkhya treatise; *PST*, 61b.2–3 (69a.6–7): "ci rjes su dpag pa gcig pu kho na tshad ma ḥam ṣe na, ma yin ṣes brjod par bya ste, *rna ba la sogs paḥi ḥjug pa yaṅ ṅo* (*śrotrâdi-vṛttiś ca*). mṅon sum tshad ma ṣes pa lhag maḥo." (This is followed by "*śrotra-tvak-* . . . *iṣyate*," which will be referred to in n. 5.2.) Some other passages are also quoted from a Sāṁkhya text by Jinendrabuddhi with the remark "ji skad du bśad pa" (*yathôktam*) or "bstan bcos su" (*śāstre*), etc. Frauwallner has shown that these were taken from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, and, by putting these passages in order, he reconstructed the portion of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* where the theory of knowledge is mentioned; "Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṁkhya Systems," *WZKSO*, Bd. II.

SK defines *pratyakṣa* in a different manner as follows: *prativiṣayâdhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam* (k. 5a). Commenting on this, *Yuktidīpikā* says that the above-mentioned definition by Vārṣagaṇya is defective because it does not include the cases of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* of *rāga*, etc., and *yogi-pratyakṣa*, which is *atîndriya*; *Yuktid.*, p. 42.11–15: *āha—yadîyaṁ śrotrâdi-vṛttir eva pratyakṣam ity abhyupeyate, ka evaṁ sati doṣaḥ syāt. ucyate—rāgâdi-viṣayaṁ yad vijñānaṁ liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakaṁ yogi-nāṁ ca dhyāna-bhūmikāsu viharatāṁ prātibhaṁ yad vijñānam utpadyate tad upasaṁkhyeyaṁ syāt. kutaḥ. na hi sukhâdayaḥ śrotrâdi-vṛtti-grāhyāḥ, yogināṁ câtîndriyaṁ jñānam iti yathā-nyāsaṁ tu kriyamāṇe te 'pi viṣayāḥ, teṣāṁ yo 'dhyavasāyas tasya pratyakṣatvaṁ kena vāryate.*

In the Sāṁkhya system, the senses are not material (*bhautika*) but psychical, being evolved from *ahaṁkāra*. The "*vṛtti*" (functioning) of a sense means that a sense approaches an object and transforms itself (*pariṇāma*) into the form of the object; cf. *PST*, 61b.7 (69b.4–5): "dbaṅ po rnams kyi ḥjug pa ni, raṅ gi yul ñe bar gyur pa na, deḥi rnam par yoṅs su gyur bar śes par byaḥo"; *Yuktid.*, p. 123.12–13: *viṣayâkāra-pariṇāmâtmikā vṛttir vṛttimato 'nanyā satī sambhavaty evêti* . . .; *NVTT*, p. 155.20–21: *pañcānāṁ khalv indriyāṇām arthâkāreṇa pariṇatānām ālocana-mātraṁ vṛttir iṣyate. SK* characterizes the "*vṛtti*" of five senses as "*ālocana-mātra*"; *SK*, 28ab:

rūpâdiṣu pañcānām ālocana-mātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ.

5.2. *NCV*, p. 107.24–25: *śrotra-tvak-cakṣur-jihvā-ghrāṇānāṁ manasâdhiṣṭhitā vṛttiḥ śabda-sparśa-rasa-rūpa-gandheṣu yathā-kramaṁ grahaṇe vartamānā pramāṇaṁ pratyakṣam.*

Jinendrabuddhi refers to the following interpretations of this definition given by the Sāṁkhyas: (A) The words "*manasâdhiṣṭhitā*" imply (1) that the mind, together with a sense [*adhiṣṭhita* = *saha*], operates toward an external object [*manas* = *mano-vṛtti*], or (2) that the functioning of a sense (*indriya-vṛtti*) toward an external object is apprehended by the mind (*manasā saṁvedanam*); *PST*, 61b.4–7 (69b.1–4). For (2), Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passage from a Sāṁkhya text: "phyi rol gyi don rnams la dbaṅ po ṣen par byed na, dbaṅ po(ḥi) ṣen pa de la yid rjes su ṣen par byed do" (see below, n. 5.58). (B) The "*vṛtti*" of the senses is of two kinds: when it is accompanied by *buddhi* (intellect) it is called *sapratyaya-vṛtti* (intellectual functioning), and when it is not accompanied by *buddhi* it is called *apratyaya-vṛtti* (unintellectual functioning). The expression "*grahaṇe vartamānā*" is used in order to rule out *apratyaya-vṛtti*; *ibid.*, 61b.7–62a.4 (69b.5–70a.1). (C) The expression "*śabda- . . . gandheṣu yathā-kramam*" means that each sense operates on its own object; *ibid.*, 62a.4 (70a.1–2). (D) The reason why the word "*vartamānā*" is mentioned in addition to "*vṛttiḥ*" is variously interpreted: (1) It is used to reject the views that the senses are *aprāpya-kārin*, that the senses merely touch the objects, etc., and to make clear that the senses transform themselves (*pariṇāma*) into the forms of the objects. (2) It emphasizes that the functioning of the senses is *avikalpaka*. (3) While "*śrotra- . . . ghrāṇānām . . . vṛttiḥ*" expresses *pramāṇa*, the words "*grahaṇe vartamānā*" indicate *pramāṇa-phala*; *ibid.*, 62a.5–62b.3 (70a.3–70b.1).

5.3. Jinendrabuddhi refers to the following reasoning set forth in a Sāṁkhya treatise: A deaf person, whose auditory sense is defective, is unable to hear sound even though he possesses the other nine sense-organs (four *buddhîndriya*s and five *karmêndriya*s) in good condition. This fact proves that sound is apprehended only by the auditory sense and not by any other sense; *PST*, 62b.4 (70b.2–3): "ji skad du bśad pa 'ḥon pas dbaṅ po dgu rnams yod pa na, sgra mi thos te, deḥi phyir rna ba kho na sgraḥi yul can te, ḥdis pags pa la sogs pa rnams raṅ gi yul ḥjug par rtogs par byaḥo' ṣes so." Cf. *SK*, 31ab: *svāṁ svām prati-padyante parasparâkūta-hetukāṁ vṛttim* (*karaṇānîti śeṣaḥ*, *STK*).

5.4. See *SK*, 11: *tri-guṇam . . . vyaktaṁ tathā pradhānam.* Gauḍapāda comments on this *kārikā* as follows: *tatra tri-guṇaṁ vyaktam, avyaktam api tri-guṇaṁ yasyaitan mahad-ādi kāryaṁ tri-guṇam, iha yad-ātmakaṁ kāraṇaṁ tad-ātmakaṁ kāryam iti, yathā kṛṣṇa-tantu-kṛtaḥ kṛṣṇa eva paṭo bhavati*, *SKBh*, p. 13.6–8. Cf. *Yogabhāṣya*, p. 187.9–11: *te khalv amī try-adhvāno dharmā . . . sarvam idaṁ guṇānāṁ saṁniveśa-viśeṣa-mātram iti paramârthato guṇâtmānaḥ.*

5.5. See *PST*, 62b.6 (70b.5): "ṣi ba (*śānta*) daṅ ḥjigs pa (*ghora*) daṅ rmoṅs pa (*mūḍha*) daṅ drug las skyes pa (*ṣaḍ-ja*) la sogs paḥi bye brag gis mthaḥ yas paḥi phyir . . ." According to whether *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas* predominates, a sound becomes *śānta* (peaceful), *ghora* (terrific), or *mūḍha* (dull); see *SK*, 38. *Ṣaḍ-ja* is one of the seven musical notes.

5.6. The Sāṁkhyas hold that the five sense-organs are produced as effects of the evolution (*pariṇāma*) of *pradhāna* (*prakṛti*, primordial matter), which is

motivated by the desire of *puruṣa* to fulfill the purpose of *puruṣa* (*puruṣârtha*). See *SK*, 31cd:

puruṣârtha eva hetur na kenacit kāryate karaṇam.

Cf. *ibid.*, 21:

puruṣasya darśanârthaṁ kaivalyârthaṁ tathā pradhānasya
paṅgv-andhavad ubhayor api saṁyogas tat-kṛtaḥ sargaḥ.

Therefore all five sense-organs must be recognized as serving *puruṣârtha*. If *puruṣârtha* were to be fulfilled by one sense-organ, then only one sense-organ would have evolved from *pradhāna*, and the other useless sense-organs would not have evolved. The Bauddhas avoid this difficulty by maintaining that the sense-organs are results produced by beginningless *karman*, which is inexplicable (*acintya*). See *PST*, 63a.4–5 (71a.3–5): ". . . kho bo cag gi las kyi dbaṅ las te las kyi rnam par smin pa bsam kyis mi khyab paḥo ṣes ḥdod do. pha rol pos ni skyes buḥi ḥdod pa ḥgrub paḥi ched du gtso boḥi ḥjug paḥo ṣes sems te, de la gal te dbaṅ po gcig kho nas skyes buḥi don phun sum tshogs na dbaṅ po gcig gi bdag ñid kho nas raṅ bṣin yoṅs su ḥgyur par rigs te, rnam pa gṣan du na ni rnam pa gṣan duḥo ṣes pas rtsod par rigs so."

5.7. Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passages from a Sāṁkhya treatise: "smras te, 'dbyibs kyi bdag ñid can gyi rigs ni yod pa kho na ste, yon tan gsum tha mi dad na yaṅ yon tan gsum gyi gnas skabs tsam tha dad pa las sgra la sogs paḥi rigs rnams tha dad do.' de skad du yaṅ bśad pa, 'sgra daṅ reg bya daṅ gzugs daṅ ro daṅ dri ste lṅa rnams ni, bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal daṅ gti mug gsum po rnams kyi ṅes par bkod paḥi bye brag rnams so' ṣes paḥo"; *PST*, 63a.7–63b.1 (71a.7–71b.1). We may summarize the contents of these two passages as follows: Although all objects are equally composed of the three *guṇa*s, the three *guṇa*s composing sounds and those composing tangibles and so on differ from each other in arrangement (*vyūha*). According to the varying arrangements of the three *guṇa*s, objects come to have different configurations (*saṁsthāna*), each of which is peculiar to a certain class of object. Therefore the sound-class, the tangible-class, etc., are distinguished from each other by their configurations.

5.8. According to the Bauddhas, a configuration or a shape (*saṁsthāna*) is a *rūpa* (*AKBh*, ad *AK*, I, 10) and therefore grasped only by the visual sense. Jinendrabuddhi says that Dignāga's criticism is based on the view held by others, and explains that view in the following manner: The visual sense which apprehends *rūpa* of a thing is immediately followed by *manas*, which apprehends the *saṁsthāna* of that thing. As there is no interval between these two apprehensions, one can assume that the *saṁsthāna* is apprehended by the visual sense. In the same manner, the tactual sense is thought to apprehend the *saṁsthāna* of a thing it touches; *PST*, 63b.3–4 (71b.3–5): "ḥo na dbyibs ni rdsas yod ma yin te, des na ciḥi phyir de gñis kyis gzuṅ bya ñid yin ṣe na, skyon ḥdi med de, pha rol poḥi bsam pas de skad bśad do. pha rol po ni gzugs can gyi dbaṅ poḥi rnam par śes paḥi rjes su ḥgro baḥi yid kyi rnam par śes paḥi [pas?] dbyibs ñe bar dmigs nas rnam par śes pa de dag gi śin tu phra baḥi dus kyi dbye ba ṅes par ḥdsin dkaḥ ba ñid kyi phyir de ḥdi kho na mig daṅ lus kyi rnam par śes pa ste, riṅ po la sogs paḥi dbyibs ḥdsin paḥo ṣes ji ltar sems pa de ltar ḥdi brjod do."

5.9. See above, *Ba*, and also n. 5.3.

5.10. V puts this passage at the beginning of *Cb*. I have followed K because it agrees with *PST*, which quotes this passage after concluding the comment on *k. 1b*$_2$; *PST*, 63b.6–7 (71b.8).

5.11. *PST*, 63b.7 (71b.8–72a.1): "pi waṅ daṅ rṅa pa ṇa wa la sogs paḥi sgraḥi rigs phan tshun tha dad pa rnams ni sgraḥi rigs las ma ḥdas par gnas pa ñid kyi phyir yul mtshuṅs pa ñid du ḥgyur ro."

5.12. I have emended K by inserting "rnams" after "skyogs" and "rgyan" in reference to V and to *PST*, 64a.2–3 (72a.2–3): "gser la sogs paḥi raṅ bṣin gyi bum pa la sogs pa dbyibs mtshuṅs pa rnams la . . ." In *Cc*, the Sāṁkhyas are charged with the absurdity of disregarding the difference between the configurations (*saṁsthāna*) of objects included in the same class. Here, on the other hand, Dignāga points out the absurdity of the Sāṁkhya theory, which leads us to the neglect of the difference of class (*jāti*) among objects of the same configuration. Thus the point of issue is not the nondistinction between the golden spoon and the golden ornament, as the unemended text of K might suggest.

5.13. According to the Sāṁkhyas, the gross objects apprehended by the senses are the effects (*kārya*) evolved from subtle elements called *tanmātra*s. The gross objects are specified (*viśeṣa*) as pleasurable, painful, or delusive according to whether *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas* predominates. However, *tanmātra*s are not specified (*aviśeṣa*); *SK*, 38a–c: *tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣāḥ tebhyo bhūtāni . . . ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ*. Thus, *rūpa-tanmātra* as the cause (*kāraṇa*) of gold and *śabda-tanmātra* as the cause of sound are indistinguishable from each other. On the other hand, the Sāṁkhyas maintain the theory that an effect is immanent in the cause (*sat-kārya-vāda*), according to which there is no essential distinction between cause and effect. Accordingly, gold and sound would have to be recognized as indistinguishable from each other. See *PST*, 64a.2–4 (72a.3–5): "gser la sogs paḥi rigs rnams daṅ deḥi rgyu rnams daṅ, sgra la sogs pa rnams daṅ deḥi rgyu sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa rnams kyaṅ gcig ñid ḥthob bo. ḥo na ma tra la sogs dbyibs mtshuṅs pa rnams kho na la gcig ñid du rigs pa ma yin nam, gser la sogs pa rnams la ni ci ltar yin ṣe na, de daṅ tha mi dad paḥi phyir de rnams kyaṅ dbyibs mtshuṅs pa rnams so ṣes pas ḥdi ni brtsad par bya ba yin no."

5.14. I have corrected "ḥjug par ḥdsin par" in K to read simply "ḥdsin par" by reference to V and *PST*, 64a.6 (72a.7). The word "*jāti-mātra*" stands for "*saṁsthāna-mātra*." By "*mātra*" it is meant that *sukha*, etc. (see below, n. 5.15), are not apprehended; see *PST*, 64a.6 (72a.7–8): "*rigs tsam ḥdsin paḥam* ṣes pa dbyibs tsam ḥdsin paḥo. tsam kyi sgra ni bde ba la sogs pa ḥdsin pa rnam par bcạd paḥi don to."

5.15. See *SK*, 12: *prīty-aprīti-viṣādâtmakāḥ . . . guṇāḥ*. Gauḍapāda explains this as follows: *tatra prīty-ātmakaṁ sattvam, prītiḥ sukhaṁ tad-ātmakam iti. aprīty-ātmakaṁ rajaḥ, aprītir duḥkham. viṣādâtmakaṁ tamaḥ, viṣādo mohaḥ*. The same explanation is found in *STK*, p. 52.10–11.

5.16. Both K and V do not regard the word "don" (*artha*) as forming part of the verse. However, *PST*, 64a.6–7 (72b.1), quotes *k. 1d* as follows: "*don ḥdi raṅ bṣin mi ḥdsin pa.*" The meaning of "de las" in Kk, K, and Vk is not clear.

5.17. Jinendrabuddhi summarizes this argument in the following *vyāpaka-viruddha* formula, in which he gives the example of seeing a cowlike shape in the twilight; *PST*, 64b.1–2 (72b.2–4): "gaṅ gi dbyibs tsam ñe bar dmigs pa ni deḥi raṅ bṣin ñe bar dmigs pa ma yin te, dper na snaṅ ba ṣan paḥi phyogs su dmigs par bya ba laṅ la sogs paḥi dbyibs tsam bṣin, dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pas sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi yaṅ dbyibs tsam dmigs paḥo ṣes ḥgal bas khyab pa gsuṅs so."

5.18. Cf. *Cd*.

5.19. See *PST*, 64b.3 (72b.5–6): "ci ste skyon ḥdir ma gyur cig ces pas, sgraḥi rigs la yaṅ dbyibs gṣan gyi khyad par kau śi ka la sogs pa ḥdod de . . ." It seems inappropriate to refer to this argument in the course of examining the theory that the sense-organ apprehends *jāti-mātra*. But Jinendrabuddhi explains that, since the word "*-mātra*" is meant to exclude only the apprehension of *sukha*, etc. (see above, n. 5.14), it is not inappropriate to examine the theory that the difference between individual objects included in the same *jāti* is apprehended by the sense-organ; *PST*, 64b.5–6 (72b.8–73a.1): "rigs kyis [P. kyi] khyad par du byas pa daṅ deḥi dbye ba ḥdsin par khas blaṅs pa na, rigs tsam ḥdsin par byed paḥo ṣes paḥi phyogs ḥdi ñams pa yaṅ ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir tsam gyi sgras bde ba la sogs pa rnam par gcod paḥi, sgra la sogs paḥi rigs kyi khyad par ma yin pas so."

5.20. There is a marked difference between K and V. This passage is quoted and explained as follows in *PST*, 64b.4–5 (72b.7): "*raṅ gi don gyis khyad par du byas paḥi* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, sgraḥi rigs kyis [P. kyi] khyad par du byas paḥi, deḥi khyad par kau śi ka la sogs pa yaṅ ḥdsin paḥi phyir ro ṣes paḥi don to." From K, V, and *PST*, I think that the Sanskrit original might have been something like this: "*svârtha-(jāti-)viśeṣaṇaṁ tad-viśeṣaṁ grahaṇāt.*" The word "rigs" (=*jāti*) is found only in K. The compound "*svârtha-(jāti-)viśeṣaṇam*" is a bahuvrīhi modifying "*tad-viśeṣam.*" The pronoun "*tad*" indicates "*svârtha*" or "*jāti.*"

5.21. The sounds (S_1, S_2, S_3 . . .) are apprehended as distinct from each other, and yet they all are apprehended as "sound." That is, S_1, S_2, S_3 . . . are recognized as particular sounds qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by the universal (*jāti*) of sound. According to Dignāga, it is conceptual construction (*vikalpa*, *kalpanā*) that relates the particular to the universal. Conceptual construction is the function of *manas*, and sense-cognition is absolutely free from it. Cf. *PST*, 64b.5 (72b.8): "khyad par ni sgraḥi rigs kyis khyad par du byas par gzuṅ bar byaḥi, gṣan du na ḥdi ni sgraḥi khyad par ro ṣes ḥdsin par mi ḥgyur ro."

5.22. This refers to the second alternative as mentioned in *D*. Cf. *PST*, 64b.7 (73a.3): "*ci ste* ṣes pa la sogs pas phyogs gṣan la yaṅ skyon de kho na gsuṅs so."

5.23. Cf. above, *Dac*.

5.24. According to Kk and Vk, *k. 2cd* is: "... sñiṅ stobs sogs // ma yin gṣan ma yin paḥi phyir." K interprets "ma yin" twice: (1) the negation of the apprehension of *sattva*, etc. (sñiṅ stobs sogs min), and (2) the word of dissent from the side of the Sāṁkhyas (ma yin, gṣan ...; cf. *Dbb–a2*). V interprets "ma yin" only in the sense of (1), and puts the first half of *k. 3a* in place of *k. 2d* at the beginning of *Dbb–a2*. Jinendrabuddhi seems to support K; *PST*, 65a.3 (73a.6–7): "'*ma yin*' ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, lṅa rnams gsum gyi bkod paḥi khyad par rnams ṣes khas blaṅs paḥi phyir ḥdi yod pa ma yin no"; also *ibid.*, 65a.4–5 (73a.8): "'*ma yin ste, gṣan ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir*' ṣes pas ..."

5.25. Sound and other objects are composed of the three *guṇa*s; therefore none of these three can be regarded as, by itself, a sound or any other object.

5.26. *SK* states that the five sense-organs have both subtle elements (*tanmātra*) and gross elements (*mahā-bhūta*) for their objects; *SK*, 34ab:

buddhîndriyāṇi teṣām pañca viśeṣâviśeṣa-viṣayāni.

STK, p. 83.1–3: *viśeṣāḥ sthūlāḥ śabdâdayaḥ śānta-ghora-mūḍhāḥ pṛthivy-ādi-rūpāḥ, aviśeṣās tanmātrāṇi sūkṣmāḥ śabdâdayaḥ*. However, the subtle elements are perceived only by sages, and cannot be perceived by the senses of ordinary people. Only the gross elements come within the range of the senses of ordinary people. Cf. *STK*, p. 83.4–5: *tatrôrdhva-srotasāṁ yogināṁ ca śrotraṁ śabda-tanmātra-viṣayaṁ sthūla-śabda-viṣayaṁ ca, asmad-ādīnāṁ tu sthūla-śabda-viṣayam eva*; *Yuktid.*, p. 40.4–5. In the gross elements, the characters of the three *guṇa*s are distinctly manifested. For example, the wind (*vāyu*) is pleasurable (*sukha*) or *sattvic* for a man suffering from heat, painful (*duḥkha*) or *rajasic* for a man suffering from cold, and stupefying (*moha*) or *tamasic* when it raises heavy dust; Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara ad *SK*, 38. Thus sound and other objects of the senses are recognized as manifestations of the three *guṇa*s, and in this respect we may regard the three *guṇa*s as causes (*kāraṇa*) and sound, etc., as their effects (*kārya*).

5.27. According to K: if sound, etc., which are the effects [of the three *guṇa*s], were not different from *sattva*, etc., then there would be no distinction [between cause and effect?]. This is odd, because it seems that the conclusion to be drawn here should be that *śabda*, etc., are not *kārya* as mentioned in *k. 3a* and in V—not that there is *abheda* between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* or between *śabda*, etc., and *sattva*, etc. Therefore, I have emended K to conform to V. The meaning of "tha mi dad kyi *lus* kyi sgra ..." in V is not clear. Possibly "lus" (*kāya*) is a misrendering of "*kārya*" (ḥbras bu).

5.28. *PST*, 65a.6 (73b.2): "de las kyaṅ khas blaṅs pa daṅ ḥgal lo."

5.29. This Sāṁkhya statement is fully quoted by Jinendrabuddhi from a Sāṁkhya text as follows: "*gaṅ brjod pa* ṣes pa la sogs pas ni rgyu ñid du khas blaṅs pa gsuṅs te, 'sñiṅ stobs sgraḥi ḥbras bur bśad nas sgraḥi bdag ñid du gnas pas ni, rdul daṅ mun pa dag sgra las byuṅ baḥi ched du ḥjug par ḥchad par byed do. rdul sgraḥi ḥbras bur bśad nas ṣes pa la sogs pa thams cad sṅa ma bṣin no. ḥdi ni khyad par te, rdul gyis sñiṅ stobs daṅ mun pa dag sgraḥi dṅos poḥi ched du ḥjug par byed do. mun pa ni sñiṅ stobs daṅ rdul dag sgra la yod paḥi ched du rnam par ḥjog par byed do' ṣes paḥo"; *PST*, 65a.7–65b.1 (73b.2–5). I have

corrected "*thams cad* ḥbras bu sgra snaṅ nas . . ." in K to read "*sñiṅ stobs* . . ." ("thams cad" [=*sarva*] is obviously a misrendering of "*sattva*" [sñiṅ stobs]).

5.30. In the Sāṁkhya statement referred to in n. 5.29, it is shown that the Sāṁkhyas admit *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* to be distinct from each other. On the other hand, they recognize all *śabdas* as forming *one* class of object: that is, they regard *kārya* (=*śabdas*) as *abhinna* and *kāraṇa* (=*guṇas*) as *bhinna*. Nevertheless, they argue that *kārya* and *kāraṇa* are not essentially different. Dignāga therefore points out that this argument would force us to admit (1) that *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are *abhinna*, like *śabdas*, or (2) that *śabdas* are *bhinna*, like the three *guṇas*. Cf. *PST*, 65b.2–4 (73b.6–74a.1).

5.31. *PST*, 65b.6 (74a.2): "*deḥi rdul phra rab* ces pa sgraḥi rdul phra rab bo." The Sāṁkhyas hold that the five kinds of *tanmātras* are composed of their respective atoms. Cf. *Yogabhāṣya* ad IV, 14: *pṛthivī-paramâṇus tanmātrâvayavaḥ*. The atom-theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is acknowledged to have been introduced into the Sāṁkhya system of thought at the time of Vindhyavāsin; Frauwallner, *Geschichte d. ind. Phil.*, I, 404.

5.32. *PST*, 65b.6 (74a.3): "*sogs paḥi* sgras ṅa rgyal (*ahaṁkāra*) daṅ chen po (*mahat*) daṅ gtso bo (*pradhāna*) gzuṅ bar byaḥo." These are all composed of the three *guṇas* and stand in a *vyakta-avyakta* (or *kārya-kāraṇa*) relation to one another.

5.33. The senses of ordinary persons can apprehend only the gross elements which are evolved from *tanmātras* (see above, n. 5.26). Those entities which are prior to *tanmātras* in the process of evolution (*pariṇāma*) are, of course, not apprehended by the senses.

5.34. Cf. *PST*, 65b.6–7 (74a.3–4): "gaṅ gi phyir ḥbras bu ñid daṅ rgyu ñid la sogs pa rnams dbaṅ poḥi yul las tha dad pa ma yin cin, dbaṅ poḥi blo yis rtogs pa yaṅ ma yin no." According to Dignāga, the universal is apprehended only by means of inference (*anumāna*); sense-perception never takes the universal for its object. See above, Section 1, n. 1.14.

5.35. Cf. above, *Bb*.

5.36. In *Dbb–b2*, Dignāga pointed out the fact that three *guṇas* in different objects belong to the same *jāti*. Therefore the Sāṁkhyas argue here that, although *triguṇa* remains everywhere the same as a *jāti*, it changes its configuration in different objects (cf. *PST*, 66a.2–3 [74a.8–74b.1]: "thams cad la bde ba la sogs paḥi rigs tha mi dad na yaṅ dbaṅ po gcig ñid du thal ba ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir dbyibs kyis khyad par du byas paḥi bde ba la sogs pa rnams ḥdsin par byed ciṅ, dbyibs de yaṅ yul gṣan la med do"). Cf. also *Ca*. The words "dbyibs kyi khyad par can" in K might be taken to imply that *sukha*, etc., are *viśeṣaṇas* of the *saṁsthāna* of the class of object, because in *Dba* we read "dbyibs kyi khyad par can gyi bde ba la sogs pa" (V: "bde ba la sogs pas khyad par du byas paḥi dbyibs"). But this construction does not make sense. I have emended K to read "dbyibs kyis khyad par du byas pa" by reference to V and the explanation given above in *PST*.

5.37. According to the Sāṁkhya doctrine, the *vṛtti* of a sense means that a sense comes to be modified into the shape of an object (cf. n. 5.1).

5.38. *PST*, 66a.3 (74b.1): "*dbyibs du maḥi dbye bas* ṣes pa sṅon po daṅ ser po la sogs paḥi dbyibs kyi khyad par gyis so." I suppose that the original Sanskrit might have been something like "*aneka-saṁsthāna-bhedāt.*"

5.39. See above, *Ba.*

5.40. We may take "ma rdum pa" (P. ma rdum) in V as a wrong transliteration of Mādhava. K simply mentions "graṅs can ḥjig par byed pa" (*sāṁkhya-vaināśika*) without giving a proper name. The nickname "*sāṁkhya-vaināśika*" (°*-nāśaka*) is mentioned in *ŚVV*, p. 212 (on Codanā, 249); *Vādanyāya-ṭīkā*, p. 52.28 [text incorrectly reads *sāṁkhyānāṁ śakamādhavavat* instead of *sāṁkhya-nāśaka-mādhavavat*]; Karnakagomin ad *PV-Svavṛtti* (ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Alahabad, 1943), p. 595.21.

Jinendrabuddhi quotes lengthy passages from a treatise of Mādhava (see below) and ends by saying: "mā dha ba (Mādhava) yis ni thams cad rnam pa gṣan du khas blaṅs so. de ñid kyi phyir ḥdi ni graṅs can phuṅ bar byed paḥo"; *PST*, 66b.6–7 (75a.6). It is reported by Hsüan-tsang that Mādhava was challenged by Guṇamati to a debate and was defeated (*Ta-t'ang-hsi-yü-chi*, pp. 913c ff.). Hsüan-tsang reports that Mādhava was very old when the debate was held, so that he must have been an elder contemporary of Guṇamati, who was a teacher of Sthiramati.

The following is quoted by Jinendrabuddhi from a treatise of Mādhava: "bde ba la sogs pa gaṅ rnams sgraḥi bdag ñid du yoṅs su ḥgyur gyi, reg bya la sogs paḥi bdag ñid du ni ma yin pa de rnams sgraḥi mtshan ñid gsum mo ṣes brjod par byaḥo. de bṣin du gaṅ rnams reg byaḥi bdag ñid kho nar yoṅs su ḥgyur gyi, don gṣan gyi bdag ñid du ni ma yin pa de rnams reg byaḥi mtshan ñid gsum mo ṣes pa ste, de bṣin du gṣan laḥaṅ śes par byaḥo. ḥo na gsum rnams kyi tshogs pa ni gsum ma yin nam, de la gcig gi tshig gis ḥbyuṅ bar ḥos te, des na gsum po rnams las śes pa ci ltar ṣe na, skyon ḥdi med de, sgra so so la gsum po gṣan daṅ gṣan yin ciṅ, deḥi phyir na gsum po rnams maṅ po ñid kyi phyir maṅ poḥi tshig go. gṣan rnams ni rnam pa gṣan du gsum rnams rnam par ḥchad par byed do. sgraḥi rdul phra rab gcig kho na gsum po ste, rdsas gsum gyi bdag ñid yin te, bde ba la sogs pa rnams gcig ñid du goṅ bur gyur ba ñid kyi phyir ro. sgraḥi rdul phra rab thams cad ni ḥdi lta bu rnams so. de bṣin du reg bya la sogs paḥi rdul phra rab rnams daṅ dbaṅ poḥi rdul phra rab rnams kyaṅ rig par byaḥo. de rnams kho na bsags pa rnams ni, spro ba las sṅar gtso bo ṣes brjod par bya la, gaṅ gi tshe spro baḥi dus na ḥdus pa rnams yin pa deḥi tshe ni rnam par ḥgyur bar tha sñad du bstan to. sgra la sogs paḥi mtshan ñid gsum po rnams daṅ rna ba la sogs paḥi mtshan ñid gsum rnams kyaṅ phan tshun tha dad paḥi rigs can rnams kho naḥo"; *PST*, 66a.6–66b.4 (74b.4–75a.3). This may be summarized as follows: Every atom is composed of the three *guṇa*s, but some atoms differ qualitatively from other atoms because of the difference of the arrangement of the three *guṇa*s. Thus the sound-atom and the tangible-atom are heterogeneous, and the difference between sounds and tangibles is due to this heterogeneity of atoms. At the time of evolution homogeneous atoms combine, and their varying combinations

give rise to various things—which, however, are included in the same class, inasmuch as component atoms are homogeneous. Prior to evolution atoms exist dispersedly, and in this state they are called *pradhāna*s.

Another passage is quoted by Jinendrabuddhi from Mādhava's treatise as follows: "gzugs la sogs pa daṅ ldan paḥi gtso bo cha śas daṅ bcas pa ste, las sṅon ma can gyi spro baḥo. ḥkhor ba yaṅ thog ma med par bśad paḥi khyad par rnams te, raṅ gi tshogs pa rnams kyis ḥdod paḥo"; *PST*, 66b.4–5 (75a.3–4). From this we know that Mādhava differs from older Sāṁkhya teachers in holding that *pradhāna* possesses *rūpa*, etc., consists of parts, and evolves by the energy which is preceded by *karman*; that *saṁsāra* is beginningless; etc. Cf. Frauwallner, *Geschichte d. ind. Phil.*, I, 407–408; Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, pp. 154–155.

5.41. In reference to the passage from Mādhava's treatise quoted in *PST* (see above, n. 5.40), I emended K by changing the position of "... paḥi mtshan ñid."

5.42. Cf. *Ba* and *Dbc*. I assume that the seven-syllable sentence "dbaṅ po mthaḥ yas par thal ba" forms part of the *Kārikās*, although neither Kk nor Vk includes it. Otherwise *k. 4* would lack one *pāda*. I have corrected K to read "de yaṅ ..." instead of "des ..." by reference to *PST*, 67a.1 (75a.7–8): "*de yaṅ tha mi dad pa* ṣes pa la sogs pas mthaḥ yas par thal bar ḥgyur baḥo."

5.43. Dignāga admits that Mādhava's theory is better than that of the older Sāṁkhya teachers in explaining the distinctions among the classes of objects (see below, *Ee*), but he does not recognize it as faultless. In order to make clear the fault in Mādhava's theory, Dignāga here tries to reproduce it precisely according to his own understanding.

5.44. Here we notice that the Sāṁkhya theory of evolution (*pariṇāma*) from a primordial matter is substantially changed by Mādhava, who, in admitting the plurality of primordial matters, stands closer to the Vaiśeṣikas than to the orthodox Sāṁkhyas.

5.45. *PST*, 67b.1–2 (75b.8–76a.2): "sgraḥi rdul phra rab rnams kho na ḥdus pa rnams ni rna baḥi dbaṅ poḥi gzuṅ bya sgrar ḥgyur te, de bṣin du bde baḥi rdul phra rab rnams kho na goṅ bar gyur pa ni raṅ rig par bya baḥi bde bar ḥgyur ro. ḥdus pa rnams rigs mi mthun paḥi ḥbras buḥi ṅo bo ñid rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no."

5.46. Mādhava states that one sound-atom is in itself constituted of the three *guṇa*s and therefore has three characters. *PST*, 66b.2 (74b.8): "sgraḥi rdul phra rab gcig kho na gsum po ste, rdsas gsum gyi bdag ñid yin te." Cf. above, n. 5.40.

5.47. Cf. *PST*, 68a.1–2 (76b.2–4): "ḥo na tha dad pa rnams kyaṅ bu ram daṅ chu la sogs pa rnams btuṅ ba la sogs paḥi raṅ bṣin gcig ñid skyed pa ma yin nam ṣe na, gsuṅs pa, *sgra gcig brjod la ni rag la* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, btuṅ ba la sogs pa yaṅ don dam par yod pa ma yin pa kho na ste, tha sñad sla baḥi don du bu ram la sogs pa de rnams kho na sgra gcig gis tha sñad du byed pa ḥbaḥ ṣig ste ..."

5.48. Because sound is composed of sound-atoms which are constituted by the three *guṇa*s, it has three characters: *sukha*, *duḥkha*, and *moha*. Cf. *PST*, 68a.4 (76b.5): "sgra ni yon tan gcig gi bdag ñid ma yin gi, ḥo na ci ṣe na, yon tan gsum gyi bdag ñid do."

5.49. The meaning of "phyal ba" in K is not clear. In its place, I have read "brjod pa," in accordance with V.

5.50. Although sound in general has three characters, each particular sound is characterized as *sukha*, *duḥkha*, or *moha* according to whether *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas* predominates.

5.51. This means that one apprehends a sound as *sukha*, *duḥkha*, or *moha*, but not as sound in general possessing three characters.

5.52. I have corrected K to read "raṅ bṣin gaṅ kho na la" instead of "dbaṅ poḥi don gaṅ kho na la," which leads to tautology.

5.53. *PST*, 68a.7–68b.1 (77a.2–3): "*reg bya la sogs pa rnams laḥaṅ mtshuṅs pa yin no* ṣes pa mñam paḥo. ḥdis kyaṅ dbaṅ po gcig ñid du thal ba de kho na gsuṅs so."

5.54. See above, *Eb*. Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga used this expression because he recognized Mādhava's theory as being less faulty than that of the older Sāṁkhyas, although he held that it contradicts his own *siddhānta*; *PST*, 68b.4–5 (77a.7–8): "ḥo na grub paḥi mthaḥ daṅ ḥgal baḥi phyir phyogs ḥdi yaṅ skyon can kho na ma yin nam ṣe na, ma dha baḥi phyogs las ḥdi skyon ñuṅ ba ñid kyi phyir ṣes dgoṅs pas ḥdi ltar bśad do ṣes pas skyon med do."

5.55. There is a marked difference between K and V, and both are hard to read. I have made a considerable emendation of K, comparing it with V.

5.56. Although K reads "ṅes pa ḥjug pa" (*niyata-vṛtti*), which implies the functioning of the senses on their respective objects, I have omitted "ṅes pa," as it is found neither in V nor in the Sāṁkhya definition of *pratyakṣa* as referred to by Dignāga in *A*.

5.57. See *PST*, 73b.6 (83a.4): "'dus gsum paḥi yul can daṅ don thams cad pa ni yid do' ṣes bśad do." See also *SK*, 35ab: "*sāntaḥkaraṇā buddhiḥ sarvaṁ viṣayam avagāhate* . . ." *STK*, p. 83.15–16: . . . "*tair* [=*bāhyêndriyair*] *upanītaṁ sarvaṁ viṣayaṁ samano-'haṁkārā buddhiḥ yasmād avagāhate* . . ."

5.58. In a Sāṁkhya treatise, it is mentioned that the object which has been apprehended by means of *indriya-vṛtti* is subsequently apprehended (rjes su ṣen pa =*anuvyavasāya*) by means of *mano-vṛtti*, and that the object which has been apprehended by means of *mano-vṛtti* is clearly apprehended (yaṅ dag rig pa =*saṁvedana*) by means of *indriya-vṛtti*. Cf. *PST*, 68b.5–6 (77a.8–77b.2): "'phyi rol gyi don rnams la dbaṅ pos ṣen par byed la, dbaṅ pos rtogs par byas pa de la ni, yid kyis rjes su ṣen par byed ciṅ, ji ltar yaṅ dbaṅ pos rtogs par byas pa la yid kyis rjes su ṣen par byed pa de bṣin du, yid kyis ṣen pa dbaṅ pos yaṅ dag par rig par byed do,' ṣes paḥi gṣuṅ ḥdis ḥjug pa gñis poḥi phan tshun yaṅ dag par rig

par byed pa ñid bśad do." Cf. also *ibid.*, 69a.3 (77b.6–7), 70a.3–4 (79a.1–2), 70a.7 (79a.6–7). Henceforward this theory is examined from various viewpoints.

5.59. In the Sāṁkhya text, after the elucidation of *anumāna*, a question is anticipated as to whether *anumāna* is the only means of cognition or not. Then the text states: "Also the functioning of the auditory and other senses (*śrotrâdi-vṛttiś ca*) [is a separate means of cognition, namely, *pratyakṣa*]" (see n. 5.1). But the functioning of the mind (*mano-vṛtti*) is not mentioned there as *pratyakṣa*. Jinendrabuddhi refers to the Sāṁkhya view which claims that the word "*ca*" in the above-cited text is intended to include *mano-vṛtti* in *pratyakṣa*; he rejects this interpretation by saying that the word "*ca*" obviously implies "not only *anumāna* but also" (*PST*, 69a.1–5 [77b.5–78a.1]).

5.60. The Sāṁkhyas recognize three *pramāṇa*s: namely, *pratyakṣa* (=*dṛṣṭa*), *anumāna*, and *śabda*; *SK*, 4: *dṛṣṭam anumānam āpta-vacanaṁ ca . . . trividham pramāṇam iṣṭam*. See also *PST*, 68b.7–69a.1 (77b.4–5): "*med kyaṅ* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, gaṅ gi tshe raṅ gi rgyud du gtogs paḥi ḥjug paḥi yaṅ dag par myoṅ ba deḥi tshe rtags med paḥi phyir rjes su dpag pa ma yin ṣiṅ, man ṅag med paḥi phyir luṅ yaṅ ma yin no. deḥi phyir ḥdi mṅon sum kho nar rigs so ṣes dgoṅs paḥo." On the basis of this quotation and explanation in *PST*, I have corrected K to read "med kyaṅ" instead of "med pas."

5.61. Cf. *PST*, 70a.2 (78b.8): "ji ltar ḥdod pa (*rāga*) daṅ khro ba (*krodha*) daṅ ṣe sdaṅ (*dveṣa*) daṅ ḥjigs pa (*bhaya*) la sogs pa rnams dran pa de bṣin du dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa rnams daṅ yid kyi ḥjug pa yaṅ yid kyis so."

5.62. I have emended K by referring to V and *PST*, 70a.6 (79a.5), 70a.7–70b.1 (79a.7): "dran pa (ni) mṅon sum gyi ṣen paḥi khyad par (ro)." Cf. *PST*, 70a.6 (79a.5): "'khyad par' gyi sgra so sor mṅon par sbrel par byaḥo."

5.63. Literally, become manifested (mṅon par gsal ba =*abhivyakti*).

5.64. Thus, the functioning of a sense (*indriya-vṛtti*) would be apprehended by the mind and the functioning of the mind (*mano-vṛtti*) by the sense. In this way the mind could recollect the functioning of a sense, since this would have been experienced by the mind in the preceding moment. See *PST*, 71a.7–71b.1 (80b.1–2): "*cig car gñis* ṣes pa la sogs pa, gal te dran pa ñid rab tu sgrub paḥi ched du gtan tshigs ma grub pa ñid du ḥdod na, de lta na lhan cig ḥbyuṅ baḥi dbaṅ po daṅ yid kyi ṣen pa dag gis phan tshun yaṅ dag par rig par byed pa na, ḥjug pa de rnams la dran paḥi rtogs pa bar ma chad par yaṅ dag par ḥbyuṅ bar ḥgyur ro."

5.65. V may be construed as follows: The mark (*nimitta*) of an object (*viṣaya*) would be noticed on the mind, which is called the possessor of the object (*viṣayin*). This construction makes sense. But "*nimitta*" cannot be taken here in that way, as Jinendrabuddhi explains: "de dag [=*viṣaya* and *viṣayin*] phan tshun rgyu mtshan (*nimitta*) daṅ rgyu mtshan las byuṅ bar (*naimittika*) ḥdod par bya ste, gṣan du na yul daṅ yul can ñid srid pa ma yin pas so. cig car skyes pa dag la rgyu mtshan daṅ rgyu mtshan can ñid ḥthad pa yaṅ ma yin te"; *PST*, 71b.2–3 (80b.4–5). From this we should understand that the *viṣaya* (=sensory

apprehension=*grāhya*) is the *nimitta* which motivates the *viṣayin* (=mental apprehension=*grāhaka*=*naimittika*). Cf. *ibid.*, 71a.1–2 (80b.2–3). The senses and the mind (along with *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi*) are respectively called gates (*dvāra*) and gatekeeper (*dvārin*) in *SK*, 35:

sāntaḥkaraṇā buddhiḥ sarvaṁ viṣayam avagāhate yasmāt
tasmāt trividhaṁ karaṇaṁ dvāri dvārāṇi śeṣāni.

5.66. *PST*, 71b.3 (80b.5): "*de yaṅ* ṣes pa khas blaṅs nas skyon gṣan gsuṅs paḥo."

5.67. The word "yaṅ" (*api*) refers back to *F*, where it has been pointed out that *mano-vṛtti* is not mentioned in the Sāṁkhya text as a kind of *pratyakṣa.*

5.68. See above, *F.* V relates "deḥi gnas skabs" (K: gnas skabs de) to "ṣugs pa" (K: ḥjug pa). Thus we may translate this passage as follows, according to V: That [mind] which occurs in that state, [viz., the mind apprehending a sensory apprehension,] is not proved to be (read "bsgrubs pa" instead of "brjod pa") a means of cognition. Therefore, there is insufficiency of definition.

5.69. Cf. above, Section 1, nn. 1.45, 47. Cf. also *PST*, 71b.5–6 (80b.7–8): "kho bo cag gis raṅ gis rig par bya ba ñid du ḥdod pa la sogs pa rnams khas blaṅs pa ñid kyi phyir, de la dran pa yaṅ dag par ḥbyuṅ ṅo. khyod kyis ni de ltar de rnams khas ma blaṅs paḥi phyir de mi srid pa kho naḥo. ci ste raṅ rig pa khas blaṅ bar bya na, deḥi tshe de yaṅ mtshan ñid kyis ma bsdus pas so ṣes pas de kho na ñuṅ ba ñid do."

5.70. Cf. above, *G.* I have emended K to read the same as in *G.*

5.71. *PST*, 71b.6–7 (81a.1–2): "ji ltar loṅ baḥi gom [P. goms] pa ma mthoṅ ba sṅon ma can rnam par ḥgod pa de bṣin du ḥdiḥi yaṅ tshad mas yoṅs su ma bcad par mṅon par brjod par byed paḥi phyir ro."

5.72. The Sāṁkhyas justified their not mentioning *mano-vṛtti* as a *pramāṇa* in their text by arguing that they regard *mano-vṛtti* as a *smṛti* and not as a *pramāṇa.* This justification has been refuted by Dignāga for the reason that *mano-vṛtti*, which has no *pūrvânubhava* of *indriya-vṛtti*, is unable to recollect the latter. In order to establish that *mano-vṛtti* has *pūrvânubhava*, the Sāṁkhyas set forth here the view that both *indriya* and *manas* apprehend the same external object. Cf. *PST*, 72a.1–2 (81a.3–4): "de ltar ḥgyur mod, 'dbaṅ poḥi ṣen pa de yod na, phyi rol gyi don kho na las [la ?] yid kyis rjes su ṣen par byed do' ṣes pa bstan bcos kyi don te, deḥi phyir ñams su myoṅ ba ma yin pa ñid ma grub bo ṣe na . . ."

5.73. Because almost the same expression is repeated, I suspect that "yid kyis ñams su ma myoṅ baḥi phyir ro" (V omits ma) originally formed part of the *Kārikās.* But both Kk and Vk omit it.

5.74. Although K is in agreement with Kk and Vk, it does not make sense. *PST*, 72a.2 (81a.4–5): "*ñams paḥam* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste . . . *gṣan mthoṅ ba* ni . . ." is in support of V. I have emended K to conform to V. But the meaning

of "dran pa" placed before "ñams paḥam" in V is hardly to be understood, and I have omitted it.

5.75. V (Peking edition) reads "ñams su myoṅ ba"; but "ñams su ma myoṅ ba" is correct. Cf. *PST*, 72a.4–5 (81a.7–8): "*ñams su ma myoṅ ba la dran pa ḥam* ṣe pa, ci ste yid kho nas ñams su myoṅ ba dran par ḥdod na, de ltar yin na ñams su ma myoṅ baḥi don la dran par ḥgyur te, de ni yid kyis sṅar ñams su ma myoṅ ba ñid kyis [=kyi] phyir ro."

5.76. Jinendrabuddhi fully quotes this Sāṁkhya statement as follows: "bstan bcos su bśad pa, 'ci phyi rol gyi don rnams dbaṅ po daṅ yid dag gis lhan cig ṣen nam ṣe na, ma yin ṣes brjod par byaḥo. ciḥi phyir ṣe na, don gcig byed paḥi dbaṅ po dag rtog pa na nus pa ñid ma yin no' ṣes paḥo"; *PST*, 72a.6 (81b.1–2).
The explanation of "gṣan mthoṅ ḥgyur" in the verse is omitted in *PSV*, but Jinendrabuddhi says: It is no more reasonable that the mind should recollect the functioning of a sense without apprehending it before than that Yajñadatta should recollect what has been experienced by Devadatta. Cf. *PST*, 72a.2–4 (81a.5–6): "*gṣan mthoṅ ba* ni dran pa ste, dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pas ñams su myoṅ ba ñid kyi phyir daṅ yid kyis kyaṅ dran par bya ba ñid kyis [=kyi] phyir ro. de yaṅ mi rigs te, lhas byin gyis ñams su myoṅ ba mchod sbyin gyis dran pa ni ma yin pas so."

5.77. This question is included in Jinendrabuddhi's quotation from a Sāṁkhya text in *PST*, 72a.6 (81b.1–2). See above, n. 5.76.

5.78. This is also fully quoted in *PST*, 73b.1–2 (82b.6–8): "bstan bcos su . . . ḥdi skad bśad do, 'de bṣin du yid ni don thams cad la dus gsum pa ñid du rab tu ḥjug te, phyi rol gyi don rnams la da ltar baḥi dus su gaṅ gi tshe dbaṅ po ḥgaḥ ṣig daṅ ldan par yid gyur ba deḥi tshe dbaṅ po daṅ ni rkyen daṅ ldan paḥi ḥjug par ḥgyur ro. ḥbaḥ ṣig pa ni ḥdas pa daṅ ma ḥoṅs pa dag gi [dus dag la ḥjug go; 70b.6 (79b.6)]' ṣes pa la sogs pa sṅar brjod la, phyis ḥdri ba ḥdi byas paḥo." Cf. Frauwallner, "Klass. Sāṁkh.," p. 29. I have emended K by reference to this quotation in *PST*.

5.79. K is corrupt. I have emended K to conform to the Sāṁkhya statement as quoted in *PST*, 68b.6 (77b.1–2). See above, n. 5.63.

5.80. The word "mthoṅ ba" in K confuses the reading. I have corrected K to conform to V.

Section 6. Examination of the Mīmāṁsaka Theory

6.1. The Mīmāṁsaka statement here referred to is the first half of *MS*, I, i, 4, of which the latter half reads as follows: "And it is not a means [of knowing *dharma*], since it apprehends [only] what is present," (*sat-samprayoge puruṣa-syêndriyāṇāṁ buddhi-janma tat pratyakṣam animittaṁ vidyamānôpalambhanatvāt*).

Śabarasvāmin does not consider this sūtra to be one giving a definition of *pratyakṣa*. What the sūtra means to say is: *pratyakṣa* is not a means of knowing *dharma*, because its characteristic feature is that it arises only when there is a contact of senses with the present object; *ŚBh*, p. 6.15–22. It is Bhavadāsa who, in his *Vṛtti*, divides the sūtra into two parts and regards the first half as the definition of *pratyakṣa*; see *NR*, pp. 133.17–134.10: *Bhavadāsenaitat sūtraṁ dvi-vidhā kṛtvā sat-samprayoge ity evam-ādi tat pratyakṣam ity evam-antaṁ pratya-kṣa-lakṣaṇa-param, animittam ity-ādi ca tasya dharmaṁ praty animittatva-paraṁ vyākhyātam.* (This view of Bhavadāsa's is referred to in *ŚVK*, I, 204.10, as "*vṛtty-antare . . .*") Kumārila develops detailed discussions along the line of Śabarasvāmin's interpretation of the sūtra and rejects Bhavadāsa's view. According to Kumārila, *pratyakṣa* cannot be defined as the rise of cognition following from "the contact of senses with something existent" (*sat-samprayoga*), because untrue perception (*pratyakṣâbhāsa*) also arises from "the contact [of senses] with something existent." The statement in the sūtra may rule out perception in a dream, which arises without the contact of sense and object, but not such illusive cognition as that of silver for what is really a conch shell. Cf. *ŚV*, IV, 10–11:

na câpy anena sūtreṇa pratyakṣaṁ lakṣyate sphuṭam
tad-ābhāse 'pi tulyatvāt svapna-jñānaika-varjanāt.
tad dhîndriyârtha-saṁyoga-vyāpāreṇa vinā bhavet
kenacit samprayoga tu bhrānty-ādiḥ syān niyogataḥ.

Thus, Kumārila construes the meaning of the sūtra as follows: That *pratyakṣa* is not a means of knowing *dharma* is understood from the well-known fact that the character "apprehension of what is present" (*vidyamānôpalambhana*) is found in *pratyakṣa*. Cf. *ŚV*, IV, 20:

yato 'sti tatra [=pratyakṣe] dharmo 'yaṁ vidyamānôpalambhanam
tasmāt tena prasiddhena gamyatām animittatā.

Kumārila's construction of the sūtra is summarized by his commentators in the following formulae: (1) *pratyakṣam animittam, vidyamānôpalambhanatvāt.* (2) *pratyakṣaṁ vidyamānôpalambhanatvam, sat-samprayoga-jatvāt.* (3) *pratyakṣaṁ sat-samprayoga-jatvam, pratyakṣatvāt.* Cf. *ŚVK*, I, 210.9–11; *NR*, p. 138.17–19.

Dignāga regards the first half of *MS*, I, i, 4, as a definition of *pratyakṣa*. The works of early commentators on *MS* have not come down to us (with the sole

exception of *ŚBh*), and their views are not known in detail; so there is little justification for a decisive identification of the views as criticized by Dignāga.

Jinendrabuddhi makes the following comments on each term constituting the sūtra; *PST*, 74a.2–7 (83a.7–83b.6): (1) The compound "*sat-samprayoga*" may be analyzed into either "*sato samprayogaḥ*" or "*satā samprayogaḥ.*" Cf. below, n. 6.2. (2) The word "*samprayoga*" means "*samyak-prakṛṣṭa-yoga*" (correct contact and of sufficient strength). Cf. n. 6.21: Kumārila's analysis is "*samprayoga*" = "*samyak prayogaḥ*"—proper function. (3) By the term "*indriyāṇi,*" *manas* is also implied. Therefore, the cognition which takes *ātman* for its object is also recognized as *pratyakṣa*. Cf. n. 6.5. (4) The compound "*buddhi-janman*" may be taken either as a *karmadhāraya* or as a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa*. Cf. n. 6.51: Kumārila takes this compound as a *karmadhāraya.*

6.2. *ŚVK*, I, 221.7–8; *NR*, p. 144.17–18:

sad ity asad-vyudāsāya na niyogāt sa gaṁsyate
samprayogo hi niyamāt sata evôpapadyate.

V translates the latter half of this verse in prose. Neither K nor V translates "*na.*"

Śabarasvāmin interprets the meaning of "*sat-samprayoge*" as "*sati samprayoge*=*satîndriyârtha-sambandhe*" (viz., when there is a contact of sense and object), and not as "*satā samprayogaḥ*" (viz., the contact [of sense] with something existent); *ŚBh*, p. 6.17–18. Against this interpretation, it may be argued that the word "*sat*" would then be redundant because the meaning of "*sati samprayoge*" can be expressed by "*samprayoge.*" In answer to this objection, Kumārila vindicates Śabarasvāmin's interpretation by saying that the word "*sat*" is used in the sūtra with the intention of removing wrong views of others with regard to a yogin's *pratyakṣa*; *ŚV*, IV, 37. There are some who hold that yogins and liberated men (*muktâtman*) can perceive objects in the past, in the future, and those that are very subtle or covered. But Kumārila argues that even a yogin's *pratyakṣa*, inasmuch as it is *prâtyakṣa*, is "apprehension of a present object" (*vidyamānôpalambhana*), because *pratyakṣa* is universally known (*prasiddha*) as being of such a nature. If the cognition of past and future objects were also to be admitted as *pratyakṣa*, then such cognitions as *abhilāṣa*, *smṛti*, and so on, would also be recognized as *pratyakṣa*. Thus, Kumārila concludes that the Sūtrakāra mentioned the term "*sat,*" which implies something well known, in order to make clear that *samprayoga* takes place in the present; *ibid*., IV, 26–36. Cf. *ŚVK*, I, 221.10–12: *nâyam arthaḥ sūtrasya satā samprayogaḥ sat-samprayoga iti. kiṁ tarhi, saṁś câsau samprayogaś cêti karmadhārayo 'yam. sac-chabdaś ca vidyamāna-vacanaḥ. tad ayam artho bhavati—vidyamāna-samprayoga-jaṁ pratyakṣam iti . . .*

6.3. *PST*, 76a.2–3 (85b.4–5): "*dbaṅ poḥi khyad par can gyis brjod kyis* ṣes pa, dbaṅ poḥi khyad par byas pa kho naḥi yul ni, sbyor zla can yin te, ji ltar mig gi gzugs ṣes pa ḥdi lta bu la sogs pa lta buḥo. deḥi phyir ḥdi ltar smra bar rigs te, gzugs la sogs pa daṅ phrad pa na ṣes paḥo."

6.4. Literally, the contact of the soul, etc., with the mind, etc.

Although the factors of cognition other than *indriya* are not explicitly mentioned in *MS*, the Mīmāṁsakas admit that the contact of *ātman*, *manas*, *indriya*,

and *artha* is the cause of a cognition. In the *Vṛttikāragrantha* quoted by Śabarasvāmin, we read: *indriya-mano-'rtha-saṁnikarṣo hi samyag-jñānasya hetuḥ, asati tasmin mithyā-jñānam, ŚBh*, p. 8.14–15. Kumārila states that *pramāṇa* may be (1) *indriya*, (2) the contact of *indriya* and *artha*, (3) that of *manas* and *indriya*, (4) that of *manas* and *ātman*, or (5) [that of] all [these factors]. Cf. *ŚV*, IV, 60:

yad vêndriyaṁ pramāṇaṁ syāt tasya vârthena saṁgatiḥ
manaso vêndriyair yoga ātmanā sarva eva vā.

ŚVV, p. 135.1–2: *ātmā manasā saṁyujyate mana indriyena indriyam arthena iti saṁyoga-tritayam ekaṁ vā pramāṇam.*

6.5. *PST*, 74a.4 (85b.6–7): "*dbaṅ po rnams kyi* (*indriyāṇām*) ṣes paḥi tshig ni ñe bar mtshon paḥi don du ste, bya rog rnams las ṣo sruṅs śig ces pa ji lta ba bṣin no ṣes sems na . . ."

Kumārila specifically states that, since *manas* is a kind of *indriya*, the contact of *manas* with *sukha*, etc., is also implied by the sūtra; see *ŚV*, IV, 83:

manasaś cêndriyatvena pratyakṣā dhīḥ sukhâdiṣu
manasā samprayukto hi nânyâtmā pratipadyate.

6.6. Literally, [the soul . . . are] not incapable of coming into contact only with something existent.

There is a difference between K and V. *PST* does not quote this verse. Two different translations, "ma rtog pa" (K) and "ruṅ ma yin" (V), seem to indicate the original Sanskrit "*akalpa*." Thus, the verse might have been something like: "*sad-mātra-samprayoge na . . . akalpaḥ . . .*"

6.7. Here, K is somewhat defective. I have followed V and emended K to conform to V.

6.8. The discrepancy between K (gaṅ gi phyir = *yasmāt*) and V (deḥi phyir = *tasmāt*) may be due to the "*yasmāt*" at the end of the foregoing sentence having been wrongly taken by K as applying to the following sentence. Or, "*tasmāt*" may have been mistaken for "*yasmāt*" by K.

6.9. The Vṛttikāra cited by Śabarasvāmin states that true perception is conditioned by the contact of senses with a real object. For instance, the cognition of silver for what is really a white conch shell is not perception, because it confuses an unreal object with a real one. The Vṛttikāra, however, instead of recognizing this idea in *MS*, I, i, 4, changes the sūtra to read "*tat-samprayoge . . . sat-pratyakṣam.*" Cf. *ŚBh*, pp. 7.24–8.5: *yat pratyakṣaṁ na tat vyabhicarati, yat vyabhicarati na tat pratyakṣam. kiṁ tarhi pratyakṣam. tat-samprayoge puruṣasyêndriyāṇāṁ buddhi-janma sat-pratyakṣam. yad-viṣayaṁ jñānaṁ tenaiva samprayoge indriyāṇām puruṣasya buddhi-janma sat-pratyakṣam. yad anya-viṣaya-jñānam anya-samprayoge bhavati tat pratyakṣam.*" It seems that there was a Mīmāṁsā commentator who, like the Vṛttikāra, managed to extract the same idea from *MS*, I, i, 4, but without changing the position of "*sat*" and "*tat*." Kumārila rejects the view of this commentator by arguing that the sūtra does not specify "*samprayoga*" as pertaining either to a (real) object (*grāhya*) or to something else, and points to the fact that the Vṛttikāra changed the reading of the sūtra

in order to exclude *bhrānti* from *pratyakṣa*; *ŚV*, IV, 12–13:

grāhyeṇânyena vêty etat kṛtaṁ naiva viśeṣaṇam
samprayogasya yena syād viśeṣo vakṣyamāṇavat.
asāmarthyaṁ ca matvâsya vṛttikāreṇa lakṣaṇe
tat-samprayoga ity evaṁ pāṭhântaram udāhṛtam.

Cf. *ŚVK*, I, 207.19–23: *nanu kenacit samprayoga-mātraṁ na pratyakṣa-kāraṇam abhipretam, api tarhi grāhyeṇa. na ca bhrānty-ādayo grāhya-saṁyukta-nayanasya jāyante. kiṁ tarhi, anya-saṁyuktêndriyasyânyârtha-viṣayāḥ. na cêdaṁ grāhya-viśeṣaṇam asmābhir eva kevalam āśritam, api tu vṛttikāreṇâpi pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-paraṁ sūtraṁ vyācakṣāṇena. tan-matam bhavadbhir upariṣṭād vakṣyata evêti nâvayor viśeṣam upalabhāmahe.*

6.10. The word "yid dvags sgom skyed pa" in K is unusual. We read "ñi maḥi gduṅ ba . . ." in the following passage, so I have emended K to read "mig rgyu" as in V. Cf. *PST*, 76a.5–6 (85b.8–86a.1): "mṅon sum ltar snaṅ gi yul ñid kyi phyir *mṅon sum ltar snaṅ* baḥo."

6.11. *Lit.*, the cognition of the eye (*cakṣur-buddhi*).

6.12. First, a sense-cognition perceives the *svalakṣaṇa* of the spot of land, which in itself is inexpressible. Then follows mental cognition which, disregarding the particularity of this *svalakṣaṇa*, recognizes it as something similar to a thing which is conceptually apprehended as "water." Through this process the *svalakṣaṇa* of the spot of land comes to be taken for a pool of "water." Cf. *PST*, 76b.2–3 (86a.6–7): "*rim gyis* ṣes pa sṅar dbaṅ poḥi śes pa ste, de nas ḥdra ba ñid du ṅes par byed paḥi yid rnam par rtog paḥo. de nas chu la sogs pa daṅ ḥdra baḥi dṅos po dran paḥo. deḥi bar ma chad par de kho na ḥdiḥo ṣes paḥi ḥkhrul ba yid kyi rnam par śes pa spyi la dmigs par ḥgyur ro." (See also above, Section 3, n. 3.7.)

6.13. To my knowledge, the notion of "*sat*" in the sense of "*śliṣṭa*" is not to be found in any other source. Jinendrabuddhi mentions that "*sat*" means "*praśasta*" in such examples as "*sat-puruṣa*." See *PST*, 76b.4–5 (86a.8–86b.1): "*yaṅ na gaṅ gaṅ gi* ṣes pa legs pa la yaṅ '*sat*' kyi sgra ḥjug ste, dper na skyes bu dam pa (*sat-puruṣa*) ṣes pa bṣin no." Cf. *Bhagavadgītā*, XVII, 26:

sad-bhāve sādhu-bhāve ca sad ity etat prayujyate
praśaste karmaṇi tathā sac-chabdaḥ pārtha yujyate.

For the following reference I am indebted to Muni Jambuvijaya: *TAV*, p. 41.16–19: *sac-chabdaḥ praśaṁsâdiṣu vartate. tadyathā praśaṁsāyāṁ tāvat sat-puruṣaḥ, sad-aśvaḥ iti. kvacid astitve san ghaṭaḥ san paṭa iti . . . kvacid ādare sat-kṛtyâtithīn bhojayate, ādṛtyêty arthaḥ.*

6.14. Some methods of curing the sense-faculties of debilitation are described as follows in *Tattvārthasūtravṛtti* by Siddhasena (Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Ser., No. 67), pp. 165.27–166.2: *śravaṇayor vedha-pralamba-tâdy-āpādanaṁ cakṣur-nāsikayor añjana-nasyābhyām upakāraḥ tathā bheṣaja-pradānāj jihvāyā jāḍyâpanayaḥ sparśanasya vividha-cūrṇa-gandha-vāsa-pragharṣāt tad iti vimalatva-karaṇam.* (Muni Jambuvijaya kindly provided me with this reference.)

6.15. Cf. *Uṇādisūtra*, II, 67: "*gamer ḍoḥ*." On the basis of this *sūtra*, everything that "goes" (√*gam*) can be meant by the word "*gauḥ*." However, as a *rūḍhi-śabda* (a word used in the conventional sense), "*gauḥ*" means only "a cow," and not other things.

6.16. The words "bstan pa ste" in Kk and K seem to be incorrect, although we find in the *Vṛtti* the corresponding words "bstan pa yin no" (K 107a.7). V reads "grags (pa)" (*prasiddhi*) instead of "bstan pa" (*nirdeśa*) in the *Kārikā* as well as in the *Vṛtti*. As "*prasiddhi*" is the main topic in *Bd–b*, one would expect "*prasiddhi*" to be mentioned in the *Kārikā*. Accordingly, I have corrected K to conform to V.

6.17. K: ". . . bstan pa yin no" does not make sense. V: ". . . grags pa ni ma yin no" agrees with *PST*, 77b.1 (87a.6): "yod paḥi sgra dbaṅ poḥi don la grags pa yaṅ ma yin no." I have emended K to conform to V and *PST*.

6.18. Instead of "don kun" (*sarvârtha*) in K, V reads "kun tu (*sarvatra*) don (*artha*) . . ." in the *Kārikā* and "thams cad du (*sarvatra*) . . . don" in the *Vṛtti*. V's reading conforms to the expression above in Section 3, *Ca*, where the same topic is treated. But here I have followed K because it is supported by *PST*, 77b.2 (87a.7): "*gal te* ṣes pa la sogs pas *don kun yaṅ dag phrad pa*ḥi sgraḥi don gsuṅs so."

6.19. The last pāda is quoted in *PST*, 77b.1 (87a.6): "*de yi bar chad med la gnod*." By comparing K, V, and *PST*, I imagine that the original verse was something like the following:

sarvenârthena yogaś ced yad dṛṣṭaṁ rūpa-śabdayoḥ
jñānaṁ sāntaram adhikaṁ tad bādhitaṁ nirantare.

6.20. Cf. n. 6.18, above.

6.21. Dignāga directs exactly the same criticism to the Naiyāyikas, who also maintain that perception is a cognition produced by the "contact" (*saṁnikarṣa*) of sense and object. See above, Section 3, *Ca–Cb*.

Kumārila vindicates the Mīmāṁsā theory by giving a new interpretation to "*samprayoga*." According to him, the prefix "*sam-*" implies "*samyak*" (proper, right), and "*prayoga*" signifies "*vyāpāra*" (function). Thus "*samprayoga*" is not used in the sense of the "contact," but it means the "proper function" of the senses as distinguished from "improper function" (*duṣproyoga*). See *ŚV*, IV, 38:

saṁyag-arthe ca saṁ-śabdo duṣprayoga-nivāraṇaḥ
prayogo indriyāṇāṁ ca vyāpāro 'rtheṣu kathyate.

Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 42ab:

vyāpāra-mātra-vācitvād aviruddhaṁ tad atra naḥ.

This idea of Kumārila's is refuted by Jinendrabuddhi as follows: (1) If "*vyāpāra*" of the senses were to mean "*grahaṇa*" (ḥdsin pa), then, as "*grahaṇa*" is nothing other than "cognition" (*vijñāna*=*buddhi*), there would follow the absurd conclusion that the rise of cognition (*buddhi-janman*) results from cognition. (2) If "*vyāpāra*" were to mean "*prakāśa*" (rab tu gsal ba), then there would

follow the difficulty that the "*vyāpāra*" belongs only to the visual sense, which has light (*tejas*), but not to the other senses. (3) The auditory sense, which is of the nature of *ākāśa*, has no "*vyāpāra*." (4) It is not commonly accepted (*aprasiddha*) that the word "*samprayoga*" implies "*vyāpāra*"; *PST*, 77b.2–5 (87a.7–87b.3).

6.22. The meaning of *k*. $6b$–c_1 is not quite clear. The Sanskrit original of "... las ḥgrol baḥi" (K) = "bor nas" (V) might have been "*nirmucya*" or some similar word. The corresponding words in the *Vṛtti* are "... las gṣan" (K) = "... bor nas" (V). It is hard to surmise the original form of "tshad ma gaṅ gaṅ las" (K) = "gaṅ las de tshad ma" (V). The following explanation in *PST* seems to suggest that the feminine pronoun "*sā*," referring to "*buddhi*," was in the verse: "*de* ces pas yon tan du gyur kyaṅ blo la sñeg gi, tshogs pa la ma yin te, de la med paḥi bud med kyi rtags ñe bar bkod paḥi phyir daṅ ḥgrel par yaṅ de ltar rnam par bśad paḥi phyir ro"; *PST*, 77b.6–7 (87b.4–5). For my translation I have inferred that the Sanskrit original was something like: "*sā* [= *buddhir*] *kasmāt pramāṇāt*."

6.23. One can hardly identify this Vṛttikāra (ḥgrel pa byed pa) with any one of the early Mīmāṁsā commentators who are known to us. We know of the following commentators: (1) Śabarasvāmin, whose *Bhāṣya* is the oldest extant commentary on *MS*. (2) The Vṛttikāra, whose views are often referred to by Śabarasvāmin; see *ŚBh*, p. 7.18 ff., and *passim*. (3) Upavarṣa, whose theory on *śabda* is referred to in the Vṛttikāragrantha quoted by Śabarasvāmin. See *ŚBh*, p. 13.7–8: *atha "gauḥ" ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ. ga-kārâu-kāra-visarjanīyā iti bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ*. Upavarṣa is recognized by some scholars as identical with (2)—cf. Rāmaswāmi Śāstri, "Old Vṛttikāras on the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Sūtras," *IHQ*, X, 431–452; G. Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources*, p. 13, etc. But other scholars distinguish Upavarṣa from (2): see H. Jacobi, "The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmans," *JAOS*, 31 (1911), pp. 1–29; P. V. Kane, "Gleanings from the Bhāṣya of Śabara and the Tantravārttika," *JBBRAS* (1921), pp. 83–98, etc. (4) Bhavadāsa, whose view is referred to by Kumārila in *ŚV*, I, 63:

pradarśanârtham ity eke kecin nānârtha-vādinaḥ
samudāyād avacchidya Bhavadāsena kalpitāt.

He is also known on the authority of *NR* and *ŚVK* to have written a *Vṛtti* in which he interpreted *MS*, I, i, 4, in a manner different from that of Śabarasvāmin (see above, n. 6.1). (5) Bhartṛmitra, whose work is known by the title *Tattvaśuddhi* and whose view is regarded by Kumārila as of materialistic tendency. See *ŚV*, Upodghāta, 10:

prāyeṇaiva hi mīmāṁsā loke lokāyatī-kṛtā
tām āstika-pathe kartum ayaṁ yatnaḥ kṛto mayā.

ŚVV, p. 3.17 (ad *ŚV*, 10): ... *Bhartṛmitrâdi-viracita-Tattvaśuddhy-ādi-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇam asty evêti* ...; *NR*, p. 4.8–10: *mīmāṁsā hi Bhartṛmitrâdibhir alokāyataiva satī lokāyatī-kṛtā nitya-niṣiddhayor iṣṭâniṣṭam phalaṁ nāstîty-ādi bahv-apasiddhānta-parigraheṇêti* ...

We have no means of knowing in any detail the theories maintained by these commentators, with the exception of Śabarasvāmin's. Neither in *ŚBh* nor in fragmentary accounts of the other commentators can we locate the theory attributed here to a Vṛttikāra (ḥgrel pa byed pa).

If the expression "ḥgrel par yaṅ" in *PST*, 77b.7 (87b.5)—see above, n. 6.22—were to be recognized as referring to the passage of *ŚBh* that reads "*satîndriyârtha-sambandhe yā puruṣasya buddhir jāyate tat pratyakṣam*," then "ḥgrel pa byed pa" must be the Bhāṣyakāra (i.e., Śabarasvāmin). However, Jinendrabuddhi mentions "bśad ḥgrel byed pa (po)" twice (viz., in *PST*, 79b.3 [89b.5] and 80b.2 [90b.5–6]), who is obviously different from "ḥgrel pa byed pa" mentioned in *PST*, 77b.6 (87b.4), 80b.3 (90b.7), and 80b.4 (90b.8). It seems likely that this "bśad ḥgrel byed pa" is the Bhāṣyakāra (i.e., Śabarasvāmin). Cf. below, nn. 6.39, 6.50.

Further, we read as follows in *PST*, 77b.6 (87b.4): "ḥgrel pa byed pas ni gaṅ yaṅ blo skye ba ṣes pa rgyan daṅ bcas paḥi ṅag brjod do ṣes pa . . ." If we are allowed to take "gaṅ yaṅ blo skye ba" as referring to "*yā . . . buddhir jāyate*" in *ŚBh*, p. 6.17, then we may say that the Vṛttikāra here referred to by Dignāga is a post-Śabarasvāmin commentator. As such he must be distinguished from the above-mentioned (2).

6.24. Kumārila also distinguishes *pramāṇa* and *phala*. But he holds that any one of the following can be considered to be *pramāṇa*: (1) *indriya*, (2) the contact of *indriya* and *artha*, (3) the contact of *manas* and *indriya*, (4) the contact of *manas* and *ātman*, and (5) the contact of all these factors. See *ŚV*, IV, 60 (and see above, n. 6.4). In any case, the *phala* is cognition, and whichever one of them can be considered as engaged in the activity (*vyāpāra*) of producing cognition is the one to be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 61:

tadā jñānaṁ phalaṁ tatra vyāpārāc ca pramāṇatā
vyāpāro na yadā teṣāṁ tadā nôtpadyate phalam.

6.25. Jinendrabuddhi explains that *saṁskāra* means either (1) *dharma* and *adharma* or (2) that latent force which results from the *jñāna* residing in *ātman*, and which is recognized as the cause of the subsequent *jñāna* because of its determining the nature of the latter; *PST*, 77b.7–78a.1 (87b.5–6). (1) and (2) are similar in respect to their being latent forces that give rise to a future result. However, *dharma* and *adharma* (which are produced from ethical or religious practice) are usually distinguished from *saṁskāra*, which results from physical or psychical action. In the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya list of *guṇa*s, *saṁskāra* is mentioned separately from *dharma* and *adharma*. Cf. *PBh*, p. 47 (the word "*adṛṣṭa*" stands for *dharma* and *adharma*); *VSV*, I, i, 5; *Tarkasaṁ.*, p. 5, etc. Praśastapāda distinguishes three kinds of *saṁskāra*s: *vega* (impulse), *bhāvanā* (impression), and *sthiti-sthāpaka* (elasticity), of which the second is psychical and the first and the last are physical (see *PBh*, pp. 633.9 ff.). This idea of Praśastapāda's is followed by later Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas—cf. *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, kk. 158–161ab, etc. Needless to say, here where the rise of cognition is under discussion, *saṁskāra* means *bhāvanā*.

6.26. Cf. *MS*, I, i, 4 (see n. 6.1).

6.27. The Mīmāṁsakas may further argue that the words "rise of a cognition" (*buddhi-janman*) should be mentioned in order to exclude such contact of sense and object as is not productive of any result. However, this consideration is unnecessary, as the contact of sense and object never fails to produce perceptual cognition. See *PST*, 78a.2–3 (87b.8–88a.1): "de [=blo skye ba smos pa] med na blo skye baḥi rgyu ma yin paḥi yaṅ dag par phrad pa yaṅ mṅon sum ñid du ḥgyur ro. deḥi phyir yaṅ dag par phrad paḥi khyad par gyi don du de byaḥo ṣe na, ḥdi ni yod pa ma yin te, gaṅ phyir phrad pa ni blo skye baḥi rgyu ma yin pa ñid srid pa ma yin te . . ."

6.28. Dignāga gives this etymological explanation of *pratyakṣa* in *NMukh*. Cf. above, Section 1, n. 1.11.

6.29. Both K and V are defective. I have emended K, comparing it with V ("gaṅ . . . brtag pa de . . .") and *PST*, 78a.6–7 (88a.6) ("*gaṅ yaṅ rtogs pa* ṣes pa . . .").

6.30. *PST*, 78b.2–3 (88b.1–2): "thun moṅ ma yin pas kyaṅ ḥjig rten tha sñad byed pa mthoṅ ṣes sṅar bśad zin to. deḥi phyir dbaṅ po kho nas tha sñad du bya ba ma yin no ṣes gsuṅs pa *ḥdi ni brtag bya ma yin no* ṣes paḥo." See above, Section 1, nn. 1.31, 1.32.

6.31. In *Da*, the Vṛttikāra has set forth the view that *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa* is "that from which a cognition arises" (*yasmād buddhir jāyate tat pratyakṣam*). Here he explains that the cognition which arises from *pratyakṣa* is ascertainment (*niścaya*)—i.e., the cognition of *viśeṣya* as qualified by *viśeṣaṇa*. This may mean that the Vṛttikāra maintains that *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa* is *viśeṣaṇa-jñāna*. Kumārila refers to the view that *pramāṇa* and *phala* are respectively *viśeṣaṇa-jñāna* and *viśeṣya-jñāna* in *ŚV*, IV, 70:

pramāṇa-phalate buddhyor viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyayoḥ
yadā tadâpi pūrvôktā bhinnârthatva-nivāraṇā.

This verse is explained by Sucaritamiśra as follows: *sarva-savikalpaka-jñānāni viśeṣaṇa-jñāna-pūrvakāṇi, yathā daṇḍy ayaṁ gaur ayaṁ śuklo 'yaṁ gacchaty ayaṁ ḍittho 'yam iti. tad iha viśeṣaṇa-jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ viśeṣya-jñānaṁ ca phalam. viśeṣya-jñāna-siddhy-arthatvāc ca viśeṣaṇa-jñānasya. tatrâpi vyāpārataḥ samāna-viṣayatvam iti*, *ŚVK*, I, 234.26–235.10. Umbeka attributes this view to the Naiyāyikas; see *ŚVV*, p. 137.10–11: *evaṁ tāvat sva-pakṣe bhikṣunôktāni dūṣaṇāni parihṛtya naiyāyika-pakṣe 'pi parihartum āha—"pramāṇa-phalate . . ." iti.* Dignāga examines this view at length in Section 3, above, Eb_1–*Ed*.

6.32. Cf. *PST*, 78b.6 (88b.6): "pha rol pos ba laṅ ñid la sogs pa rnams daṅ, deḥi rten rdsas kyaṅ dṅos po ñid du khas blaṅs te, deḥi phyir deḥi yul can ñid du dbaṅ poḥi blo dogs par ḥgyur ro."

The view that the universal as well as the individual can be perceived by the sense is not found in *ŚBh*. Kumārila clearly states that both the universal and the individual are perceived by sense-cognition. This is, according to him, the reason why *MS*, I, i, 4, does not specify the object of the sense. See *ŚV*, IV, 84:

sambaddhaṁ vartamānaṁ ca gṛhyate cakṣur-ādinā
sāmānyaṁ vā viśeṣo vā grāhyaṁ nâto 'tra kathyate.

Prabhākara holds the view that the individual and the universal are undifferentiated when cognized by the sense (cf. n. 6.33). Cf. G. Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources*, pp. 95–96; Sinha, *Indian Psychology: Cognition*, pp. 34–35.

6.33. That sense-cognition is unable to relate the individual with the universal has been fully discussed by Dignāga in Section 4, *D*, above.

Prabhākara vehemently attacks Dignāga's theory that the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) alone is the object of sense and that the association of the individual with the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) is nothing but *kalpanā*; see *Bṛhatī*, pp. 38–50. He maintains that the universal (*jāti*) and the individual (*jātimat*) are never differentiated (*abheda*) by pointing to the fact that people apprehend an object as "*ayaṁ gauḥ*" and not as "*idaṁ gotvavad dravyam*"; *ibid.*, p. 41.4–6. Thus he says that *savikalpaka-jñāna* apprehends the same object with *nirvikalpaka-jñāna*; *ibid.*, pp. 39.3–40.1: *nirvikalpaka-pratyaya-pramita-viṣayatvaivêṣyate savikalpakānāṁ jāty-ādi-pratyayānām*; p. 50.1–2: *ekâlambanâbhiprāyeṇa sāmānya-viśeṣa-jñānayoḥ, na hy anya-samprayukte cakṣuṣy anyâlambanasya jñānasyôtpattis sambhavati* . . . Kumārila recognizes *savikalpaka-jñāna*, which relates the individual with the universal, as a type of *pratyakṣa*. See *ŚV*, IV, 120:

tataḥ paraṁ punar vastu dharmair jāty-ādibhir yayā
buddhyâvasīyate sâpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā.

6.34. Cf. above, Section 4, n. 4.17.

6.35. This verse is exactly the same as *k. 5cd* in Section 1, above. Although both Kk and Vk include this verse, I consider it as forming part of the *Vṛtti* and not of the *Kārikās.*

6.36. Cf. above, Section 1, n. 1.43.

6.37. Dignāga bases his epistemology on the Vijñānavāda philosophy and sets forth the view that what forms the object of perception is nothing other than "*viṣayâbhāsa*" (appearance as an object) of the cognition itself. As such, the object of perception is self-cognizable; see above, Section 1, n. 1.61.

6.38. Both K and V are defective. *PST*, 79b.2–3 (89b.3–4), 79b.5 (89b.7): "*rnam kun don gyi rnam śes ni gnas te . . . mṅon sum blor mi ḥgyur*" makes good sense. I have therefore emended K to conform to *PST.*

6.39. Jinendrabuddhi says that this is the view of the Bhāṣyakāra (bśad ḥgrel byed pa po). Cf. *PST*, 79b.3 (89b.4–5): "*mṅon sum gyi sgra ni* ṣes pa la sogs pa ste, gaṅ gi phyir bśad ḥgrel byed pa poḥi ḥdod pas mṅon sum gyi sgra gsum rnams kho na la ḥjug ste." In *ŚBh*, p. 6.19–20, we read: *buddhir vā janma vā saṁnikarṣo vêti naiṣāṁ kasyacid avadhāraṇârtham etat sūtram.* But exactly the same idea as that mentioned by Dignāga cannot be located in *ŚBh.*

6.40. See above, Section 1, n. 1.11.

6.41. According to the Bauddhas, *pratyakṣa* is so named for the following reasons: (1) The sense (*akṣa*) is the basis (*āśraya*) of *pratyakṣa*. (2) The sense is the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*) of *pratyakṣa*. Cf. above, Section 1, n. 1.31. Here the word "*pratyakṣa*" is taken in the first sense.

6.42. See above, Section 4, n. 4.17.

6.43. See above, Section 4, *Eb*.

6.44. Both Kk and Vk regard "don gṣan ḥbras bur smra ba yis" as forming part of the *Kārikās*. I consider it part of the *Vṛtti*, because otherwise there would be one *pāda* too many.

6.45. K and V differ from each other markedly in the *pāda* c. *PST* does not quote it. By referring to the *Vṛtti*, I corrected K to read "gaṅ de las" instead of "gaṅ las der."

The whole argument set forth by Dignāga in *Df* is referred to as follows in *ŚVK*, I, 228.22–26: *atra buddhi-janma pratyakṣam ity ucyate, tasya ko 'rthaḥ. kiṁ buddher janmâtiriktam anatiriktaṁ vā. yady atiriktaṁ tad vācyaṁ kīdṛśam iti. na ca sva-mate janma-svarūpam abhihitam. yadi vaiśeṣikôkta-svakāraṇa-samavāyo janmâbhidhīyate, tasya nityatvenâkṣânadhīnatvāt pratyakṣa-śabdâbhi-dheyatvânupapattiḥ. anatiriktatve tu punar-uktataiva doṣaḥ.* See also *ŚVV*, p. 133.8–11; *NR*, p. 151.7–9.

6.46. *PST*, 80b.1 (90b.5): "dpyod pa pa rnams kyis kyaṅ deḥi (ka ṇa bhu dsā yi) lugs kho na la brten to."

The Mīmāṁsakas do not set forth their own theory concerning the "rise" (*janman*) of *buddhi*; so the Vaiśeṣika theory is recognized here as their *svamata* according to *tantra-yukti* (cf. above, Section 3, n. 3.35).

6.47. *PST*, 80b.1–2 (90b.4–5): "skye ba yaṅ ka ṇa bhu dsā (Kaṇabhuj) ni bdag la raṅ rgyu la bloḥi ḥdu ba ste, yaṅ na yod pa ñid daṅ yon tan ñid daṅ blo ñid ḥdu ba ste." Here, two interpretations of "*buddhi-janman*" are given: (1) *buddher ātmani svakāraṇe samavāyaḥ*, and (2) *sattā-guṇatva-buddhitvānāṁ buddhau samavāyaḥ*. (1) The Vaiśeṣikas hold the theory that *buddhi* is a *guṇa* of *ātman*. As *ātman* is a *dravya*, the relation between *ātman* and *buddhi* is that of *samavāya* (inherence), *ātman* being *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of *buddhi*. Thus, "rise" of *buddhi* means that *buddhi* comes to inhere in *ātman*. (2) Since *guṇa* is admitted as *sāmānyavat* (*VS*, I, i, 7), *buddhi* as a *guṇa* possesses its *sāmānya* (viz., *sattā*, *guṇatva*, or *buddhitva* according to whether *buddhi* is recognized as a *sat*, a *guṇa*, or a *buddhi*). The relation between *guṇa* and *sāmānya* is also that of *samavāya*. Thus, "rise" of *buddhi* means that *buddhi* comes to possess *sāmānya* or that *sāmānya* comes to inhere in *buddhi*.

6.48. K: "skye ba blor ḥdod na" does not make sense. In reference to V, I have corrected K to read: "ḥphrod pa ḥdu ba de las blo skye bar ḥdod na." V reads "dbaṅ poḥi blo" instead of "blo." K uses two different terms, "ḥdu ba" and "ḥphrod pa ḥdu ba," but neither V nor *PST* (see n. 6.47) make this distinction.

6.49. *VS* does not explicitly mention that *samavāya* is *nitya*. Praśastapāda proves *nityatva* of *samavāya* on the ground that its cause is not known by any means. See *PBh*, p. 697.13–16: *sambandhy-anityatve 'pi na saṁyogavad anityatvaṁ bhāvavad akāraṇatvāt. yathā pramāṇataḥ kāraṇânupalabdher nityo bhāva ity*

uktaṁ tathā samavāyo 'pîti. na hy asya kiṁcit kāraṇaṁ pramāṇata upalabhyata iti. Cf. Athalye, *Tarkasaṁ.*, p. 97.

6.50. Jinendrabuddhi puts two different interpretations on "gñi ga ltar na yaṅ" (*ubhayathâpi*): (1) whether we follow the Sūtrakāra's view or the Vṛttikāra's view, and (2) whether "rise of cognition" is taken in the sense of inherence of *buddhi* in *ātman* or in the sense of inherence of *sattā*, etc., in *buddhi*. Cf. *PST*, 80b.4–5 (90b.8–91a.1): "*deḥi phyir gñi ka ltar na yaṅ* ni gal te mdo byed pa poḥi ḥdod pas yin na daṅ, gal te ḥgrel pa byed pa poḥi ḥdod pas yin naḥo. yaṅ na gal te raṅ gi rgyu la ḥbras bu ḥdu ba blo skye bar ḥdod na daṅ, gal te yod pa ñid la sogs pa rnams ḥbras bu śes pa la ḥdu ba yin na ste, gñi ga ltar na yaṅ mṅon sum ñid du rigs pa ma yin no." I have followed the second interpretation, because here Dignāga himself does not mention the difference of opinion between the Sūtrakāra and the Vṛttikāra.

Jinendrabuddhi refers to the view of the Bhāṣyakāra (bśad ḥgrel byed pa) and that of the Vṛttikāra (ḥgrel pa byed pa), and gives the following explanations: According to the Bhāṣyakāra, only that sense-cognition which unerringly corresponds to the object is recognized as *pratyakṣa*; see *ŚBh*, pp. 7.24–8.1: *yat pratyakṣaṁ na tat vyabhicarati, yat vyabhicarati na tat pratyakṣam.* The thought that *samavāya* is the means of cognition contradicts this view of the Bhāṣyakāra's. Because *samavāya* is *nitya* it could produce cognition whether there is an object or not; cognitions thus produced would not unerringly correspond to the object. On the other hand, the Vṛttikāra's view is set forth in the statement, "that from which cognition arises is *pratyakṣa*"; see above, *Da.* According to this view, "rise" of cognition cannot mean *samavāya*: *samavāya*, which is *nitya*, does not arise from anything. Thus, the thought that *samavāya* is the means of cognition cannot be admitted, whether according to the Bhāṣyakāra's (or Sūtrakāra's) view or according to the Vṛttikāra's view. See *PST*, 80b.2–4 (90b.5–8).

6.51. In answer to Dignāga's criticism, Kumārila sets forth his view in *ŚV*, IV, 53cd–58, which may be summarized as follows: In the cases of all *kārakas* (factors of action), it is seen that they are different from their *vyāpāra* (i.e., the action itself)—as, for instance, the eye, the instrument (*karaṇa*) of the act of seeing, is different from seeing. However, this is not the case with cognition. Since cognition does not continue to exist even for a moment, it never happens that a cognition is invalid (*apramâtmaka*) without possessing *vyāpāra* at the moment of its rising and becomes valid afterwards when it comes to have *vyāpāra* of cognizing an object. Any cognition is valid as soon as it is produced (*jāyamāna-pramāṇatā*). It is to make this point clear that *MS*, I, i, 4, used the expression "*buddhi-janman.*" Cf. *ŚVK*, I, 228.27–229.6: *nâyaṁ buddhi-janmêti ṣaṣṭhī-samāsaḥ, kiṁ tu buddhiś câsau janma cêti karmadhārayaḥ. janma-śabdaś ca kartari manin-pratyayântaḥ, tena jāyamānā buddhiḥ pramāṇam ity uktaṁ bhavati.*

6.52. *ŚVK*, I, 228.20–21; *ŚVV*, p. 132.16–17; *NR*, p. 150.14–15; *TSP*, p. 108.1–2:

buddhi-janmani puṁsaś ca vikṛtir yady anityatā
athâvikṛtir ātmâyam [°*ânyaḥ* in *ŚVV*] *pramātêti na yujyate.*

Cf. *ŚVK*, I, 228.15–17: *nanv evam api yan nityam ātmānaṁ mīmāṁsakā manyante tan na sidhyet. jñāna-janmani vikārâpattyā carmavad anityatva-prasakteḥ. jñāna-janmanā tv avikṛtasya pūrvâvasthāyām ivâpramātṛtva-prasaṅgaḥ.* Cf. also *ŚVV*, p. 132.12–15; *NR*, p. 150.11–13.

6.53. In answer to this criticism, Kumārila states that the modification of the soul (*puruṣa*, *ātman*), which is of the nature of consciousness, does not contradict its eternity. See *ŚV*, IV, 53ab:

vikriyā jñāna-rūpasya na nityatve virotsyate.

Cf. *ŚVV*, p. 132.20–22: *buddhāv utpannāyām utpadyata evâtmano jñātṛ-rūpo vikāraḥ tathâpi nâsau nityatvaṁ vināśyati, pratyabhijñā-pratyayenâvasthā-dvaye 'py anusandhānāt. sa evâtmā kenacid ātmanā naṣṭaḥ kenacid utpannaḥ kenacid āsta iti, tathâvabhāsanāt kuṇḍalâdiṣu sarpavad iti*; *ŚVK*, I, 228.22–26; *NR*, p. 150.19–21.

Although the soul is variously modified in different states it is essentially unchangeable, just as a snake is still the same snake even though it is seen to change positions (i.e., from a coiled to a straight position). That the soul is essentially unchangeable is proved by the fact that the "I" who sees a pot today is recognized (*pratyabhijñā*) as the same "I" who saw a cloth yesterday. Kumārila fully discusses the eternity of the soul in *ŚV*, Ātmavāda. The expression "*kuṇḍalâdiṣu sarpavat*" in the above-cited *ŚVV* (also in *NR*) is taken from *ŚV*, Ātmavāda, 28:

tasmād ubhaya-hānena vyāvṛtty-anugamâtmakaḥ
puruṣo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ kuṇḍalâdiṣu sarpavat.

The Bauddha repudiation of Kumārila's argument on the eternity of the soul is found in *TS*(*P*), ch. VII/2 Mīmāṁsākalpitâtmaparīkṣā. (Cf. S. Mookerjee, *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. 154–171.)

Tibetan Text

PRAMAṆĀSAMUCCAYAVṚTTI: PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA

Translated by

A. KANAKAVARMAN AND DAD-PAḤI ŚES-RAB (*on right-hand pages*)

B. VASUDHARARAKṢITA AND SEṄ-RGYAL (*on left-hand pages*)

In editing K and V, the following editions have been collated: for K, P (Peking edition, reprinted and published by the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto, vol. 130), and N (Snar-thaṅ edition, kept in the Otani University Library, Kyoto); for V, D (Sde-dge edition, kept in the Koyasan University Library, Wakayama), C (Co-ne edition, kept in the Library of Congress, Washington), P, and N. For the kārikās in K and V, I have also collated Kk in D, and Vk in P. Both K and V are found in Mdo-ḥgrel, Ce (95) in each edition. Since the printing of N is not clear, I have referred to it only when I found the reading of P to be questionable.

Figures on the margin of the page indicate folio and line numbers of P, and folio number of D, C, and N. Line number of D is given in parentheses. * and + respectively indicate the beginning of the folio of P, and that of D, C, and N.

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THE PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYAVṚTTI

PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA

Tibetan Translation By Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ-rgyal

SECTION 1. EXPOSITION OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

13a.6 (14b.1) rgya gar skad du, pra mā ṇa sa mu tstsha ya bṛ tti.
C.14b bod skad du, tshad ma kun las btus paḥi ḥgrel pa.
N.13a saṅs rgyas la phyag ḥtshal lo.
A. k.1 tshad mar gyur pa ḥgro la phan par bṣed[1]
13a.7 **ston pa bde gśegs skyob la phyag ḥtshal nas*
tshad ma[2] *sgrub phyir raṅ* (2) *gi gṣuṅ kun las*
btus te sna tshogs ḥthor rnams ḥdir gcig bya
ḥdir yaṅ rab tu byed paḥi daṅ por rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu phun sum
13a.8 *tshogs pas tshad mar gyur pa ñid kyis bcom ldan ḥdas la bstod pa
N.13b brjod pa ni gus pa bskyed par bya baḥi don duḥo. +de la rgyu ni bsam
pa daṅ sbyor ba phun (3) sum tshogs paḥo. bsam pa ni ḥgro ba la phan
13b.1 par bṣed *paḥo. sbyor ba ni ḥgro ba la bstan pa ston paḥo. ḥbras bu
ni raṅ daṅ gṣan gyi don phun sum tshogs paḥo. raṅ don phun sum
tshogs pa ni bde bar gśegs pa ñid kyis te, don gsum ñe bar blaṅs par
13b.2 byaḥo: rab tu *mdses (4) paḥi don ni skyes bu gzugs legs pa bṣin no;
phyir mi ldog paḥi don ni rims nad legs par byaṅ ba bṣin no; ma lus
paḥi don ni bum pa legs par gaṅ ba bṣin te; don gsum po de yaṅ
13b.3 phyi rol gyi ḥdod *chags daṅ bral ba daṅ, slob pa daṅ, mi slob pa
rnams (5) las raṅ don phun sum tshogs pa khyad par du bya baḥi
phyir ro. gṣan don phun sum tshogs pa ni sgrol baḥi don gyis na
skyob pa ñid do.
13b.4 de lta buḥi yon tan can *gyi ston pa la phyag ḥtshal nas, tshad ma
bsgrub par bya baḥi phyir raṅ gi rab tu byed pa rigs[3] paḥi sgo la
sogs pa rnams las (6) ḥdir gcig tu btus te, tshad ma kun las btus pa
13b.5 brtsam par byaḥo. gṣan gyi tshad ma *dgag par bya baḥi phyir daṅ,
raṅ gi tshad maḥi yon tan brjod par bya baḥi phyir te,[4] gaṅ gi phyir
gṣal bya rtogs pa ni tshad ma la rag las pa yin la,[5] ḥdi la yaṅ log par
rtogs[6] (7) pa maṅ bas naḥo.

[1] Vk phan bṣed pa [2] DCPN mar [3] DC rig [4] DC daṅ [5] DC pas
[6] PN rtog

THE PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYAVṚTTI

PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA

TIBETAN TRANSLATION BY KANAKAVARMAN AND DAD-PAḤI ŚES-RAB

SECTION 1. EXPOSITION OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

93b.4 rgya gar skad du, pra mā ṇa sa mu cca ya vṛ tti.[1]

N.96b bod skad du, tshad ma kun las btus paḥi ḥgrel pa.

93b.5 *saṅs rgyas la phyag ḥtshal lo.

A. k.1 tshad mar gyur pa ḥgro la phan par bṣed
ston pa bde gśegs skyob la phyag ḥtshal nas
tshad ma bsgrub phyir raṅ gi gṣuṅ kun las
93b.6 *btus te sna tshogs ḥthor rnams *ḥdir gcig bya*

ḥdir rab tu byed paḥi daṅ por rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu phun sum tshogs
pas tshad mar gyur pa ñid kyis bcom ldan ḥdas la bstod pa brjod pa
93b.7 ni gus pa bskyed par bya baḥi don duḥo. de la rgyu ni *bsam pa daṅ
sbyor ba phun sum tshogs paḥo. bsam pa ni ḥgro ba la phan par bṣed
N.97a paḥo. sbyor ba ni ḥgro ba la bstan pas[2] ston paḥo. +ḥbras bu ni raṅ
93b.8 daṅ gṣan gyi don phun sum tshogs paḥo. raṅ don phun *sum tshogs
pa ni bde bar gśegs pa ñid kyis te, don gsum ñe bar blaṅ bar byaḥo:
rab tu mdses paḥi don ni skyes bu gzugs legs pa bṣin no; phyir mi
94a.1 ldog paḥi don ni rims nad legs par byaṅ ba *bṣin no; ma lus paḥi don
ni bum pa legs par gaṅ ba bṣin te; don gsum po de yaṅ phyi rol paḥi
ḥdod chags daṅ bral ba daṅ, slob pa daṅ, mi slob pa rnams las raṅ
94a.2 don phun sum *tshogs pa khyad par du bya baḥi phyir ro. gṣan don
phun sum tshogs pa ni sgrol baḥi don gyis na skyob pa ñid do.

de lta buḥi yon tan can gyi ston pa la phyag ḥtshal nas, tshad ma
94a.3 bsgrub par bya baḥi phyir raṅ gi rab tu *byed pa rigs paḥi sgo la sogs
pa rnams las ḥdir gcig tu btus te tshad ma kun las btus pa brtsam par
byaḥo. gṣan gyi tshad ma dgag par bya baḥi phyir daṅ, raṅ gi tshad
94a.4 maḥi yon tan brjod par bya baḥi phyir te, *gaṅ gi phyir gṣal bya rtogs
pa ni tshad ma la rag las pa yin la, ḥdi laḥaṅ log par rtogs[3] pa maṅ
bas naḥo.

[1] P pra ma ṇi sa mu ñtsa ya bṛ tti, N pra mā ṇa . . . [2] PN pa [3] PN rtog

B. de la

13b.6 *k.2ab mṅon sum daṅ ni *rjes su dpag*
tshad ma[1]

gñis kho naḥo gaṅ gi phyir ṣe na,

mtshan ñid gñis gṣal bya

raṅ daṅ phyiḥi[2] mtshan ñid dag las gṣan paḥi mtshan ñid gṣal bar bya
13b.7 ba gṣan ni med do. raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can *ni mṅon +sum
C.15a (15a.1) la, spyiḥi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ni rjes su dpag paḥo ṣes śes
paḥo.

gal te ḥdi mi rtag ces bya ba la sogs paḥi rnam pas kha dog la
13b.8 sogs pa ḥdsin pa daṅ, lan cig ma yin pa ḥdsin pa[3] de ji[4] *ltar ṣe na,

de ltar ḥdsin pa ni yod mod kyis ḥon kyaṅ, (2) gṣal bya deḥi rab
sbyor bas,

k.2cd de la rab sbyor [phyir] tshad ma
gṣan [ni yod pa] ma yin [no][5]

N.14a raṅ daṅ +spyiḥi mtshan ñid tha sñad du ma byas pa daṅ kha dog ñid
14a.1 dag las kha dog la sogs *pa gzuṅ nas, spyiḥi mtshan ñid ni kha dog la
sogs pa mi rtag go ṣes mi rtag pa ñid la sogs par yid kyis rab tu sbyor
bar byed do. (3) deḥi phyir tshad ma gṣan ma yin no.

k.3a yaṅ yaṅ śes paḥaṅ ma yin te

14a.2 *gaṅ lan cig ma yin par don de ñid so sor ṅo śes pa yod mod, de ltar
na yaṅ tshad ma gṣan ni ma yin no. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

k.3b thug pa med ḥgyur

gal te śes pa thams cad tshad ma ñid du ḥdod pa de lta na ni (4) tshad
14a.3 ma thug *pa med pa ñid du ḥgyur te,

dran sogs bṣin

dran pa ni dran pa ñid do. dper na dran pa daṅ, ḥdod pa daṅ, ṣe sdaṅ
la sogs pa sṅar rtogs[6] paḥi don la tshad ma gṣan ma yin pa bṣin no.

[1] Vk tshad maḥo [2] P phyi yi [3] CPN *om.* pa [4] C *om.* ji [5] DCPN *om. the words in brackets* [6] CPN rtog

C. de la

14a.4 *k.3c mṅon sum rtog daṅ *bral baḥo*[1]

śes pa gaṅ la rtog pa med pa de mṅon (5) sum mo. rtog pa ṣes bya
ba ḥdi ji lta bu ṣig yin ṣe na,

k.3d miṅ daṅ rigs sogs su sbyor baḥo[1]

ḥdod rgyal baḥi sgra rnams la miṅ gi khyad par du byas nas rjod par
14a.5 *byed de, lhas byin ṣes bya ba daṅ, rigs kyi sgra rnams la ci ste, ba
laṅ ṣes bya ba daṅ, yon tan gyi sgra rnams la (6) yon tan gyis te, dkar

B. de la

k.2 $a-b_1$ mṅon sum daṅ ni rjes su dpag
tshad ma dag ni

gñis kho na ste, gaṅ gi phyir

94a.5 *k.2b_2-c_1 mtshan ñid *gñis*
gṣal bya

raṅ daṅ spyiḥi mtshan ñid dag las gṣan paḥi[1] gṣal bar bya ba[2] med do. raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ni mṅon sum yin la, spyiḥi mtshan ñid
94a.6 kyi yul can ni rjes su *dpag paḥo ṣes śes par byaḥo.

gal te ḥdi ltar ḥdi mi rtag ces bya ba la sogs paḥi rnam pas kha dog la sogs pa ḥdsin pa daṅ, lan cig ma yin par ḥdsin pa de ji ltar ṣe na,
94a.7 de ltar ḥdsin pa ni yod *mod kyi ḥon kyaṅ,

k.2c_2-d de la rab sbyor phyir
tshad ma gṣan ni yod ma yin

raṅ daṅ spyiḥi mtshan ñid dag[3] tha sñad du bya ba ma yin pa daṅ[4]
94a.8 kha dog ñid[5] dag las kha dog la sogs pa bzuṅ nas,[6] *⁺kha dog la sogs
N.97b pa mi rtag go ṣes mi rtag pa ñid la sogs par yid kyis rab tu sbyor bar byed do. deḥi phyir tshad ma gṣan ma yin no.

k.3a yaṅ yaṅ śes paḥaṅ ma yin te

94b.1 gaṅ lan cig ma yin *par don de ñid so sor ṅo śes pa[7] yin mod, de lta na yaṅ tshad ma gṣan ni ma yin no. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

k.3b thug pa med[8] ḥgyur

gal te śes pa thams cad tshad ma ñid du ḥdod pa de lta na ni tshad ma
94b.2 thug pa med pa *ñid du ḥgyur te,

dran sogs bṣin

dran pa ni dran pa ñid do. dper na dran pa daṅ, ḥdod pa daṅ, ṣe sdaṅ la sogs pa sṅar rtogs paḥi don la tshad ma gṣan ma yin pa bṣin no.

[1] PN mtshan ñid *after* gṣan paḥi [2] PN gṣan ni *before* med [3] PN dag las [4] PN pahi [5] PN ḥdi [6] PN spyiḥi mtshan ñid ni *before* kha dog [7] PN so sor ṅes pa [8] N med par

C. de la

94b.3 *k.3c mṅon sum rtog *pa daṅ bral ba*

śes pa gaṅ la rtog pa med pa de ni mṅon sum mo. rtog pa ṣes bya ba ḥdi ji lta bu ṣig ce na,

k.3d miṅ daṅ rigs sogs bsres pa ḥo[1]

94b.4 ḥdod rgyal baḥi sgra rnams la miṅ gis[2] khyad par du byas nas *don brjod par byed de, lhas byin ṣes bya ba daṅ, rigs kyi sgra rnams la rigs kyis[3] ste, ba laṅ ṣes bya ba daṅ, yon tan gyi sgra rnams la yon

po ṣes bya ba daṅ, bya baḥi sgra rnams la bya baḥi sgo nas te, ḥtshed[2]
14a.6 pa ṣes bya ba daṅ, *rdsas kyi sgra rnams la rdsas kyi sgo nas te, dbyug
pa can rva can ṣes bya ba lta buḥo.

ḥdi la kha cig na re ḥbrel ba khyad du byas paḥi sgra yin no ṣes zer ro.

gṣan dag ni don (7) gyis stoṅ paḥi sgra ḥbaḥ ṣig gis don rnams
14a.7 *khyad par du[3] byas śiṅ brjod do ṣes ḥdod do.

gaṅ la rtog pa de dag med pa de mṅon sum mo.

[1] Vk miṅ daṅ rigs sogs su sbyor baḥi, rtog pa daṅ bral mṅon sum mo
[2] P mchod [3] PN *om.* du

Daa–1. ci gaṅ gi phyir gñis la brten nas skyed[1] paḥi rnam par śes
14a.8 paḥi dbaṅ po la brten paḥo ṣes brjod kyi, yul la brten *pa ṣes ci ma
N.14b +yin[2] (15b.1) ṣe na,
C.15b *k.4ab thun moṅ min[3] paḥi rgyu +yi phyir*
de yi tha sñad dbaṅ pos byas[4]

yul gzugs la sogs pa ni ma yin no. ḥdi ltar yul ni rgyud gṣan gyi yid
14b.1 kyi rnam par śes pa daṅ yaṅ thun moṅ yin no. *thun moṅ ma yin pa
la tha sñad byed pa yaṅ mthoṅ ste, dper na rṅaḥi sgra nas kyi myu
(2) gu ṣes pa bṣin no.

de lta bas na mṅon sum rtog pa daṅ bral bar ḥthad pa yin no.

[1] CPN skyes [2] C *om.* ci ma yin [3] D yin [4] DCPN dbaṅ po las

14b.2 *Daa–2.* chos mṅon pa las kyaṅ, "mig gi rnam par śes *pa daṅ ldan
pas sṅon po śes kyi sṅon poḥo sñam du ni ma yin no," "don la don
du ḥdu śes kyi don la chos su ḥdu śes pa ni ma yin no" ṣes gsuṅs
(3) so.

Dab. gal te de[1] gcig tu mi rtog na "rnam par śes pa lṅa po de ḥdus
14b.3 *pa la dmigs pa" ji ltar yin, gaṅ yaṅ skye mched kyi raṅ gi mtshan
ñid la so so raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can yin gyi, rdsas kyi raṅ gi
mtshan ñid la ni ma yin no ṣes kyaṅ ji ltar gsuṅs śe na,
14b.4 *k.4cd der don du mas* (4) *bskyed *paḥi phyir*
raṅ don spyi yi spyod yul can

de rdsas du mas bskyed par bya baḥi phyir na raṅ gi skye mched la spyiḥi spyod yul can ṣes brjod kyi, tha dad pa la tha mi dad par rtogs pa las ni ma yin no.

[1] CPN *om.* de

14b.5 *Dac.* don ḥdi ñid *smras pa.

tan gyis te, dkar po ṣes bya ba daṅ, bya baḥi sgra rnams la bya
94b.5 *baḥi sgo nas te, ḥtshed par byed pa daṅ, rdsas kyi sgra rnams la
rdsas kyi sgo nas te, dbyug pa can rva can ṣes bya ba lta buḥo.

ḥdi la kha cig na re ḥbrel bas khyad par du byas pas[4] yin no ṣes zer ro.

94b.6 gṣan *dag ni don gyis stoṅ paḥi sgra ḥbaḥ ṣig gis don rnams khyad
par du byas śiṅ brjod do ṣes ḥdod do.

gaṅ la rtog pa de dag med pa de mṅon sum mo.

[1] KkPN paḥo [2] PN gi [3] PN kyi [4] PN paḥi

94b.7 *Daa–1.* ci ste gaṅ gi phyir gñis la brten nas bskyed paḥi *rnam par
śes pa la dbaṅ po la brten pa ṣes brjod kyi, yul la rten pa cis na ma
yin ṣe na,

k.4ab thun moṅ min paḥi rgyu yi phyir
de yi tha sñad dbaṅ pos byas

94b.8 yul gzugs la sogs pa la ni ma yin *no. ḥdi ltar yul ni rgyud gṣan gyi
N.98a daṅ yid kyi rnam par śes pa daṅ thun moṅ pa yin no. thun +moṅ ma
yin pa las tha sñad byed pa yaṅ mthoṅ ste, dper na rṅaḥi sgra daṅ nas
kyi myu gu ṣes pa bṣin no.
95a.1 de lta *bas na mṅon sum rtog pa daṅ bral ba ḥthad pa yin no.

Daa–2. chos mṅon pa las kyaṅ "mig gi rnam par śes pa daṅ ldan
pas sṅon po śes kyi sṅon poḥo sñam du ni ma yin no," "don la don
95a.2 du ḥdu *śes kyi don la chos su ḥdu śes pa ni ma yin no" ṣes gsuṅs so.

Dab. gal te de gcig tu mi rtog pa yin na "rnam par śes pa lṅa po de
bsags pa la dmigs pa" ji ltar yin, gaṅ yaṅ[1] "skye mched kyi raṅ gi
95a.3 mtshan *ñid la so so raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can yin gyi, rdsas kyi
raṅ gi mtshan ñid la ni ma yin no" ṣes kyaṅ ji ltar gsuṅs śe na,

k.4cd der don du mas[2] bskyed paḥi phyir
raṅ don spyi yi[3] spyod yul can

95a.4 de rdsas du mas *bskyed par bya ba yin paḥi phyir raṅ gi skye mched
la spyiḥi spyod yul can ṣes brjod kyi, tha dad pa la tha mi[4] dad par
rtog pa las ni ma yin no.

[1] PN la [2] PN ma [3] PN spyiḥi [4] PN *om.* mi

Dac. smars paḥaṅ,[1]

k.5 *du maḥi ṅo boḥi chos can ni*[1]
dbaṅ po las rtogs srid ma yin
(5) *raṅ raṅ rig bya tha sñad kyis*
bstan bya min na dbaṅ poḥi yul[2]

de ltar na re ṣig dbaṅ po lṅa las skyes paḥi mṅon sum gyi śes pa rtog
14b.6 *pa med pa yin yaṅ,
gṣan gyi ḥdod pa la brten nas ḥdir khyad par byas pa ste, de dag ni thams cad du rtog pa med pa ḥbaḥ ṣig go.

[1] P no [2] Vk bstan min ṅo bo dbaṅ poḥi yul

Db. *k.6ab* *yid kyaṅ don* (6) *daṅ chags la sogs*
raṅ rig rtog pa med pa yin

14b.7 yid kyaṅ *yul gzugs la sogs pa la dmigs śiṅ ñams su myoṅ baḥi rnam
pas ḥjug pa ste, rtog pa med pa ḥbaḥ ṣig go. ḥdod chags daṅ ṣe sdaṅ
14b.8 daṅ gti mug daṅ bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal la sogs pa ni dbaṅ po (7) la *mi
N.15a +bltos paḥi phyir, raṅ rig paḥi mṅon sum mo.

Dc. de bṣin du,

k.6cd *rnal ḥbyor rnams kyi bla ma yis*
bstan don tha dad tsam ṣig mthoṅ[1]

rnal ḥbyor ba rnams kyis kyaṅ luṅ las rnam par rtog pa daṅ ma ḥdres
15a.1 paḥi don *tsam mthoṅ ba ni mṅon sum mo.

[1] Vk . . . bla mas bstan, ma ḥdres pa yi don tsam mthoṅ

C.16a *Dd.* re +ṣig[1] gal te ḥdod chags la (16a.1) sogs paḥi raṅ rig pa mṅon
sum yin na rtog paḥi śes pa yaṅ mṅon sum du ḥgyur ro[2] ṣe na, de ni
bden te,

k.7ab *rtog pahaṅ raṅ rig ñid du ḥdod*
15a.2 **don la ma yin de rtog phyir*

de yul la ni ḥdod chags la sogs pa ñid bṣin[3] du mṅon sum ma yin yaṅ raṅ rig go ṣes bya baḥi (2) skyon ni med do.

de dag ni mṅon sum mo.

[1] C śig [2] PN *om.* ro [3] PN *om.* bṣin

E. *k.7cd* *ḥkhrul daṅ kun rdsob śes pa*[1] *daṅ*
15a.3 *rjes *dpag rjes su dpag las byuṅ*
k.8ab *dran daṅ mṅon ḥdod ces bya ba*[2]
mṅon sum ltar snaṅ rab rib bcas

re ṣig ḥkhrul baḥi śes pa ni smig rgyu la sogs pa la chu la sogs par
15a.4 rtog paḥi (3) phyir mṅon sum ltar *snaṅ baḥo. kun rdsob tu yod pa
ni don gṣan[3] sgro ḥdogs pas na deḥi ṅo bor brtags nas ḥjug paḥi

k.5 *du maḥi ṅo boḥi chos can ni*
95a.5 *dbaṅ po las rtogs *srid ma yin*
raṅ gi rig bya bstan min pa
gzugs ni dbaṅ poḥi spyod yul yin

de ltar na re śig dbaṅ po lha las skyes paḥi mṅon sum gyi śes pa rtog pa med pa yin no.[2]
95a.6 gṣan gyi ḥdod pa la *ltos nas ḥdir khyad par du byas pa yin gyi, thams cad kyaṅ rtog pa med pa yin no.

[1] PN don smras pa [2] PN yaṅ

Db. *k.6ab* *yid kyaṅ don daṅ chags la sogs*
raṅ rig rtog pa med pa yin
95a.7 yid kyaṅ yul gzugs la sogs pa la *dmigs śiṅ ñams su myoṅ baḥi rnam pas ḥjug pa ste, rtog pa med pa ñid do. ḥdod chags daṅ ṣe sdaṅ daṅ gti mug daṅ bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal la sogs pa la yaṅ raṅ rig pa[1] dbaṅ
95a.8 po la mi ltos paḥi phyir *yid kyi[2] mṅon sum mo.

[1] PN ni *instead of* la yaṅ raṅ rig pa [2] PN raṅ rig paḥi *instead of* yid kyi

Dc. de bṣin du,

k.6cd *rnal ḥbyor rnams kyi bla mas bstan*
ma ḥdres pa yi don tsam mthoṅ
N.98b rnal ḥbyor ba rnams kyis kyaṅ luṅ las rnam par rtog +pa daṅ ma
95b.1 ḥdres paḥi don tsam mthoṅ ba ni *mṅon sum mo.

Dd. gal te ḥdod chags la sogs paḥi[1] raṅ rig pa[2] mṅon sum yin na, rtog paḥi śes paḥaṅ mṅon sum du ḥgyur ro ṣe na, de ni bden te,

k.7ab *rtog paḥaṅ raṅ rig ñid du ḥdod*
95b.2 *don la ma yin *der rtog phyir*

de yul la ni ḥdod chags sogs pa ñid bṣin du mṅon sum ma yin yaṅ, raṅ rig pa la ni ma yin paḥi phyir skyon med do.

de ltar de dag ni mṅon sum mo.

[1] PN pa [2] PN paḥi

95b.3 *E.* *k.7cd* *ḥkhrul daṅ kun rdsob *yod śes daṅ*
rjes dpag rjes su dpag las byuṅ
k.8ab *dran daṅ mṅon ḥdod ṣes bya ḥo*[1]
mṅon sum ltar snaṅ rab rib bcas[2]

re ṣig ḥkhrul paḥi śes pa ni smig rgyu la sogs pa la chu la sogs par
95b.4 *brtags nas ḥjug paḥi phyir mṅon sum ltar snaṅ baḥo. kun rdsob tu yod paḥi śes pa ni[3] kun rdsob tu yod pa rnams la[4] don gṣan sgro

phyir mṅon sum ltar snaṅ baḥo. rjes su dpag pa deḥi ḥbras bu la sogs
15a.5 paḥi śes pa ni sṅar ñams su myoṅ *myoṅ ba la rtog paḥi phyir mṅon
sum ma yin no.

[1] DCPN kun rdsob yid śes [2] Vk bya baḥo [3] DC bṣin

F. ḥdir yaṅ,

k.8cd *bya daṅ* (4) *bcas par rtogs paḥi phyir*
tshad maḥi ḥbras bu ñid du ḥdod[1]

ḥdi la phyi rol pa rnams kyi bṣin du tshad ma las ḥbras bu don gṣan
15a.6 du ḥgyur ba *ni med kyi, ḥbras bur gyur baḥi śes pa de ñid yul gyi
rnam pa can du skyes pa daṅ bya ba daṅ bcas par rtogs pa de ñe bar
blaṅs nas, tshad ma ñid du ḥdogs[2] pa ste, (5) bya ba med paḥaṅ ma
15a.7 yin no. dper na ḥbras *bu rgyu daṅ rjes su mthun par skyes pa la
rgyuḥi gzugs ḥdsin ṣes brjod do. bya ba med par yaṅ ma yin pa de
bṣin du ḥdir yaṅ yin no.

[1] Vk ḥbras bu ñid yin ḥjal byed la [2] DC ḥdod

G. *k.9a* *raṅ rig la yaṅ ḥdir ḥbras bu*[1]

N.15b śes pa ni snaṅ ba gñis +las skyes te, *raṅ gi snaṅ ba daṅ yul gyi snaṅ
15a.8 baḥo. snaṅ (6) ba de gñis las gaṅ raṅ[2] rig pa de ni ḥbras bur ḥgyur
ro. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

k.9b *de yi ṅo bo las don ṅes*

gaṅ gi tshe śes pa don gyi yul daṅ bcas pa[3] deḥi tshe, de daṅ rjes
15b.1 *su mthun paḥi raṅ rig pa ḥdod pa ḥam mi ḥdod paḥi don rtogs par
byed do.

gaṅ gi tshe phyi rol gyi don ḥbaḥ ṣig gṣal (7) byar byed pa deḥi
tshe ni,

k.9c–d_1 *yul gyi snaṅ ba ḥdi ñid ḥdi*[4]
tshad ma

15b.2 deḥi tshe ni śes pa raṅ rig pa yin yaṅ, ltos[5] *pa med paḥi raṅ gi ṅo
boḥi don gyis snaṅ ba ḥdi tshad maḥo. gaṅ gi phyir ṣe na, don de[6]

*k.9*d_2 *de yis ḥjal bar byed*

C.16b ji lta ji ltar don gyi rnam pa dkar +po daṅ dkar po ma yin pa la sogs
15b.3 pa ñid śes pa (16b.1) la snaṅ ba na de daṅ deḥi ṅo boḥi *yul daṅ bcas
par ḥjal bar byed de,

de ltar rnam pa du ma rig paḥi śes pa ñe bar blaṅs pa la[7] de lta de ltar[8] tshad ma daṅ gṣal bya ñid du ñe bar ḥdogs pa yin te, chos thams cad ni bya ba daṅ bral ba yin pas naḥo.

15b.4 de ñid *smras pa.

btags nas deḥi ṅo bor brtags nas ḥjug paḥi phyir mṅon sum ltar snaṅ
95b.5 baḥo. rjes su dpag pa *daṅ deḥi ḥbras bu la sogs paḥi śes pa ni sṅar ñams su myoṅ ba la rtog paḥi phyir mṅon sum ma yin no.

[1] PN byaḥo [2] P cas, N ces (?) [3] PN yod pa ni *instead of* yod paḥi śes pa ni [4] PN raṅ la *instead of* kun rdsob . . . rnams la

F. ḥdir yaṅ,

k.8cd *bya daṅ bcas par*[1] *rtogs paḥi phyir*
ḥbras bu ñid du yod tshad ma

95b.6 ḥdi la phyi rol *pa rnams kyi bṣin du tshad ma las ḥbras bu don gṣan du gyur ba ni med kyi, ḥbras bur gyur baḥi śes pa de ñid[2] yul gyi rnam pa can du skyes pa daṅ, bya ba daṅ bcas par[3] rtog pa de ñe bar
95b.7 blaṅs nas, tshad ma ñid du *ḥdogs pa ste, bya ba med par yaṅ yin[4] no. dper na ḥbras bu rgyu daṅ rjes su mthun par skyes pa la rgyuḥi gzugs ḥdsin ces brjod de, bya ba med pa yaṅ yin[5] pa de bṣin du ḥdir yaṅ yin no.

[1] PN pa [2] PN *om.* ñid [3] PN pa [4] PN med paḥaṅ ma yin [5] PN ma yin

95b.8 *G.* *k.9a* *yaṅ *na raṅ rig ḥdir ḥbras bu*[1]
śes pa ni[2] gñis su snaṅ bar skyes te, raṅ gi snaṅ ba daṅ yul gyi snaṅ baḥo. snaṅ ba de[3] gñis la gaṅ raṅ rig pa de ni ḥbras bur ḥgyur ro. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

96a.1 *k.9b* *de yi*[4] *ṅo bo las *don ṅes*

N.99a gaṅ gi tshe śes +pa yul daṅ bcas pa don yin pa deḥi tshe [5]···raṅ rig pa daṅ rjes su mthun par don ḥdod paḥam mi ḥdod pa rtogs par···[5] byed do.

96a.2 gaṅ gi tshe phyi rol gyi don ḥbaḥ ṣig *gṣal byar byed pa deḥi tshe ni,

k.9c–d_1 *yul gyi snaṅ ba ñid de ḥdiḥi*
tshad ma

deḥi tshe ni śes pa raṅ rig par bya ba[6] yin yaṅ raṅ gi ṅo bo la mi bltos par[7] don gyi snaṅ ba ḥdiḥi tshad maḥo. gaṅ gi phyir don de

96a.3 *k.9d_2* *de yis*[8] *ḥjal *bar bya*[9]

ji lta ji ltar don gyi rnam pa dkar po daṅ dkar po ma yin pa la sogs pa ñid śes pa la snaṅ ba na de daṅ deḥi ṅo boḥi yul de[10] ḥjal bar byed[11] do.

96a.4 de ltar rnam pa du ma rig paḥi śes pa *ñe bar blaṅs pa de lta de ltar tshad ma daṅ gṣal bya ñid du ñe bar ḥdogs pa yin te, chos thams cad ni bya ba daṅ bral ba yin paḥi phyir ro.

ḥdi ñid smras pa.

k.10 *gaṅ tshe snaṅ ba*[9] *de gṣal bya*
tshad ma daṅ (2) *deḥi ḥbras bu ni*[10]
ḥdsin rnam rig pa[11] *de yi phyir*
de gsum tha dad du ma byas

[1] Vk yaṅ na raṅ rig ḥbras bu ste [2] DC daṅ [3] DC paḥi [4] Vk . . . snaṅ ba ñid de ḥdiḥi [5] PN bltos [6] DC *om.* de [7] DC *om.* la [8] C *om.* de lta de ltar, PN de ltar [9] DCPN rnam pa [10] Vk . . . daṅ ni deḥi ḥbras bu [11] Vk ḥdsin daṅ rnam rig, DC rnams rigs *instead of* rnam rig

Ha. ci ste śes pa tshul gñis so ṣes ji ltar rtogs par bya ṣe na,
15b.5 *k.11ab* *yul śes pa daṅ deḥi*[1] **śes paḥi*[2]
dbye bas blo yi tshul gñis ñid[3]
yul ni gzugs la sogs pa ste gaṅ gis de śes pa ni don daṅ (3) raṅ snaṅ baḥo. yul śes pa ni gaṅ yul daṅ rjes su mthun paḥi śes pa ste, śes pa
15b.6 de[4] snaṅ ba daṅ, *raṅ snaṅ baḥo. de ltar ma yin te, gal te gzugs ñid raṅ śes pa ḥam raṅ gi ṅo bor ḥgyur na ni śes pa yaṅ yul śes pa daṅ khyad par med par ḥgyur ro.

[1] Vk de [2] DC paḥo [3] DC ni [4] DC ste

Hb. phyis[1] rjes la skye baḥi (4) śes pa la yaṅ sṅar riṅ du ḥdas paḥi
15b.7 *yul snaṅ bar mi ḥgyur te, gaṅ gi phyir ṣe na, de yul ma yin paḥi phyir ro. deḥi phyir śes pa la tshul gñis yod par grub bo.

[1] PN phyi

Hc–1. *k.11c* *dus phyis dran pa las kyaṅ ste*
N.16a tshul gñis ñid do ṣes ḥbrel +to. gaṅ gi phyir *yul bṣin[1] du śes pa la
15b.8 (5) yaṅ dus phyis myoṅ baḥi dran pa skye ste,[2] deḥi phyir yaṅ śes paḥi tshul gñis ñid du grub pa yin no. raṅ rig pa ñid du yaṅ ṅo. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,
k.11d *ma myoṅ bar ḥdi med phyir ro*[3]
16a.1 ñams su *ma myoṅ bar don mthoṅ baḥi dran pa ni med do. gzugs la sogs paḥi dran pa bṣin no.

[1] DC gṣan [2] PN bskyed de [3] DCPN ḥdir ma myoṅ ba med phyir ro

Hc–2. ci ste gzugs (6) la sogs pa bṣin du śes pa[1] yaṅ śes pa gṣan gyis
16a.2 myoṅ ba yin no ṣe na,[2] de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te, *gaṅ gi[3] phyir
k.12a–b₁ *śes pa gṣan gyis ñams myoṅ na*
thug med
thug pa med pa ṣes bya ba ni śes pa gṣan[4] gyis myoṅ bar byed naḥo. ji ltar ṣe na,
k.12b₂ *de laḥaṅ dran pa ste*

k.10 *gaṅ ltar*[12] *snaṅ ba de gṣal bya*
96a.5 *tshad ma daṅ deḥi *ḥbras bu ni*
ḥdsin rnam rig paḥo de yi[13] *phyir*
de gsum tha dad du ma byas

[1] PN ḥbras bu yin *instead of* ḥdir ḥbras bu [2] PN ḥdir *after* ni [3] PN *om.* de [4] PN deḥi [5] PN de daṅ rjes su mthun paḥi raṅ rig pa ḥdod paḥam mi ḥdod paḥi don rtog par [6] PN raṅ rig pa *instead of* raṅ rig par bya ba [7] PN paḥi [8] PN yi [9] PN byed [10] PN yul daṅ bacs pa *instead of* yul de [11] P byad [12] PN tshe [13] P deḥi

Ha. ji ste śes pa[1] tshul gñis so ṣes ji ltar rtogs[2] par bya ṣe na,
k.11ab *yul śes pa daṅ de śes paḥi*
96a.6 *dbye bas blo yi*[3] *tshul *gñis ñid*
yul ni gzugs la sogs pa ste, gaṅ gis[4] de śes pa de[5] ni don daṅ raṅ snaṅ baḥo. [6]···yul śes pa la gaṅ śes pa de ni···[6] yul daṅ rjes su mthun paḥi
96a.7 śes paḥi[7] snaṅ ba daṅ, raṅ snaṅ baḥo. *gṣan du na gal te [8]···yul śes pa yul gyi ṅo bo ñid ḥam···[8] raṅ gi ṅo bo ñid du[9] gyur na ni śes pa śes pa yaṅ yul śes pa daṅ khyad par med par ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN paḥi [2] PN rtog [3] PN bloḥi [4] PN gi [5] PN *om.* de [6]··· ···[6] PN yul śes pa ni gaṅ [7] PN śes pa ste, śes pa de [8]··· ···[8] PN yul gyi ṅo bo ñid raṅ śes pa ḥam [9] PN ṅo bor

Hb. phyis rjes su las skyes paḥi śes pa la yaṅ sṅar riṅ du ḥdas
96a.8 *paḥi yul snaṅ bar mi ḥgyur te, gaṅ gi phyir de yul ma yin paḥi phyir ro. deḥi phyir śes pa la tshul gñis yod par grub po.

Hc–1. *k.11c* *dus phyis dran pa las kyaṅ ṅo*
96b.1 tshul gñis ñid do[1] ṣes ḥbrel to. *gaṅ gi phyir yul bṣin du śes pa[2]
N.99b +la yaṅ dus phyis myoṅ baḥi dran pa skyes te, deḥi phyir yaṅ śes paḥi tshul gñis ñid[3] grub pa yin no. raṅ rig pa ñid du yaṅ ṅo. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,
96b.2 *k.11d* *gaṅ phyir ma myoṅ bar *ḥdi med*
ñams su ma myoṅ bar don dran pa ni mthoṅ ba med de, gzugs la sogs paḥi dran pa bṣin no.

[1] PN duḥo [2] PN paḥi [3] PN *om.* ñid

Hc–2. ci ste gzugs la sogs pa bṣin du śes pa yaṅ śes pa gṣan gyis[1]
96b.3 myoṅ ba yin no ṣe na, *de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir
k.12a–b₁ *śes pa gṣan gyis ñams myoṅ na*
thug med
thug pa med pa ṣes bya ba ḥdi śes pa śes pa gṣan gyis myoṅ bar byed naḥo. ci ltar ṣe na,
96b.4 *k.12b₂* *de laḥaṅ*[2] *dran *pa ste*

16a.3 śes pa (7) gṣan gyis śes pa de ñams su myoṅ bar *byed na, de la yaṅ phyis kyi dran pa mthoṅ dgos pas so. des na de la yaṅ śes pa gṣan gyis ñams su myoṅ ba yin na ni thug pa med par ḥgyur ro.

[1] DC *om.* śes pa [2] PN *om.* ṣe na [3] DC *om.* gi [4] DC bṣin

Hc–3. k.12cd de bṣin yul gṣan la ḥpho ba
med ḥgyur de yaṅ mthoṅ ba ñid[1]

16a.4 *deḥi phyir gdon mi za (17a.1) bar raṅ rig paḥi +śes pa khas blaṅ bar
C.17a byaḥo. de yaṅ ḥbras bu ñid du gnas par grub bo.[2]

de ltar na mṅon sum rtog pa daṅ bral ba yin no.

[1] Vk mthoṅ phyir ro [2] DC *om.* bo

SECTION 2. EXAMINATION OF THE VĀDAVIDHI DEFINITION

16a.5 *A.* (17a.1) deḥi rjes la[1] gṣan gyis byas paḥi mṅon sum brtag *par bya ste,

k.1 rtsod sgrub slob dpon gyi[2] *ma yin*
ṅes par sñiṅ po med (2) *par dgoṅs*
gṣan du cha śas su gsuṅ ḥgyur
des na kho bos brtag par byaḥo[3]

16a.6 rtsod pa sgrub[4] pa ni slob dpon dbyig gñen gyi ma yin no. gaṅ *gi phyir rtsod pa sgrub pa de la ni slob dpon gyis sñiṅ po med par dgoṅs pa ste, de lta ma yin na cha śas can du mdsad par ḥgyur ro. (3) de na kho bos kyaṅ tshad ma la sogs pa cuṅ zad cig brtag par byaḥo.

[1] DC su [2] DCN gyis [3] Vk bya [4] DC bsgrub

16a.7 *B.* don de *las skyes paḥi rnam śes mṅon sum yin ṣes bya ba ḥdir,
N.16b *k.2ab kun la don +ḥdi ṣes brjod na*[1]
gaṅ de de ḥbaḥ ṣig las min

gal te de la[2] ṣes bya ba ḥdis rkyen kun brjod pa yin na ni, śes pa gaṅ
16a.8 yul gaṅ la (4) *skyes pa deḥi tha sñad du byaḥi, de ḥbaḥ ṣig las ni ma yin no. dmigs paḥi rkyen ḥbaḥ ṣig las śes pa ni ma yin no. "sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba rnams bṣi[3] las skye baḥo" ṣes grub paḥi mthaḥ
16b.1 las *ḥbyuṅ baḥi phyir ro.

[1] Vk don de ṣes pas kun brjod na [2] DC la de *instead of* de la [3] DC gṣi

śes pa gaṅ dag gis śes pa de ñams su myoṅ bar byed pa[3] de la yaṅ phyis dran pa mthoṅ dgos pas so. des na de la yaṅ śes pa gṣan gyis[4] ñams su myoṅ ba yin na ni thug pa med par ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN gyi [2] PN la yaṅ [3] PN na [4] PN gyi

96b.5 *Hc–3. k.12cd *de ltar yul gṣan dag la ḥpho*[1]
med ḥgyur de yaṅ ḥdod pa ḥo[2]

deḥi phyir gdon mi za bar raṅ rig paḥi śes pa khas blaṅ bar byaḥo. de yaṅ ḥbras bu ñid de,

96b.6 de ltar na mṅon sum rtog *pa daṅ bral ba ṣes bya ba ḥdi gnas pa yin no.

[1] PN de bṣin du, yul gṣan dag la ḥpho ba ni [2] PN ḥdod phyir ro

SECTION 2. EXAMINATION OF THE VĀDAVIDHI DEFINITION

A. deḥi rjes la gṣan gyis byas paḥi mṅon sum brtag par bya ste,

k.1 rtsod sgrub slob dpon gyi[1] *ma yin*
sñiṅ po ṅes par ma dgoṅs so[2]
96b.7 *cha śas gṣan du *smra baḥi phyir*
des na kho bos brtag par bya

rtsod pa bsgrub pa ni slob dpon dbyig gñen gyi ma yin no. yaṅ na de la slob dpon gyis sñiṅ po ma dgoṅs pa yin te, gaṅ gi phyir rtsod pa
96b.8 bsgrub par byed *par[3] cha śas gṣan du bkod pa yin paḥi phyir ro. des na kho bos kyaṅ tshad ma la sogs pa cuṅ zad cag brtag par byaḥo.

[1] Kk gyis [2] Kk pa [3] PN rtsod pa bsgrub par

B. "don de las skyes paḥi rnam par śes pa mṅon sum yin no" ṣes
97a.1 bya ba *ḥdir,

k.2ab don de ṣes pas kun brjod na
gaṅ de de ḥbaḥ ṣig las min

gal te de las ṣes bya ba ḥdis[1] rkyen kun brjod pa yin na ni, śes pa gaṅ
N.100a yul +gaṅ las skyes pa deḥi tha sñad du byaḥi de ḥbaḥ *ṣig las ni ma
97a.2 yin no. dmigs paḥi rkyen ḥbaḥ ṣig las śes pa skye ba ni ma yin te, "bṣi yis[2] sems daṅ sems byuṅ rnams" ṣes grub paḥi mthaḥ las ḥbyuṅ baḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN ḥdiḥi PN gṣi yi

C. *k.2cd* *dmigs paḥo ṣe na dran sogs kyi*
śes paḥaṅ (5) *gṣan la ltos*[1] *ma yin*
gal te don de[2] las ṣes pa ḥdis yul tsam yin na ni, dran pa daṅ rjes su
16b.2 dpag pa daṅ mṅon par ḥdod pa la *sogs paḥi śes pa yaṅ dmigs par
bya ba gṣan la mi ltos te, dud pa la sogs pa dmigs nas me la sogs paḥi
śes pa skye ba ni ma yin no.

[1] PN bltos [2] PN ḥdi

16b.3 *D.* (6) gzugs la sogs pa ñid la dmigs pa la[1] don du brjod par *bya
graṅ na, ci śes pa skye ba de ltar snaṅ ba de la de bṣin du dmigs nas
skye ba yin nam, de ste gṣan du snaṅ du zin kyaṅ ji ltar yod paḥi de
rgyur ḥgyur ba yin graṅ.

[1] DC *om.* la

16b.4 *Da–1.* de las cir ḥgyur ṣe na, gal te ji lta ba de las *śes pa skye na
ni de ltar (7) na bsags pa la dmigs pa yin paḥi phyir lṅa po kun rdsob
par ḥgyur te, de ñid la dmigs pa yin paḥi phyir ro.

Da–2. sṅon po la sogs par snaṅ baḥi śes pa la don de las skyes paḥi
16b.5 *śes pa mṅon sum du ḥgyur ro ṣes ḥdod pa de lta na ni, tshogs la de
C.17b dag la khas blaṅs pa bden yaṅ yod paḥi +rdsas (17b.1) kyi rnam pa
ñid thob ste, de ñid[1] rdsas la sogs pa ñid du snaṅ bas na rdsas daṅ
16b.6 graṅs la sogs *paḥi rnam pa yaṅ ḥthob bo.

[1] PN *insert* la *after* ñid

Db. de ste ji ltar yod pa rgyur ḥgyur[1] na ni, de ltar rdsas la sogs pa
ni thal baḥi ñes par mi ḥgyur te, de ltar na de dag med paḥi phyir ro.
16b.7 de ltar na yaṅ gaṅ la[2] tha sñad du (2) bya ba ste de ni ḥthob *par mi
N.17a ḥgyur te, de dag so so +la śes pa yod pa[3] ma yin no. so so ba de dag
ḥdus pa rgyu yin yaṅ de ḥdus par yod pa la sogs pa ni khas ma
blaṅs so.

[1] DC gyur [2] DC *insert* yaṅ *after* la [3] PN yod pa ni

Dc. de ñid smras pa.
k.3 *ji ltar snaṅ ba de yod min*
16b.8 *de *yi phyir na don dam du*
sems kyi dmigs pa lṅa rnams (3) *so*[1]
de la tha sñad du ma byas

[1] Vk lṅa po bsags la dmigs paḥi phyir

97a.3 *C.* *k.2cd* *dmigs paḥo ṣe na *dran sogs kyi*
śes paḥaṅ[1] *gṣan la bltos ma yin*
gal te don de las ṣes pa ḥdi yul tsam la yin na ni dran pa daṅ rjes su
97a.4 dpag pa daṅ mṅon par ḥdod pa la sogs paḥi śes pa yaṅ dmigs par *bya
ba gṣan la mi bltos te, me la sogs paḥi śes pa ni du ba la sogs pa la
dmigs pa ni ma yin no.

[1] PN pa

D. gzugs la sogs pa rnams[1] la dmigs paḥi don[2] brjod par bya graṅ
97a.5 na, ci gaṅ snaṅ ba de *rnams la śes pa skye ba de ltar de dag dmigs
par brjod pa yin nam, ci ste gṣan snaṅ du zin kyaṅ ji ltar yod pa śes
paḥi rgyur ḥgyur graṅ.

[1] PN ñid [2] PN dmigs pa la don du

97a.6 *Da–1.* de las cir ḥgyur ṣe na, gal te ji ltar snaṅ ba de de *dag la śes
pa skye na ni, de ltar na rnam par śes paḥi tshogs lṅa ni bsags pa la
dmigs pa yin paḥi phyir, kun rdsob tu yod pa[1] ñid dmigs pa ṣes bya
ba khas blaṅs paḥo.[2]

[1] PN par [2] PN nas

97a.7 *Da–2.* sṅon po la sogs par snaṅ *baḥi śes pa rnams don de las skyes
paḥi rnam par śes pa yin paḥi phyir mṅon sum ñid du ḥgyur ro, ṣes
ḥdod pa.[1] de ltar na de dag la de tshogs pa la btags par yod na[2] yaṅ
97a.8 rdsas su yod paḥi rnam pa ñid ḥthob *ste, de ñid rdsas la sogs pa
ñid du snaṅ bas na rdsas daṅ graṅs la sogs paḥi rnam pa laḥaṅ
thob bo.

[1] PN *om.* ṣes ḥdod pa [2] PN bsags pa tha dad du yod pa yin *instead of* tshogs pa . . . na

Db. ji ste ji ltar yod pa las gṣan du snaṅ yaṅ śes paḥi rgyur ḥgyur
97b.1 na ni, de ltar na rdsas la sogs *pa la thal baḥi ñes par ni mi ḥgyur te,
de ltar de dag med paḥi phyir ro. de ltar na yaṅ gaṅ las gaṅ ṣes tha
sñad du bya ba de ni thob par mi ḥgyur te, de dag so so ba la śes pa
97b.2 yod pa ma yin no. de dag *bsags pa na yaṅ so so ba rgyu yin gyi de
bsags pa ni ma yin te, tha sñad du yod paḥi phyir ro.

J.100b *Dc.* +de ñid smras pa.
k.3 *gaṅ snaṅ ba de de las min*[1]
lṅa po bsags pa[2] *dmigs paḥi phyir*
97b.3 *gaṅ las de ni *don dam par*[3]
de la tha sñad du ma byas
ṣes bya ba ni bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad paḥo.

[1] KkPN gaṅ ṣig snaṅ ba de las min [2] Kk la [3] KkPN pa

Dd. dmigs pa la sogs pa yaṅ dmigs par bya ba ñid du thal bar
17a.1 ḥgyur te, de dag ni don dam par yod pas so. *gṣan du na yod pa ma yin pa zla ba gñis la sogs par snaṅ ba yaṅ sṅon po la sogs par snaṅ baḥi śes paḥi rgyur ḥgyur ro.

E. *k.4* (4) *don gyi tshul gyis dben pa yaṅ*
brjod bya ma yin

17a.2 śes pa thams cad don gyi *tshul daṅ bral na yaṅ tha sñad du bya bar mi nus so.

yul ḥdiḥi yaṅ
spyi yi tshul gyis bstan par bya
des na tha sñad du mi bya

rnam par śes pa lṅa rnams kyi yul ni yul deḥi spyiḥi[1] tshul gyis tha
17a.3 sñad du bya ba yin gyi, (5) raṅ gyi *ṅo boḥi tshul gyis tha sñad du bya ba ni ma yin no. spyiḥi ṅo boḥi tshul las ni gzugs la sogs pa tha sñad du byed do. deḥi phyir rnam par śes pa lṅa rnams kyi yul ni tha sñad du bya bar mi nus so ṣes bya ba ni rtsod pa sgrub pa laḥo.[2]

[1] DC *om.* spyiḥi [2] PN sgrub paḥo

SECTION 3. EXAMINATION OF THE NYĀYA THEORY

17a.4 *A.* (17b.5) *rigs pa can rnams ni "dbaṅ po daṅ don phrad pa (6) las skyes paḥi śes pa tha sñad du byas pa ma yin pa ḥkhrul ba med pa ṣen[1] paḥi bdag ñid ni mṅon sum mo" ṣes zer ro.

[1] PN ṣes

17a.5 *B.* ḥdi yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te, khyad par ḥdi dag *ni mi gśaḥo. gaṅ gi phyir

k.1ab *dbaṅ po las byuṅ don blo la*[1]
tha sñad la sogs srid ma yin

[1] DC las, Vk blo la ni *instead of* don blo la

Ba. ḥkhrul (7) ba srid paḥi yul la ni khyad par du bya graṅ na, tha
17a.6 sñad du bya baḥi yul[1] ni rjes su dpag pa las yin gyi, *dbaṅ poḥi blo ni tha sñad kyi yul ñid du srid pa ma yin te,[2] deḥi phyir ma ḥkhrul
N.17b baḥi khyad par bstan par mi bya ba ñid do. dbaṅ poḥi blo +tha sñad

Dd. mig[1] la sogs pa yaṅ dmigs par bya ba ñid du thal bar ḥgyur te,
97b.4 de dag kyaṅ don dam par gṣan du yod *paḥi phyir ro. zla ba gñis la
sogs par snaṅ ba daṅ sṅon po la sogs par snaṅ baḥi[2] śes paḥi rgyu
yin no.

[1] PN dmigs [2] PN ba yaṅ

E. *k.4a–b_1* *don gyi*[1] *ṅo bos dben pa yaṅ*
brjod bya ma yin

97b.5 śes pa thams cad kyi don gyi ṅo bo las gṣan *du tha sñad bya bar mi
nus so.

k.4b_2–d *yul ḥdiḥi yaṅ*
spyi yi[2] *tshul gyis bstan par bya*
des na tha sñad du ma byas[3]

rnam par śes pa lṅa po rnams kyi yul ni deḥi spyiḥi[4] ṅo bos tha sñad
97b.6 du bya ba yin gyi, raṅ gi ṅo boḥi *tshul gyis tha sñad du bya ba ni ma
yin no. spyiḥi ṅo boḥi tshul nas ni gzugs la sogs pa ñid kyi tha sñad
du byed do. rnam par śes pa lṅa rnams kyi yul ni tha sñad du bya
bar[5] mi nus so ṣes bya ba ni rtsod pa bsgrub paḥi *ḥo.

[1] PN gyis [2] KkPN spyiḥi [3] Kk bya [4] PN *om.* spyiḥi [5] PN bas

SECTION 3. EXAMINATION OF THE NYĀYA THEORY

A. rigs pa can rnams ni, "dbaṅ po daṅ don phrad pa las skyes paḥi śes pa tha sñad du bya ba ma yin pa ḥkhrul ba med pa ṣen paḥi bdag ñid can ni mṅon sum mo" ṣes zer ro.

97b.8 *B.* ḥdir yaṅ khyad par rnams *rigs pa ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

k.1ab *dbaṅ po las byuṅ don blo la*[1]
tha sñad la sogs srid ma yin

[1] P las

Ba. ḥkhrul ba srid pa yod pa[1] la ni khyad par du bya graṅ na, dbaṅ
98a.1 poḥi blo la bstan par bya baḥi yul ñid srid pa *ma yin te, bstan par
bya ba ni rjes su dpag paḥi yul yin paḥi phyir ro. bstan par bya ba
ma[2] yin pa ñid la yaṅ ḥkhrul ba yod pa ma yin te, dbaṅ poḥi blo
98a.2 thams cad du bstan par[3] bya bar mi nus pa *deḥi phyir khyad par

C.18a du bya bar mi nus pa deḥi phyir khyad par (18a.1) gyi[3] +thig[4] mi
bya ba ñid do.

[1] DC yul la [2] DC no [3] DC khyad par du bya ba [4] DC tshigs

17a.7 *Bb.* ḥkhrul *baḥi khyad par ñid kyaṅ srid pa ma yin te, ḥkhrul ba
ni yid la ste, de ḥkhrul baḥi yul can yin paḥi phyir ro.

Bc–1. ṣen[1] pa ni ṅes pa ste, de spyi la sogs pa daṅ ldan paḥi dri la
17a.8 sogs pa[2] la rtogs par mi byed pa mi mthoṅ *ba de bas na (2) mi
srid do.

[1] PN ṣes [2] DC *om.* pa

Bc–2. ci ste don ji lta ba la sogs paḥi śes paḥi ldog ḥtshams[1] su
brjod do ṣe na, de lta na khyad par du byed paḥi tshig[2] rigs pa ma
yin te, ma ḥkhrul baḥi phyir yaṅ dbaṅ poḥi blo thams cad raṅ raṅ
17b.1 *gi don tsam ḥdsin par byed pa yin no.

[1] PN mtshams [2] DC tshigs

Bc–3. de dag gis ni bśad paḥi rnam par (3) rtog pa la[1] yaṅ so sor
brjod do. gaṅ smras pa ṣen paḥi bdag ñid ces pa la ṣen pa ni ḥbras
17b.2 bu yin na de dbaṅ poḥi blo la mi srid de, don ji lta *ba la sogs paḥi
śes pa ñid dṅos kyi ḥbras bu yin paḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN *om.* la

Bd. ci ste tha sñad du bya ba ma yin pa la sogs pa smos pa[1] ni śes
pa deḥi raṅ gi ṅo bo (4) bstan par bya baḥi phyir yin no ṣe na, ma
17b.3 yin te, mṅon sum gyi *mtshan ñid brjod par bya ba yin paḥi phyir
la, de yaṅ[2] dbaṅ po daṅ don du phrad pa ñid kyis grub paḥi phyir
ro. śes paḥi raṅ gi ṅo bo bstan par bya baḥi phyir yin na yaṅ yon tan
17b.4 daṅ, rdsas rtsom par mi byed pa daṅ, nam *mkhaḥ la (5) sogs pa
śes par bya baḥi yul ma yin pa ñid kyaṅ bstan par bya ba yin paḥi
phyir ha can thal bar ḥgyur ro.

[1] DC *insert* la *after* smos pa [2] DC la

Ca. thams cad du phrad nas skye ba mṅon sum du ḥdod na ni,

k.1cd *bar daṅ bcas pa ḥdsin pa daṅ*
17b.5 **śes pa lhag paḥaṅ mi thob ḥgyur*[1]

ri la sogs pa la ni yul daṅ dbaṅ po bar (6) med pa ste bar daṅ bcas
pa yin bṣin du ḥdsin pa mthoṅ med[2] kyi, dbaṅ po lhag par ḥdsin pa
ni rigs pa ma yin no.

[1] Vk thob mi ḥgyur, PN ḥthob *instead of* thob [2] PN mod

gyi tshig[4] mi bya ba ñid do.

1 srid paḥi yul (V) *may be better* 2 PN *om.* ma 3 PN *om.* bstan par
4 PN tshigs su

Bb. ḥkhrul baḥi yul ñid kyaṅ[1] srid pa ma yin te, ḥkhrul ba[2] ni yid kyi[3] ḥkhrul baḥi yul ñid[4] yin paḥi phyir ro.

1 P kyis 2 P yid kyi yul *instead of* ḥkhrul da 3 P *om.* yid kyi
4 P *om.* ñid

98a.3 *Bc–1.* ṣen pa ni ṅes pa ste, de spyi[1] la sogs pa daṅ ldan *paḥi[2] ba
N.101a laṅ la sogs +pa la ma brtags par[3] ma mthoṅ baḥi phyir mi srid do.

1P spyiḥi 2P pa 3P pa ni

Bc–2. ci ste don ji lta ba bṣin ma yin pa la sogs pa ldog[1] paḥi don
du brjod do ṣe na, de lta na yaṅ khyad par du byed paḥi tshig rigs pa
98a.4 ma *yin te, ma ḥkhrul baḥi phyir yaṅ, dbaṅ poḥi blo thams cad raṅ
raṅ gi don tsam ḥdsin par byed pa yin no.

1 PN rtog

Bc–3. de dag gis ni bśad paḥi rnam par rtog pa la yaṅ so sor brjod
98a.5 do. ṣen paḥi bdag ñid ces *pa la ṣen pa ni ḥbras bu yin no ṣes gaṅ
smras pa, dṅos su don ji lta bṣin ma yin pa la sogs pa śes pa ḥbras bu
ñid ni dbaṅ poḥi blo la mi srid do.
98a.6 *Bd.* ji ste yaṅ tha sñad du bya ba ma yin pa la sogs pa *smos pa ni
śes pa deḥi raṅ gi ṅo bo bstan paḥi[1] phyir yin no ṣe na, ma yin te,
mṅon sum gyi mtshan ñid brjod par bya ba yin phyir la, de[2] yaṅ dbaṅ
98a.7 po daṅ don phrad pa ñid kyis grub paḥi phyir ro. *śes paḥi raṅ gi ṅo
bo bstan par bya ba ñid na yaṅ[3] yon tan daṅ, rdsas rtsom par mi
byed pa daṅ, bya ba med pa daṅ,[4] nam mkhaḥ la sogs pa yul ma yin
98a.8 pa ñid du bstan par bya ba yin paḥi phyir ha can *thal bar ḥgyur ro.

1 PN bstan par bya baḥi 2 PN de la 3 PN bstan par bya baḥi phyir yin na yaṅ 4 PN med paḥi

Ca. thams cad du[1] phrad nas skye ba mṅon sum du ḥdod na ni,
gzugs daṅ sgra dag

k.1cd bar daṅ bcas par ḥdsin pa daṅ
śes pa lhag paḥam mi thob ḥgyur[2]

98b.1 dri la sogs paḥi[3] yul[4] dbaṅ po bar *med pa la,[5] bar daṅ bcas pa yin[6]
pa bṣin du ḥdsin pa mthoṅ ba ma yin ṣin,[7] [8]lhag par ḥdsin pa yaṅ[9]
ma yin no.

1 PN *om.* thams cad du 2 sic. vide n. 22; Kk . . . lhag paḥaṅ thob mi ḥgyur 3 PN pa ni 4 PN yul daṅ 5 PN ste 6 PN ma yin 7 PN mthoṅ mod kyi 8 PN dbaṅ po *before* lhag par 9 PN ḥdsin pa ni rigs pa

17b.6 *Cb.* phyi rol du[1] *ḥjug paḥi phyir ḥthad pa ñid do: dbaṅ po gñis
N.18a +kyi rten las phyi rol du[2] ḥjug pa ste, des na yul de[3] bar daṅ bcas pa
lhag par ḥdsin pa[4] yaṅ ḥthad (7) pa yin no ṣe na, de yaṅ rigs pa ma
yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

17b.7 *k.2a rten *las dbaṅ po phyir min par*[5]

grub bo ṣes bya ba tshig gi lhag maḥo. dbaṅ po ni rten gyi yul ñid
la gnas pa ste, der gso ba la sogs pa la rab tu sbyor baḥi phyir ro.
17b.8 des na dbaṅ po kho na bar du chod (18b.1) paḥi don ḥdsin *par
byed do.

C.18b dbaṅ po phyi rol du[6] ḥpho ba bden du chug na +yaṅ,

k.2b yul la ḥdsin par nus ma yin

gṣan du na rten[7] pa bsgribs kyaṅ yul ḥdsin par ḥgyur ro. deḥi phyir
18a.1 mig daṅ rna ba dag gis naṅ[8] rten gyi gnas kho na *ḥthob ste, yul
gyi skad cig ma dag las (2) bar daṅ bcas pa daṅ lhag par ḥdsin par
rigs pa min no.

[1] PN tu [2] PN tu [3] DC te [4] PN ḥdsin pa pa [5] Vk dbaṅ po rten
las phyir mi ḥpho [6] PN tu [7] DCN brten [8] PN na

Da. k.2c bde sogs gṣal bya min pa ḥam

18a.2 ḥam ṣes smos pa ni ḥam gyi sgra las tshad ma[1] gṣan ḥthob par *ḥgyur
paḥo. gaṅ ḥdi ltar rtags la[2] sogs pa med par[3] bdag ñid kyi bde ba
daṅ sdug bsṅal daṅ ḥdod pa daṅ ṣe sdaṅ (3) daṅ ḥbad rtsol rnams la
ḥdsin pa de tshad ma ma yin pas, bde ba la sogs pa rnams gṣal bya
18a.3 ñid du *mi ḥgyur baḥam, der ḥam[4] ṣes smos pas tshad ma gṣan ñid
mtshon par ḥgyur baḥo.

k.2d dbaṅ po gṣan yod yid dbaṅ po

yaṅ na yid kho na dbaṅ po ñid du brjod par bya ste, de daṅ phrad
18a.4 pa las (4) skyes pa mṅon *sum ñid du bsgrub par bya baḥi don duḥo.

[1] PN *om.* ma [2] DC pa [3] PN *om.* par [4] PN ram

Db. k.3a bkag pa med phyir thob[1] *ce na*

ci ste yaṅ gṣan gyi ḥdod pa ma bkag pa ru sgrub pa la yid kyi dbaṅ
po ñid bkag pa med paḥi phyir ḥthob pa ñid do ṣe na, gṣan gyi ḥdod
18a.5 pa la ni *yid kyi dbaṅ po yod la rag na de lta na ni,

k.3b dbaṅ po gṣan (5) *gyi sgra don med*

gal te gṣan gyis smras paḥi yid la bkag pa med paḥi phyir dbaṅ po
N.18b yin na, des "rna ba la sogs dbaṅ por +brjod do" ṣes bstan pa don
18a.6 med *par ḥgyur te, bkag pa med pa ñid las de grub paḥi phyir ro.

[1] DCPN ḥthob

Ea. k.3c don ṅes ḥbras bu yod min pas[1]

ṡes paḥi yaṅ ni mtshan[2] ñid las, (6) don gṣan ḥbras bur[3] smra bar

Cb. gal te phyi rol du ḥjug paḥi phyir ḥthad pa ñid do: dbaṅ po
98b.2 gñis kyi *ni rten las phyi rol du ḥjug pa ste, des na yul de bar daṅ bcas
pa daṅ lhag ma ḥdsin paḥaṅ ḥthad pa yin no ṣe na, de yaṅ rigs pa ma
yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

k.2a rten las phyir dbaṅ ḥpho min par

98b.3 grub bo ṣes *bya ba ni tshig gi lhag maḥo. dbaṅ po ni rten gyi yul ñid
na gnas pa ste, der gso ba la sogs pa rab tu sbyor baḥi phyir ro. des
N.101b na dbaṅ +po kho nas bar du chod paḥi don ḥdsin par byed do.
98b.4 dbaṅ po phyi rol *du ḥpho ba bden du chug na yaṅ,

k.2b yul la ḥdsin par nus ma yin

gṣan du na rten bsgribs kyaṅ yul ḥdsin par ḥgyur ro. deḥi phyir mig
daṅ rna ba dag gi, naṅ rten gyi gnas kho nar ma phrad par yul
98b.5 *ḥdsin paḥi phyir,[1] bar daṅ bcas pa daṅ lhag par ḥdsin pa yaṅ rigs pa
yin no.

[1] PN yul gyi skad cig ma dag las

Da. dbaṅ po lṅa kho na yin na ni,

k.2c bde sogs gṣal bya min pa ḥam

98b.6 ḥam ṣes smos pa ni ḥam gyi sgra las tshad *maḥi graṅs gṣan blaṅs pa
yin no. gaṅ ḥdi ltar rtags[1] la sogs pa med par bdag ñid kyi bde ba
daṅ, sdug bsṅal daṅ, ḥdod pa daṅ, ṣe sdaṅ daṅ, ḥbad rtsol rnams la
98b.7 ḥdsin pa de tshad ma ma yin pas, *bde ba la sogs pa rnams gṣal bya
ñid du mi ḥgyur ba ḥam, tshad ma de la tshad ma gṣan ñid ñe bar
bgraṅ bar byaḥo.

k.2d yaṅ na dbaṅ po gṣan yid yin[2]

98b.8 yaṅ na yid kho na dbaṅ po ñid du brjod par bya *ste, de daṅ phrad
pa las skyes pa mṅon sum ñid du bsgrub par bya baḥi don duḥo.

[1] PN rtag [2] KkPN dbaṅ po gṣan yod yid dbaṅ po

Db. k.3a bkag pa med phyir thob ce na

ji ste yaṅ gṣan gyi ḥdod pa la ma bkag pa bsgrub pa la yid kyi dbaṅ
99a.1 po ñid bkag pa *med paḥi phyir thob pa ñid do ṣe na, gṣan gyi ḥdod
pa la ni yid kyi dbaṅ po yod la rag[1] na de lta na ni,

k.3b dbaṅ po gṣan gyi sgra don med

99a.2 gal te gṣan gyis smras paḥi yid la bkag pa med *paḥi phyir dbaṅ po
yin na, des "sna la sogs pa dbaṅ por brjod do" ṣes bstan pa don med
par ḥgyur te, bkag pa med pa ñid las de grub paḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN rab

99a.3 *Ea.* don gṣan ḥbras bur smra baḥi śes pa ñid *tshad ma yin na,

k.3c ṅes paḥi don la ḥbras bu med

18a.7 ḥgyur, ṅes paḥi bdag ñid can gyi śes pa ni tshad *ma ste, tshad ma
de skyes kyi rjes la don lhag tu rtogs so ṣes bya ba ni ḥbras bu med
par ḥgyur ro.

[1] Vk ṅes paḥi don la ḥbras bu med [2] DCPN tshad (cf. Vk) [3] DCPN bu (cf. Vk)

Eb–1. gal te khyad par du byed paḥi śes pa tshad ma yin te: gaṅ
18a.8 spyi la sogs pa khyad par du byed paḥi śes pa de ni tshad (7) *ma yin
la, gaṅ rdsas la sogs pa khyad par du bya baḥi śes pa de ni ḥbras bu
yin no ṣe na, de[1]

k.3d khyad par la min tha dad phyir

tha dad pa ni khyad par du byed pa khyad par du bya ba[2] tha dad
18b.1 pa yin la, yul gṣan la tshad mar ḥgyur *ṣiṅ gṣan la ḥbras bur ḥgyur
ba yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te, dper na seṅ ldeṅ (19a.1) gi yul la bcad ciṅ
C.19a ⁺gśags pas[3] pa la śa chod pa ni ma mthoṅ ṅo.

[1] DC de yi [2] PN byed pa [3] PN *om.* pas

Eb–2. ji ste khyad par bya baḥi śes paḥi rgyu yin paḥi phyir deḥi
18b.2 yul ñid kyaṅ yin no ṣe na, ma *yin te, ha caṅ thal bar ḥgyur baḥi
phyir ro. de lta na ni byed pa po thams cad gcig tu ḥgyur te, khyad
par du (2) bya baḥi śes paḥi rgyu yin pa ñid kyis deḥi byed pa yin
paḥi phyir ro. deḥi phyir gaṅ la las kyi bya ba yod par brjod pa de
18b.3 *ñid deḥi ḥbras bu ñid du rigs so.

Ec. gṣan yaṅ,

k.4a₁ de la yod min

de la khyad par du byed pa lhag par rtogs pa med paḥi ḥbras bu yaṅ
med la tshad ma yaṅ med do.

Ed. k.4a₂ (3) *gñis śe na*

18b.4 ci ste yaṅ khyad par du byed paḥi śes pa ñid tshad *ma daṅ gṣal bya
gñis kar yaṅ ḥgyur te, dper na bdag[1] gis bdag khoṅ du chud par byed
tsam na, gṣal bar bya ba[2] yaṅ ḥgyur ṣiṅ ḥdsin pa po yaṅ yin pa bṣin
no ṣe na,

k.4b ma yin khyad par bya laḥaṅ[3] ḥgyur

18b.5 de lta na ni *⁺khyad par (4) du bya baḥi śes pa laḥaṅ tshad ma daṅ
N.19a gṣal bya gñis ka thob[4] par ḥgyur ro. gal te śes pa daṅ śes bya don
gṣan yin yaṅ tshad ma daṅ gṣal bya ñid du ḥgyur ba ste, raṅ gis bdag
18b.6 khoṅ du chud paḥi śes pa bṣin no *ṣes pa de ñid dṅos po gñis ka la
yaṅ ḥgyur ba yin no. (5) khyad par du byed paḥi śes pa bdag daṅ
mtshuṅs so ṣes pa ni ma yin gyi[5] gñis ka la yaṅ[6] sbyar bar byaḥo.

[1] PN raṅ [2] PN bar [3] PN baḥaṅ [4] PN ḥthob [5] DC gyis [6] PN laḥaṅ

ṅes paḥi bdag ñid can gyi śes pa ni tshad ma ste, tshad ma[1] de skyes pa na don rtogs paḥi phyir ḥbras bu med par ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN *om.* ma

99a.4 *Eb–1.* gal te khyad par du byed paḥi *śes pa tshad ma yin te: gaṅ spyi la sogs pa khyad par du byed paḥi śes pa de ni tshad ma yin la,
N.102a gaṅ rdsas +la sogs pa khyad par du bya baḥi śes pa de ni ḥbras bu yin no ṣe na, de

k.3d khyad par[1] la min tha dad phyir

99a.5 *tha dad pa ni khyad par du byed pa khyad par du bya ba las tha dad pa yin la, yul gṣan la tshad mar ḥgyur ṣiṅ[2] yul gṣan la ḥbras bur
99a.6 ḥgyur ba yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te, seṅ ldeṅ gi yul la[3] bcad ciṅ *bśags pas pa la śa chad pa ni ma mthoṅ ṅo.

[1] PN *om.* par [2] N yul gṣan . . . ṣiṅ, *twice* [3] PN las

Eb–2. ci ste khyad par du bya baḥi śes paḥi rgyu yin paḥi phyir deḥi yul ñid kyaṅ yin no ṣe na, ma yin te, ha caṅ thal bar ḥgyur
99a.7 baḥi phyir ro. de lta na ni byed pa po *thams cad ḥtshol bar ḥgyur te, khyad par du bya baḥi śes paḥi rgyu yin pa ñid kyis deḥi byed pa yin paḥi phyir ro. deḥi phyir gaṅ la las kyi bya ba yod par brjod pa de ñid[1] deḥi ḥbras bu ñid du rigs so.

[1] PN ñid la

99a.8 *Ec.* *gṣan yaṅ,

k.4a$_1$ der yaṅ[1] yod min

khyad par rtogs par bya ba de la ḥbras bu med paḥam tshad ma med do.

[1] KkPN de la

Ed. k.4a$_2$ de gñis ṣes[1]

ci ste yaṅ khyad par du byed paḥi śes pa de ñid tshad ma gṣal bya
99b.1 gñi gar yaṅ ḥgyur te, *dper na raṅ gi bdag ñid khoṅ du chud par byed pa tsam na gṣal bar bya bar yaṅ ḥgyur ṣiṅ, ḥdsin pa po yaṅ yin pa bṣin no ṣe na,

k.4b ma yin khyad par bya laḥaṅ ḥgyur

99b.2 de lta na ni khyad par du bya baḥi śes *pa laḥaṅ tshad ma daṅ gṣal bya gñi ga thob par ḥgyur ro. gal te śes pa daṅ śes byaḥi don gṣan yin yaṅ tshad ma daṅ gṣal bya ñid du ḥgyur ba yin te, raṅ rig gis rig
99b.3 paḥi śes paḥi bdag ñid bṣin *du[2] de ñid dṅos po gñis su ḥgyur baḥi phyir, khyad par du byed paḥi śes pa bdag daṅ mtshuṅs so ṣes gñi gar sbyar bar mi byaḥo.

[1] PN de ñid ces [2] raṅ rig . . . bṣin du, *sic. vide* n. 3.49.

Ee. de lta na ni śes bya khoṅ du chud kyaṅ gaṅ[1] ma rtogs pa daṅ
18b.7 the *tshom za ba[2] daṅ log par rtog pa las log pa de ḥbras bur ḥgyur
na, de yaṅ mi rigs te, gaṅ gi[3] phyir

k.4c ma rtogs (6) *la sogs kun la min*

re ṣig thams cad du ma rtogs pa la sogs pa las ḥbyuṅ baḥi ṅes pa de
18b.8 dag ni *yod pa ma yin te, kha cig tu bzas[4] pa tsam gyis śes pa skye
bas so. ma rtogs pa la sogs pa yod du chug na yaṅ,

k.4d log[5] pa ḥbras bur yod ma yin[6]

19a.1 log pa ṣes bya ba ni[7] ma rtogs pa la sogs pa med pa la bya na, *yod
pa ma yin pa de ni ḥbras bu ma yin te, de gṣal byar ḥgyur ba ni mi
dbyod paḥi phyir ro.

de ltar na re ṣig rigs pa can rnams kyi mṅon sum ni rigs pa ma yin
no.

[1] PN *om.* gaṅ [2] C bar [3] PN *om.* gi [4] DC gzas [5] P lag [6] Vk ldog pa med phyir ḥbras bu min [7] C de

SECTION 4. EXAMINATION OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY

19a.2 *A.* bye brag pa rnams kyi mdo las re ṣig[1] *gaṅ ḥbrel ba ḥbaḥ ṣig
(19b.1) las grub pa de rdsas la mṅon sum mo ṣes so. "bdag daṅ
C.19b dbaṅ po daṅ[2] don +du phrad pa las gaṅ grub pa de gṣan yin[3] no"
ṣes so.

kha cig ni tshad ma las don gṣan du ḥdod de, thun moṅ ma yin
19a.3 paḥi rgyu *yin paḥi phyir dbaṅ po daṅ don du phrad pa tshad mar
rtog par byed do. gṣan dag ni gtso (2) bo yin paḥi phyir bdag daṅ
yid du phrad pa tshad maḥo ṣes zer ro.

[1] PN śig [2] DC *om.* daṅ [3] PN *om.* yin

Ba. de ltar na ni gaṅ ḥdi skad "the tshom daṅ gtan la ḥbebs paḥi
19a.4 *śes pa dag las grub pa ni mṅon sum daṅ rtags can gyi śes pa dag
N.19b go" ṣes bśad pa +daṅ ḥgal lo. bṣi po phrad pa las skyes paḥi śes pa
19a.5 daṅ, gtan (3) la ḥbebs pa las skyes pa mtshuṅs pa ma yin te, *gtan
la ḥbebs pa ni brtag pa sṅon du ḥgro ba yin paḥi phyir la, mṅon
sum ni yul la lta ba tsam yin paḥi phyir ro. yul la lta ba tsam ṣes pa
ni bṣi po phrad pa las skyes pa ste, de la brtag ciṅ dpyod pa gaṅ
19a.6 *la srid.

Ee. de ltar na ni śes bya khoṅ du chud pa na, gaṅ ma rtogs pa daṅ,
99b.4 the tshom za *ba daṅ, log paḥi śes pa las ldog pa de ḥbras bur ḥgyur na, de yaṅ rigs ma yin te,
.102b *k.4c ma +rtogs la sogs kun la min*
re ṣig thams cad du ma rtogs pa la sogs pa la dṅos poḥi yul ṅes pa ni
99b.5 *yod pa ma yin te, kha cig tu bzas pa tsam las śes pa skye bas so. ma rtogs pa la sogs pa yod du chug na de lta na yaṅ,
k.4d ldog pa med phyir ḥbras bu min
99b.6 ldog pa ṣes bya ba ni ma rtogs pa la sogs *pa med pa la bya na, yod pa ma yin pa de ni ḥbras bu ma yin te, de gṣal byar ḥgyur bar mi rigs paḥi phyir ro.

de ltar na re ṣig rigs pa can rnams kyi mṅon sum ni rigs pa ma yin no.

SECTION 4. EXAMINATION OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY

99b.7 *A.* bye brag *pa rnams kyi mdo las, re ṣig ḥbrel ba ḥgaḥ[1] ṣig las grub paḥi rdsas ḥgaḥ ṣig la mṅon sum gyi mtshan ñid yin no ṣes bya ba daṅ, "bdag daṅ dbaṅ po daṅ yid daṅ don du phrad pa las gaṅ
99b.8 grub *pa de[2] gṣan yin no" ṣes zer ro.

kha cig ni tshad ma las ḥbras bu don gṣan du ḥdod de, thun moṅ ma yin paḥi rgyu yin paḥi phyir dbaṅ daṅ don phrad pa tshad mas
100a.1 rtogs par byaḥo ṣeḥo. gṣan dag ni *gtso bo yin paḥi phyir bdag daṅ yid phrad pa tshad ma yin no ṣes zer ro.

[1] PN ḥbaḥ [2] PN grub pa pa de

Ba. de lta na ni gaṅ ḥdi skad du "the tshom daṅ gtan la phebs
100a.2 paḥi śes pa dag gi[1] grub pa ni mṅon sum daṅ rtags can *gyi śes pa dag gis bśad do" ṣes bya ba de ḥgal lo. bṣi po phrad pa las skyes paḥi śes pa daṅ, gtan la phebs pa las[2] skyes paḥi śes pa mtshuṅs pa
100a.3 yaṅ ma yin te, gtan la phebs pa ni brtags pa *sṅon du ḥgro ba can yin paḥi phyir la, mṅon sum ni yul lta ba tsam yin paḥi phyir ro. yul la lta ba tsam ṣes bya ba ni bṣi po phrad pa las skyes pa yin te, de la rtags ciṅ dpyad pa ga la srid.

[1] PN las [2] P la

Bb. (4) dbaṅ po daṅ don du phrad pa tshad mar smra bas ni lhag
par bstan pa[1] ci yaṅ med pa ñid do. dbaṅ po daṅ don du phrad pa
tshad mar smra baḥi ltar na ni ḥdi ci ṣig ces śes par ḥdod paḥi tshe
19a.7 don mthaḥ dag ḥdsin par *ḥgyur te, thams cad kyi bdag ñid daṅ
phrad paḥi phyir ro.

[1] DC la

C. bdag daṅ yid du phrad (5) par smra ba la yaṅ[1] yul tha dad la yul gṣan la tshad mar ḥgyur ṣiṅ gṣan la ḥbras bur ḥgyur ba ni med do ṣes sṅar smras zin to.

[1] PN *om.* yaṅ

19a.8 *D.* *gṣan yaṅ "spyiḥi khyad par la ltos[1] pa" daṅ "rdsas daṅ yon
tan daṅ las la ltos[2] pa" mṅon sum ṣes ni sbyar bar mi bya ste, gaṅ
gi phyir dbaṅ po daṅ yul du phrad (6) pa las skyes pa ni

k.1ab yul la lta baḥi don can phyir
19b.1 **khyad par rnams daṅ sbyar mi bya*

dbaṅ poḥi blo rnams ni raṅ gi don tsam ḥdsin par byed pa yin paḥi[3]
phyir, khyad par rnams daṅ lhan cig tu sbyor ba ni mi ḥthad do.
19b.2 ḥdi ni ḥdiḥi spyi yin ṣiṅ rdsas la sogs pa rnams daṅ ḥbrel (7) *baḥo,
ṣes daṅ gi don gñis ṅes par bzuṅ nas de bṣin du brtag par byaḥo. de
yaṅ dran pa la sogs pa yin paḥi phyir ḥdi la yid kyi blos khyad par
du byas pa[4] ḥthad pa kho na ste, gṣan du na[5] dri[6] mṅar ro ṣes ḥdsin
19b.3 pa yaṅ *mṅon sum du ḥgyur la, de ltar ḥgyur bar yaṅ mi rigs te,
(20a.1) khyad par du byed pa daṅ khyad par bya ba dag dbaṅ po tha
dad kyi yul yin paḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN bltos [2] PN bltos [3] PN paḥi *instead of* pa yin paḥi [4] DC la
[5] PN ni [6] PN dris

Ea. gal te yaṅ rdsas gcig pa[1] dbaṅ po du maḥi gzuṅ bya yin no ṣe
N.20a na, ⁺de lta na ni,
19b.4 *k.1c₁ *gcig min*
C.20a te, gzugs la sogs pa bṣin ⁺du du mar ḥgyur ro. gzugs la sogs pa la
ni dbaṅ (2) po du mas gzuṅ bar bya baḥi gcig ñid gaṅ du yaṅ[2] mthoṅ
ṅo.

k.1c₂ [gcig min] *gzugs sogs kyaṅ gcig ḥgyur*
19b.5 *gal te dbaṅ po du maḥi gzuṅ bya yin kyaṅ tha mi dad par ḥdod na
ni, gzugs la sogs pa yaṅ rdsas bṣin gcig ñid du ḥgyur ro.

[1] DC pas [2] DC *om.* yaṅ

100a.4 *Bb.* dbaṅ *po daṅ don phrad pa tshad mar smra ba la ni bsgre ba
cuṅ zad kyaṅ med pa ñid du ḥgyur ro. dbaṅ po daṅ don phrad pa
tshad mar smra baḥi ltar na ni, ḥdi ci ṣig ces śes par ḥdod paḥi tshe
100a.5 don mthaḥ dag *+ḥdsin par ḥgyur te,[1] thams cad kyi bdag ñid daṅ
N.103a phrad paḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN de (thams cad . . .)

C. bdag daṅ yid phrad par smra ba laḥaṅ, yul tha dad pa la yul
100a.6 gṣan la tshad mar ḥgyur ṣiṅ, gṣan la ḥbras bur ḥgyur ba ni med *do,
ṣes sṅar bśad zin to.

D. gṣan yaṅ "spyi daṅ khyad par la yaṅ bltos pa" daṅ, "rdsas daṅ
yon tan daṅ las la bltos pa" mṅon sum mo ṣes sbyar bar mi bya ste,
100a.7 gaṅ gi phyir dbaṅ po daṅ don *phrad pa las skyes pa ni,

k.1ab yul la lta baḥi don can phyir
khyad par rnams daṅ sbyor mi byed

dbaṅ poḥi blo rnams ni raṅ gi don tsam ḥdsin par byed pa yin paḥi
100a.8 phyir,[1] khyad par rnams daṅ lhan *cig tu sbyor ba ni mi ḥthad do.
gdon mi za bar don gñis gzuṅ nas ḥdi ni ḥdiḥi phyi ḥam rdsas la sogs
pa yin no ṣes de ltar ḥbrel pa brtags par bya ba yin te, des na ldan pa
100b.1 mi mṅon par byas *pa ḥam tha mi dad par brtags nas ḥdsin pa yin no.
khyad par de yaṅ dran pas draṅs paḥi phyir yid kyi blo la ḥthad pa
yin no. gṣan du na ni dri mṅar[2] ro ṣes ḥdsin pa yaṅ mṅon sum du
100b.2 ḥgyur na, de ltar ḥgyur bar yaṅ *mi rigs te, khyad par du byed pa
daṅ khyad par du bya ba dag dbaṅ po tha dad paḥi yul yin paḥi
phyir ro.

[1] PN phyir ro [2] PN mar

Ea. gal te yaṅ rdsas gcig dbaṅ po du maḥi gzuṅ bar bya ba yin no
ṣe na, de lta na ni,

k.1c$_1$ *gcig min*[1]

100b.3 gzugs *la sogs la bṣin du du mar ḥgyur ro. gzugs la sogs pa la ni
dbaṅ po du mas gzuṅ bar bya baḥi gcig ñid[2] gaṅ du yaṅ ma mthoṅ
ṅo.

k.1c$_2$ *gzugs sogs gcig tu ḥgyur*

100b.4 gal te dbaṅ po du *maḥi gzuṅ bar bya ba yin yaṅ tha mi dad par ḥdod
na ni gzugs la sogs pa yaṅ rdsas bṣin du gcig tu ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN min te [2] PN *om.* ñid

Eb. $k.1d_1$ *mthoṅ ṣe na*

de dag gal te ḥdi ltar dbaṅ po (3) tha dad kyaṅ yul rdsas la śes pa
19b.6 tha mi dad pa *ni mthoṅ ba kho na ste, yod pa ñid daṅ yon tan ñid dag lta buḥo; de lta bas na[1] gzugs la sogs pa la gcig ñid daṅ du ma ñid du thal bar mi ḥgrub bo ṣe na, śes pa tha mi dad pa ḥdi lta bu ni mthoṅ na, ḥon kyaṅ,

19b.7 $k.1d_2$ *de dbaṅ po *las min*[2]

de dbaṅ (4) poḥi sgo nas dbaṅ po gṣan gyi yul śes pa ni ma yin no. gaṅ gi phyir ṣe na,

k.2a dbaṅ gṣan don med ḥgyur phyir ro

gal te dbaṅ po gṣan gyi yul la yaṅ dbaṅ po gṣan gyis ḥdsin nus par
19b.8 ḥdod *na ni, gzugs la sogs pa la dbaṅ po du ma brtag[3] pa don med par ḥgyur ro.

[1] DC de bash *in stead of* de lta bas na [2] Vk dbaṅ po de las min [3] DC brtags

Ec. gal te ḥdi ltar (5) gzugs la sogs pa tha dad du yod paḥi phyir dbaṅ po gcig gis ḥdsin par mi nus so ṣe na, de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te,[1]
20a.1 *ciḥi phyir ṣe na, dbaṅ pos ni

k.2b raṅ yul tha dad kyaṅ ḥdsin nus

raṅ gi yul la ni sṅon po la sogs paḥi tha dad pa daṅ, graṅs la sogs paḥi tha dad pa la yaṅ (6) ḥdsin par nus pa[2] la, khyod kyis ni tha
20a.2 dad kyaṅ[3] dbaṅ *pos ḥdsin nus par ḥdod paḥi phyir ro. gal te graṅs la sogs paḥi tha dad la ḥdsin pa ni dbaṅ po gṣan gyi yul la ḥdsin pa ma yin no. dbaṅ po gṣan gyi yul ñid ni gzugs las tha dad paḥi reg
20a.3 bya lta bu ste, de mig gis *gaṅ cug (7) gzuṅ.[4]
N.20b gaṅ dag gal +te reg paḥi rdsas mig gis ḥdsin na ni dbaṅ po gṣan gyi[5] yul yaṅ mig gi[6] raṅ gi yul yin no, gsal bar khas blaṅs paḥi phyir
20a.4 tha dad kyaṅ sṅon po la sogs pa bṣin du reg pa la sogs *pa yaṅ[7] mig gis ḥdsin par thal bar ḥgyur baḥi phyir daṅ, tha (20b.1) dad pa ñid ni dbaṅ po du mas gzuṅ bar bya baḥi rgyu mtshan yin na, cis na dbaṅ po gṣan gyi yul mi ḥdsin.

[1] DC no [2] PN *om.* pa [3] DC par [4] D bzuṅ [5] PN gyis [6] PN gis [7] PN *om.* yaṅ

C.20b *Ed.* gaṅ yaṅ don tha mi dad pa la yaṅ dbaṅ po du mas +ḥdsin
20a.5 *par ḥgyur, gzugs la sogs pa so so la yaṅ,

k.2c dbaṅ po kun gyis ḥdsin par ḥgyur

de rdsas la sogs pa bṣin no. (2) de ltar na yaṅ[1] gzugs la sogs pa yaṅ dbaṅ po gcig gi[2] gzuṅ bya ma yin par ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN *om.* yaṅ [2] PN gis

Eb. *$k.1d_1$* *mthoṅ na*[1]
N.103b de dag gal te ḥdi ltar dbaṅ po tha dad paḥi yul rdsas la +śes pa tha
100b.5 *mi dad pa ni mthoṅ ba kho na yin te, yod pa ñid daṅ yon tan ñid
dag lta buḥo; gzugs la sogs pa rnams la ni ma yin no; deḥi phyir
100b.6 gcig du mar ḥgrub po ṣe na, śes pa tha mi dad pa ḥdi lta *bu ni
mthoṅ na, ḥon kyaṅ,

$k.1d_2$ *de dbaṅ po las min*[2]

de dbaṅ poḥi sgo nas dbaṅ po gṣan gyi yul śes pa ni ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

k.2a *dbaṅ po du ma don med phyir*[3]

100b.7 gal te dbaṅ po gṣan *gyi yul la yaṅ dbaṅ po gṣan gyis ḥdsin nus pa
ḥdod na ni, gzugs la sogs pa la dbaṅ po du ma brtags pa don med par
ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN mthoṅ ṣe na [2] Kk dbaṅ po de las min [3] KkPN dbaṅ gṣan don med ḥgyur phyir ro

Ec. gal te ḥdi ltar gzugs la sogs pa tha dad du yod paḥi phyir
100b.8 *dbaṅ po gcig gis[1] ḥdsin par mi nus so ṣe na, de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te,
ciḥi phyir ṣe na, dbaṅ pos ni

k.2b *raṅ yul tha dad kyaṅ ḥdsin nus*

101a.1 ḥgyur. raṅ gi yul la sṅon po la sogs pa tha dad pa daṅ *graṅs la sogs
pas tha dad pa ni khyod kyi ḥdod[2] pas tha dad kyaṅ dbaṅ pos ḥdsin
par nus pa yin gyi, dbaṅ po gṣan gyi don ni ma yin no. dbaṅ po gṣan
101a.2 gyi yul ñid ni gzugs *las tha dad paḥi reg bya lta bu ste, gaṅ gi phyir
de mig gi gzuṅ ba[3] ma yin no.

gal te reg paḥi gzuṅ baḥi rdsas kyaṅ mig gis ḥdsin na ni dbaṅ po
101a.3 gṣan gi[4] yul yaṅ mig gi[5] raṅ gi yul yin no *ṣes gsal bar khas blaṅs paḥi
phyir, tha dad kyaṅ sṅon po la sogs pa bṣin du reg bya la sogs pa
yaṅ mig gis ḥdsin par thal bar ḥgyur baḥi phyir, tha dad pa ñid ni
101a.4 dbaṅ po du mas gzuṅ bar bya baḥi *rgyu mtshan ma yin gyi, ḥon
kyaṅ dbaṅ po gṣan gyi don mi ḥdsin pa yin no.

[1] PN gi [2] P ḥod [3] PN ḥdsin pa [4] PN gyis [5] PN gis

Ed. gal te yaṅ don tha mi dad pa yaṅ dbaṅ po du mas ḥdsin pa yin
na, gzugs la sogs pa so so la yaṅ,

101a.5 *k.2c* *dbaṅ po kun *gyis*[1] *ḥdsin par ḥgyur*

te, rdsas la sogs pa bṣin no. de ltar na yaṅ gzugs la sogs pa[2] yaṅ
dbaṅ po du mas gzuṅ bar bya bar ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN gyi [2] PN pa la

20a.6 *Ee.* *ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te, gzugs la sogs pa de dag la
raṅ raṅ gi bye brag ṅes pa yod pa yin la, de med paḥi phyir dbaṅ
poḥi blo sṅon po la mi ḥkhrul lo ṣe na, ci yaṅ de (3) dag gi ṅes pa
20a.7 ñid de ji lta *bu ṣig. gaṅ la gzugs ñid med pa de mig gis gzuṅ bar
bya ba yin la, de bṣin du reg bya la sogs pa rnams kyi raṅ raṅ gi yul
la ṅes pa ñid yin nam, de lta na ni mig gi reg bya tshogs pa[1] laḥaṅ
ḥjug
20a.8 $k.2d_1$ *rdsas *sogs la min*
rdsas daṅ graṅs la sogs pa daṅ las (4) rnams la gzugs ñid daṅ reg bya
ñid med par ḥdod paḥi phyir ro. mig daṅ reg pa dag gis de dag ḥdsin
par mi ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN *om.* pa

20b.1 *Ef.* gal te de lta na ni gaṅ la *gzugs ñid yod pa de mig gi gzuṅ bya
yin no; de lta bas na reg bya la sogs pa yaṅ de bṣin du ṅes pa ñid
kyis[1] khyad par yod pa yin no; de (5) bṣin du gzugs la sogs med paḥi
20b.2 phyir ro; rdsas la sogs pa la ṅes *pa med par ḥgyur ro ṣe na,
$k.2d_2$ *de lta na*
ni mdo daṅ yaṅ ḥgal te, de
$k.3a_1$ *med* paḥi *phyir*
N.21a mi ḥkhrul lo ṣes gzugs ñid la sogs pa ni sgra la sogs pa[2] +la med
pas mi ḥkhrul bar brjod kyi, gzugs ñid[3] la sogs (6) pa gzugs la[4] yod
20b.3 *paḥi sgo nas ni ma yin no.

[1] P kyi [2] PN *om.* pa [3] DC *om.* ñid [4] DC *om.* gzugs la

Eg. de dag ni rigs pa daṅ yaṅ mi ḥtsham ste,
$k.3a_2$ [.......]
$k.3b_1$ [.......]
dbaṅ po gṣan gyi med pa la sogs par brtags nas gzuṅ ba ni gzuṅ ba ma
20b.4 yin na, gzuṅ bas stoṅ pa de ji ltar gzugs ñid la sogs pas *sbyor bar
byed.[1] gal te rgyu med par ḥdsin pa med paḥo ṣe na, deḥi (7) phyir
gzugs la sogs paḥi raṅ gi yul la ṅes pa ñid ni sbyor bar mi bya ba ñid do.

[1] DC bya ste

Eh. gal te ḥdi ltar rdsas la sogs pa la tha mi dad par ḥdsin pa mthoṅ[1]
20b.5 ba *de ji lta ṣe na,
$k.3b_2$ *gṣan gyi yul*[2]
mig ni reg par bya ba dag las tha dad paḥi yul la dmigs pa ste, gṣan
ñid daṅ lhan cig rgyu baḥi (21a.1) spyiḥi yul la tha mi dad du ḥdsin
20b.6 paḥi dran paḥi śes pa skyes pa yin gyi, gzugs *la sogs pa gzuṅ ba ni

101a.6 *Ee.* ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te, gzugs la sogs *pa de dag la
N.104a raṅ raṅ +gi bye brag ṅes pa yod pa yin la, "de med paḥi phyir" dbaṅ
poḥi blo sṅon po la "mi ḥkhrul lo" ṣe na, ci ltar na de dag ṅes pa
101a.7 byed pa ñid yin. gaṅ la gzugs ñid med pa de mig gi gzuṅ bar *bya ba
ma yin la, de bṣin du reg par bya ba la sogs pa rnams kyi yaṅ raṅ raṅ
gi yul ṅes pa ñid yin pa, de lta na mig daṅ reg[1] pa dag gi ḥjug[2]

$k.2d_1$ rdsas sogs la min

101a.8 rdsas daṅ graṅs la sogs pa daṅ *las rnams la gzugs ñid daṅ reg bya
ñid med par ḥdod paḥi phyir, mig daṅ reg pa dag gis de dag ḥdsin par
mi ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN rig [2] PN dag ḥjug go.

Ef. gal te de lta na gaṅ la gzugs ñid[1] yod pa de[2] mig gi gzuṅ bya
101b.1 yin te, de lta *bas na reg bya[3] la sogs pa la yaṅ de bṣin du ṅes pa ñid
kyis khyad par yod pa yin no; de bṣin du gzugs ñid la sogs pa med
paḥi phyir rdsas la sogs pa la ṅes pa med par ḥgyur ro ṣe na,

$k.2d_2$ de lta na

101b.2 *yaṅ

$k.3a_1$ med phyir min[4]

"mi ḥkhrul lo" ṣes bya baḥi mdo daṅ ḥgal lo. gzugs ñid la sogs pa ni
sgra la sogs pa la med pas mi ḥkhrul par brjod kyi, gzugs ñid la sogs
101b.3 pa gzugs la sogs pa *la yod paḥi sgo nas ni ma yin no.

[1] P *om.* ñid [2] P *om.* de [3] P reg pa [4] P med phyir. *vide* n. 43

Eg. rigs pas kyaṅ rtog pa ḥdi ḥthad pa ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

$k.3a_2$ mi ḥdsin pa ni

$k.3b_1$ med phyir[1]

te, dbaṅ po gṣan gyis mi ḥdsin pa ni ḥdsin pa med pa yin la, ji ltar
101b.4 *de gzugs la sogs pas byed pa yin. rgyu med pas ḥdsin pa med par
ḥgyur[2] ro. deḥi phyir gzugs ñid la sogs pa rnams ni ṅes par byed pa
ñid du mi rigs so.

[1] PN med paḥi phyir [2] PN mi ḥgyur

101b.5 *Eh.* gal te ḥdi ltar rdsas la sogs *pa la tha mi dad par ḥdsin pa
mthoṅ ba de ji lta ṣe na,

$k.3b_2$ gṣan gyi spyod yul yin[1]

mig daṅ reg[2] pa dag gis[3] tha dad paḥi yul la dmigs pa ste, de daṅ
101b.6 lhan cig rgyu baḥi spyiḥi yul can gyi[4] tha mi dad par ḥdsin paḥi *dran
paḥi śes pa gṣan ñid skyes pa yin gyi, gzugs la sogs pa ma gzuṅ bar
N.104b ni deḥi blo med +paḥi phyir ro. de bṣin du khyad par can[5] tha dad pa

C.21a ma yin te, deḥi blo med paḥi phyir ro. de bṣin +du khyad par[3] med
paḥi phyir dbaṅ po raṅ raṅ gis yul tha dad la dmigs śiṅ, don gṣan
20b.7 rnam par gcad paḥi yul (2) la tha mi dad kyi blo skyes pa ni *thams
cad du yid kyi śes pa yin gyi, yod pa ñid daṅ yon tan ñid dag las
skyes paḥi mṅon sum ni ma yin te, de ñe bar mtshon paḥi phyir ro.
mṅon sum gyis gzuṅ ṅo sñam paḥi ṅa rgyal de dag ni rtog ge ṅan pa
20b.8 rnams *kyi yin no.

[1] DC mi mthoṅ [2] Vk gṣan gyi spyod yul min [3] PN khyad par du

Fa–1. k.3c yul de mtshuṅs par[1] *ḥdod ce* (3) *na*
ḥdi ltar ḥgyur te khyad par du byed pa daṅ khyad par du bya ba dag
ni dbaṅ poḥi yul du mtshuṅs par khas blaṅs par bya ste, de mi ḥdsin
21a.1 pa ni deḥi blo med paḥi phyir ro ṣe na, de lta *yin[2] na ni,
k.3d mi ḥdod pa laḥaṅ[3] *thal bar ḥgyur*
gal te gñis ka dbaṅ poḥi gzuṅ bya ñid du mtshuṅs pa yin na ni, (4)
N.21b rdsas daṅ yon tan daṅ las dag rdsas daṅ ldan pa yin paḥi phyir, +yod
21a.2 pa ñid bṣin rdsas dbaṅ po *thams cad par ḥgyur ro.

de bṣin du "rdsas gcig daṅ ldan paḥi phyir rdsas yod pa ñid ma yin pa" bṣin dbaṅ po thams cad pa yin paḥi phyir yod pa ñid du ḥgyur ro.

[1] Vk yul mtshuṅs ñid du [2] PN ma yin [3] PN paḥaṅ

21a.3 *Fa–2.* gal te rdsas la ṣugs (5) paḥi yod pa ni rdsas gcig *po de daṅ
ldan par brjod do ṣe na, ma yin te, tha dad pa med paḥi phyir yod
pa daṅ tha mi dad pa yin no. thams cad du yod pa la rdsas la sogs
pa dgag par bya ba ni ma yin te, de skad du yaṅ, "las daṅ yon tan
21a.4 la yod *phyir, yod pa las min yon tan (6) min" ṣes brjod do. gal te
yaṅ rdsas la ṣugs pa rdsas ñid gcig yin gyi gṣan la ṣugs[1] pa rdsas
gcig ma yin no ṣes zer ba ni rdsas tha dad du ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN *om.* la ṣugs

21a.5 *Fb.* gaṅ gi tshe mig gis mṅon sum *gyis me droḥo[1] ṣes ḥdsin pa
deḥi tshe reg bya yaṅ mig gi gzuṅ byar ḥgyur ro. deḥi phyir (7) yod
pa ñid daṅ yon tan ñid bṣin dbaṅ po tha dad kyi gzuṅ bya ñid yin
yaṅ rdsas tha mi dad do ṣes pa ni ma yin no.

[1] DC mi ḥdreḥo

21a.6 *Ga.* gal te de ltar dbaṅ po tha dad *kyi gzuṅ bya yin paḥi phyir
yaṅ gṣan ñid du smra ba yin na ni,
k.4a₁ ma ṅes

101b.7 rnams raṅ gi dbaṅ pos dmigs nas don gṣan *rnam par bcad paḥi yul
thams cad la tha mi dad paḥi yid kyi[6] śes pa skyes pa yin gyi, yod pa
ñid daṅ yon tan ñid dag la ni mṅon sum ñid yod pa ma yin te, de ñe
101b.8 bar ma mtshon paḥi phyir mṅon *sum gyis gzuṅ ṅo sñam paḥi mṅon
paḥi ṅa rgyal de dag ni rtog ge ṅan pa ba rnams kyi yin no.

[1] Kk gṣan gyi spyod yul ji ltar yin [2] PN rigs [3] PN gi [4] PN yul la
[5] PN can las [6] PN kyis

Fa–1. k.3c yul mtshuṅs ñid du ḥdod ce na
ḥdi ltar ḥgyur te, khyad par daṅ khyad par can dag gdon mi za bar
102a.1 dbaṅ *po mtshuṅs paḥi yul ñid du khas blaṅ bar bya ste, de ma gzuṅ
bar deḥi blo med paḥi phyir ro ṣe na, ḥdi lta yin na ni,
k.3d mi ḥdod pa yaṅ[1] thal bar ḥgyur
102a.2 gal te gñi ga dbaṅ po mtshuṅs paḥi gzuṅ *bar bya ba ñid yin na ni
rdsas daṅ yon tan daṅ las dag kyaṅ rdsas daṅ ldan pa yin paḥi phyir,
yod pa ñid bṣin du rdsas dbaṅ po thams cad par ḥgyur ro.
102a.3 de bṣin du "rdsas gcig daṅ ldan paḥi phyir yod *pa ñid rdsas[2] ma
yin pa"-r hgyur te, yod pa ñid[3] ni dbaṅ po thams cad pa yin paḥi
phyir ro.

[1] Kk laḥaṅ [2] PN rdsas yod pa ñid *instead of* yod pa ñid rdsas [3] PN
om. ñid

Fa–2. gal te rdsas la ṣugs pa yaṅ yod pa ni rdsas gcig po de daṅ ldan
102a.4 par brjod do ṣe na, ma yin te, tha dad pa med paḥi *phyir te, yod pa
ñid[1] tha mi dad pa yin no. rdsas la sogs pa thams cad la yod pa dgag
par bya ba ni ma yin te, de skad du yaṅ "yon tan daṅ las rnams la
102a.5 yod paḥi phyir las ma yin yon tan ma yin[2] no" *ṣes brjod do. gal te
yaṅ rdsas la ḥjug pa kho na rdsas gcig yin gyi, gṣan la ḥjug pa rdsas
gcig ma yin no ṣes bya ba yin na ni tha dad par ḥgyur ro.

[1] P na, N ni [2] PN las la yon tan med pa ma yin

102a.6 *Fb.* gaṅ gi tshe yaṅ mig gi mṅon sum me[1] droḥo *ṣes bya bar ḥdsin
pa deḥi tshe reg bya yaṅ mig gi gzuṅ byar ḥgyur ro. de ltar yaṅ ma
yin no.[2] deḥi phyir yod pa daṅ yon tan ñid bṣin du dbaṅ po tha dad
N.105a kyi gzuṅ bya yin yaṅ rdsas tha mi dad do ṣes bya ba +ni mi rigs so.

[1] PN mi [2] PN *om.* de ltar . . . *vide* n. 60

102a.7 *Ga.* *gal te de ltar na dbaṅ po tha dad[1] kyi gzuṅ bya yin paḥi phyir
yaṅ du ma ñid du smra ba na ni,
k.4a$_1$ ma ṅes[2]

dbaṅ po gcig gi gzuṅ bya la yaṅ rdsas daṅ yon tan daṅ las kyi (21b.1)
C.21b tha dad daṅ, sṅon po la sogs paḥi tha dad mthoṅ ste, dbaṅ +po tha
21a.7 dad med kyaṅ sṅon po la *sogs paḥi tha dad du ḥdsin pa mthoṅ ṅo;
gaṅ ṣig gaṅ med kyaṅ ḥbyuṅ ba de ni deḥi rgyu ma yin paḥi phyir
dbaṅ po tha dad ni gṣan ñid kyi rgyu ma yin no ṣe na,

k.4a$_2$ *de ni gṣan du brjod*

21a.8 dbaṅ po tha dad kyi (2) gzuṅ bya yin paḥi phyir ṣes pas ni *du ma
ñid du brjod pa yin gyi, dbaṅ po gcig gi gzuṅ bya yin paḥi phyir
gcig tu ma yin na gaṅ las ma[1] ṅes par ḥgyur. dbaṅ po tha dad kyi
gzuṅ bya yin pa kho nas du ma ñid brjod pa ni ma yin gyi, ḥon kyaṅ
21b.1 du ma ñid kho na yin *paḥi phyir ma ṅes +pa ma (3) yin no.
N.22a dbaṅ po tha dad med kyaṅ ṣes gaṅ brjod pa ḥdis,

k.4b thams cad bsgrub byar brjod ma yin

dbaṅ po thams cad kyi tha dad las du mar brjod pa ni ma yin te,
21b.2 gaṅ dbaṅ po tha dad pa de du ma kho naḥo *ṣes yin paḥi phyir ro.
blo tha dad kyaṅ gṣan gyi rgyu yin pas ni mi ḥgegs so.

[1] PN *om.* ma

Gb. (4) gṣan yaṅ,

k.4cd blo dbaṅ tha dad las tha dad
gaṅ la gcig yin gṣan du na[1]

dbaṅ po yaṅ tha dad blo yaṅ tha dad pa las gṣan ñid du mi brjod
21b.3 par ḥgyur ro. *dbaṅ po yaṅ tha dad blo yaṅ tha dad pa de la ni gcig
ñid yin no ṣes paḥi go skabs med do.

[1] Vk dbaṅ po tha dad med kyaṅ blo tha dad phyir ni tha dad na gṣan du tha dad med gaṅ las

H. de dag gi yon tan la sogs pa la mṅon (5) sum gyi[1] śes pa skye
ba la yaṅ gsal bar rig par byaḥo. de dag gis ni raṅ gi rten daṅ ḥbrel
21b.4 *baḥi sgo nas gṣi la sogs pa daṅ phrad pa ñid brjod pa yin te,
de lta na yaṅ thams cad du phrad pa las śes pa skye ba ni ma yin
no ṣes rigs pa can gyis mṅon sum brtags par ji lta ba bṣin du brjod
(6) zin to.
21b.5 deḥi phyir bye brag paḥi *mṅon sum ni sgrub par dkaḥo.

[1] DC gyis

gaṅ gi phyir dbaṅ po gcig gi gzuṅ bar bya ba ñid la yaṅ rdsas daṅ yon
102a.8 tan daṅ las tha dad *pa daṅ, sṅon po la sogs pa tha dad pa mthoṅ ba
yin no; dbaṅ po tha dad pa med kyan ḥdsin pa tha dad pas sṅon po la
sogs pa tha dad par mthoṅ ba yaṅ yin no; gaṅ med par gaṅ ḥbyuṅ ba
102b.1 de ni *deḥi rgyu ma yin paḥi phyir du ma ñid la dbaṅ po tha dad pa ni
gtan tshigs ma yin no ṣe na,

k.4a$_2$ *de ni gṣan du brjod*

gaṅ las ma ṅes par ḥgyur ba dbaṅ po tha dad paḥi gzuṅ bya yin paḥi
102b.2 phyir du ma ñid du smras pa *yin gyi, dbaṅ po gcig gi gzuṅ bya yin
paḥi phyir gcig ñid du ni ma yin no. dbaṅ po tha dad paḥi gzuṅ bya
kho na yin paḥi phyir du ma ñid du brjod pa ni ma yin gyi ḥon kyaṅ
102b.3 du ma kho naḥo[3] ṣes brjod paḥi *phyir ma ṅes pa ma yin no.

dbaṅ po tha dad pa med kyaṅ ṣes brjod pa ḥdir,

k.4b *thams cad bsgrub byar brjod ma yin*

du ma thams cad dbaṅ po tha dad pa las yin no ṣes smras pa ni ma
102b.4 yin gyi, ḥon kyaṅ *gaṅ du dbaṅ po tha dad pa de du maḥo ṣes smras
pa yin no. blo tha dad pa yaṅ du ma ñid kyi rgyu yin pa bkag pa ni
med do.

[1] PN thams cad *instead of* tha dad [2] PN ma yin [3] PN naḥi

Gb. gṣan yaṅ,

k.4cd *dbaṅ po tha dad med kyaṅ blo*
tha dad phyir ni[1] *tha dad na*[2]
102b.5 *gṣan du tha dad *med gaṅ las*

gaṅ la dbaṅ po tha dad pa med kyaṅ blo tha dad pa las sna tshogs
ñid du brjod par bya ba yin pa der, dbaṅ po tha dad pa daṅ blo tha
dad pa la ni gcig ces bya baḥi go skabs yod pa ma yin no.

[1] Kk na [2] Kk ni

102b.6 *H.* *des ni yon tan la sogs pa la mṅon sum gyi śes pa yaṅ[1] bsal bar
rig par bya ste, gaṅ gi phyir de dag kyaṅ raṅ gi rten[2] la ḥbrel baḥi
sgo nas bṣi la sogs pa phrad pa kho na las skyes pa yin no.
102b.7 ji ltar *yaṅ thams cad du phrad pa las śes pa skyes pa ma yin pa[3]
N.105b +de ltar rigs pa can gyi mṅon sum [4]···brtag par bśad zin to. de ltar
na···[4] bye brag paḥi mṅon sum yaṅ ñes pa daṅ bcas pa yin no.

[1] PN śes pa mṅon sum yin pa yaṅ [2] PN rtin [3] PN ma yin par bśad pa
[4] PN brtag pa de bṣin du

SECTION 5. EXAMINATION OF THE SĀṂKHYA THEORY

A. (21b.6) ser skya pa rnams kyis ni rna ba la sogs paḥi ḥjug pa
mṅon sum du ḥdod do. rna ba daṅ pags pa daṅ mig daṅ lce daṅ sna
rnams yid kyis byin gyis brlabs nas yul la ḥjug pa ste, sgra daṅ
21b.6 *reg bya daṅ gzugs daṅ ro daṅ dri da ltar (7) ba rnams la go rim[1]
bṣin du ḥdsin pa ni mṅon sum gyi tshad maḥo ṣes so.

[1] DC rims

Ba. de dag gi ltar na yaṅ dbaṅ po rnams kyi
k.1a$_1$ *thug pa med paḥam*
21b.7 de dag gis ni dbaṅ po gṣan gyi gzuṅ bya yul ma *yin pa ñid kyis raṅ
gi yul la ḥjug paḥi dbaṅ po[1] ḥdod pa yin la, yon tan gsum gyi ḥphel
C.22a ba daṅ ḥgrib (22a.1) pa tsam +gyis tha dad las sgra la sogs paḥi rigs
21b.8 tha dad ces ḥdod de, sgra gcig pu yaṅ yon tan gyi ḥphel ḥgrib *kyi
N.22b tha dad +kyis thug pa med paḥi phyir, dbaṅ po dpag tu med pas
ḥdsin par khas blaṅ bar byaḥo.

[1] PN poḥi

Bb. yaṅ na,
k.1a$_2$ *dbaṅ gcig ḥgyur*
ci ste der yon tan (2) gsum tha mi dad pas rigs gcig ñid yin na ni, de
22a.1 ltar na sgra tha dad ḥdsin *pa bṣin reg pa la sogs paḥaṅ ḥdsin par
thal bar ḥgyur baḥi phyir dbaṅ po gcig ñid du ḥgyur te, thams cad
du yon tan gsum po tha mi dad paḥi[1] phyir ro. yon tan gsum daṅ
22a.2 bral baḥi sgraḥi rigs *ni yod (3) pa ma yin no. gaṅ sgra ñid du gyur
ba de ni reg bya la sogs pa la ma yin no.

[1] PN *om.* paḥi

Ca. gaṅ gi tshe sñiṅ stobs la sogs paḥi dbyibs kyis gnas skabs kyis
22a.3 tha dad kyi sgra la sogs pa[1] tha dad pa ji ltar med; sgraḥi *rigs tha
mi dad par mtshuṅs paḥi dbyibs kyi gnas skabs ni yod pa (4) yin la,
reg pa la sogs rnams las tha dad pa ste, rigs mthun paḥi gzuṅ bar
22a.4 bya baḥi yul la rna ba ḥjug pa yin no; de bṣin du reg pa la *sogs pa

SECTION 5. EXAMINATION OF THE SĀṀKHYA THEORY

102b.8 *A.* ser skya pa *rnams kyi yaṅ rna ba la sogs pa ḥjug pa ni mṅon
sum du ḥdod de, "rna ba daṅ, pags pa daṅ, mig daṅ, lce daṅ, sna
rnams yid kyi byin gyis brlabs nas, sgra daṅ reg bya daṅ gzugs daṅ
103a.1 ro daṅ *dri rnams la go rim ji lta ba bṣin du ḥdsin pa la ḥjug pa ni
mṅon sum gyi tshad maḥo" ṣes zer ro.[1]

[1] PN ba

Ba. de rnams kyi ltar na yaṅ, dbaṅ po rnams
k.1a$_1$ *thug med*[1]
103a.2 de dag gis ni dbaṅ po gṣan gyi *gzuṅ bya yul ma yin pa ñid kyis dbaṅ
po rnams raṅ gi yul la ḥjug par ḥdod pa yin no. yon tan gsum ḥphel
ba daṅ ḥgrib pa tsam gyi khyad par las sgra la sogs paḥi rigs tha dad
103a.3 paḥi phyir, *sgra gcig kho naḥi yon tan ḥphel ba daṅ ḥgrib pa tsam
gyis khyad par gyis mthaḥ yas paḥi phyir, ḥdsin pa po dbaṅ po mthaḥ
yas par khas blaṅ bar bya dgos so.

[1] Kk thug pa med pa(ḥam)

Bb. *k.1a*$_2$ *yaṅ na dbaṅ po gcig*[1]
103a.4 ci ste der[2] yon tan *gsum tha mi dad paḥi phyir rigs tha mi dad pa de
lta yin na, sgraḥi khyad par ḥdsin pa bṣin du reg bya la sogs paḥaṅ[3]
ḥdsin par thal baḥi phyir dbaṅ po gcig ñid thob pa ste, khyad par
103a.5 thams cad la yon tan *gsum khyad par med paḥi phyir ro. gaṅ gi
phyir gaṅ sgra kho na la ḥgyur gyi reg bya la sogs pa rnams la ni ma
yin no ṣes bya ba yon tan gsum las gṣan paḥi sgraḥi rigs med paḥo.[4]
103a.6 thams cad la yon tan *gsum khyad par med paḥi phyir ro.

[1] Kk (pa)ḥam dbaṅ gcig ḥgyur [2] PN de [3] PN par [4] PN pas (thams cad . . .)

Ca. ci ltar med de gaṅ gi tshe sñiṅ stobs la sogs paḥi dbyibs kyi[1]
khyad par gyis sgra la sogs pa la ni tha dad pa yin te, sgraḥi rigs la
103a.7 ni tha mi dad paḥi dbyibs yod *pa yin la reg bya la sogs pa rnams las[2]
ni tha dad paḥo; rigs de yaṅ rna ba ḥjug paḥi gzuṅ bar bya ba yin la,
de bṣin du reg bya la sogs pa rnams la yaṅ yin no; deḥi phyir ji skad

la yaṅ ṅo; deḥi phyir ji skad du brjod paḥi skyon du thal bar ḥgyur ro[2] ṣe na, de lta na yaṅ reg bya ni mig gis[3] mthun paḥi yul du (5) ḥgyur te, gaṅ phyir dbyibs ni

$k.1b_1$ *gñis* kyi *gzuṅ bya*[4]

22a.5 riṅ po[5] la sogs paḥi dbyibs la mig *daṅ reg bya dag gi śes pa mthoṅ baḥi phyir raṅ gi yul de kho nar ḥjug go ṣes pa ni rnam par gsal to.[6]

[1] DC la sogs pa dag [2] PN *om.* ro [3] DC gi [4] D byar [5] DCPN ri, cf. K [6] DC te

Cb. dbyibs kyis byas paḥi rigs kyi bye brag ḥdod paḥi ltar na ni,
22a.6 sgra la sogs pa ni rna ba la sogs (6) pas[1] mi ḥdsin par *ḥgyur te, gaṅ gi phyir ṣe na, dbyibs ni

$k.1b_2$ *gsum gyi spyod yul min*[2]

dbyibs ni rna ba daṅ sna daṅ lce rnams kyis gzuṅ bar bya ba ma yin pas, mthoṅ bṣin paḥi sgra daṅ dri daṅ ro rnams mṅon sum ma yin par ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN pa la [2] Vk gsum gyi yul ma yin

22a.7 *Cc.* $k.1c_1$ **yul gcig* la dbyibs maṅ po *ḥthob*[1]
(7) par yaṅ ḥgyur te, dbaṅ po gcig gi yul gyi dbye ba yod na ni deḥi
N.23a bye brag gi rigs du ma yod paḥi phyir yul gcig tu +dbyibs du ma mthoṅ bar ḥgyur ro.

[1] Vk yul gcig ñid thob

22a.8 *Cd.* dbyibs rnams la *khyad par med par mtshuṅs paḥi phyir gser la sogs paḥi skyogs rnams daṅ rgyan rnams kyi
C.22b $k.1c_2$ *tha dad* +kyaṅ *med* (22b.1) par *ḥgyur ro*[1]
dbyibs mtshuṅs par yod paḥi phyir gser daṅ sgra daṅ sñiṅ stobs daṅ[2]
22b.1 rdsas la sogs pa *rnams kyaṅ mtshuṅs par ḥgyur ro. de bṣin du raṅ raṅ gi yul la ḥjug pa yaṅ mi ḥgyur.

[1] Vk dbyer med ḥgyur [2] DC *om.* sniṅ stobs

D. ci dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pas rigs raṅ tsam ḥdsin par byed dam, bde
22b.2 ba la sogs paḥi[1] khyad par du (2) byas paḥi rigs ḥdsin *par byed.

[1] PN pas

Daa. gal te rigs raṅ tsam ḥdsin na ni, don gyi

$k.1d$ *raṅ bṣin ḥdsin par mi ḥgyur te*[1]

des ni dbyibs tsam ḥdsin pa yin pas na sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi bde
22b.3 ba la sogs paḥi raṅ bṣin ma ṅes par thal bar ḥgyur *ro.

[1] Vk de las raṅ bṣin ḥdsin ma yin

103a.8 bśad paḥi *ñes par thal bar mi[3] +ḥgyur ro ṣe na, de lta na[4] yaṅ mig
N.106a daṅ reg pa dag yul mtshuṅs pa thob ste, gaṅ gi phyir dbyibs ni

$k.1b_1$ gñis gzuṅ

103b.1 riṅ po la sogs paḥi dbyibs la mig daṅ, reg paḥi śes pa *dag mthoṅ baḥi phyir de dag raṅ raṅ gi yul la ḥjug par ni ḥgal lo.

[1] PN kyis [2] PN la [3] PN *om.* mi [4] P *om.* na, N *not clear*

Cb. sgra la sogs pa rnams kyaṅ rna ba la sogs pa rnams kyis gzuṅ bar bya ba ma yin par ḥgyur te, gaṅ gi phyir dbyibs ni

103b.2 *$k.1b_2$ gsum gyi *spyod yul min*

dbyibs ni rna ba daṅ sna daṅ lce rnams kyis gzuṅ bar bya bar ma mthoṅ baḥi phyir sgra daṅ dri daṅ ro rnams mṅon sum ma yin par ḥgyur ro.

103b.3 *Cc.* dbyibs kyis byas paḥi rigs kyi khyad par ḥdod pa ni, *dbyibs maṅ po rnams

$k.1c_1$ yul gcig tu[1] thob

ste, gaṅ gi phyir dbaṅ po gcig gi yul gyi rigs las ma ḥdas pa kho nar deḥi khyad par gyi rigs du ma yin paḥi phyir dbyibs du ma yul mtshuṅs pa thob bo.

[1] Kk ñid

103b.4 *Cd.* *gser la sogs paḥi skyogs rnams[1] daṅ rgyan rnams[2] la sogs pa[3] dbyibs mtshuṅs pa rnams la yaṅ

$k.1c_2$ tha mi dad[4]

gser la sogs pa daṅ sgra la sogs pa yaṅ rigs rnams gcig ñid thob ste,
103b.5 dbyibs mtshuṅs *paḥi phyir ro. de lta na yaṅ raṅ gi[5] yul ḥjug pa med do.

[1] PN *om.* rnams [2] PN *om.* rnams [3] PN paḥi [4] Kk tha dad med
[5] PN *om.* raṅ gi

D. dbaṅ po ḥjug pa yaṅ rigs[1] tsam ḥdsin[2] par byed par ḥgyur ram, rigs kyi khyad par can gyi bde ba la sogs pa ḥdsin par byed par ḥgyur.

[1] PN rig [2] PN ḥjug par ḥdsin

103b.6 *Daa.* *gal te re ṣig rigs tsam ḥdsin par byed pa yin na, don

k.1d de yi[1] raṅ bṣin ḥdsin ma yin

sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi dbyibs tsam ḥdsin par byed pa ñid yin na
103b.7 ni, bde ba la sogs pa rnams kyi raṅ bṣin *ṅes par ma gzuṅ bar thal bar

Dab. dbyibs tsam ḥdsin pa ñid yin (3) no.

k.2a$_1$ *don gyi bye brag ḥdsin* par *mi ḥgyur*

te, gaṅ gi phyir[1] dbyibs tsam gyi snaṅ ba cuṅ zad la dmigs kyi don
yul gyi raṅ gi ṅo bo la mi dmigs pas so. sgra la sogs paḥi bye brag
22b.4 *kyaṅ mi ḥdsin par ḥgyur ro. de bṣin du pi waṅ gi sgra daṅ rṅaḥi
sgra ṣes bya ba la sogs paḥi bye brag (4) kyaṅ mi ḥdsin par ḥgyur te,
der[2] dbyibs gṣan mi srid paḥi phyir ro.

[1] DC *om.* phyir [2] DC de

Dac. *k.2a*$_2$*–b* *don ḥdsin no ṣe na yaṅ*
22b.5 *yid bṣin rnam par *rtog pa yin*[1]

raṅ gi don khyad par can du byed na yaṅ khyad par de ḥdsin pa na
yid kyi ḥjug pa bṣin du raṅ gi yul la rtog pa daṅ bcas par ḥgyur ro.

[1] Vk ḥdsin naḥaṅ yid bṣin rnam rtog ḥgyur

Dba. ci ste (5) bde ba la sogs pas khyad par du byas paḥi dbyibs
22b.6 *ḥdsin na[1] ni, de lta na yaṅ,

k.2c$_1$ *gnas skabs deḥi*[2]

yid kyi ḥjug pa bṣin du rnam par rtog pa ñid do ṣes bya baḥi don
to.[3]

[1] DC *om.* na [2] Vk gnas skabs der ḥgyur [3] P no

Dbb. bde ba la sogs pa yaṅ so sor ḥdsin par byed dam, sdom pa
yaṅ ḥdsin par ḥgyur graṅ.

22b.7 *Dbb–a1.* de la re ṣig *so (6) sor ni mi ḥdsin te, +raṅ gi yul la ḥdsin
N.23b pa la sogs paḥi dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa ni sgra la sogs paḥi gzuṅ bar bya
ba la yin gyi,

k.2c$_2$ *sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa la ni ma yin no*[1]

22b.8 sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa daṅ sgra *la sogs paḥi raṅ bṣin so so ni ma yin
no. deḥi phyir de dag rnams rna ba la (7) sogs paḥi ḥjug paḥi gzuṅ
bar bya ba ma yin no.

[1] Vk sñiṅ stobs sogs, ma yin

Dbb–a2. *k.2d* [............][1]

k.3a$_1$ *gṣan min ṣe na*

23a.1 sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las gṣan ñid ni *ma yin te, de
yaṅ gzuṅ bar bya ba yin no[2] ṣe na,

k.3a$_2$ *ḥbras min paḥam*

gal te sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa sgra las gṣan ma yin na ni tha mi (23a.1)
C.23a dad kyi +lus kyi sgra la sogs pa ḥbras bu ma yin la, sñiṅ stobs

ḥgyur te, gaṅ gi phyir śin tu gsal bar ma yin par dbyibs tsam dmigs na yul gyi raṅ bṣin ma dmigs pa mthoṅ ṅo.

[1] KkPN las

103b.8 *Dab.* dbyibs tsam ḥdsin par byed pa ñid yin *na,

k.2a$_1$ don tha dad[1] *mi ḥdsin*

N.106b sgra la sogs paḥi khyad +par ḥdsin pa med par ḥgyur ro. de ltar[2] pi waṅ gi sgra daṅ rṅaḥi sgra ṣes bya ba[3] la sogs pa de lta buḥi khyad

104a.1 par mi ḥdsin par ḥgyur te, *de la dbyibs gṣan med paḥi phyir ro.

[1] KkPN tha dad don [2] PN de ltar na [3] PN de lta bu *after* ṣes bya ba

Dac. k.2a$_2$–2b don la

yid bṣin rnam par rtog pa can

raṅ gi don rigs kyi[1] khyad par can[2] deḥi khyad par ḥdsin paḥi phyir,

104a.2 raṅ gi yul la yid kyi ḥjug pa bṣin du rnam *par rtog pa can du ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN *om.* kyi [2] PN can nam

Dba. ci ste dbyibs kyi khyad par can gyi bde ba la sogs pa ḥdsin par byed pa de lta na yaṅ,

k.2c$_1$ gnas skabs der ḥgyur

104a.3 yid kyi ḥjug pa bṣin rnam par rtog pa can ñid do śes bya baḥi *don to.

Dbb. bde ba la sogs pa ḥdsin pa na so so ba ḥam bsdus pa ḥdsin par byed.

Dbb–a1. de la re ṣig so so ba ḥdsin pa ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir raṅ gi yul la mṅon du phyogs pa las dbaṅ po ḥjug paḥi phyir sgra la sogs

104a.4 *pa gzuṅ bar bya ba yin gyi,

k.2c$_2$ sñiṅ stobs sogs min[1]

sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa so so ba ni sgra la sogs paḥi raṅ bṣin ma yin pa deḥi phyir de dag ni rna ba la sogs paḥi ḥjug paḥi gzuṅ bya ma yin no.

[1] Kk sñiṅ stobs sogs

104a.5 *Dbb–a2. k.2d *ma yin gṣan ma yin paḥi phyir*

gaṅ gi phyir sgra la sogs pa rnams las[1] sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa gṣan ma yin pa, deḥi phyir sgra la sogs pa bṣin du de yaṅ gzuṅ bar bya ba yin te,

104a.6 *k.3a gṣan min ṣe na ḥbras min *paḥam*

gal te sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa rnams las sgra la sogs pa[2] gṣan ma yin pa des na tha dad pa med paḥi sgra la sogs pa ḥbras bu ma yin no.[3]

23a.2 *la sogs pa[3] yaṅ sgra la sogs paḥi rgyu ma yin par ḥgyur ro. "sñiṅ stobs sgraḥi raṅ bṣin du rnam par bṣag par byas nas ni" ṣes bya ba la sogs pa gaṅ brjod pa de yaṅ ḥgal bar ḥgyur (2) ro. sñiṅ stobs la
23a.3 sogs pa *phan tshun tha mi dad de sgra la sogs pa daṅ gcig pa ñid du ḥgyur na ni, tha mi dad kyi raṅ bṣin yin pas rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu dag tu ḥdod pa la gnod do ṣes bya ba la sogs pa ni ḥam ṣes brtag paḥi sgraḥi don yin no.

[1] Vk [ma yin] gṣan ma yin paḥi phyir [2] PN *om.* no [3] DC *insert* la *after* pa

Dbb–a3. gṣan yaṅ,

23a.4 *k.3b* *gṣan ñid* (3) **min na gzuṅ bya min*

gal te yaṅ bde ba la sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las[1] gṣan ma yin pa de lta na ni so sor gzuṅ bar bya bar mi ḥgyur la,[2] rdul phra rab kyaṅ
23a.5 gzuṅ bar bya bar mi *ḥgyur ṣiṅ de tsam[3] la sogs pa yaṅ ño. gaṅ don (4) gṣan ma yin paḥi dbaṅ poḥi yul de thams cad dbaṅ poḥi yul ma yin par ḥgyur ro. ḥbras bu ñid la sogs par ḥdsin pa ni spyiḥi yul can
23a.6 ñid du thal bar ḥgyur baḥi *phyir ro. de ltar na re ṣig so sor[4] mi ḥdsin to.

[1] PN *om.* las [2] PN *insert* rdul phra rab kyaṅ gzuṅ bar bya bar mi ḥgyur la *before* rdul phra rab . . . [3] D de la tsam [4] DC so sor ni

Dbb–b1. ci ste sdom[1] pa la ḥdsin na ni de lta na yaṅ dbaṅ po (5) thams cad ḥjug par ḥgyur te,

k.3c₁ *sna tshogs rnam par ro*[2]

N.24a sna tshogs +kyi rnam paḥi gzuṅ bya la tha mi dad paḥi rnam par
23a.7 ḥdsin pa *ni ḥthad pa ma yin te,[3] deḥi dbaṅ gi gzuṅ bar bya ba yoṅs su bcad paḥi phyir ro. sgra la sogs pa la tha mi dad par ḥdsin pa yaṅ mthoṅ ṅo.

[1] PN sdoms [2] Vk sna tshogs rnam ḥgyur [3] N na min te *instead of* ma yin te

Dbb–b2. (6) bde ba la sogs paḥi yul ñid kyaṅ mtshuṅs par ḥgyur
23a.8 ro[1]. dbaṅ po rnams *kyi

k.3c₂ *yul ñid mtshuṅs par ḥgyur ro*[2]

dbaṅ po rnams raṅ gi yul la ḥjug par mi ḥgyur te, bde ba la sogs pa yul gṣan la rigs kyi bye brag yod paḥi phyir ro. de lta na yaṅ dbaṅ
23b.1 po gcig ñid du thal (7) bar *ḥgyur ro.

[1] DCP *om.* ro [2] Vk don mtshuṅs ḥgyur, PN *insert* du *after* ñid

yaṅ na sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa sgra la sogs paḥi rgyu ma yin par ḥgyur
104a.7 ro. *"sñiṅ stobs[4] ḥbras bu sgrar[5] snaṅ nas sgraḥi bdag ñid du rnam
par gnas pa na" ṣes bya ba la sogs pa gaṅ smras pa de daṅ ḥgal bar
ḥgyur ro. rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu dag tha mi dad raṅ bṣin yin paḥi phyir
104a.8 sñiṅ stobs la *sogs pa rnams ni phan tshun tha mi dad pa ñid dam,
sgra du ma ñid dam ṣes rnam par brtags paḥi don la ḥam gyi sgra yin
no.

[1] PN la [2] PN la sogs pahi ḥbras bu [3] PN med do *instead of* med paḥi . . . ma yin no [4] PN thams cad (*sarva*) *instead of* sñiṅ stobs (*sattva*) [5] PN sgra

Dbb–a3. gṣan yaṅ,

N.107a *k.3b* *+gṣan min na yaṅ gzuṅ bya min*

104b.1 gal te yaṅ bde[1] ba la *sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las gṣan ma yin pa, de
lta na yaṅ deḥi rdul phra rab rnams kyaṅ gzuṅ bar bya bar ma gyur
cig sñam nas so so ba[2] gzuṅ bya ma yin no. de srid de tsam la sogs
104b.2 pa yaṅ ṅo.[3] dbaṅ poḥi[4] don las[5] gṣan ma yin pa[6] de *thams cad dbaṅ
poḥi don ma yin te, ḥbras bu ñid la sogs pa ḥdsin pa spyiḥi yul can
ñid du thal baḥi phyir te, de ltar re ṣig so so bar gzuṅ ba ma yin no.

[1] P bde bde, N *not clear* [2] P so ba, N *not clear* [3] PN la sogs paḥi . . . [4] PN tshig gi *instead of* dbaṅ poḥi [5] PN *om.* las [6] PN *om.* pa

Dbb–b1. ji ste bsdus pa ḥdsin to ṣe na, de lta na yaṅ dbaṅ poḥi
104b.3 *ḥjug pa thams cad

k.3c$_1$ *sna tshogs rnam* par *ḥgyur*

te, gzuṅ bya tha dad pa la tha mi dad paḥi ḥdsin paḥi rnam pa ni
ḥthad pa ma yin te, deḥi dbaṅ gis gzuṅ bya yoṅs su ma bcad paḥi
104b.4 phyir ro. sgra la sogs pa rnams la *tha mi dad pa mthoṅ ba yin no.

Dbb–b2. bde ba la sogs paḥi yul ñid la dbaṅ po rnams

k.3c$_2$ *don mtshuṅs ñid*

ḥgyur te, dbaṅ po rnams[1] yul mtshuṅs par ḥgyur gyi, raṅ gi yul la
104b.5 ḥjug pa ñid du mi ḥgyur gyi, de yul gṣan *la bde ba la sogs paḥi rigs
tha mi dad paḥi phyir ro. des na dbaṅ po gcig ñid du thal ba de ñid
du ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN rnam

Dbb–b3. ma yin te raṅ raṅ gi dbyibs kyis khyad par du byas pa
ḥdsin no[1] ṣes brjod do ṣe na, de skad du ni brjod na rigs par ni mi[2]
brjod de, gaṅ gi phyir

k.3d₁ du mar ḥdsin phyir

23b.2 gzugs kyi rigs gcig la yaṅ dbyibs tha *dad kyi sgo nas du mar ḥdsin
par byed pa yin gyi, dbyibs gcig (23b.1) gi rjes su ṣugs nas ḥdsin pa
C.23b ni ma mthoṅ ṅo. der dbyibs kyi tha dad +las rigs kyi tha dad ḥdod
23b.3 na ni, de ñid dbaṅ po thug pa med par thal bar ḥgyur ba *yin no.

[1] PN to [2] PN ma

Ea. ḥdi la[1] ni,

k.3d₂–4a graṅs can gyi
bye brag la las[2] mi ḥdod do

sṅon gyi[3] ser skya paḥi lugs la ḥdas par smra ba graṅs can phuṅ bar
byed (2) paḥi ma rdum pa[4] na re, "sgraḥi mtshan ñid gsum[5] las tha
23b.4 mi dad pa ma yin te, rigs *gṣan ñid las ni ma yin pas reg bya la sogs
paḥi mtshan ñid gsum po dbaṅ po tha dad gṣan gyis gzuṅ bar ḥthad
pa ma yin no. deḥi phyir bde ba la sogs pa rnams la tha dad yod pas
23b.5 dbaṅ (3) po rnams raṅ *raṅ gi yul dbaṅ byed pa"-r brjod do. raṅ gi
yul la ḥjug paḥi dbaṅ po rnams la tha mi dad paḥi raṅ gi bye brag
yod pa yin pas,

k.4b dbaṅ po rnams thug pa med par thal bar ḥgyur ro

ṣes zer ro.

[1] DC *om.* la [2] Vk kha cig *instead of* la las, C *om.* la [3] PN *om.* gyi
[4] PN *om.* pa [5] DC gsum pa

23b.6 *Eb.* gal te rigs kyi tha dad *las kyaṅ bde ba la sogs paḥi yul dbaṅ
po nus pa (4) daṅ ldan par byaḥo ṣes sṅon ma rnams las khyad par
N.24b du byed pa +lta na ni, de bas kyaṅ ches lhag par du kho bos smra
bar bya ba ñid de,

k.4cd re reḥi ṅo bo[1] thams cad ni[2]
23b.7 *gtso *bor[3] rdul phran so sor yod*

bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal daṅ gti mug daṅ sgra daṅ reg bya daṅ bya ba
dag gis tha dad kyi rigs las (5) tha dad paḥi gtso bo rdul phra rab
thams cad du soṅ ba yod do ṣes brjod par byaḥo.

23b.8 *k.5ab rab tu *sbyor baḥi bye brag las*
ḥbras buḥi[4] ṅo bor mtshon par byed

de ḥdi ltar yaṅ dag par rab tu sbyor baḥi bye brag las raṅ gi rigs las
ma ḥdas par ḥbras buḥi ṅo bor[5] grub pa ni dbaṅ po rnams kyi yul
(6) du ḥgyur ro.

[1] VkDC bor [2] Vk na [3] Vk bo [4] Vk bu [5] PN bohi

Dbb–b3. ḥon te dbyibs kyis[1] khyad par du byas pa[2] ḥdsin par byed
104b.6 do ṣes brjod pa ma yin nam ṣe na, ḥdi smra ba yin na ma *rigs par
smras pa yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

k.3d_1 rjes ḥjug mi ḥdsin phyir

gaṅ gi phyir gzugs kyi rigs gcig la dbyibs du maḥi dbye bas[3] ḥdsin pa
na dbyibs gcig rjes su ḥjug pa ni ma mthoṅ ṅo. de la dbyibs tha
104b.7 *dad pas rigs tha dad par ḥdod na dbaṅ po mthaḥ yas par thal ba de
ñid yin no.

[1] PN kyi [2] PN khyad par can [3] PN dbyibs kyi khyad par du mas

Ea. ḥdir yaṅ

k.3d_2–4a ḥgaḥ ṣig
graṅs can tha dad par ḥdod na

104b.8 graṅs can ḥjig par byed pa[1] sṅar gyi graṅs can gyi mṅon par ḥdod *pa
las ḥdas par[2] smras pa ni,[3] "sgraḥi mtshan ñid gsum po rnams las
N.107b reg bya la sogs paḥi mtshan ñid gsum poḥi[4] rigs tha mi dad[5] ma +yin
te, tha mi dad pa rnams la dbaṅ po gṣan gyis ḥdsin pa ni ḥthad pa ma
105a.1 yin no. deḥi phyir bde ba la *sogs pa dbaṅ poḥi yul rnams la rigs tha
dad pa yod pa yin te, gaṅ gi dbaṅ du byas nas raṅ gi yul la ḥjug pa ñid
ni dbaṅ po rnams so" ṣes brjod pa yin no. de yaṅ[6] raṅ gi khyad par
rnams la tha dad pa med paḥi phyir,

k.4b dbaṅ po mthaḥ yas par thal bar

105a.2 yod pa *yin[7] no.

[1] PN byed paḥi mdo ni [2] PN mṅon par ḥdod pas [3] PN *om.* ni
[4] PN la sogs pa gsum poḥi rigs can [5] PN tha mi dad paḥi mtshan ñid can
[6] PN des *instead of* de yaṅ [7] PN ma yin

Eb. gal te yaṅ bde ba la sogs pa dbaṅ poḥi rigs yul rnams rigs tha
dad pa yaṅ bsgrub par bya baḥi phyir sṅar gyi grub mthaḥ las ḥdaḥ
105a.3 par byed pa des na, śin tu gsal baḥi rigs pas kho bos *bśad par
byaḥo.

k.4cd kun la[1] rdul phran tha dad pa
re reḥi ṅo bo gtso bo yin

bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal daṅ gti mug daṅ, sgra daṅ reg bya la sogs pa
105a.4 rigs kyi khyad par gyis tha dad pa thams cad du soṅ baḥi rdul *phra
rab rnams gtso bo ṣes brjod par bya ste,

k.5ab yaṅ dag sbyor baḥi khyad par las
ḥbras buḥi ṅo bo mtshon par byed

de lta na ni sbyor baḥi khyad par las raṅ gi rigs las ma ḥdas par

24a.1 *Ec. k.5cd *rdul phran gsum poḥi raṅ bṣin du*
gcig deḥi ṅo bor[1] *gaṅ gis ḥgro*[2]
gal te sgra la sgraḥo ṣes bde ba la sogs pa daṅ bral baḥi tha mi dad
kyi blo de don du maḥi raṅ bṣin tha mi dad pa yin par ni mi rigs te,
24a.2 ciḥi phyir *ṣe na,
k.6ab rigs mi mthun las gyur pa yi
rab tu (7) *sbyor bar ḥdod ma yin*[3]
gsum po sbyor[4] ba las gcig tu gyur ba ni yod pa ma yin te, graṅs
can rnams kyi rigs tha dad du ḥgyur paḥi phyir ro. sgra gcig brjod
24a.3 pa ni *yod pa[5] la rag las na[6] dṅos po gcig pa ni yod pa ma yin no.

[1] PN boḥi [2] Vk rdul phran raṅ bṣin gsum ñid na, ḥbras bu gcig par gaṅ gis rtogs [3] Vk rigs mi mthun par sybar na yaṅ, yoṅs su ḥgyur bar mi ḥdod do [4] DC sbyar [5] PN *om.* pa [6] PN rag la

Ed. ci ste gsum poḥi raṅ bṣin du ḥgyur paḥi sgra (24a.1) daṅ bde
C.24a ba la sogs par gaṅ brjod pa śes par ḥdod paḥi raṅ bṣin +de[1] dbaṅ
poḥi yul du ḥbyuṅ bar ḥgyur ro ṣe na,
24a.4 *k.6cd *tshul gñis śes par mi ḥdod na*
ḥbras bu gcig gi ṅo bor ḥgyur[2]
gal te rna bas sgra ñan pa la sogs paḥi blo ni bde ba la sogs pa la
mi (2) ltos par gṣan las khyad par du gyur ba ḥdi la ḥjug par byed
24a.5 de[3] de *ñid kho nas gcig gi raṅ bṣin du ḥgyur ro. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,
k.7ab don gyi raṅ bṣin du ma ste[4]
dbaṅ poḥi yul ni khyad par can
N.25a sgra la sogs paḥi don gyi[5] raṅ bṣin du ma yod pa las raṅ +bṣin gaṅ
24a.6 la blo ḥjug pa (3) de *dbaṅ poḥi don te, de ñid dbaṅ poḥi yul yin
no. de yaṅ gcig kho na ste, reg bya la sogs pa rnams la yaṅ mtshuṅs
pa yin no.[6] deḥi phyir rigs pa ma yin no.

[1] DC te [2] Vk ṅo bo gñis ñid mi ḥdod na, ḥbras bu ṅo bo gcig ñid thob [3] PN byed pa yin no [4] Vk la [5] PN gyis [6] DC ma yin no *instead of* yin no

Ee. k.7cd deḥi phyir re reḥi dṅos po la
graṅs can lugs las khyad par ḥphags[1]
24a.7 *sṅon grags paḥi graṅs (4) can gyi lta ba las khyad par du ḥphags
śiṅ mchog tu gyur ba ni bden pa kho na ste, rigs kyi bye brag gcig
gi raṅ bṣin can[2] gyi rgyu las ḥbras bu skye bar brtags pa ste, de lta
24a.8 na ni rigs mi mthun gyi ḥbras bu mi rtsom *mo ṣes mdses par ḥgyur
gyi, gsum gyi raṅ bṣin gcig (5) pa ñid las ni ma yin no.

[1] Vk deḥi phyir graṅs can lugs dor te, re reḥi ṅo bo ñid mchog yin [2] DCN tsam

105a.5 ḥbras buḥi raṅ bṣin dbaṅ *po rnams kyi yul ñid du rtogs par ḥgyur ro.

[1] KkPN las

Ec. *k.5cd* *rdul rnams*[1] *ṅo bo gsum ñid na*
ḥbras tha dad med ga la[2] *rtogs*

gaṅ sgra la[3] sgraḥo[4] ṣes bde ba la sogs pa las ldog paḥi tha mi dad
105a.6 paḥi blo skye ba gaṅ yin pa de tha dad pa du *maḥi raṅ bṣin la ni mi rigs te, ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

k.6ab *sbyor yaṅ rigs mi mthun pa dag*
yoṅs su ḥgyur bar mi ḥdod do

gsum yaṅ dag par sbyor bas gcig tu ḥgyur ba ni ma yin te, graṅs can
105a.7 *rnams kyi rigs tha dad paḥi phyir gcig gi sgraḥi brjod byar ḥgyur gyi raṅ bṣin gcig ni ma yin no.

[1] Kk phran [2] Kk gaṅ las [3] PN las [4] PN *om.* sgraḥo

Ed. ci ste yaṅ sgra raṅ bṣin gsum pa can la bde ba la sogs pa gaṅ
105a.8 phyal baḥam ḥdsin par ḥdod pa de dbaṅ *poḥi yul du ḥgyur te,

k.6cd *ṅo bo gñis ñid*[1] *ḥdod med na*
ḥbras la ṅo bo gcig ñid thob

N.108a gal te rna bas +sgra ḥdsin pa la bltos pa med par bde ba la sogs pa
105b.1 gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba la ḥdir blo ḥjug pa yin na de ñid raṅ *bṣin gcig[2] ṣes bya ba ḥthob bo. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

k.7ab *raṅ bṣin maṅ poḥi dṅos rnams laḥaṅ*[3]
dbaṅ poḥi don ni khyad par can

du maḥi raṅ bṣin gyi sgra la sogs pa la yaṅ raṅ bṣin[4] gaṅ kho na la
105b.2 blo ḥjug pa de ñid *dbaṅ poḥi blo yul yin la, de yaṅ gcig ñid do. reg bya la sogs pa rnams la mtshuṅs pa ṣes bya ba de mi rigs so.

[1] Kk med [2] PN cig [3] Kk la [4] PN dbaṅ poḥi don *instead of* raṅ bṣin

Ee. *k.7cd* *deḥi*[1] *phyir graṅs can ḥdod spaṅs nas*
re reḥi ṅo bo ñid mchog yin

105b.3 sṅon grags[2] paḥi *graṅs can gyi lta ba spaṅs pa na, ḥbras bu la rigs kyi khyad par re reḥi raṅ bṣin[3] rgyu kho na las skyes bar brtag pa mchog yin te,[4] de ltar na rigs mi mthun pa ḥbras bu mi rtsol ba
105b.4 ḥthad pa daṅ bcas *par ḥgyur ro. gsum po rnams gcig gi ṅo bo ñid la ni ma yin no.

[1] Kk de [2] PN graṅs [3] PN raṅ bṣin mchog yin te [4] PN rgyu kho na brtag par bya ba ma yin no

F. gal te yaṅ da ltar baḥi sgra tsam ḥdsin par byed paḥi dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa mṅon sum du ḥdod pa de lta na ni,

*k.8*a_1 *yul gcig ma yin*

24b.1 gṣal bar bya *ba thams cad kyaṅ yul ma yin pas[1] tshad ma yin pa bsal bar ḥgyur ro.

*k.8*a_2*–b* *ḥjug pa de*[2]
tshad mar brjod pa ma yin (6) *no*

dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa yaṅ dag par myoṅ bar byed paḥi yid kyi dbaṅ po
24b.2 la ni rtags la sogs pa med pas tshad *mar ma brjod paḥi phyir ñams pa ñid du ḥgyur ro. der ḥjug paḥi yaṅ dag par myoṅ ba tshad ma gṣan gyi khoṅs su ḥdu bar ni mi ḥgyur ro.

[1] DC pa [2] Vk ste

G. ñes pa de[1] ni med de, der (7) ṣugs paḥi ñams su myoṅ ba ni dran
24b.3 pa ste, ḥdod pa la *sogs pa bṣin no; gaṅ ji skad du "dran pa ni mṅon sum gyi[2] ḥjug paḥi bye brag go" ṣes brjod do; deḥi phyir dbaṅ poḥi śes pa ni phyi rol[3] gyi don la mṅon sum ste, dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa daṅ
24b.4 bar du ma chod pa yin no; draṅ *paḥo (24b.1) ṣe na,
C.24b *k.8c* *dran min ñams* [+]*su ma*[4] *myoṅ phyir*[5]
bar ma chod[6] paḥi yid ni dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa ḥdsin par byed paḥi dran
N.25b par rigs pa ma yin te,[7] [+]sṅar ñams su ma myoṅ baḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN *om.* de [2] PN gyis [3] P phyir *instead of* phyi rol [4] PN mi [5] Vk dran pa ma yin ma myoṅ phyir [6] PN chad [7] D no

H. *k.8d* *cig car gñis ka ḥbyuṅ bar ḥgyur*[1]
24b.5 *cig car ba yin na yaṅ dbaṅ po[2] śes pa daṅ, de ñams su myoṅ (2) bar byed paḥi yid gñis ka bsal bar khas blaṅs par ḥgyur ro. de lta na ni yul gyi rgyu mtshan yul can la yod par ḥgyur ro.

*k.9*a_1 *de ni tshad maḥi*[3]

24b.6 dbaṅ *po ñams su myoṅ baḥi yid de ni tshad mar ma brjod de des[4] ni deḥi gnas skabs la ṣugs pa po yaṅ tshad mar ma brjod paḥi phyir ñams[5] (3) par ḥgyur ro. raṅ rig tu ḥdod pa la sogs pa la[6] ñes pa med
24b.7 de,[7] dran pa ṣes bya ba *ni loṅ baḥi gom pa ñid do.[8] de yod paḥi[9] lta na ni "dran pa ḥdi mṅon sum ḥdsin paḥi bye brag go" ṣes bya bar ḥgyur ro.

[1] Vk gñis ka cig car ḥbyuṅ ṣe na [2] DC pas [3] Vk min [4] PN des de *instead of* de des [5] DC myaṅs [6] DC *insert* ni *after* la [7] DC do [8] CP de [9] DC pa

I. de lta na yaṅ bar ma chod paḥi dbaṅ poḥi yul ḥdsin na ni dran
24b.8 par mi ḥgyur te, (4) yid kyis ñams su ma[1] *myoṅ baḥi phyir ro. sṅar

F. gal te yaṅ sgra la sogs pa ḥdsin pa tsam la dbaṅ poḥi[1] ḥjug pa mṅon sum yin pa, de lta na gṣal bya thams cad kyi yul can gyi tshad ma
105b.5 ma *bstan par ḥgyur te, gaṅ las ṣe na,

k.8ab ma lus yul la ḥjug pa yi[2]
tshad ma mṅon par ma brjod phyir

dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa yid kyis rig pa rtags[3] la sogs pa med kyaṅ,[4] yid
105b.6 kyi dbaṅ po de ni tshad mar ma brjod paḥi *phyir ñuṅ ba ñid do. deḥi ḥjug paḥi rig[5] pa ni tshad ma gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bar ḥdu ba ma yin no.

[1] PN dbaṅ poḥi ṅes pa [2] PN paḥi [3] PN brtags [4] PN pa [5] PN rigs

G. ñes pa de ni med de, deḥi ḥjug pa rig[1] pa ni ḥdod pa la sogs pa
105.b7 bṣin du dran pa yin te, "mṅon sum gyi[2] ṣen[3] paḥi khyad *par[4] dran pa yin no[5] ṣes ji skad bśad pa lta buḥo; deḥi phyir dbaṅ poḥi śes pa[6] rnams ni phyi rol gyi don la mṅon sum[7] yin la, dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa la ni de ma thag paḥi yid kyi dran pa yin no ṣe na,
105b.8 *k.8c dran *pa ma yin ma myoṅ phyir*

dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug paḥi ṅes pa la de ma thag paḥi yid kyi dran pa mi rigs te sṅar ñams su ma myon baḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN rigs [2] PN gyis [3] PN ṅes [4] PN khyad par gyi [5] PN dran pa ni yod pa yin no [6] PN dbaṅ po [7] PN mṅon sum gyi śes pa

N.108b *H. k.8d gñi*[1] *+ga cig car ḥbyuṅ ṣe na*
106a.1 dbaṅ poḥi ṣen[2] pa daṅ de[3] ñams su myoṅ baḥi *yid cig car mṅon par gsal bar ḥgyur ro ṣe na, de lta na yaṅ yul rgyu mtshan med paḥi yul can du ḥgyur ro.

k.9a₁ de yaṅ tshad min

106a.2 dbaṅ po myoṅ baḥi yid de yaṅ tshad mar ma bśad paḥi phyir *ḥjug pa la tshad mar[4] ma bsgrubs pas ñuṅ baḥi gnas skabs de ñid do. raṅ rig pa yin paḥi phyir ḥdod pa la sogs pa rnams la dran pa ṣes bya ba ñes pa med do. "mṅon sum gyi ṣen[5] paḥi khyad par[6] dran pa yin no[7]"
106a.3 *ṣes bya ba ḥdi ni loṅ baḥi spyod pa ñid yin no.

[1] Kk gñis [2] PN ṅes [3] PN des [4] PN ma [5] PN ṅes [6] PN *om.* khyad par [7] PN dran pa la khyad par ḥdi yod do

I. de lta na ni dbaṅ poḥi don la yaṅ de ma thag paḥi dran pa mi srid de, yid kyis ñams su ma myoṅ baḥi phyir ro. yid kyis[1] phyi rol

yid kyis phyi rol gyi don ñams su myoṅ ba ni[2] med do. dran pa

k.9a₂–b *ñams paḥam*
dran pa yin naḥaṅ gṣan mthoṅ ḥgyur[3]

dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa tsam ṣig myoṅ baḥi phyir ñams su ma[4] myoṅ ba
25a.1 ḥam, dran pa *ñams paḥam[5] ṣes bya baḥi ḥam ṣes paḥi (5) sgra rnams
rnam par brtag paḥi don to. ji ltar ñams par ḥgyur te, phyi rol gyi
don la dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa daṅ lhan cig tu skyes pa yid kyis ñams su
25a.2 myoṅ ba ḥdod pa *yin no ṣe na, gaṅ ji skad du "don gcig gis dbaṅ
po gñis bskyed paḥi nus pa ni brtag par mi nus so" ṣes brjod (6) paḥi
phyir de ni ñams pa ñid do.

[1] PN *om.* ma [2] PN *om.* ni [3] Vk gṣan lta na, ñams paḥam yaṅ na dran pa yin [4] PN *om.* ma [5] DC pa

J. ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te,[1] dran paḥi yid lhag[2] tu ḥdsin
25a.3 par bstan paḥi *ched du lhan cig kho nar skye ba bkag pa yin no;[3]
lhan cig par grub pa ñid la "ci phyi rol gyi don la dbaṅ po daṅ yid
dag gis lhan cig tu ḥdsin par[4] byed dam" ṣes (7) ḥdsin lugs la brgal
25a.4 te, "gaṅ gi tshe la lar dus gcig tu dbaṅ *daṅ ldan paḥi yid ḥbyuṅ
N.26a ṅo" ṣes sṅar brjod paḥi phyir ro ṣe na, de +lta na yaṅ,

k.9c–d₁ *dran pa lhag par brjod phyir na*
rnam bsal[5]

gal te dran pa lhag par brjod par bya baḥi phyir phyi rol gyi don la
25a.5 yid daṅ lhan cig (25a.1) bkag pa yin na ni, *de lta na yaṅ gaṅ ji skad
C.25a du "ḥdi ltar dbaṅ +pos gzuṅ gi rjes la yid kyis ḥdsin par byed de, de
ltar yid kyis gzuṅ nas dbaṅ po ji lta ba bṣin du rig par byed do" ṣes
25a.6 bya ba la sogs pa brjod pa de rnam par bsal[6] ba yin no. *deḥi phyir
phyi rol gyi don (2) la dran pa ḥdi[7] yod pa ma yin no.

[1] DC no [2] DC rtag [3] PN te [4] PN *om.* par [5] Vk gsal [6] PN gsal [7] DC ni

K. gal te yid phyi rol gyi don la dṅos su ḥjug pa de lta[1] na yaṅ,

k.9d₂ *dbaṅ*[2] *gṣan don med ḥgyur*

dbaṅ po gṣan rnams phyi rol gyi don la ḥjug pa don med par ḥgyur
25a.7 te, *skyes buḥi don yid kyis sgrub paḥi phyir ro.
deḥi phyir de ltar yul gyi raṅ bṣin ṅes par (3) gzuṅ bar mi nus
paḥi phyir graṅs can gyi mṅon sum tshad ma ma yin no.

[1] PN ltar [2] C dab gaṅ (?)

gyi don sṅar ñams su myoṅ ba ni med do.
106a.4 *k.9*a_2*–b* **ñams pa ḥam*
dran pa yin naḥaṅ gṣan mthoṅ ḥgyur[2]
dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa tsam[3] ñams su myoṅ baḥi phyir dran pa ñams su
ma myoṅ ba ḥam ñams pa ṣes bya baḥi ḥam gyi sgra ni rnam par
106a.5 brtag paḥi don laḥo. ci ltar ñams ṣe na *gal te phyi rol gyi don la
dbaṅ po ḥjug pa daṅ lhan cig skyes paḥi yid ñams su myoṅ bar ḥdod
na, "don gcig byed paḥi dbaṅ po dag rtog pa la nus pa ma yin no"
ṣes gaṅ bśad pa de ñams pa yin no.

[1] PN kyi [2] KkPN gṣan lta la, ñams paḥam yaṅ na dran pa yid [3] PN *om.* tsam

106a.6 *J.* gal te *ñes pa ḥdi yod pa ma yin te,[1] dran pa lhag paḥi ṣen[2] pa
bstan paḥi don du lhan cig pa ṣes bya ba bkag pa yin no; lhan cig pa
grub pa ñid la "ci phyi rol gyi don rnams la dbaṅ po daṅ yid dag
106a.7 lhan cig ṣen[3] par byed dam" *ṣes ṣen[4] pa la ḥdri ba yin no; "da ltar[5]
baḥi dus su dbaṅ po ḥgaḥ ṣig daṅ ldan pa gaṅ gi tshe yid gyur na[6]"
ṣes tshig sṅa ma yod paḥi phyir ro ṣe na, de ltar yaṅ
k.9c *don la dran pa lhag bsgrub na*
106a.8 gal te dran pa lhag pa sgrub *paḥi don du phyi rol gyi don gyi yul la
yid kyi lhan cig pa bkag pa yin pa de lta na, [7]··· "ji ltar yaṅ dbaṅ pos
rtogs par byas pa la yid kyis rjes su ṣen par byed pa de bṣin du yid
N.109a kyis +ṣen pa dbaṅ pos yaṅ dag rig par byed do"···[7] ṣes bya *ba la
106b.1 sogs pa de daṅ
*k.9*d_1 *ḥgal ba*[8]
yin no. deḥi phyir phyi rol gyi don la dran pa ḥdi ma yin no.

[1] P *om.* te [2] PN ṅes [3] PN ṅes [4] PN ṅes [5] PN lta [6] PN yin no *instead of* gyur na [7]··· ···[7] PN ci ltar yaṅ dbaṅ poḥi śes pa la yid ṣen par byed pa ma yin la de bṣin du yid kyi ṅes pas dbaṅ poḥi don rig pa ma yin no [8] Kk te

K. gal te yaṅ yid[1] phyi rol gyi don la dṅos su ḥjug pa de lta[2] yin na,
*k.9*d_2 *dbaṅ gṣan don med ḥgyur*[3]
106b.2 phyi rol gyi don la dbaṅ *po gṣan dag don med par ḥgyur te, yid kyis
skyes buḥi[4] don ñe bar bsdus paḥi phyir ro.

de ltar yul gyi raṅ bṣin ṅes par ma gzuṅ baḥi phyir graṅs can gyi mṅon sum ni tshad ma ma yin no.

[1] PN yid kyi [2] PN lta na [3] KkPN dbaṅ gṣan mthoṅ don med [4] PN skyes bu la

SECTION 6. EXAMINATION OF THE MĪMĀṀSAKA THEORY

A. (25a.3) dpyod pa pa rnams ni "yod pa daṅ yaṅ dag par phrad
25a.8 nas *skyes paḥi skyes buḥi dbaṅ po rnams kyi blo de mṅon sum mo"
ṣes zer ro.

Ba. de la,

k.1 *yod paḥi gsal bya med pa ste*
phrad ces pa las de rig bya
yaṅ dag par phrad pa ni (4) *yod pa*
kho na daṅ yin par ṅes paḥi phyir[1]

25b.1 med pa gsal *bar bya baḥi don du yod pa smos pa ni rigs pa ma yin
no.

[1] Vk . . . . , sbyor ṣes bya las de rtogs ḥgyur, yaṅ dag sbyor ba ṅes par ni, yod ñid la ni bstan ce na

Bb. *k.2a* *lan du phrad pa bstan ṣe na*[1]
ci ste yaṅ dbaṅ po rnams kyis ni yaṅ dag par phrad nas so ṣes brjod
25b.2 par bya ba la gaṅ gis sbyar ṣiṅ yaṅ dag par phrad par byed ces *dogs
na, lan du (5) phrad par gzuṅ bar byas pa ste, deḥi don du yod pa
smos so ṣe na, de lta na ni,

k.2b *dbaṅ poḥi khyad par can*[2] *brjod kyis*
dbaṅ po khyad par can du bya baḥi don ñid[3] du so sor sbyor[4] ba brjod par rigs so.

[1] Vk ci ste zla ba bstan phyir na [2] DCPN du [3] DC *om.* ñid [4] DC sbyar

25b.3 *Bc.* ci ste yaṅ *ḥdir bdag la sogs pa daṅ yid la sogs pa daṅ yaṅ
N.26b sbyor ṣiṅ phrad pa brjod par bya ste, de spyiḥi[1] (6) ⁺sgras brjod pa
yin no ṣe na, de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no.[2]

k.2cd *yod pa tsam daṅ phrad pa ruṅ*
ma yin min te gaṅ gis[3] *brjod*[4]

25b.4 skyes bu *la sogs pa spyir yod pa tsam daṅ phrad pa ñid ni grub pa
kho na ste, deḥi phyir med pa[5] la ni mi ḥjug ste,

gaṅ yaṅ smig rgyu la sogs pa yod pa ma yin pa (7) mṅon sum ltar

SECTION 6. EXAMINATION OF THE MĪMĀṀSAKA THEORY

106b.3 *A.* spyod pa pa rnams ni[1] "*yod pa daṅ yaṅ dag par sbyor ba na
skyes buḥi dbaṅ po rnams kyi[2] blo skyes pa de ni mṅon sum mo."

[1] PN kyaṅ [2] PN dbaṅ poḥi

Ba. de la

k.1 *gal te yod pas med bsal na*
ma yin[1] sbyor las de[2] rtogs[3] ḥgyur
yaṅ dag sbyor ba ṅes par ni
106b.4 *yod ñid la ni *bstan pa yin*

ṣes bya ba smos te, med pa ḥgag paḥi don du yod pa smos pa[4] ni rigs pa ma yin no.

[1] KkPN *om.* ma yin [2] KkPN de ni [3] KkPN rtogs par [4] PN yod paḥi sbyor ba

Bb. *k.2a* *ci ste zla bo[1] bstan phyir yin*
ci ste yaṅ dbaṅ po rnams yaṅ dag par sbyor ba ṣes brjod pa na,
106b.5 *gaṅ daṅ yaṅ dag par sbyor ṣes sems pa na zla bo daṅ sbyor bar rtogs
pa yin te, deḥi don du yod pa smos so ṣe na,[2] de lta na yaṅ,
k.2b *dbaṅ poḥi[3] khyad par can brjod kyis*
106b.6 dbaṅ poḥi don khyad par can kho na zla bor brjod par *rigs so.

[1] Kk ba [2] PN smos paḥi [3] KkPN po

Bc. ci ste yaṅ bdag la sogs pa yaṅ ḥdir yid la sogs pa daṅ sbyor bar brjod par bya ste, de yaṅ spyir yod paḥi sgras brjod do ṣes bya ba de yaṅ mi rigs so.

k.2cd *yod tsam ldan pa[1] ma[2] rtog pa*
106b.7 *ma yin *gaṅ ṣig sgrub par byed*

skyes bu la sogs pa yod pa tsam daṅ[3] sbyor ba ñid las grub[4] ste, deḥi phyir[5] med pa la de mi ḥjug pa yin no.

gaṅ yaṅ mig rgyu[6] la sogs pa mṅon sum ltar snaṅ ba med pa de
106b.8 daṅ lhan *cig ḥgaḥ ṣig kyaṅ yaṅ dag par sbyor ba ma yin gyi, ḥon
kyaṅ yul gyi khyad par ḥgaḥ ṣig tu ñi maḥi gduṅ ba las byuṅ baḥi

25b.5 snaṅ ba de daṅ yaṅ ḥgaḥ ṣig tu phrad par ḥgyur te,[6] yul *khyad par can daṅ ñi maḥi gduṅ ba daṅ, ḥbyuṅ baḥi bye brag rnams ni yod pa tsam kho na ste, de mig gi blo daṅ phrad nas don med paḥi yid kyi
C.25b rnam par śes pa rgyu[7] las rim gyis +ḥkhrul baḥi śes pa ḥbyuṅ ste,
25b.6 (25b.1) deḥi phyir de[8] *dgag par yod pa smos pa rigs pa ma yin no.

[1] PN ciḥi [2] PN te [3] PN gi [4] Vk yod tsam ldan pas mi rtogs pa, ma yin gaṅ ṣig sgrub par byed [5] PN *insert* de *after* med pa [6] DC ro [7] DC rgyu ba [8] DC de dag

Bd–a. k.3ab ci ste yod sgra dam par ḥdod
dbaṅ po mdses par brjod pa yin[1]

gaṅ yaṅ ḥdi ltar brtag par bya ste, gaṅ du dbaṅ po gaṅ ṣig dam par
25b.7 grub pa de ni gṣan la mi ḥjug ste, *des na de daṅ yaṅ dag par phrad pa ḥam, yaṅ (2) na gaṅ dbaṅ po rab tu mdses pa daṅ phrad nas brjod paḥo ṣe na,

k.3cd dam par grub daṅ mdses pa de[2]
mig sman la sogs gṣan[3] *las kyaṅ*[4]

25b.8 de grub ces bya ba ni tshig kha bskaṅ paḥi *don duḥo. rdul sogs pa gṣan gyis kyaṅ dbaṅ po dam par[5] grub par byed pa ste don tsam ḥbaḥ ṣig las ni (3) ma yin no. dbaṅ poḥi rab tu mdses pa yaṅ mig
26a.1 sman[6] daṅ rkaṅ pa byug pa la sogs pa las kyaṅ yin pas *de daṅ rab tu sbyar ba yaṅ mṅon sum du ḥgyur ro.

[1] Vk ci ste dbaṅ po gaṅ ṣig la, thim daṅ śis par ḥdod ce na [2] DC ste [3] DN bṣin [4] Vk de thim pa de gṣan las kyaṅ, śis pa mig sman sogs paḥaṅ yod [5] PN pas [6] PN min, sman *instead of* mig sman

Bd–b. gal te de de ltar ni mi ḥgyur te, dper na ḥgro baḥi sgra las ba laṅ mtshon gyi gṣan la ḥgro baḥi bya ba yod kyaṅ ma (4) yin pa
26a.2 de bṣin du, don kho nas dam par grub ciṅ *mtshon par byed kyi gṣan las ni ma yin no; de bṣin du rab tu mdses pa la yaṅ brjod par byaḥo ṣe na, brgal ba ḥdi ni mi bzad pa ste,

k.4ab grags[1] *las de ltar brtag*[2] *graṅ*[3] *na*
sgra de dbaṅ poḥi yul la min

N.27a ḥgro baḥi +sgra (5) ni ba laṅ *kho na la grags[4] pas ḥgro baḥi sgra
26a.3 las[5] mtshon pa ste, de bṣin du dam pa daṅ rab tu mdses par bya baḥi phyir yod paḥi sgra[6] dbaṅ po la grags[7] pa ni ma yin no. deḥi phyir
26a.4 yod paḥi sgra las de ltar brtags pa yaṅ rigs pa ma yin *no.

[1] PN graṅs [2] DC brtags [3] DC graṅs [4] DC grag [5] DC la [6] DC sgras [7] DC gnas

C. k.4cd kun tu don daṅ phrad graṅ na
gzugs sgra (6) *bar du chod pa daṅ*

N.109b khyad par yod pa yin te, de[7] mig gyi blo daṅ[8] phrad pa +las don[9] de
107a.1 med kyaṅ śugs kyis bstan par bya *ba ma yin pa ḥkhrul baḥi yid kyi
rnam par śes pa rim gyi rgyus[10] yin paḥi phyir te, de dgag paḥi don du
yod pa smos pa ni mi rigs so.

[1] KkPN pas [2] Kk mi [3] PN yod pa tsam ni skyes bu daṅ [4] PN ma grub [5] PN gaṅ gi phyir [6] PN yaṅ kha cig ni yi dvags sgom skyed pa *instead of* gaṅ yaṅ mig rgyu [7] PN *om.* de [8] PN mig daṅ blo [9] PN *om.* don [10] P rgyu

Bd–a. k.3ab ci ste dbaṅ po gaṅ ṣig la
thim daṅ śis par ḥdod ce na

107a.2 *gaṅ yaṅ dbaṅ po gaṅ ṣig la thim pa ṣes bya ba ni gṣan du mi ḥjug
paḥi phyir te, des na de daṅ yaṅ dag par sbyor baḥo; gaṅ yaṅ dbaṅ
po gaṅ la bkra śis pa de[1] ni ruṅ ba ñid du yaṅ dag par brjod pa ste,
107a.3 de daṅ *yaṅ dag par sbyor baḥo ṣes smra ba.

k.3cd de thim pa ni gṣan yaṅ ḥdir
śis pa mig sman sogs laḥaṅ[2] yod

de ṣes bya ba ni ṅag ñe bar bkod paḥi don duḥo. rdul la sogs pa
107a.4 gṣan yaṅ dbaṅ po la thim pa *yin gyi don ñid ḥbaḥ ṣig ni ma yin no.
dbaṅ po śis[3] paḥi don du yin ṣe na, sṅar mig sman bcud pa[4] daṅ
rkaṅ paḥi sku byug pa la sogs paḥaṅ śis[5] pa yin te, des na de dag daṅ
107a.5 yaṅ dag par sbyor *ba las mṅon sum du ḥgyur ro.

[1] PN *om.* de [2] Kk paḥaṅ, PN la [3] PN śes [4] P bluṅ ba, N blud pa [5] P śes

Bd–b. de ltar ni mi ḥgyur te ḥdi ltar dper na, ḥgro bas na ba laṅ ṣes
brjod pa na ḥgro ba gṣan yaṅ ba laṅ du ḥgyur ba ni ma yin no; de
107a.6 bṣin du don kho na thim pa las yod par *ḥgyur gyi gṣan ni ma yin no;
de bṣin du śis[1] pa la[2] yaṅ brjod par byaḥo, ṣe na, mi ḥdra ba ñe bar
bkod pa yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

k.4ab grags las de ltar brtags graṅ na[3]
dbaṅ poḥi yul la sgra de[4] med

107a.7 gaṅ *gi phyir goḥi sgra ni ḥgro bas ba laṅ la grags pa yin la, de ltar
yod paḥi sgra thim paḥi phyir ram, śis paḥi ñid kyi phyir dbaṅ poḥi
107a.8 don la grags pa[5] ni ma yin no. deḥi phyir de ltar brtags *kyaṅ yod
paḥi sgra de smos pa[6] ni mi[7] rigs pa yin no.

[1] PN śes [2] PN las [3] KkPN de ltar brtags kyaṅ bstan pa ste [4] KkPN de sgra [5] PN bstan pa [6] P yod smos pa [7] N *om.* mi

C. k.4cd don kun yaṅ dag sbyor ba la
[1]*···gzugs sgra bar du chod pa daṅ*

k.5ab chen poḥaṅ ḥdsin par mthoṅ bas na
bar du ma chod pa la gnod[1]

ḥdi ltar thams cad du dbaṅ pos don thob par byed pa la ni rag na,
26a.5 gaṅ ḥdi gzugs *daṅ sgra dag las ni[2] bar du chod bṣin pa la ḥdsin ṣiṅ,
dbaṅ poḥi tshad las lhag pa la yaṅ ḥdsin (7) par byed do.[3] de ltar
gñis kar yaṅ mi ḥgyur baḥi phyir dbaṅ po ni dri la sogs pa bṣin du
bar du[4] ma chod pa na ḥdsin par ni[5] ma mthoṅ ṅo.

[1] Vk bar ma chad la de gnod byed [2] P na [3] PN de [4] PN *om.* du
[5] PN *om.* ḥdsin par ni

26a.6 *Da. k.5cd *blo yi rgyu yi tshogs pa ru*[1]
brjod pa bor nas gaṅ las[2] *de*[3]
k.6a₁ tshad ma

ḥgrel pa byed mkhan gyis ni don gṣan ḥbras bur smra ste, tshad
C.26a maḥi ⁺ḥbras bu (26a.1) bloḥi skye ba las gṣan du ma mthoṅ ba gaṅ
26a.7 la[4] gaṅ las blo skye bar grub pa *de[5] mṅon sum mo ṣes ḥdod do.
de la brjod pa de la[6] yaṅ ji lta ba bṣin du brjod paḥi bdag la sogs pa
daṅ sbyor ba daṅ ḥdu byed[7] daṅ bcas pa dag bor nas blo la rgyu gṣan
26a.8 ni med na gaṅ gis mṅon sum ñid *kyi tha (2) sñad du byas.

k.6a₂ ci ste don yin paḥam[8]

ci ste yaṅ don kho na mṅon sum gyi rgyuḥi tshogs par brjod par byed
pa de lta na,

k.6b blo yi skye ba ṣes cis[9] *bsnan*

26b.1 ḥdi skad du yod pa daṅ yaṅ dag par phrad pa skyes buḥi dbaṅ *po
rnams mṅon sum mo ṣes bśad pas chog mod, blo daṅ skye ba bsnan
pas ci (3) ṣig bya. gaṅ las byuṅ ba de ṣes pa de yaṅ rnam par brtag[10]
pa las yin no.

[1] Vk dag [2] PN la [3] Vk tshad ma gaṅ *instead of* gaṅ las de [4] DC
om. gaṅ la [5] PN ste [6] PN *insert* brjod pa la *after* de la [7] DCN ḥdu
byed pa [8] Vk ji ltar don yin paḥam [9] Vk ci [10] DC brtags

Db. gṣan yaṅ,

k.6cd don daṅ dbaṅ po[1] *yid skyes bu*
26b.2 *sbyor daṅ ḥdu byed pa *las gṣan*
N.27b *k.7ab mṅon sum ⁺gyi ni blo skyed*[2] *paḥi*
tshogs pa brjod pa de ji ltar[3]

tshogs pa de dag gis mṅon sum du skyed par byed (4) pa ñid ni ma
yin no.

gaṅ dbaṅ po daṅ don du phrad par brtag pa de ni ma yin te, mṅon
26b.3 sum *ṣes bya ba de gñis la gnas paḥi phyir ro. yaṅ dag par ḥdu ba

k.5ab chen poḥaṅ ḥdsin par mthoṅ bas na···[1]
bar chad med la de gnod byed

N.110a gal te don kun la dbaṅ po +phrad *paḥi byed pa yin na,[2] gzugs daṅ
107b.1 sgra[3] ḥdi dag la, bar du chod par ḥdsin pa daṅ, dbaṅ poḥi tshad las
lhag pa[4] ḥdsin pa[5] gaṅ yin pa de dag du mi ḥgyur ro. dbaṅ po bar
107b.2 chad med paḥi dri la sogs pa rnams *la de dag ma mthoṅ baḥi phyir
ro.

[1]··· ···[1] PN gzugs daṅ sgra dag mthoṅ ba yi, chad daṅ chen poḥi śes pa gaṅ
[2] PN no [3] PN sgra daṅ [4] PN brtag par [5] PN paḥi

Da. *k.5cd blo yi rgyu yi*[1] *tshogs pa dag*
brjod las ḥgrol baḥi tshad ma gaṅ[2]
k.6a$_1$ gaṅ las

ḥgrel pa byed pa ni ḥbras bu don gṣan du smra ba la blo skye ba las
107b.3 gṣan ḥbras bu ma mthoṅ nas gaṅ las[3] blo *ḥbyuṅ ba de mṅon sum mo
ṣes zer ba der yaṅ, gaṅ mṅon sum ñid du bstan par bya ba ji skad
bśad paḥi bdag la sogs pa daṅ sbyor ba[4] ḥdu byed daṅ bcas pa la sogs
107b.4 pa las gṣan bloḥi rgyu yod pa *ni ma yin no.

k.6a$_2$ ci ste ḥdi ñid na

ci ste yaṅ rgyuḥi tshogs pa ḥdi dag kho na[5] mṅon sum du brjod do ṣe
na,

k.6b de blo skye bas[6] *ci ṣig bya*

de lta na ni yod pa daṅ yaṅ dag par sbyor ba skyes buḥi dbaṅ po ni
107b.5 mṅon sum mo ṣes *bya bar ḥgyur mod, de gaṅ las byuṅ ṣes brtags
paḥi bloḥi skye bas ci ṣig bya.

[1] PN bloḥi rgyuḥi [2] sic. de? [3] PN la [4] PN bdag daṅ phrad pa la
sogs pa [5] PN nas [6] PN ba

Db. gṣan yaṅ,

k.6cd gaṅ[1] *tshe don daṅ dbaṅ po yid*[2]
skyes bu sbyor ba ḥdu byed ldan
k.7ab blo skye ba yi[3] *tshogs pa la*
107b.6 *mṅon sum brjod pa de ci*[4] **ltar*

tshogs pa ḥdi dag thams cad dbaṅ po so so la ḥjug pa ni ma yin no.
gaṅ yaṅ dbaṅ po daṅ don phrad pa mṅon sum mo ṣes brtags pa[5]
107b.7 sbyor ba de yaṅ gñis la gnas paḥi phyir dbaṅ po kho na la *ḥjug par

yaṅ mṅon sum ma yin pa ñid de, ḥdi so sor sgrub par byed paḥo ṣes mi brtag go.

[1] DC poḥi [2] DCPN bskyed [3] DCPN lta

Dc. gal te yaṅ brjod pa, ba laṅ ñid (5) ḥdiḥi[1] rta ñid ḥdiḥi[2] ṣes gaṅ
26b.4 *las ṅes par ḥbyuṅ ba de mṅon sum mo ṣe na, de yaṅ rigs[3] pa ma yin te, gaṅ gi phyir

k.7cd *glaṅ ñid yod sbyor las don ni*
ba laṅ[4] ñid sogs su ḥjal byed
k.8ab *dbaṅ poḥi blo la don rnams daṅ*
26b.5 *sbyor baḥi nus pa yod ma *yin[5]*

ba laṅ ñid tsam la lta ba ste, (6) khyod kyi lugs kyi dbaṅ poḥi blo la de tsam la[6] brten nas lta baḥi nus pa med par ḥgyur te, de dag sbyor bar ni mi byed la, ma sbyor[7] bar ba laṅ la sogs pa ṅes par yaṅ
26b.6 mi rigs so. *deḥi phyir khyad par du bya ba daṅ khyad par du byed pa daṅ brjod par bya ba daṅ rjod par byed paḥi rnam par (7) rtog pa ḥdi dag thams cad yid kyis ñe bar ḥdogs par byed kyi,[8] dbaṅ poḥi blos[9] ni ma yin no. ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

26b.7 *raṅ raṅ rig *par bya baḥi don*
bstan bya min tshul dbaṅ poḥi yul[10]

chos du ma yod du zin kyaṅ dbaṅ poḥi yul ni gaṅ thun moṅ ma yin paḥi bdag ñid dbaṅ po la snaṅ ba (26b.1) ste ḥthob par bya baḥi yul
26b.8 yin la, raṅ gi +snaṅ *baḥi śes pa skyes pa deḥi bdag ñid[11] so sor rig
C.26b par byed de śes paḥi raṅ gi cha[12] śas bṣin no. de lta bu bdag ñid kyis brjod par bya ba la sogs pa ni bstan par mi nus te, brjod par bya ba
27a.1 la sogs pa ni spyiḥi yul *yin paḥi (2) phyir ro.

[1] DC ḥdi [2] DC ḥdiḥo [3] PN rig [4] DC glaṅ [5] Vk ba laṅ ñid sogs sbyor las don, ba laṅ la sogs su ḥjal byed, don daṅ yaṅ dag ḥbrel pa la, dbaṅ poḥi blo ni nus yod min [6] DC las [7] PN sbyar [8] DC hyis [9] DC blo [10] Vk rig byar raṅ ñid bstan med pas, gzugs don dbaṅ poḥi spyod yul lo [11] DC *om.* ñid [12] P ma

Dd. ci ste yaṅ spyiḥi rnam paḥi tshul nas kyaṅ don de ñid yin te, dbaṅ poḥi yul yin paḥi phyir daṅ, rnam pa thams cad kyi ṅes pa yin
N.28a paḥi phyir ro ṣe na, +de lta na yaṅ,

27a.2 *k.8cd* *don min śes *paḥaṅ rnams kun du*
mṅon sum blo ru[1] gnas par ḥgyur

mṅon sum gyi (3) sgra ni gsum la ḥjug ste, tshad ma daṅ, śes pa daṅ yul rnams laḥo. de yaṅ tshad ma la ni dṅos su yin la cig śos gñis po
27a.3 la ni *brtags nas so. de la yul la[2] ni mṅon sum gyis gṣal[3] bar bya ba[4] yin paḥi phyir mṅon sum ṣes gdags so. śes pa dbaṅ (4) po la brten

mi byaḥo ṣes brtag par mi byaḥo.

[1] P gaṅ gi [2] PN yi [3] PN baḥi [4] Kk ji [5] PN don rtog par byed paḥi *instead of* brtags pa

Dc. ḥdi ni ba laṅ kho na yin ḥdi ni rta kho na yin no ṣes gaṅ las ṅes pa ḥdir ḥgyur ba de mṅon sum mo ṣes gaṅ brjod pa de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te,

107b.8 *k.7cd ba laṅ ñid sogs ldan *las don*
ba laṅ la sogs ḥjal bar byed
k.8ab don daṅ yaṅ dag ḥbrel ba la
dbaṅ poḥi blo ni nus yod min

khyod kyi ḥdod pas dbaṅ poḥi blo ba laṅ ñid[1] tsam la lta ba daṅ
108a.1 deḥi rten la lta baḥi nus pa yod par ḥgyur gyi *+de dag sbyor ba la
N.110b ni ma yin no. ḥbrel ba[2] med par ba laṅ la sogs paḥi ṅes pa mi rigs so.
deḥi phyir khyad par daṅ khyad par can dag daṅ, rjod par byed pa
108a.2 daṅ brjod par bya ba thams cad *la yid las byuṅ ba tha mi dad par
ñe bar ḥdogs pa rnam par rtog pa yin gyi dbaṅ poḥi blo ni ma yin no.
ciḥi phyir ṣe na,

raṅ rig bya[3] ñid bstan med pa
gzugs ni[4] dbaṅ poḥi spyod yul lo

108a.3 dbaṅ poḥi don ni *chos du ma can yin yaṅ,[5] de thun moṅ ma yin paḥi
bdag ñid gaṅ gis dbaṅ po la snaṅ bar ḥgyur ba der snaṅ baḥi śes paḥi
skye baḥi rgyu yin pa de ni, śes paḥi raṅ gi bdag ñid bṣin du so soḥi
108a.4 bdag ñid rig pa yin *no. de deḥi bdag ñid kyis[6] bstan par nus pa ma
yin te, brjod par bya ba spyiḥi yul can yin paḥi phyir ro.

[1] PN *om.* ñid [2] PN ḥbrel ba gṣan [3] KkP rig bya raṅ, N rigs bya raṅ [4] KkPN don [5] PN no [6] PN kyi

Dd. ci ste yaṅ spyiḥi rnam pas kyaṅ don de dbaṅ poḥi mṅon sum
108a.5 gyi yul du ḥgyur na thams cad yul yin par *ḥgyur ro.
k.8cd don gyi rnam kun rnam śes ni[1]
gnas pa mṅon sum blor gyur med[2]

mṅon sum gyi sgra ni tshad ma daṅ śes pa daṅ yul gsum la ḥjug go.
de la tshad ma la nı gtso bo yin la, gṣan dag la ni ñe bar btags pa
108a.6 *yin te: de la yul la[3] ni mṅon sum gyi gṣal bya yin paḥi phyir mṅon
sum du btags pa[4] yin no; śes pa la ni dbaṅ po la so sor[5] ḥjug pas

pa tshad ma daṅ mtshuṅs pa yin paḥi phyir mṅon sum du gdags par
27a.4 rigs *pa yin no. gal te gzugs la sogs paḥi spyiḥi rnam pa la dmigs
paḥi blo ni dbaṅ po la mi ltos par tha mi dad du ñe bar brtag ciṅ
ḥjug par byed de, de[5] dbaṅ poḥi gṣan dbaṅ du gyur pa ma (5) yin no,
ṣe na,

27a.5 rnam pa *thams cad du don gyi śes pa gzugs la sogs paḥi yon tan
ñid la sogs paḥi don yod paḥi śes pa[6] dbaṅ po gṣan gyi spyod yul la
yaṅ rgyu bar byed na ni, dbaṅ po du ma don med par ḥgyur ro ṣes
27a.6 sṅar brjod *zin to. deḥi phyir thun moṅ ma yin paḥi yul gyi (6) raṅ
gi ṅo bo ñid dbaṅ poḥi spyod yul yin no. de ltar na re śig gaṅ las blo
skyes pa de mṅon sum yin par ni mi rigs so.

[1] Vk ruṅ [2] PN yun *instead of* yul la [3] PN gcal [4] PN bar [5] DC *om.* de [6] DC pas

De. k.9a ci ste blo yi skye ba ḥdod
27a.7 bloḥi skye ba ñid *kyi phyi rol gyi don la mṅon sum mo ṣes thos te,
deḥi tshe dogs pa bsu nas lan brjod pa, don gṣan ḥbras bur (7) smra
ba yis,

k.9b don gṣan thob par ḥgyur ma yin

ji ltar byas na ṣe na,

27a.8 *k.9cd don gyi blo śar ḥbras *yin[1] na*
de las gṣan ḥbras med pas so

lhag par rtogs śiṅ khoṅ du chud pas ni ḥbras bu yin la tshad ma ni
blo las gṣan ma yin pas blo tshad ma ñid la[2] ḥbras bu yod pa ma
(27a.1) yin no.

[1] Vk min [2] DC las

27b.1 *Df. k.10a–c blo yi skye ba *gṣan yin na*[1]
ḥphro ḥdu raṅ gi rgyu las te
tshad ma ḥphrod ba ḥdu ba las

C.27a +bye brag pa +rnams kyi ni[2] raṅ gi rgyu las skyes paḥi ḥbras buḥi
N.28b chos ḥphrod pa ḥdu ba daṅ yod pa la sogs pa yin la, gal te ḥphrod
27b.2 pa ḥdu ba de *las dbaṅ poḥi blo (2) skye par ḥdod na ni, ḥphrod pa
ḥdu ba mṅon sum du ḥgyur la, de ni rtag pa yin paḥi phyir ḥgaḥ ṣig
tu yaṅ skye ba ma yin no. deḥi phyir gñis kaḥi ltar yaṅ tshad ma de
sbyar bar mi byaḥo.

27b.3 *k.10d ci ste gṣan *min de[3] don med*

gal te blo daṅ skye ba gṣan ñid ma yin na ni de ltar na blo ñid mṅon
sum ste, (3) de bas na skye ba smos pa don med par ḥgyur ro.

[1] DC no [2] DC *insert* blo *after* ni [3] DCPN ḥdi

108a.7 tshad ma daṅ mtshuṅs pa ñid kyi phyir[6] mṅon sum *du ñe bar btags
pa yin no. gal te yaṅ gzugs la sogs pa rnams spyiḥi rnam pa can la[7]
blos dmigs par byed pa yin na, de dbaṅ po la bltos pa med par tha mi
108a.8 dad par brtags nas ḥjug pas dbaṅ poḥi gṣan *gyi dbaṅ du mi ḥgyur ro.
don gyi rnam pa thams cad la rnam śes ḥdod pas na gzugs la sogs
pa rnams kyi yon tan ñid daṅ yod pa ñid śes paḥi phyir, dbaṅ po gṣan
108b.1 gyi yul la ḥpho bas dbaṅ po du ma don med do, *ṣes sṅar bśad +pa yin
N.111a no. deḥi phyir thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid kyi yul gyi raṅ bṣin dbaṅ poḥi
spyod yul yin no. de ltar re ṣig gaṅ las blo[8] skye bar ḥgyur ba de
mṅon sum yin pa mi rigs so.

[1] Kk don mi śes paḥaṅ rnam kun du, PN . . . śe na [2] Kk mṅon sum blo ru gnas par ḥgyur, PN mṅon sum blor gyur gnas pa med [3] PN *om.* la [4] N . . . phyir mṅon sum du btags par ḥgyur ba yin paḥi phyir mṅon sum du btags pa [5] PN *om.* so sor [6] PN *om.* phyir [7] PN gyi [8] PN blos

108b.2 *De. k.9a ci ste blo *skye bar ḥdod na*
gaṅ la blo skye ba ñid mṅon sum du thos so ṣes bya baḥi dogs pa de
bsu nas lan brjod par bya ste, don gṣan ḥbras bur smra ba yis,[1]
k.9b ḥbras bu gṣan ni rñed ma yin
108b.3 ci ltar byas *pas śe na,
k.9cd blo ñid[2] skye ba yin na ni
de las gṣan paḥi[3] ḥbras bu[4] med
tshad maḥi ḥbras bu ni rtogs pa yin la, de yaṅ blo las gṣan ma yin
paḥi phyir blo tshad ma yin na ḥbras bu med do.

[1] Kk yi [2] PN la [3] PN pa [4] PN bya

108b.4 *Df. k.10a–c gal te blo *las skye[1] gṣan na*
raṅ gi rgyu la ḥdu ba ste
tshad ma yin yaṅ gaṅ de las[2]
bye brag pa rnams ni ḥbras bu skye baḥi raṅ gi rgyu la ḥdu ba ḥam,
108b.5 yod pa la sogs pa daṅ phrod pa ḥdu bar ḥdod do. *de la gal te re ṣig
ḥphrod pa ḥdu ba de las blo skye bar[3] ḥdod na ḥphrod pa ḥdu ba
mṅon sum du ḥgyur te, de yaṅ rtag[4] paḥi phyir ḥgaḥ ṣig la skye bar
ma yin no. deḥi phyir gñi ga ltar na yaṅ de tshad mar rigs pa ma yin
no.
108b.6 *k.10d *ci ste gṣan min brjod don med*
ci ste blo las skyes pa gṣan ma yin pa de ltar blo ñid mṅon sum yin
pas ṅag las de ṣes skye ba smos pa don med pa yin no.

[1] PN rkyen [2] Kk gaṅ las de, PN gaṅ las der [3] PN skye ba blor *instead of* ḥphrod pa . . . skye bar [4] PN brtags

E. k.11ab skyes bu rnam par gyur nas blo
skyed[1] *na mi rtag pa ru ḥgyur*

27b.4 gal te *blo bskyed par bya baḥi phyir skyes bu snar gyi gnas skabs las rnam par ḥgyur te gṣal bya la ḥjug par byed do ṣes brjod na ni, de ltar na skyes bu mi rtag par ḥgyur baḥi phyir mi (4) ḥdod pa thob par ḥgyur ro.

27b.5 *k.11cd ci ste bdag *de mi ḥgyur na*
de la tshad ma ṣes mi sbyar

skyes bu la ḥgyur ba med na ni tshad ma ma yin paḥi gnas skabs daṅ ḥdi la khyad par med paḥi phyir, de las skyes paḥi blo tshad mar byed pa ni mi ḥthad[2] pa ñid do.

27b.6 de ltar na gṣan *dag gis[3] ḥdod paḥi (5) mṅon sum ni sgrub par dkaḥo.

[1] DCPN bskyed [2] PN thad [3] PN gi

tshad ma kun las btus pa las mṅon sum gyi leḥu ste daṅ poḥo.

E. k.11ab blo skye ba na[1] *skyes bu yaṅ*
108b.7 *gal te rnam ḥgyur *mi rtag ñid*[2]
gal te yaṅ blo skye ba na[3] skyes bu sṅa maḥi gnas skabs rnam par gyur nas ḥjal bar byed pa po ñid du ḥdod na ni, de lta yin na skyes bu
108b.8 mi rtag par ḥgyur na, de yaṅ ḥdod pa *ma yin no.

k.11cd ci ste bdag la rnam ḥgyur med[4]
ḥjal bar byed par mi rigs so[5]

rnam par mi ḥgyur ba ni blo skye ba na yaṅ skyes bu ḥjal bar byed
109a.1 pa po ma yin paḥi gnas skabs las khyad par med pa ni ḥjal *bar byed
N.111b pa po ñid +du mi[6] rigs so.

de ltar gṣan gyi ḥdod paḥi mṅon sum de la tshad ma ḥthad ma yin, ñes pa daṅ bcas pa brjod pa yin no.

[1] PN skye baḥi [2] Kk skyes bu rnam par ḥgyur nas blo, gal te skyed na mi rtog ḥgyur [3] PN skye baḥi [4] Kk ḥgyur med na [5] Kk de la tshad ma ḥthad ma yin [6] PN ma

lehu daṅ poḥo

प्रमाणसमुच्चयवृत्तिः

प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः

A. प्रमाणभूताय जगद्धितैषिणे प्रणम्य शास्त्रे सुगताय तायिने ।

प्रमाणसिद्ध्यै स्वमतात्समुच्चयः करिष्यते विप्रसृतादिहैकतः ॥ १ ॥

अत्र भगवतो हेतुफलसम्पत्त्या प्रमाणभूतत्वेन स्तोत्राभिधानं शास्त्रादौ གུས་པ་བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན་དུའོ། तत्र हेतुराशयप्रयोगसम्पत्। आशयो जगद्धितैषिता। प्रयोगो जगच्छासनाच्छास्तृत्वम्। फलं स्वपरार्थसम्पत्। स्वार्थसम्पत्सुगतत्वेन त्रिविधमर्थमुपादाय। प्रशस्तत्वं सुरूपवत्। अपुनरावृत्त्यर्थं सुनष्टज्वरवत्। निःशेषार्थं सुपूर्णघटवत्। དོན་གསུམ་པོ་འདི་ཡང་ཕྱི་རོལ་པའི་འདོད་ཆགས་དང་བྲལ་བ་དང་། སློབ་པ་དང་། མི་སློབ་པ་རྣམས་ལས་རང་དོན་ཕུན་སུམ་ཚོགས་པ་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། परार्थसम्पज्जगत्तारणात्तायित्वम्। एवंगुणं शास्तारं प्रणम्य ཚད་མ་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རང་གི་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་རིགས་པའི་སྒོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ལས་འདིར་གཅིག་ཏུ་བཏུས་ཏེ། ཚད་མ་ཀུན་ལས་བཏུས་པ་བརྩམ་པར་བྱའོ།། གཞན་གྱི་ཚད་མ་དགག་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། རང་གི་ཚད་མའི་ཡོན་ཏན་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ। प्रमाणाधीनो हि प्रमेयाधिगमः འདི་ལ་འདང་ལོག་པར་རྟོགས་པ་མང་བས་ནའོ།

B. དེ་ལ་

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च प्रमाणे

དེ་གཉིས་ཁོ་ན་སྟེ། यस्माद्

लक्षणद्वयं ।

प्रमेयं

न हि स्वसामान्यलक्षणाभ्यामन्यत्प्रमेयमस्ति । स्वलक्षणविषयं हि प्रत्यक्षं सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानमिति प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । यत्तर्हीदमनित्यतादिभिराका-

रैर्वर्णादि गृह्यते ऽसकृद्वा तत्कथम् । དེ་ལྟར་འཛིན་པ་ནི་ཡོད་མོད་ཀྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་

तत्र संधाने न प्रमाणान्तरं

स्वसामान्यलक्षणाभ्यां ह्यव्यपदेश्यवर्णत्वाभ्यां वर्णादि गृहीत्वानित्यतया चानित्यं वर्णादीति मनसा संधत्ते । དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མ་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

न च ॥२॥

पुनः पुनरभिज्ञाने

གང་ལན་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་སོ་སོར་ངོ་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་མོད། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་ཚད་མ་གཞན་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན

ऽनिष्ठासक्तेः

གལ་ཏེ་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཚད་མ་ཉིད་དུ་འདོད་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ནི་ཚད་མ་ཐུག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ།

स्मृतादिवत् ।

དྲན་པ་ནི་དྲན་པ་ཉིད་དོ། स्मृतीच्छाद्वेषादिवत्पूर्वाधिगतविषयत्वात् ཚད་མ་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པ་(བཞིན་ནོ)།

C. དེ་ལ

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं

ཤེས་པ་གང་ལ་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་དེ་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་མོ། अथ केयं कल्पना नाम ।

नामजात्यादियोजना ॥३॥

यदृच्छाशब्देषु नाम्ना विशिष्टोऽर्थ उच्यते डित्थ इति । जातिशब्देषु जात्या गौरिति । गुणशब्देषु गुणेन शुक्ल इति । क्रियाशब्देषु क्रियया पाचक इति । द्रव्यशब्देषु द्रव्येण दण्डी विषाणीति । འདི་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ་འབྲེལ་པས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱས་པས་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། अन्ये त्वर्थशून्यैः शब्दैरेव विशिष्टोऽर्थ उच्यत इति । यत्रैषा कल्पना नास्ति तत्प्रत्यक्षम् ।

Daa-1. अथ कस्माद् द्वयाधीनायामुत्पत्तौ प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते न प्रतिविषयम् ।

असाधारणहेतुत्वादक्षैस्तद्व्यपदिश्यते ।

ཡུལ་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། विषयो हि मनोविज्ञानान्यसंतानिकविज्ञानसाधारणः । असाधारणेन च व्यपदेशो दृष्टो यथा भेरीशब्दो यवाङ्कुर इति ।

དེ་ལྟ་བས་ན་མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་པ་དང་བྲལ་བ་འགྱུར་པ་ཡིན་ནོ །

Daa-2. ཆོས་མངོན་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་ चक्षुर्विज्ञानसमङ्गी नीलं विजानाति नो तु नीलमिति । अर्थे ऽर्थसंज्ञी न त्वर्थे धर्मसंज्ञीति ।

Dab. यत्तर्हीदं संचितालम्बनाः पञ्च विज्ञानकाया इति तत्कथं यदि तदेकतो न विकल्पयति । यच्चोक्तमायतनस्वलक्षणं प्रत्येते स्वलक्षणविषया न द्रव्यस्वलक्षणं प्रतीति ཇི་ལྟར་(གསུངས་)ཞེ་ན །

तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वात् स्वार्थे सामान्यगोचरम् ॥४॥

अनेकद्रव्योत्पद्यत्वात्तत्स्वायतने सामान्यगोचरमित्युच्यते न तु भिन्नेष्वभेदकल्पनात् ।

Dac. སྨྲས་པའང་

धर्मिणो ऽनेकरूपस्य नेन्द्रियात्सर्वथा गतिः ।

स्वसंवेद्यमनिर्देश्यं रूपमिन्द्रियगोचरः ॥५॥

དེ་ལྟར་ན་དེ་ཞིག་དབང་པོ་ལྔ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། अत्र विशेषणं परमतापेक्षम् । सर्वे त्वविकल्पका एव ।

Db. मानसं चार्थरागादिस्वसंवित्तिरकल्पिका ।

मानसमपि रूपादिविषयालम्बनमविकल्पकमनुभवाकारप्रवृत्तं रागादिषु च स्वसंवेदनमिन्द्रियानपेक्षत्वाद् मानसं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

Dc. དེ་བཞིན་དུ་

योगिनां गुरुनिर्देशाव्यतिभिन्नार्थमात्रदृक् ॥६॥

योगिनामप्यागमविकल्पाव्यवकीर्णमर्थमात्रदर्शनं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

Dd. གལ་ཏེ་འདོད་ཆགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རང་རིག་པ་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ན། རྟོག་པའི་ཤེས་པའང་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ནི་བདེན་ཏེ།

कल्पनापि स्वसंवित्ताविष्टा नार्थे विकल्पनात् ।

དེ་ཡུལ་ལ་ནི་འདོད་ཆགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་དུ་མངོན་སུམ་མ་ཡིན་ཡང་། རང་རིག་པ་ལ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ།། དེ་ལྟར་དེ་དག་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་མོ།

E. भ्रान्ति संवृतिसज्ज्ञानमनुमानानुमानिकं ॥७॥

स्मार्ताभिलाषिकं चेति प्रत्यक्षाभं सतैमिरम् ।

तत्र भ्रान्तिज्ञानं मृगतृष्णिकादिषु तोयादिकल्पनाप्रवृत्तत्वात्प्रत्यक्षाभासम् । संवृतिसज्ज्ञानं संवृतिसत्स्वर्थान्तराध्यारोपात्तद्रूपकल्पनाप्रवृत्तत्वात्प्रत्यक्षाभासम् । अनुमानतत्फलादिज्ञानं पूर्वानुभूतकल्पनयेति न प्रत्यक्षम् ।

F. འདིར་ཡང་

सव्यापारप्रतीतत्वात्प्रमाणं फलमेव सत् ॥८॥

འདི་ལ་ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བཞིན་དུ་ཚད་མ་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་དོན་གཞན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ནི་མེད་ཀྱི། འབྲས་བུར་གྱུར་པའི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་། བྱ་བ་དང་བཅས་པར་རྟོག་པ་དེ་ཉེ་བར་བླངས་ནས་ཚད་མ་ཉིད་དུ་འདོགས་པ་སྟེ། བྱ་བ་མེད་པར་ཡང་ཡིན་ནོ།། དཔེར་ན་འབྲས་བུ་རྒྱུ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པར་སྐྱེས་པ་ལ་རྒྱུའི་གཟུགས་འཛིན་ཞེས་བརྗོད་དེ། བྱ་བ་མེད་པར་ཡང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་འདིར་ཡང་ཡིན་ནོ།

G. स्वसंवित्तिः फलं वात्र

द्व्याभासं हि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते स्वाभासं विषयाभासं च । तस्योभयाभासस्य विज्ञानस्य यत्स्वसंवेदनं तत्फलम् ।

तद्रूपो ह्यर्थनिश्चयः ।

གང་གི་ཚེ་ཤེས་པ་ཡུལ་དང་བཅས་པ་དོན་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་རང་རིག་པ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པར་འདོད་པའམ་

མི་འདོད་པ་རྟོགས་པར་ཕྱེད་དོ། यदा तु बाह्य एवार्थः प्रमेयस्तदा

विषयाकारतैवास्य प्रमाणं

तदा हि ज्ञानं स्वसंवेद्यमपि स्वरूपमनपेक्ष्यार्थाभासतैवास्य प्रमाणम् । यस्मात्

सोऽर्थस्

तेन मीयते ॥९॥

यथा यथा ह्यर्थस्याकारः शुभ्रादित्वेन ज्ञाने प्रतिभाति तत्तद्रूपः स विषयः प्रतीयते । དེ་ལྟར་རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་རིག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཉེ་བར་སྣངས་པ་དེ་ལྟ་དེ་ལྟར་ प्रमाणप्रमेयत्वमुपचर्यते । निर्व्यापारा हि सर्वधर्माः । འདི་ཉིད་སྨྲས་པ

यदाभासं प्रमेयं तत्प्रमाणफलते पुनः ।

ग्राहकाकारसंवित्ती त्रयं नातः पृथक्कृतम् ॥१०॥

Ha. कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते द्विरूपं विज्ञानमिति ।

विषयज्ञानतज्ज्ञानविशेषात्तु द्विरूपता ।

विषये रूपादौ यज्ज्ञानं तदर्थस्वाभासम् । विषयज्ञाने तु यज्ज्ञानं तदर्थानुरूपज्ञानाभासं स्वाभासं च । अन्यथा यदि विषयज्ञानमर्थाकारमेव स्यात्स्वाकारमेव वा विषयज्ञानज्ञानमपि तदविशिष्टं स्यात् ।

Hb. न चोत्तरोत्तराणि ज्ञानानि पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानविषयाभासानि स्युः । तस्याविषयत्वात् । དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པར་གྲུབ་པོ།

Hc-1. स्मृतेरुत्तरकालं च

ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་འབྲེལ་ཏོ། यस्माच्चानुभवोत्तरकालं विषय इव ज्ञानेऽपि स्मृतिरुत्पद्यते तस्मादस्ति द्विरूपता ज्ञानस्य । स्वसंवेद्यता च । कस्मात्

न ह्यसावविभाविते ॥११॥

ཉམས་སུ་མ་མྱོང་བར་དོན་དྲན་པ་ནི་མཐོང་བ་མེད་དེ། གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ།

Hc-2. ཅི་སྟེ་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞིན་དུ་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་ཤེས་པ་གཞན་གྱིས་མྱོང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར

ज्ञानान्तरेणानुभवेऽनिष्ठा

ཐུག་པ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ཤེས་པ་ཤེས་གཞན་གྱིས་མྱོང་བར་བྱེད་ན་འོ། ཇི་ལྟར་ཞེ་ན

तत्रापि हि स्मृतिः ।

ཤེས་པ་གང་དག་གིས་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ལ་ཡང་ཕྱིས་དྲན་པ་མཐོང་དགོས་པས་སོ།། དེས་ན་དེ་ལ་ཡང་ཤེས་པ་གཞན་གྱིས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་ཐུག་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ།

विषयान्तरसञ्चारस्तथा न स्यात् स चेष्यते ॥१२॥

དེའི་ཕྱིར་གཉོན་མི་ཟ་བར་རང་རིག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཁས་བླང་བར་བྱའོ།། དེ་ཡང་འབྲས་བུ་ཉིད་དོ།། དེ་ལྟར་ན་མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་པ་དང་བྲལ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་གནས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

Abbreviations and Selected References

Sanskrit Index

Tibetan Index

ABBREVIATIONS AND SELECTED REFERENCES

AbhD: Abhidharmadīpa with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, ed. P. S. Jaini. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. IV, Patna, 1959.

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Mahāy. Saṁgr.: Mahāyānasaṁgraha of Asaṅga, Chinese version by Hsüan-tsang. T. 1605, vol. XXXI, pp. 132–152.

Mahāy. Sūtrālam.: Asaṅga, Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra, édité et traduit par S. Lévi. tome I—Texte, Paris, 1907.

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MBh: Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, ed. F. Kielhorn. 2nd ed., Poona, 1892.

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NBh: Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, ed. G. Jha. Poona Oriental Series 58, Poona, 1939.

NBT: Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara, ed. together with *DhP* by D. Malvania.

NC: Dvādaśāra-Nayacakra of Mallavādin, ed. together with *NCV* by Muni Jambuvijaya. Śrī Ātmanand Jain Granthamālā Serial no. 92, Bhavnagar, 1966.

NCV: Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī Nayacakravṛtti of Siṁhasūri, ed. together with *NC* by Muni Jambuvijaya.

NMañj:Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa. Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Benares, 1936.

NMukh: Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, Chinese version by Hsüan-tsang. T. 1628, vol. XXXII, pp. 1–6.

NR: Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathimiśra, published in *Mīmāṁsāślokavārttikam*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1898–1899.

NS: Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, published with *NBh* in Poona Oriental Series 58.

NV: Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara. Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1916.

NVT-Pariśuddhi: Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi of Udayana, ed. together with *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* of Vardhamāna, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1911–1924.

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PBh: Praśastapādabhāṣya (or *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*) of Praśastapāda, published together with *Sūkti*, *Setu*, and *Vyomavatī*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1930.

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PS Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga, Tibetan version.
Kk: Kanakavarman's trans., Peking ed., Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5700.
Vk: Vasudhararakṣita's trans., Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4203.

PST: Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā of Jinendrabuddhi. Tibetan version, Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4268; Peking ed., Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5766 (folio number of Peking ed. is given in parentheses).

PSV: Pramāṇasmuccayavṛtti of Dignāga, Tibetan version.
K: Kanakavarman's trans., Peking ed., Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5702.
V: Vasudhararakṣita's trans., Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4204; Peking ed., Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5701.

PV: Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, as published with *PVBh* and *PVV*.

PVBh: Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya (or *Vārttikālaṁkāra*) of Prajñākaragupta, ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. I, Patna, 1953.

PVin: Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti, Tibetan version, Peking ed., Mdo-ḥgrel XCV (Ce), 250b–329a (Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5710).

PVV: Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin, ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana. *The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, vols. XXIV/3–XXVI/3, Patna, 1938–1940.

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SK: Sāṁkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as published together with *STK* in Calcutta Sanskrit Series 15.

SKBh: Gauḍapādabhāṣya on *SK*, as published in H. D. Sharma, *The Sāṁkhyakārikā with the Commentary of Gauḍapādācārya*, Poona, 1933.

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STK: Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra, ed. Ramesh Chandra. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 15, Calcutta, 1935.

ŚV: *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, as published together with *ŚVV*, *ŚVK*, and *NR*.

ŚVK: Ślokavārttikakāśikā of Sucaritamiśra. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series XC, XCIX, Trivandrum, 1926–1929.

ŚVV: Ślokavārttikavyākhyā (*Tātparyaṭīkā*) of Bhaṭṭombeka, ed. S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstri. Madras University Sanskrit Series, no. 13, Madras, 1940.

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TriṁśBh: *Triṁśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* of Sthiramati, ed. together with *Triṁś* by S. Lévi.

TS: *Tattvasaṁgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, ed. together with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* by E. Krishnamacharya. 2 vols., G.O.S., XXX, XXXI, Baroda, 1926.

TSP: *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla, as published with *TS* in G.O.S.

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Vibhūti: Vibhūticandra's notes on *PVV*, as published in footnotes in R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana's edition of *PVV*. (The number which I write in superscript by the page number indicates the footnote number for that page.) These notes seem to have been taken from Devendrabuddhi's commentary on *PV*; see Frauwallner, "Devendrabuddhi," *WZKSO*, IV (1960), 119–123.

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Viṁś: *Viṁśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu, ed. together with *Triṁś* by S. Lévi.

VS: *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda, ed. together with Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* by Muni Jambuvijaya. G.O.S., no. 136, Baroda, 1961.

VSU: Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra, published with Jayanārāyaṇa's *Kaṇādasūtravivṛti* in *Vaiśeṣikadarśanam*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1861.
VSV: Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti of Candrānanda, ed. together with *VS* by Jambuvijaya.
WZKM: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vienna.
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